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A B S T R A C T 
 
OF CLOUDS AND STREAMS, PROPHETS AND PROFITS: THE POLITICAL 
SEMIOTICS OF CLIMATE AND WATER IN THE BRAZILIAN NORTHEAST 
 
 
Renzo Romano Taddei 
 
 
 
 
 
The reorganization of the local material order, brought about by economic 
development efforts in the so-called developing world, is, to a large extent, dependent on 
how efficient these efforts are in reorganizing the symbolic order. In this transformational 
process, the creation of new institutions and with them new institutionalized rituals, is a 
widely employed resource. This research uses sociosemiotic theories to study the 
transformations of meanings that characterize these moments of social change. I describe, 
through three case analyses, the major elements of the microphysics of the meaning 
transformations that take place during institutionalized rituals. On the theoretical side, this 
research had the purpose of showing how a body of theory, that became known as 
metapragmatics, can be fruitfully applied to domains broader than verbal communication - in 
this case the analysis of the key role of institutionalized rituals as arenas in which semiotic 
transformations enable political change to take place. 
This research focuses on how economic development efforts bring with them new 
ways of conceptualizing and making use of the environment. This is particularly relevant in 
areas in which the climate is seen as a main constraint for development, as in semi-arid 
regions. The case study addresses the forms in which different social actors in Northeast 
Brazil make use of distinct narratives on climate, science, politics and religion in their 
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participation in local political processes. The analyses focus on three institutionalized rituals 
of relatively recent creation – one involving local rain prophets, one being the annual 
meeting of meteorologists and finally a local participatory water allocation meeting -, all 
seeking to influence how sectors of the local population understand and relate to 
environmental phenomena.  
An important element of the analysis here presented lies on how historical narratives 
on climate, coupled with political and economic genres, structures and processes that 
developed through time, are strategically used as framing devices in discussions and decision-
making processes related to the environment. We conclude by arguing that being able to 
produce some degree of semiotic regimentation seems to be a requirement for efficient 
action in any political field. 
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But if you say: “How am I to know what he means, when I see nothing but the signs he gives?” 
then I say: “How is he to know what he means, when he has nothing but the signs either?” 
Ludwig Wittgenstein1 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 1953, Section 504, emphasis in the original. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By mid-December of every year, Gilton de Araújo makes specific observations of the 
ecosystem to forecast the coming rainy season in the semi-arid Brazilian Northeast. He is a 
farmer in the town of Caicó, in the Seridó region, and uses traditional forecasting methods 
by focusing on the correlations between the behavior of some animals and the occurrence of 
rains. At the end of 2003, Gilton observed that the red ants he usually finds on his lands, 
close to the riverbed, were abandoning their nests on low-lying ground, and migrating to 
higher ground. According to Gilton, this was a sign that rain was on the approach, because 
when it rains, the river stream flow increases, and washes away any nests located too close to 
the riverbed. In this same year, he also observed a curious phenomenon: some of these ants 
were migrating to the top of local palm trees. He did not give it much attention, however, 
until the rains arrived in mid-January. There had never been, in recorded history going back 
to the late nineteenth century, a January with such intense rains. In Ceará, one of the nine 
states that make up the Northeast region of the country, forty-three of the one hundred and 
eighty-three municipalities declared a state of emergency; over thirty thousand people had to 
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leave their flooded homes; and at least fifteen people died due to the heavy rains. Gilton 
retrospectively interprets the abnormal behavior of the ants, in scaling the palm trees, as a 
sign that the approaching rains would be considerably above the usual level.  
Local individuals considered knowledgeable on issues of rain forecasting, such as 
Gilton, make their observations based on the behavior of animals and insects, and the 
appearance of the sun, the sky, and the stars. Although some call them ‘rain prophets,’ it is a 
denomination that many of them refuse to accept. They are not gifted with miraculous 
powers. Instead they are systematic observers of nature’s signs. They are, in other words, 
ethnosemioticians. 
Rain prophets in Northeast Brazil are one of the many groups of stakeholders 
involved in the conflict over who has authority to diagnose climate (and other environmental 
elements such as water supply), a matter that relates directly to the well being of large sectors 
of the local rural population. The participation of different stakeholders in such conflictive 
arenas often involves strategic maneuvering in order to make their preferred conceptual 
approaches and sets of categories appear as the most authoritative one. One important 
element of all social dynamics is the way in which visibilities are constructed and 
deconstructed while social actions unfold. Most parts of our thinking and communicative 
activities employ concepts that are used as categories for making sense of things and acting 
in the world in certain ways. Visibilities and invisibilities are important in the sense that they 
inform the mental maps and schemata that actors use in their activities. At the same time, a 
great deal of social action has, as a dominant or secondary goal, and in overt or covert ways, 
the objective of imposing social categories – and with it a certain configuration of visibilities 
- as being legitimate, proper, ‘natural,’ or necessary. We can call this the fundamental 
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semiotic dimension of social action, and the research here presented uses this aspect of 
social life as its investigative focus. 
Our case study addresses the forms in which economic development efforts – and 
some institutional transformations they generate and through which they operate - have 
been changing the political life of different sectors of the population in the Jaguaribe Valley, 
located on the eastern side of the state of Ceará, in the Brazilian Northeastern region. 
Economic development in poor places like the state of Ceará brings with it radically new 
ways of conceptualizing and making use of the environment, usually reframed as “natural 
resources.” In general, this causes some degree of distress to local populations, and generates 
or increases local conflict. In this analysis, we will take two slices of local social dynamics 
that portray some of the main conflicts over how the environment, politics, and the relation 
between both, is conceptualized, represented in local and official narratives, and played out 
in the political game. 
1 – Rain: With the push for economic development comes an increase in the use of 
science as a planning and management tool by official agencies, a fact that can be seen in the 
increased use made of climatic science and rain forecasting technologies. Drought resistant 
seeds, for example, are distributed in case the local meteorological agency forecasts below 
average precipitation for an upcoming rainy season. Since these seeds need a certain amount of 
constant rain fall, and being at the same time expensive, the government usually waits until 
the meteorological agency declares that the rainy season has “really started” (meaning that 
rainfall will be constant from that point onwards). In local production practices, seeds are 
deposited in the soil right after the first rains, when humidity has reached around one foot 
deep. However, if rains are not constant enough, those seeds are often lost, fields are once 
again prepared, and producers wait for the next rains. Following this process cycle implies 
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that many seeds are lost each year until rains are frequent enough to enable agricultural 
production. For this reason, the government tries to convince the population to base their 
planting decisions on scientific climate forecasts. However, many local producers don’t 
accept the authority of science as a given, and complain that drought resistant seeds are 
systematically distributed too late. These producers usually grant more authority to local 
knowledgeable persons on “traditional” forecasting techniques, like Gilton, than to scientific 
readings of climate. This tendency is reinforced by the fact that state politicians have, in the 
past, linked climate forecasting to political action, which has led to disastrous manipulations 
of the social perception of the role of meteorology in society. In addition, local 
meteorologists have to deal with the fact that climate forecasts are “political bombs” to be 
handled with care, as drought forecasts tend to have a deep impact on local political life, due 
to the anxieties – and the political use made of them, as we will see – brought by such 
forecasts. At the same time, rural sectors of the hinterlands2, such as the Jaguaribe Valley, 
ridicule meteorologists as being fools and incompetent. For a great deal of the valley’s rural 
population, climate is a cosmological matter3, considered to be above state planning, politics 
and government. We will see this entire issue in greater detail in chapter five. 
My main intention in this work is to understand how institutions are designed and 
set up in order to address specific circumstantial needs, and end up defining a great deal of 
the interpretive environment in which meanings will be created and exchanged through 
social action. I will focus on two institutional novelties created to address the issue of climate 
information in such a politicized environment. The first is the annual rain prophets’ meeting, 
                                                 
2 I will use the term hinterland, throughout this text, in the same sense that the word sertão is used locally with 
reference to the semi-arid inland region of the state. The word sertão has many usages in Brazil, however the 
most usual is perhaps its application to the inland areas that were once considered frontier regions during 
colonial times. 
3 I am making use of Tambiah’s definition of cosmology, which is transcribed on page ninety-three. 
  
6
taking place in the municipality of Quixadá, in the hinterlands. The meeting is not organized 
by the rain prophets, but rather by local business people. I will discuss how the 
circumstances in which the meeting takes place contrast with the usual audience of these 
traditional forecasts, implicating a radically different form of creating meaning from the 
performances of prophets. 
The second event to be analyzed is the annual international meeting of 
meteorologists in Fortaleza. I will try to understand the internal dynamics of the meeting 
through the analysis of the political environment in which scientific forecasts are issued. As 
we will see, the meeting was created with the intent to circumvent the extreme vulnerability 
of meteorologists (and forecasts) to political manipulations of all sorts. The strategy used by 
the organizers of the meeting was, on the one hand, to create a network of institutions acting 
together, and, on the other, to regiment the amount of forecasts available to society – to just 
one forecast, a consensus among all institutions – so as to increase the perceived value of the 
fruits of meteorological work.  
Thus, as we will see, analyzing the social life of traditional and scientific climate 
forecasts, and the uses made of them in Ceará’s hinterland, is an interesting way to grasp 
some aspects of how conceptual frameworks are configured in local political and 
institutional dynamics. While analysis of the rain prophets can be found in chapters five and 
six, the meteorological activities are described and analyzed in chapters seven and eight. 
2 – Water: Economic development programs have led to the local demand for water 
to grow faster than the increasing water availability, which is worsening the already intense 
conflicts for water. Following guidelines adopted by international donors, such as the World 
Bank, and by institutions such as the Brazilian Association for Water Resources (ABRH), 
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participatory approaches have been adopted in an attempt to deal with the rising levels of 
conflict. In the Jaguaribe Valley, a local commission was created in 1994 to allocate water 
from the main dams of the valley. Around sixty percent of the one hundred and seven 
members of the commission are representatives of local associations of producers, of fishing 
communities, or of rural workers’ unions. Some of these groups are among the most 
disadvantaged sectors of the state’s population. Since, in this water allocation commission, all 
members have equal voting power, some very modest producers found themselves, in 
unprecedented ways, holding an equal amount of potential power in decision making 
processes for water conflict resolution matters as that held by large land owners and local 
politicians.  
These participatory water allocation meetings have become arenas in which different 
conceptual frameworks are played out against each other. At these events, technicians and 
officials from state agencies tend to rely on their technical way of thinking and 
communication. This is manifested in the way in which they describe water infrastructure, 
using the metric system and other technical conventions, and also through the principles on 
which they ground their water management approaches: they work to promote 
rationalization and efficiency in water usage, basing their reasoning on the idea that water is a 
scarce resource with economic value; which is also reflected in the government’s preferential 
water allocation for activities with more added economic value. On the other hand, many 
sectors of the local population have radically different ways of thinking about, and relating to 
water; differences which have developed throughout the region’s local history, and which 
naturally transform the water allocation meetings into battlefields focused on the 
representation of natural resources, the role of science and technicality in society, economic 
development and politics.  
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At the same time, the participatory water allocation commission of the Jaguaribe 
Valley, commissioned and organized by the state, is inserted in a wider political context of 
conflict between the state government and local politicians. One outcome of this state of 
affairs was the weakening of control, by the state government, of the water accumulation 
infrastructure of the hinterland, which has been historically linked to the clientalistic style of 
political relations that characterized the history of the state rural areas. The participatory 
water allocation meetings, which were created with the goal of preventing major social crises 
in times of water scarcity, ended up, serendipitously, becoming a tool for the construction of 
a new political institutional configuration in which the state government could establish 
direct contact with local technicians, without these having to pay the usual respect to local 
patrons. Through an analysis of the internal dynamics of the water allocation ritual, I intend 
to show how this process tries to substitute the old chain of clientalistic ties that marks 
traditional political relations of the hinterland with a new chain of political institutions – 
consisting basically of participatory water allocation commissions on different scales, from 
local reservoirs to state level -, but all under the tight control of state bureaucracy. In other 
words, institutional decentralization was put to work for the centralization of decision 
making regarding economic development in the state. The reader will find a presentation of 
the background history of the political and institutional changes that enabled the appearance 
of the water commissions in chapter nine, while in chapter ten the internal dynamics of a 
meeting of the Jaguaribe water allocation commission is presented, and is analyzed in 
chapter eleven. 
We open the text with a brief introduction to Peircean Semiotics (chapter one), and 
of studies that apply such theoretical insights to the study of power relations and political 
processes and institutions (chapter two). Then, before getting into the core of the 
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ethnographic material, we present, in chapters three and four, some background historical 
notes and a brief discussion of the role of water and rain in past and present cultural and 
political processes in Ceará. 
The main focus of this research is on the semiotic aspects of political struggles 
related to the cases mentioned and, more specifically, on how values and perceptions related 
to the environment and the political world are played out through the manipulation of 
symbols and of narratives, in discussions about climate and in water commissions. 
Employing terms used by Parmentier (1994), this research intends to investigate how the 
political world is disrupted and reformed through conflict and through a contextual play of 
symbolic forms at the second level of semiosis, which Silverstein (1993) has called the 
metapragmatic level. One special focus of attention here is the role of institutions and 
institutionalized rituals in such symbolic manipulations4. 
 
Scale and Perspective 
The following work has the mark of a hybrid genre. It was conceived with the intention of 
participating in anthropological debates; it has been inspired by the phenomenological 
aspects of Peircean semiotic theory; and has come to fruition through the research and 
fieldwork undertaken as part of a research and technology development program designed to 
study the political and economic impacts of scientific climate forecasting and water 
                                                 
4 It is important to say that this is not a systematic and comprehensive presentation and analysis of both the 
rain prophets phenomenon or the participatory water allocation experience in Ceará. Regarding the former, to 
my knowledge it is yet to be done, although some contributions towards that can be seen in Finan (1998); 
Karen Pennesi, from the University of Arizona, is currently carrying out fieldwork among the prophets, and 
local writer Abelardo Montenegro is preparing a book on the topic; the correlate theme of popular almanacs 
with descriptions of traditional forecast methods is discussed in Rios, 2003. For the latter, please refer to 
Garjulli et al. (2002), and also to Lemos and Oliveira (2004), Taddei et al. (2005), Broad et al. (2005), and 
Teixeira (2005). 
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management schemes in underdeveloped rural areas, with the goal of informing public 
policy design to decrease local populations’ vulnerability to intense climate variations, such 
as drought and flooding.  
Multidisciplinary work requires negotiation over which approaches to use in tackling 
the issues at hand, given that different disciplines have each distinct conceptual frameworks. 
For this reason, multidisciplinary work is an interesting process as it exposes and questions 
what researchers learn in graduate school to take for granted. On the one hand, the need to 
make sense of social, economic and political processes spread over a relatively large area 
such as the Jaguaribe Valley - sometimes with the use of aggregate statistic indicators -, 
brought me closer to the sociological approach. On the other hand, this dissertation was also 
inspired by the need to deconstruct what I feel is an excessively positivistic take on how local 
individuals think and act in relation to climate and water – the approach that sees individuals 
as billiard balls with no past or dreams -, views which are shared by a great deal of the so-
called “development community” and by applied technology practitioners. While working on 
this dissertation, I could have chosen to disregard the constraints that stemmed from the 
larger research project; however, I did not want this work to be completely disconnected 
from local debates on the issues here discussed. I made this decision so that my work would 
effectively contribute to these debates. 
In this work I focus on political fields where decisions over the use of climate 
information and water allocation take place. More specifically, I will analyze institutionalized 
rituals, the arenas in which the field situation is shaped or transformed. Throughout this 
work we will use the concept of field to refer to the structures of objective relations created 
through interactional dynamics that are attached to a specific area of social life (Turner, 1974, 
1975; Vincent, 1978, 1986; Bourdieu, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2002a, 2002b). Turner defines 
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political field as “the totality of relationships between actors oriented to the same prizes and 
values” (1974, p. 127). In a different passage this author complements that definition by 
saying that fields are “the abstract cultural domains where paradigms are formulated, 
established, and come into conflict. Such paradigms consist of sets of ‘rules’ from which 
many kinds of sequences of social action may be generated but which further specify what 
sequences must be excluded. Paradigm conflict arises over exclusion rules” (Ibid., p. 17). As 
Vincent reminds us, “political fields overlap and interpenetrate: some are organized and 
purposive; others contain much that is arbitrary and accidental. This important notion allows 
for the manipulation of the ambiguous so important for successful political action” (1978, p. 
183). For Bourdieu, the theoretical concept of field is intimately connected with the effort to 
understand the transactions through which power relations exist in a social realm. The 
linguistic field, for example, is composed of a set of social dynamics for linguistic 
interchange through which configurations of social positions and power relations are 
reproduced or transformed (1991, 1996). 
Fields therefore have configurations of spatiality and temporality that go beyond a 
community level, by further interconnecting agents who are positioned in different levels of 
a political structure. The concept of wider-reaching fields provides a way of approaching the 
interrelations between larger scale processes (like the effects of globalization, or the 
implications of what Wallerstein called the World System, for instance) and local scales, 
something that more and more anthropological theorists understand as a requirement of the 
discipline. It is also a good approach to the way in which most local agents and applied social 
scientists working with societal responses to climatic events understand the situation.  
The geographic area in which this research unfolds focuses on the perennialized 
section of the Jaguaribe River, that is, its central and northern areas (see maps on page x and 
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figure nine in appendix A). Starting from the Orós Reservoir (which is linked by a canal to a 
smaller reservoir called Lima Campos, in the municipality of Icó), this section of the river 
runs around two hundred and sixty kilometers towards the north, until it reaches the Itaiçaba 
Dam, where its waters are pumped to a one hundred and ten kilometer long canal linking the 
Jaguaribe River to the Fortaleza metropolitan area. In this region, Limoeiro do Norte is an 
important local political and economic center, where most water meetings for the Jaguaribe 
Valley are held. Around seventy kilometers north from Orós is the town of Jaguaribe. There 
we find the small Santa Maria5 Reservoir, where an important case of water conflict took 
place, as we will see later in this text. The main branch of the Jaguaribe River is the Banabuiú 
River, also perennialized by the Banabuiú Reservoir. In this same basin, Morada Nova, a 
municipality located fifty kilometers to the west of Limoeiro do Norte, is of special interest 
for being an important political and economic center of the region. In Buraco Fundo, a rural 
district in the municipality of Morada Nova, another case of conflict over water allocation 
from the local reservoir took place, but with a different outcome from that in the Santa 
Maria case. Around thirty kilometers north of the Banabuiú Reservoir is Quixadá, a 
municipality with the oldest public reservoir in Brazil: the Cedro Reservoir. The annual 
meeting of rain prophets for the state also takes place in this same municipality. And finally, 
Fortaleza, the state’s capital, also forms part of this panorama since the state government, 
along with its water and meteorological agencies, is located there. 
The reader will notice that this text is eclectic and synthetic in its use of theory, with its 
intention of exploring various analytical possibilities that can be applied to the ethnographic 
material. Of central importance in this investigation is the attempt to extrapolate insights 
                                                 
5 The names of individuals and communities in the case study on water conflicts have been changed to ensure 
their anonymity. 
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from the study of language ideologies, a line of investigation that also focuses on elements that 
go beyond the direct use of language in the semiotic organization of social life. As argued by 
Gal: 
 
the importance of linguistic ideologies for social research lies exactly in the fact 
that they are not only about talk. They envision and enact connections between 
aspects of language and other arenas of social life. Ultimately, any analysis of 
language ideologies will want to understand the social institutions that create and 
enact these links and the effects of the social relationships produced. […] A 
double analytical strategy is apparent in many studies of language ideology: 
ideologies that appear to be about language, when carefully reread, are revealed 
to be coded stories about political, religious, or scientific conflicts; ideologies that 
seem to be about, say, religion, political theory, human subjectivity, or science 
invite reinterpretation as implicit entailments of language ideologies or as the 
precipitates of widespread linguistic practices […] Indeed, it appears that images 
of linguistic phenomena gain credibility when they create ties with culturally 
salient aesthetic, moral, scientific, or political arguments. And, conversely, ideas 
about language often contribute to legitimation (or, in Bourdieu’s term, 
misrecognition) of political arrangements (Gal, 1998, p. 323-324). 
 
 
In the cases analyzed here, we focus on how institutional transformations are part of 
the designing, creating and manipulating processes of the interpretive contexts in which talk 
takes place.  
 
Meaning, Social Action and Agency 
My argument will be based on two theoretical positions. Firstly, in a great deal of twentieth 
century anthropological theory (as in structuralist semiotics), meaning was taken as an 
explanatory element of social dynamics by defining the directionality of the relationship 
between meaning and social action as one-dimensional. Anthropologists and other social 
scientists have too frequently used concepts of symbols as causal explanations, while the 
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semiotic operations and transformations that take place in social dynamics are usually left 
unaccounted for, or are treated as secondary against the functional, economic or political 
aspects of the events and processes being studied. However, in this work I take a different 
theoretical stance by assuming that there is mutual causal circularity, or dialect, if you will, 
between meaning and social action.  
The second grounding theoretical feature is the way in which the approach takes into 
consideration issues of agency and the subject. Recent anthropological theory has returned to 
discussions of agency, as we find, for example, in Sartre’s book Search for a Method (1968). 
Sartre approaches the issue of the subject by trying to find a common ground upon which 
both Marxist political theory and Existentialist philosophy compliment each other. He found 
that the problem was not Marx’s work, but rather the direction Marxism was taking at the 
time the book was written, a direction that tended to over-emphasize the deterministic role 
of modes of production in history and in society. Sartre dealt with this by going back to 
Engels and asserting that “Men (sic) themselves make history but in a given environment that 
conditions them” (Ibid., p. 85). Sartre’s negation of total determination is also clear in his 
idea of project: “Man defines himself by his project. This material being perpetually goes 
beyond the condition which is made for him; he reveals and determines his situation by 
transcending it in order to objectify himself – by work, action, or gesture” (Ibid., p. 150). 
Human existence is directed towards the future; and economic constraints, which are 
reflected in, and to some extent originate from symbolic aspects of life, have throughout 
history shaped a particular configuration of possibilities, and not of determinants. 
Working along similar lines, Dirks, Eley, and Ortner (1994) argue that history is one 
of the most important novelties in agency-sensitive anthropology. The historical turn in 
anthropology exposed the limitations of atemporal structuralist analysis, and helped to de-
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reify identities and cultures. History per se does not immediately imply agency, but rather 
creates the conceptual field in which agency can exist. Theory requires the subject to be 
historically and culturally construed, and yet from a political perspective, this subject is also 
capable of at least some degree of autonomy. This aspect of autonomy in political theory is 
matched by empirical evidence that historical events are influenced, to some degree, by the 
will of subjects. Dirks, Eley, and Ortner propose that, “in fact, such an actor is not only 
possible but ‘normal,’ for the simple reason that neither ‘culture’ itself nor the regimes of 
power that are imbricated in cultural logics and experience can ever be wholly consistent or 
totally determining” (Ibid., p. 18). Cultural content is usually inconsistent, as are life 
experiences, and Raymond Williams finds in these inconsistencies the “fractures” through 
which residual and emergent arenas of practice can appear (1977, p. 121; we find a similar 
position in Turner, 1975, p. 146). Ortner (2001) states that agency is related to power, which 
is unevenly distributed, leading to the uneven restriction of agency, and is also related to 
culturally constituted intentions. “Subjects (who make, enact, contest, or resist ‘projects’),” 
she says, “are culturally and politically and historically construed, and that understanding of 
the construction of subjects within the ‘long conversations’ of history is central to the 
anthropological/historical endeavor” (Ibid., p. 83). Yet, at the same time, she continues, 
these “actors have continued to occupy spaces, literally and metaphorically, at least partly 
outside of that conversation, where they are constructed by other relations, within other 
conversations, in other ways.”  
By electing the political dimension of semiotic manipulations present in social 
dynamics as our focus of analysis – through the intentional, unintentional, or bricolage-like 
regimentation of meanings; through manipulations of semantic fields; or through the use of 
discursive strategies that enhance or decrease the visibility of certain groups or themes (both 
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in attack or in defense) – we are assuming a theoretical standpoint from which, firstly, we 
take reality as being something socially constructed; i.e., we give a “fundamental emphasis on 
the social origins of thought and representation, on their roots in or responsiveness to the 
experience of a particular social position” (Woolard, 1998, p. 10). Secondly, reality is a result 
of collective, and to some degree uncontrolled action, and the outcomes of these social 
constructions are more complex and multi-dimensional than our semiotic and cognitive 
apparatus can grasp in their totality (yet culture has found ways of overcoming such 
limitations through the teleological functioning of semiosis – to be discussed in more detail in 
chapter one). And thirdly, constructions of reality are inherently unstable, not only because 
conflicting ideas, viewpoints, and representations are an integral part of these constructions, 
but also because life contains an important degree of unpredictability.  
Any account of reality requires a sustained constant effort over a certain period of 
time, and being successful in this effort, in practice, means becoming a momentary winner in 
the everlasting battle for the authority to impose legitimate definitions in a particular social 
world. As Dirks, Eley, and Ortner have nicely stated, political discourses are always an 
attempt to domesticate the infinitude of identity (1994, p. 32). In this context, the 
quintessential oppressed individual, totally unconscious of his or her oppression, is a myth 
that requires a reified notion of reality. At the extreme opposite pole, the hyper-conscious 
revolutionary is also a myth that depends on the same type of reification.  
Social hierarchies are reflected in local narratives, and the power held over the social 
apparatus of narrative making is unevenly distributed. Bond is right when he takes from 
Ricoeur the idea that “people think from ideology rather than about it” (2002, p. 239), and 
we should add to that the fact that there is hardly any ideological configuration that is 
pervasive to all social groups in a social setting, as there is no ideological configuration that is 
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good for all situations one encounters in social life. In this context, sabotage attempts against 
controlling narratives, in many degrees and intensities, seem to be more a rule rather than an 
exception, sometimes even by those who tend, most often, to profit from these dominant 
narratives, as Bailey (2001[1969]) has demonstrated. Thus, in part, the political game consists 
of the use of strategy in order to make a preferred take on reality more widely accepted or 
authorized than it really is, and to make use of strategies in order to sustain such a state of 
affairs for as long as possible or profitable. “Representations of the real are weapons in the 
struggle to define the real” (Collins, 1998, p. 268). As Cohen stated more than three decades 
ago, while being “phenomenon sui generis existing in their own right and observed for their 
own intrinsic value,” symbols “are nearly aways manipulated, consciously or unconsciously, 
in the struggle for, and maintenance of, power between individuals and groups” (1974, p. xi). 
At the same time, contestation, in its many forms, is part of the very same 
environment in which these self-depicted-as-hegemonic narratives exist. According to Briggs, 
“contestation is a crucial facet of how particular ideologies and practices come to be 
dominant” (1998, p. 249). It is therefore of central importance for those in privileged 
positions to sustain narratives of reality that underplay or make invisible such actions of 
contestation, which many times take on the form of sabotage. More often than not, social 
scientists (Marx included) fall victim to such strategically-created illusions. In the words of 
Eagleton, “ideology creates and acts in a social world while it masquerades as a description 
of that world” (1991, p. 19). 
With all this said, the question is raised of how “real” the naturalization of the 
arbitrary is. This topic has been debated by many scholars, with some (e.g. Kroskrity, 1998) 
arguing that a degree of naturalization of power relations does in fact exist, something that is 
also reflected in a statement by Bourdieu that “the language of authority never governs 
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without the collaboration of those it governs, without the help of the social mechanisms 
capable of producing this complicity” (1991, p. 113; see also Gal, 1998, p. 321); others also 
reaffirm the crucial importance of contestation, with a focus on the way in which these 
particular ideologies and practices become dominant (e.g. Briggs, 1992, 1998; also Bond, 
2000, 2002).  
In my understanding of the question, we cannot predetermine upon which of the 
alternative views the weight will fall, principally because individuals are differently positioned 
within the many existing and overlapping social hierarchies, implying that they have different 
access to the semiotic pools necessary to make sense of specific situations (which implies they 
have different takes on issues), and that they also have different access to the practical means 
that allow them to affectively act upon these views. In this process, some individuals may 
not see aspects of certain social relations that other individuals can see, suggesting that the 
objects of such relations have been naturalized. Alternatively, even if these aspects of social 
relations are visible, certain individuals still may not have the effective means in order to act 
upon them leading to the risk of some external analysts believing that there has been a 
naturalization of the situation, which is not really the case. Finally, aspects of social relations 
may be visible to certain individuals, however these individuals instead decide to use 
pragmatic strategies (in Bailey’s sense) to act upon the situation (without calling the attention 
of others) through sophisticated manipulations of meanings, or through the use of sabotage 
(in physical or linguistic domains – e.g. the use of jokes, lies, or gossip). Taking all of this 
into consideration, it therefore can be argued that the phenomenon at hand is more gradient 
than it is dichotomous, as argued by Kroskrity (2000a, p. 9). On the other hand, active 
contestation can be correlated to high levels of discursive consciousness, while relatively 
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unchallenged, highly naturalized, and definitively dominant ideologies can be linked to what 
Giddens calls practical consciousness (Giddens, 1984; Kroskrity, 1998, 2000a).  
In any case, one important strategy in such a game is to try and manipulate the 
contextual factors that define the way in which messages are interpreted, rather than simply 
controlling the content of a message: this is what Silverstein calls the metapragmatic dimension 
of language use (1979, 1993); it is also part of what Goffman refers to as framing (1974). 
Intitutions and institutionalized rituals play a major role in such processes, as we will see 
throughout this text. 
*    *    * 
This is a dissertation about, and for, the Brazilian Northeast. Our intention here is to present 
a view “from the margins,” to use Besteman’s expression (1999, p. 5), and to analyze how 
institutions, discourses, and forces of the state and of civil society appear from such a view 
point. Examining the ways marginal people imagine the society in which they are inserted 
“illuminate[s] structures of domination, the effectiveness of its discourses, the nature of its 
hegemonic representations, and the extent of its popular support” (Ibid.). This is especially 
the case when such people constitute the numeric majority of a population, as is case for 
Ceará. However, it should be remembered that such representations are rarely found to be 
coherent and uniform, but rather tend to be increasingly fragmented, and even contradictory, 
in accordance with the degree of disconnection they have from main dominant discourses 
that, by imposing genres and regimenting representations, end up producing some degree of 
homogenization. 
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For the aforementioned reasons, I do not purport that this dissertation is the only way 
to interpret the things I describe here; however, I do hope it is an interesting and relevant 
one. 
Throughout the text, citations in Portuguese will be in italic characters, accompanied 
by (tentative) English translations in regular characters. 
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Part 1 
Sociosemiotic Foundations of Social Practice 
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1. From Peircean Semiotics to Metapragmatics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter I intend to present some aspects of the semiotic theory of Charles Sanders 
Peirce. This will be followed by a discussion of recent anthropological work that uses 
semiotic concepts in its study of social practice. Three elements of Peirce’s semiotics are 
central to this analysis: how he conceptualizes sign and some of its implications, his 
phenomenological categories of existence, and his understanding of cognitive work, that is, 
of the dynamic semiotic movements through which perceptions become habits. 
According to Peirce, “a sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody 
for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the 
mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. The sign which it 
creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object” (Peirce, 
CP 2.2286). The aforementioned case of Gilton’s reading of the ants’ behavior can therefore 
be seen as an elementary semiotic situation, in which the object is the approach of rains, and 
                                                 
6 We will adopt the same convention established in Peircean studies in regards to bibliographical referencing. 
As found in the Collected Papers (CP), the first numbers indicate volume, and those after the point refer to the 
paragraph number. The citation mentioned above can therefore be found in volume 2, paragraph 228.  
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the sign is the movement of ants from lower to higher ground. Gilton’s knowledge of the 
connectedness between rains and ant behavior serves as an interpretant, while the 
connectedness itself is the ground that links the object with the sign. This connectedness is 
what Peirce calls indexicality. Parmentier (1994, p. 4) offers another clear example: imagine a 
golf player who drops bits of grass from her raised hand and observes them flutter in a 
specific direction. The player can then adjust the next shot according to the perceived wind 
direction. In this semiotic event, the object is the wind blowing in a certain direction; and the 
sign is the grass blowing in a certain direction. The golfer’s knowledge of the physical 
connectedness between wind and grass serves as the interpretant. Based on this example, 
Peirce would have understood the resemblance between wind direction and grass direction 
as iconicity. 
In this line of thought, a sign has a triadic structure, and thus contrasts with Saussure’s 
conceptualization of signs, which consists of a dyadic relation between the signifier and the 
signified, in a closed system of signs that excludes empirical elements. According to 
Parmentier:  
 
Determination does not just flow from object to sign but from the object through 
the sign to some further action or mental representation, what Peirce terms the 
‘interpretant,’ which is thus mediately determined by the same object (CP 6.347). 
The interpretant is the translation, explanation, meaning, or conceptualization of 
the sign-object relation in a subsequent sign representing the same object; a sign 
which is highly determined is one which offers little ‘latitude of interpretation’ 
(MS 283:1367) (1994, p. 4-5) 
 
 
Peirce’s interpretant is the cultural factor of a sign, and therefore necessarily implies 
open-endedness – the interpretant interprets something as signifying an object to somebody, 
                                                 
7 MS is a reference to The Charles S. Peirce Papers. 
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in a specific context. It is the locus for interpretation, and is what “makes signification part 
of a connected web and not an isolated entity” (Daniel, 1984, p. 18). 
Peirce’s semiotic phenomenology is not interested in metaphysical modalities, but is 
rather interested in modes of relation in experience (Parker, 1998, p. 105). Time is the basis 
of the phenomenological experience of the world, while social and cultural worlds are 
temporally structured phenomena. This relational focus can be seen in his phenomenological 
categories, which are also triadic: the category of Firstness refers to positive possibility, while 
Secondness refers to individuating existence, and Thirdness refers to law-governedness. 
According to Peirce, at the level of immediate experience, the subject-object dichotomy is 
non-existent. Although the dichotomous distinction is introduced at “higher” levels, 
immediate experience is instead characterized by a sense of interruption and discontinuity. In 
Peirce’s phenomenology, time is defined as change and transformation. Change, or 
development, takes place alongside, and by means of, relations. The separation between 
object and subject only comes after subsequent reflection, and requires the determination of 
a relation in order to define it (Parker, 1998, p. 111-112). 
The actuality of events, the material world of objects, is what Peirce calls Secondness.  
Secondness implies discontinuity, a rupture between the self and a particular instance of the 
world in question, and it also implies bruteness due to its lack of reason. “We have a two-sided 
consciousness of effort and resistance, which seems to me to come tolerably near to a pure 
sense of actuality” (Peirce, CP 1.24). Yet a brute fact that stands out in experience is only 
defined by its occurrence in a context made up of an existing network of other brute facts. 
This network is defined as a cluster of qualities that are associated with one another through 
experience (Parker, 1998, p. 113). A quality not (yet) objectified as a brute fact, is what Peirce 
calls Firstness. It cannot be anything but a possibility, in the same sense that “redness, before 
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anything in the universe was yet red, was nevertheless a positive qualitative possibility” 
(Peirce CP 1.25). Thirdness, on the other hand, is a category which includes the regularity of 
experience, of general principles, or of laws. “The experience of Thirdness is thus awareness 
of a teleological element in our own actions and in the natural world. Actuality, the course of 
natural events, tends to conform to an idea that in some way regulates them” (Parker, 1998, p. 116; 
emphasis added). Thirdness, according to Parker, is the principle that softens the edges of 
individuation and impels things towards greater unity. Peirce calls this teleology habit, in that 
it refers to the tendency of events to conform to general patterns.  
It is noteworthy to mention Peirce’s classification of signs. For the sake of analysis, 
Peirce divides his typology of signs into three parts, the first of which is the nature of signs 
(or representamens), the second is related to relationship between sign and object, and the third 
relates to the relationship between sign and interpretant. Peirce’s classification of signs is 
developed in the following table: 
 
 
Phenomenological 
categories 
Sign or 
representamen 
Relationship of 
sign to object 
Relationship of 
sign to 
interpretant 
First Qualisign (tone) Icon Rheme 
Second Sinsign (token) Index Dicent sign 
Third Legisign (type) Symbol Argument 
Source: Daniel, 1984, p. 30. 
 
 
A sign that is a First in itself is called a qualisign. It is a sign that is characterized by 
being no more than a capacity, (like redness, for example). When this capacity is embodied in 
real experience, it becomes a sinsign. If the embodiment of such capacity invokes some kind 
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of general order or general possibility of representation, like a cultural convention, the 
representamen then becomes a legisign (such as a red rose being interpreted as a romantic 
declaration). 
In regards to the relationship between sign and object, signs can be considered icons, 
indices (or indexes), or symbols. Icons are signs that represent some qualities of the object. The 
sign of an object resembles the object, and shares some of its qualities. A map is an example 
of iconic sign; in the golfer’s example, the grass direction is an iconic sign of the wind direction. 
An index is a sign that is characterized by its contiguity or concurrence with an object. 
Smoke is an indexical sign of fire; ants moving to higher grounds during a specific time of 
the year are, for Gilton, an index of approaching rains; and the way grass falls is an indexical 
sign of the presence and effect of wind. According to Daniel, indexical signs are what we call 
facts, in the sense that they are “naturalized” interrelations between ideas and things that we 
usually consider to be “obvious” because of their predominance in the common sense world 
(Daniel, 1984, p. 32). A symbolic sign, on the other hand, is connected to its object by 
convention. Most words of a given language are symbols. This is because the connection 
between words, objects, and concepts is arbitrary, and does not depend on continuity, or the 
sharing of any particular quality8.  
Finally, signs and interpretants are related in that they generate rhemes, dicent signs and 
arguments. When a sign represent itself in an interpretive context as a rheme, it is a sign of 
possibility, of pure interpretive potentiality not yet actualized into use; it is therefore 
impossible to say whether it is true or false. A rheme is a sign whose interpretant represents 
it as being an icon. An example is a pointing arrow outside its context of use, or a common 
                                                 
8 As the reader can see, many of the terms used by Peirce were also used by Saussure, and later by symbolic 
anthropologists, but with different meanings. For the sake of comparison, the reader can find a description of 
Victor Turner’s symbolic terminology, which became very prominent in anthropology, in Turner, 1975.  
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noun as a linguistic possibility, but not in use. A dicent sign is the actualization of a qualisign; 
for example in a sentence, in a proposition, or as used in judgments. They can be said to be 
true or false, even though the justification for such a judgment implies the need for 
arguments, or a sign of inference, through induction, deduction, or abduction9. Dicent signs are 
signs that have interpretants that represent them as being indices, while arguments have 
interpretants that represent them as being symbols (Parmentier, 1994, p. 17). While for 
Daniel “the argument provides us the canons upon which our view of the world in its most 
indubitable sense is based” (1984, p. 35), Peirce defines an argument as “a sign whose 
interpretant represents its object as being an ulterior sign through a law, namely, the law that 
the passage from all such premises to such conclusion tends to be truth” (CP 2.262). 
There is a compositional relationship between these kinds of semiotic relations, in 
the sense that every index embodies an icon – i.e., “an index directs the mind to some aspect 
of reality and an icon provides some information about it” (Parmentier, 1994, p. 7) - , and 
every symbol embodies both an index and an icon. Furthermore, every sinsign embodies a 
qualisign, and both are embodied by a legisign. The same pattern of relations occurs between 
rhemes, dicent signs and arguments. However, not all combinations of the three sign aspects 
are logically possible. The table below aids us by indicating the logically possible 
combinations: 
 
                                                 
9 Abduction is, according to Peirce, the inferential process by which hypotheses are constructed. Hypothesizing 
occurs through the creation of rules or theories that are related by similarity (iconicity) to the fact explained (such 
as in the use of metaphors) - Petrilli, 2001, p. 151; Parker exemplifies: “Bears are thick-furred, clawed, and 
lumbering; the object in the path ahead is thick-furred, clawed, and lumbering; therefore the object in the path 
ahead is probably a bear” (1998, p. 6). It differs from deduction (if a rule is true for a type of phenomenon, it 
applies to particular instances of such phenomenon; e.g. “All bears are dangerous; Ursula is a bear; therefore 
Ursula is dangerous”), in which the relationship is indexical; and from induction (the extrapolation of the 
characteristics of a sample to the whole; e.g. “Ursula and numerous others are classified as bears; Ursula and 
the others are dangerous; therefore, any bear is probably dangerous”), in which the relation is symbolic. 
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 Qualisign Sinsign Legisign 
Symbol - - Argument 
 - - Dicent sign 
 - - Rheme 
Index - Dicent sign Dicent sign 
 - Rheme Rheme 
Icon Rheme Rheme Rheme 
 
 
The possibilities of combination are, then: 
1 – (rhematic iconic) qualisigns; e.g., feeling of ‘red’; 
2 – (rhematic) iconic sinsign; e.g., individual diagram, mimicry; 
3 – rhematic indexical sinsign; e.g., spontaneous cry, like ouch!; 
4 – dicent (indexical) sinsign; e.g., telephone ring, extension of column of mercury in 
a thermometer; 
5 – (rhematic) iconic legisign; e.g., architectural order, a typical diagram; 
6 – rhematic indexical legisign; e.g., a pointing arrow, or type of shout, like hello!; 
7 – dicent indexical legisign; e.g., vendor’s cry, like beer here!; 
8 – rhematic symbol (legisign); e.g., the noun book; 
9 – dicent symbol (legisign); e.g., proposition; 
10 – argument (symbolic legisign); e.g., syllogism. 
(Parmentier, 1994, p. 17-18; Daniel, 1984, p. 36-38, n13) 
Due to logical implications, the words inside the parenthesis are not necessary in the 
definition of a sign class.  
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As Parmentier explains, there are interesting connections and interactions between 
different sign types. Peirce identifies three positive linkages between signs that Parmentier 
refers to as replication, composition, and downshifting. Replication refers to the necessity for 
legisigns to generate replicas of themselves in actual instances of signification, like the real 
use of the word ‘the’ in a phrase. Replicas are special sinsigns, in that they are not only 
peculiar occurrences regarded as significant, but also that their significance lies in the 
existence of a law or convention that renders them so. Composition, on the other hand, 
refers to the internal complexity of certain sign classes, which sometimes embody lower-
ranking signs. As an example, a dicent symbol is composed of two rhemes: a rhematic 
symbol (a common noun used to express its information), and a rhematic indexical legisign 
(a demonstrative pronoun used to indicate the subject of a piece of information) (1994, p. 
18). Furthermore, downshifting refers to the tendency of some sign classes to be 
systematically perceived through their interpretants as being lower-ranking. For instance, 
frequently a rhematic indexical legisign is interpreted as being a rhematic iconic legisign; such as is 
the case of ‘that’ in the phrase ‘that table,’ which is interpretable only because of the 
proximity of the object in question (the table), and it is so only because of its formal 
resemblance to a possible class of objects sharing the same feature of being ‘relatively far 
away from the speaker’ (1994, p. 18-19). Peirce calls these instances, in which the 
significance of the sign is affected by such semiotic transformations, degenerate signs. 
There is a key implication in Peirce’s third trichotomy (rheme, dicent, argument) in 
regards to historical and anthropological analysis: identical representamen can shift ranks in 
different contexts or historical moments. Jappy’s (in Parmentier, 1994, p. 19) provided a 
clear example of how the presence of ultramarine pigment in Quattrocento paintings may be 
interpreted differently in different historical eras. For a non-specialist modern museum 
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visitor, the presence of such pigment is interpreted as a rhematic iconic sinsign, that is, a sign 
that is a particular occurrence, that stands for its object by resemblance, and that can only be 
interpreted as representing some original object. For a contemporary viewer, the presence of 
the pigment could generate some additional interpretants: due to the rarity and high cost of 
the pigment, it could act as a dicent indexical sinsign pointing to a wealthy patron. While the 
place of ultramarine in the overall color code of the period, and also the position of 
particular shades of ultramarine in a painting can function as dicent indexical legisigns, since the 
color was part of a system of general regularities. So, in this example, the passage of time 
corresponds to a lowering of the rank of the sign, due to a decrease in the richness of 
“collateral knowledge” (1994, p. 19). 
 
Semiotic Flow and Semiotic Habits 
For Peirce, the semiotic process is not only a subset of cognition, but includes reality itself, 
which is also semiotically constituted. John F. Boler (1963) claims that Peirce’s 
understanding of reality is a synthesis of epistemological realism and epistemological idealism. His 
realism ascertains that the semiotic process is constrained, and that one cannot think 
whatever he or she wants due to other factors of reality that influence our thoughts from the 
outside. His idealism, on the other hand, argues that nothing exists that is not “thought-like”; 
ideas can only resemble other ideas (Daniel, 1984, p. 16). Reality for Peirce ultimately 
consists of the (ever-changing) consensual thoughts of a community of enquirers. 
The dynamic quality of both semiotic processes, and of reality, can be found in 
several passages of Peirce’s work: “Anything which determines something else (its 
interpretant) to refer to an object to which itself refers (its object) in the same way, the 
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interpretant becoming in turn a sign, and so on ad infinitum” (Peirce, CP 2.303). Peirce 
understands the self and culture as elements formed by, and structured around, signs; even 
the human being itself is a sign: “The self … is a continuum. [T]he self is a sign in a 
continuous semiotic flow” (Parker, 1998, p. 122). Personality is seen as  
 
the connection among ideas; it is a developmental teleology, the general principle 
of which determines that some possibilities will be actualized and others avoided 
and neglected. (…) Personality is the continuum of potentiality that lives in the 
present and is most readily identified as the self. (…) [P]ersonality may be 
characterized as the patterns by which ideas are associated, the set of good and 
bad rules of inference that govern one’s thought (Parker, 1998, p. 126).  
 
 
In this sense, the constituting agent must him-herself be formed in ongoing processes of 
the world (Parker, 1998, p. 112). 
In this scheme, culture is understood as a dense cluster of semiotic habits (Daniel, 1998, 
p. 67). Daniel draws attention to the similarities between Peirce’s notion of semiotic habits 
and Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus. Habitus refers to systems of durable and 
transposable dispositions produced by the constitutive structures of a particular environment 
and the material conditions of existence that characterize a subject’s condition. These 
dispositions are:  
 
[S]tructured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, 
as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations 
which can be objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without in any way being the 
product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without 
presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations 
necessary to attain them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated without 
being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 
72).   
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In this manner, the habitus always tends to reproduce the same objective structures of 
which they are products. They are determined by past conditions and, in reproducing 
identical or interchangeable practices, they prolong the structures from which they originate. 
The concept of habitus not only explains the unconscious continuity of social structures and 
practices over time, but also gives an account of this unconsciousness through locating 
processes of incorporation and objectification in inculcation: the internalization of externality 
and the externalization of internality. 
The set of semiotic habits, or the habitus, implies a certain understanding of what is 
possible, what is impossible, what is probable, what is reasonable, and what is scandalous, all 
in a manner seemingly taken for granted. Habitus synchronizes the production of 
commonsense, of an objective view of the world, and of a collective consensus of meanings. 
This explains why negative sanctions are liable to occur in environments where the practices 
confronted are different and distant from the others around them, located in the same 
habitus. Xenophobia, generation conflicts, and the criminalization of odd behaviors, are all 
phenomena that can be analyzed through this view. 
One important aspect of culture, as semiotic habits or as habitus, is the way in which it 
tends to protect itself from external attacks. As Daniel argues: 
 
culture as a dense cluster of semeiosic habits has such recuperative and appeasing 
capabilities that it cannot be easily undermined or even challenged despite all the 
intellectual belligerence we may summon to mount such a challenge. Marx’s 
celebrated “opiate” is only one – even if the most poignant – example where a 
major domain of culture, religion, offers persuasive ways of understanding 
aspects of the world that may otherwise remain incomprehensible (Daniel, 1998, 
p. 67).  
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Bourdieu makes a similar point: “the habitus tends to protect itself from crisis and 
critical challenges by providing itself with a milieu to which it is as pre-adapted as possible, 
that is, a relatively constant universe of situations tending to reinforce its dispositions by 
offering the market most favorable to its products” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 61). Culture is 
directed always towards itself, which is the basis of its teleological character (Thirdness). 
According to Daniel, this is also the reason why fugitive, centripetal ideas, actions, or things 
are almost impossible to seek and find, which is not due to culture’s stability, but rather 
because of its patterned dynamism (1998, p. 68). 
 
Habitus, de-structured 
There are important differences in the way Peirce and Bourdieu make use of the idea of 
durable dispositions in their concepts of semiotic habits and habitus; a major difference lies 
in the structuralist inheritance present in Bourdieu’s work. We will now briefly comment on 
some of the limitations of the concept of habitus, and show how Peirce’s notion of semiotic 
habits, due to its incorporated realistic features based on his phenomenology of signs, avoids 
some problems found in mainstream structuralism.  
Bourdieu is identified with a different kind of structuralism from that of Levi-Strauss, 
one that has changed its focus from deep innate mental structures to a focus on structures 
that are stable, to a certain point, but are also transmitted, inculcated, produced and reproduced, 
through processes of practice. Time is one major element of disruption for Bourdieu’s 
structuralism, since it requires reproduction: if the structures are not innate, it is their 
reproduction that warrants social stability. The logic of practice(s) is what operates this 
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stabilization mechanism: the habitus delimits the universe of possibilities and induces 
specific symbolic configurations and, as a result, necessity is transformed into virtue; and a 
more or less homogeneous “common sense” is produced. In this panorama, practice is 
always seen as exchange, whether material or symbolic. This leads Bourdieu to affirm that 
“practices never cease to comply with an economic logic” (1990, p. 122).  
The fact that structures are not set from birth, but have to be learned and 
reproduced over time, generates all sorts of discontinuities that can be revealed through 
empirical analysis. The practical coherence of symbolic systems, Bourdieu explains, lies both 
in the regularity and unity, and in their fuzziness, irregularities and incoherencies (1990, p. 
86). Bourdieu based his line of thought in two conflictive ideas, non-genetic structures and 
social stability. He tried to explain society as a whole by expanding them as conceptual tools. 
Nevertheless, these tools are not appropriate to explain social change, and his results in 
attempting to do this are confusing, even for him. In some passages, he argues that 
unidirectionality and set and all encompassing determinants do not exist, and that individuals 
are actors in an economic arena, who decide for themselves, but within the rules of the game 
(like the Kabila challenge rituals); here habitus provides restrictions on a set of possibilities 
rather than providing total determination and, in this line of argument, the action of subjects 
can bring change to the whole system. However, Bourdieu contrasts these ideas in other 
passages, by arguing that determination and the unsubject are indeed present, and that social 
dynamics are disconnected from individuals, in such a way as an “orchestra that plays 
without the need for a conductor.” 
According to King (2000), the two strands of Bourdieu’s work, his theory of practice 
and his concept of habitus, are incompatible. “Although Bourdieu believes that the notion of 
the habitus resolves the subject-object dualism of social theory,” states King, “in fact, the 
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habitus relapses against Bourdieu’s intentions into the very objectivism which he rejects” 
(2000, p. 417). The problem is evident when Bourdieu tries to fix the problem of social 
determinism within the concept of habitus, by creating a theory of social change based on 
the notion of the hysteresis effect (referring to the physical phenomenon whereby there is a  
time lag between the reversal of the poles of a magnet and the moment in which the effects 
of the reversal start being effective in practice). In the social world, the hysteresis effect 
occurs when the conditions in which a habitus was generated, change, forcing the habitus to 
transform and catch up with the new context. The issue is, nevertheless, that the hysteresis 
effect does not solve the problem of social change, but only sidesteps it, and implies that 
social change necessarily results from external objective factors (King, 2000, p. 427). In this 
manner, if Bourdieu’s theory of practice was an important step towards the overcoming of 
the dichotomy between subjectivism and objectivism, his concepts of habitus and the 
hysteresis effect push him back to an objectivist position. 
Going back to Peirce, we find that there are some features in his semiotics that are 
relevant for our discussion. First, self, personality and culture are defined according to the 
same principle: they are all more or less dense clusters of semiotic habits. This definition 
ruptures with the representation of culture as individuals living under the same rubric of a 
common language or common values, and extends the possibilities of culture far beyond the 
point at which individuals need not share a reified, ill-defined, and hard to frame idea of 
culture, but rather the sharing of some semiotic habits will ensure some degree of 
communication, and therefore some cultural activity between them, even in situations in 
which they don’t speak the same language. Secondly, a set of semiotic habits is composed of 
cultural prescriptions, biological aspects, and contextual factors. This means that single acts 
of communication, together with the natural transformation of contextual elements through 
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the dynamics of life, lead to changes in a set of semiotic habits. Therefore, by linking cognition 
dynamically to the material world, and by understanding phenomenological reality 
(Secondness) as disturbances in the flow of time (which are central elements of his semiotic 
phenomenology), Peirce prevents his concept of habit from gaining the same undesirable 
qualities that Bourdieu’s habitus has gained. Peirce’s semiotic habits are Bourdieu’s habitus 
de-structured. 
Furthermore, within the perspective of Peircean phenomenology, a different vision 
of the subject is presented. The self is, at the same time, a sign (to others), and also a 
semiotic flow (to us). We affect the dynamics of the world through our actions, the world 
being itself semiotically constructed. This means that a social world does not remain the 
same when one individual is added or taken away; individuals act in the world, affecting it, 
even if they try not to do so. In this perspective, there is no un-subject, but there is also no 
free-floating personality, meaning that the self is a self in regards to a specific and real 
context:  the self is not only constrained, it is also context-specific. This perspective 
resembles certain psychological theories in which the self is understood in relation to the 
circumstances in which individuals finds themselves (Harrington, 1993). This also can be 
articulated with Ortner’s discussion of the two modalities of agency, one related to issues of 
power, and the other to the notion of intention (Ortner, 2001). Distinctive positions in 
relation to a specific power configuration will affect the intensity and nature of constraint 
encountered by individuals, but having said this, there is really nothing that can nullify their 
agency, except severe physical impairment or death. Scholars such as Raymond Williams and 
James Scott provided us with valuable evidence that no hegemony is complete, and that 
there is agency even in the smallest act of resistance (Scott, 1990; Williams, 1977). Agency 
that is related to the notion of intention is not the free agency of the existentialists, but 
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rather is agency with culturally constituted intentions. Ordinary life is “organized in terms of 
culturally constituted projects, projects that infuse life with meaning and purpose. People 
seek to accomplish things within a framework of their own terms, their own categories of 
value” (Ortner, 2001, p. 80). There is no need to theorize about the ultimate nature of agency 
or intention, but for the purposes of social sciences, an account of how these concepts are 
related to social practices suffices. 
 
Semiosis and the Politics of Signs 
Peirce uses the concept of clusters of semiotic habits that are dynamically inserted into flows 
of semiosis. Instability, rather than stability, is the intrinsic quality of semiotic flows. In order 
to retain specific configurations of semiotic habits, a certain “effort” is needed in the 
semiotic work of cognition – provided by the teleological quality of semiosis, of which 
Peirce talks. Routine, redundancy, and regulation are some strategies used by culture when 
hazard lurks at its thresholds. These strategies give semiotic habits the power to be able to 
colonize or conquer fugitive elements.   
Semiotic appropriation operates in a cycle that moves from a percept to a concept. In 
this dynamic work of culture, percepts carry with them “undeniable and forceful traces or 
aspects of the outer world of dynamic objects” (Daniel, 1998, p. 87). This is not solely a 
mental process, but rather body and mind are seen as two aspects of the same whole.  
Yet not always is the appropriation of something “strange” into the inner semiotic 
dynamics of culture/habit/personality successful. According to Daniel: 
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The semeiosic process of incorporation can be stopped in its tracks so to speak, 
at the very gate of the inner world. It could be arrested in its initial hybridity; it 
could progress into its translation by an immediate/emotional interpretant and 
not move beyond it. Or it may go as far as being translated into an 
energetic/dynamic interpretant, arrested in its specificity, and be stuck there as 
nothing more than a trace of action and reaction, a reminder of the Secondness, 
the uniqueness, the incomparability, and the ungeneralizability of the event of the 
“stranger’s” entry into the inner world, who was then condemned to remain 
there as a stranger (ibid., p. 88). 
 
 
Of course the dynamics of semiotic habits occasionally find a way to incorporate the 
“strange”, or at least some of its more palatable aspects. Modifications of the inner world 
may lead to the subsequent construction of an interpretant which enables the 
accommodation of novelty, through the summoning of another object that is seen as iconic 
of the other. This allows for the novelty’s successful absorption into inner world semiosis 
(Ibid., p. 89)10.  
The theoretical description above may seem rudimentary when compared to the 
complexity of the dynamics of semiosis in actual situations11; for this reason it should be 
taken as a basic description of a multi-layered cognitive structure in which, in a fractal 
manner, countless semiotic operations are being performed at any given moment. We also 
need to further analyze some aspects of the semiotic appropriation of novelty. In this work, 
I propose the hypothesis that, in given circumstances, the emotional content of the 
immediate interpretant, in consonance with the self-protective qualities of semiotic habits, 
may be the factors that operate the semiotic processes that are central in processes of power 
relations. We will now attempt to make explicit the relationship between the semiotic work 
                                                 
10 We should remember that Peirce defines reality as the semiotic consensus of a community (of inquirers). In 
this sense, words like borders, thresholds, limits, are here being used metaphorically. 
11 For a more detailed description of this process see Daniel, 1998. 
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of cognition and the processes responsible for the “naturalization” of socio-cultural 
differences, relations of power, and domination.   
 Once again, Daniel’s work on the limits of culture will provide us with useful material 
for analysis. In his article (1998), Daniel mentions a moment of semiotic crisis that he 
experienced during his ethnographic work. In a given moment, after one of his informants 
described to him an unspeakable act of collective violence against a defenseless boy who was 
attacked, mutilated and set on fire during the Sri Lanka riots of 1983, in which the informant 
participated as a perpetrator, Daniel asked the informant (in a desperate effort to change the 
subject, as Daniel himself suggests) what his goal in life was. “I want a VCR,” replied the 
informant. As Daniel explains, this answer left him “speechless” (Ibid., p. 76). From the 
perspective of an anthropologist, operating inside a linguistic game of well-structured 
dialectics between analytic and synthetic thinking, in which one academically constructs the 
other’s cultural universe while always running the risk of ethically hyper correcting in the 
effort of being self-conscious about his or her own biases, there was no possible meaningful 
connection to be made between the description of the horrendous scene, and the following, 
“I want a VCR”. “What stance does one take toward the Other when the Other is evil?” asks 
Daniel? “The question is held at bay at the limits of culture” (Ibid., p. 90). 
It would not be difficult to imagine, I believe, someone else in the same situation, 
but playing a different language game, and dealing differently with the issue. Given the 
pragmatic orientation of everyday life, holding “too-powerful” questions at bay is a luxury 
that most people cannot afford. Of course there are cases in which the limits of the work of 
culture are obvious, such as the example Daniel provides about a man that could not talk 
about his father and brother, who were both murdered in front of him during the same riots 
in Sri Lanka, without his losing consciousness. The literature on trauma is rich with 
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descriptions concerning this theme. Nevertheless, it thankfully seems to be more the rule 
than the exception that people try to overcome (both in semiotic and in other domains) the 
effects of trauma. Our argument is that, in a situation in which logical interpretants cannot 
incorporate a given percept, it becomes connected to semiotic dynamics through other 
means; by means of a connection with already existing concepts that are characterized as 
belonging to lower semiotic levels (i.e., with strong iconic and indexical elements, which may 
involve the already mentioned downshifting process). This occurs due to an indexical 
relationship being formed between available concepts and sociopolitical aspects of the situation12. 
This is the stage at which emotions become a key element, because at this point they trigger 
mechanisms of self-defense, or of a particular set of semiotic habits. In theory, the anxiety 
that springs from everyday political life of a given social group, in its multiple levels, is 
enough to start this same process. Part of the habitus’ defense mechanism is to channel 
psychic energy for a counter-attack against any threats. In semiotic terms, this means that a 
novel percept will be associated with interpretants that are located in a particular position; a 
position linked to danger, disgust, evil, and the like (i.e., in a position that will be a focus of 
attack), within the gradation of categories associated with the perceived political economy of 
that moment. However, with all of this said, it must also be remembered that not all 
situations of semiotic confusion are associated with danger, and some may even be 
associated with divine intervention. It is the pragmatic elements of a given situation, which 
play the role of linking a percept with indexical traces that in the end will define which 
logical interpretant will be activated by a given situation.  
                                                 
12 This affirmation may seem tautological, but we should remember that there is no point of departure for the 
dynamics of semiosis, and that it is a continuous process; and that Peirce’s semiotics are connected to the 
ontological reality of the world, and are not self-enclosed in a Saussurean way. Furthermore, the mentioned 
political economy of a context of action is also semiotically constructed, and this is what Peirce refers to when 
he affirms that perception itself is Thirdness. 
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Our argument can be summarized as follows: although extremely energetic percepts 
may challenge the semiotic process, the cognitive apparatus will still summon the logic 
interpretant that is most coherent or adaptive towards a given percept, from within the 
current set of semiotic habits, which is triggered because of the habit’s self-protective 
mechanisms; on the other hand, the logic interpretant that is summoned must necessarily 
reflect the political economy’s categories, which are linked to the context in which the 
experience takes place. In this case, because there are hardly any semiotic moments that can 
be disconnected from the political economy attached to the context in which semiosis takes 
place, we may take a step further and assume that this logic can also be applied to other 
situations that are not necessarily related to conditions that Daniel calls the “limits of 
culture.” In other words, every average verbal interaction involves some anxiety, which is set 
off by the bruteness of Secondness that forces itself on a set of semiotic habits constituting 
personality or self. To use Peirce’s terminology, these ordinary interactions tend to trigger 
semiotic processes in which the result of percept appropriation is a degenerated symbol, i.e., a 
symbol that tends to favor its iconic and/or indexical aspects.  
Due to the inherent dynamism of the semiotic process, neither semiotic habits, nor 
the political configuration of concepts attached to them, remain stable for very long. By 
adding the idea that semiosis/cognition is a collectively constructed process, we reach a 
point in which we can change our focus from micro-semiotic processes to larger social 
processes, when phenomena at the micro levels have important implications. One factor of 
special interest is how such semiotic processes can form part of the inner workings of some 
sociopolitical dynamics; such as the fight over the legitimacy of categorizations, over the 
authority to impose definitive explanations and diagnosis for things and events, all of which 
constitute all types of larger political processes. Before we concentrate our attention on such 
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a scale of linkages, we will first make some brief comments on the teleological quality of 
semiosis. 
 
Teleology and Tautology 
Through Peirce’s insight on the teleological qualities of semiotic habits, we can see that our 
cognitive mechanisms not only affect the social world, through a cognitive imposition of 
distinctions and categorizations, but they also create enforcement mechanisms for the 
continuation of these reifications. In another words, they reduce the entropic 
characterization of the world, or at least generate patterns that are, up to some degree, stable. 
It seems to be a requirement for our semiotic functioning that the overwhelming complexity 
of reality be tamed through some degree of reification and conceptual simplification, so our 
minds can work semiotically. Such reduction in conceptual complexity seems to result in an 
increased efficiency in our work with signs (Deacon, 1997, p. 22). 
We could say that language use (and broadly speaking semiotic life) is, in this sense, 
the operation of reification networks that transform the overwhelmingly complex to the 
realm of the manageable. Discourses are semiotic technologies that lead to the insertion of 
ambiguities and of overwhelming complexities into these reifying chains. Discourse works in 
conjunction with material technologies, to create constraints in space and time, framing our 
perception and producing teleological effects in our clusters of semiotic habits. Some 
narratives (such as religion, in terms of religious orthodoxy) are peculiarly intense in their 
capacity to “saturate” interpretive semiotic dynamics, producing a “little latitude of 
interpretation” as Peirce has mentioned (Parmentier, 1994).  
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Anxiety is also an integral element in this panorama. Noteworthy theorizations 
concerning anxiety can be found in the works of scholars such as Alfred Schutz and Simone 
de Beauvoir. Schutz suggests the existence of what he calls fundamental anxiety as one of the 
structuring aspects of everyday life; it is the primordial anticipation, from which all others 
originate (the anticipation that death is unavoidable), combined with fear.  
 
From the fundamental anxiety spring the many interrelated systems of hopes and 
fears, of wants and satisfactions, of chances and risks which incite man within 
the natural attitude to attempt the mastery of the world, to overcome obstacles, 
to draft projects, and to realize them (1967a, p. 228).  
 
 
Similarly, Simone de Beauvoir says that one of the central projects of human 
existence is the attempt to transcend the natural limits of being human – the inevitable and 
irreducible bodily vulnerability to illness, injury, and death (in Ortner, 1996, p. 14). In such a 
way, human semiotic life in general, and language in particular, seem to be intertwined with 
desire, “a desire for sense, for mastery, for overcoming life’s losses, uncertainties and 
mortality” (Collins, 1998, p. 262). 
While teleology seems to be a basic element of human semiotic life, the result of the 
basic cognitive principles discussed above, tautology seems to be its usual complement. At the 
edges of perceptive limits, where cognitive energy fades, the world appears to be composed 
of discrete entities; and this occurs due to the fact that systems of signs are projected over 
perception (an idea famously developed by Benjamin Lee Whorf), and gaps in perception are 
disguised by the apparent “completeness” of semiotic habits. There is a tendency to look for 
similarities, for proportionality, and for equivalences, even where they hardly exist. This leads, 
among other things, to Turner’s famous assertion that “norms and values [become] saturated 
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with emotion, while the gross and basic emotions become ennobled through contact with 
social values. The irksomeness of moral constraint is transformed into the ‘love of virtue’” 
(Turner, 1967, p. 30). Tautology is what transforms the continuum into the discrete; it fills 
the conceptual, cognitive, memory, and mental gaps13. The fact that every human action 
happens in time enables the tautological aspect of our semiotic constructions to pass 
unperceived; this tautological invisibility is also attained due to the teleological organization 
of the whole semiotic field. Hilbert, for example, follows Durkheim in his argument 
concerning the way in which, in many circumstances, problems are constructed around 
practical goals that count as solutions, and values are mobilized on behalf of claims, rather 
than the reverse. Claim-making activities are rituals for problem recognition, and those 
activities end up temporarily reifying a specific moral order. That is why, according to 
Durkheim, the factual and the moral spheres are one and the same: society is morality, and 
morality is society. According to Hilbert:  
 
[Claims-making activities] are devices for saving the appearances of objective 
social order in the absence of other corroborative evidence. Just as the meaning 
of the law is maintained by the recruitment of its violators, just as professional 
competence is maintained by the recognition of incompetence, or 
meaningfulness by the recognition of nonsense, so does social order stand in 
relation to its constituted exceptions. (1992, p. 186) 
 
 
Needless to say, the underlying foundations of cultural systems, where meanings, 
genres, narratives and discourses originate, are themselves rarely put to the test, logically or 
                                                 
13 What we are calling tautology here is also referred to in social theory as positive and negative feed backs (among 
other terms). Feed backs may exist as helpful categories, even if they suggest totalized and closed social systems. 
All systems are ultimately open, but can exist for more or less long periods of time as if they were “closed” 
entities, with the provision that they do not suffer from the influences of external factors that are stronger than 
those factors responsible for regimenting the variable elements of the system itself. In this sense, tautology 
exists as a feature of all systems in which feed backs are present. But once again, feed backs, even though they 
are seeming stability, are only temporary (if not illusory). 
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analytically, in everyday practice; instead, they are used. However, these foundations are 
constantly confronted by reality. By means of the teleological characteristic of semiotic 
systems, aided by tautological strategies, the apparent stability of such cultural constructions 
is maintained. But in reality, there is a constant and everlasting struggle for the retention of 
these foundations; Teleology and tautology provide not only the appearance of stability, but 
also of coherence, from an internal viewpoint.  
In this sense, a scientific work, as with any other narrative types, is constructed upon 
reifications (as is language, and living in general), and this is peculiarly poignant in disciplines 
such as anthropology. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for instance, commented with discontent on 
the effects that teleological tendencies of semiosis have on perception, and as result, on 
scholarly descriptions of otherness: 
 
I am persuaded that we have come to know no other men except Europeans; 
moreover it appears from the ridiculous prejudices, which have not died out even 
among men of letters, that every author produces under the pompous name of 
the study of man nothing much more than a study of men of his own country. 
… One does not open a book of voyages without finding descriptions of 
characters and customs, but one is altogether amazed to find that these authors 
who describe so many things tell us only what all of them knew already, and have 
only learned how to see at the other end of the world what they would have been 
able to see without leaving their own street, and that the real features which 
distinguish nations, and which strike eyes made to see them, have almost always 
escaped their notice (in Parmentier, 1994, p. 161). 
 
 
Yet, to some degree, social action forces reality onto these kinds of reifications, to the 
extent that we have to deal with an unpredictable reality all of the time; in this vein we could 
say that our actions in life have the ultimate mark of a bricolage (Lévi-Strauss, 1966, p. 16). 
Nevertheless, our relationship with the world’s unpredictability is marked by processes of 
semiotic regimentation that turn the ambiguous into ideas with structure, pattern and 
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planned regularity. Besides the effects that teleological tendencies of semiotic habits have on 
the perceptions of our own semiotic life, there is an important implication stemming from 
our semiotic life being organized around habits: a large deal of the usual elements of our 
everyday life are made invisible, constituting what Bourdieu called doxa. Doxa are the 
normative aspects of the social organization made ‘invisible’, unthinkable, and deeply rooted 
through socialization and, because of this, taken for granted. Contrary to the concepts of 
orthodoxy or heterodoxy, which imply awareness and the recognition of possible different 
beliefs, doxa have an underlying and unconscious existence. Doxa are related not only to the 
collective symbolic universe, but also to the organization of spatial structures and of 
temporal forms, and to the submission of the agent to collective rhythms. These space and 
time configurations (and the way they structure, and are structured, by the material and 
semiotic aspects of life), structure not only a group’s representation of the world, “but the 
group itself, which orders itself in accordance with this representation” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 
163). Doxa is the naturalization of the arbitrary; or an established order producing the 
naturalization of its own arbitrariness. The result of this process is the sense of reality, the 
correspondence between mental and social structures, which is the basis for adherence of an 
individual to an established order.  According to Bourdieu:   
 
Schemes of thought and perception can produce the objectivity that they 
produce only by producing misrecognition of the limits of the cognition that they 
make possible, thereby founding immediate adherence, in the doxic mode, to the 
world of tradition experienced as a ‘natural world’ and taken for granted (Ibid., p. 
164). 
 
 
Doxa contains what Taussig called implicit social knowledge, “[w]hat makes people 
without their knowing quite why or quite how, with what makes the real real and the normal 
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normal, and above all with what makes ethical distinctions politically powerful” (1987, p. 
366). 
One of the implications of the existence of doxa is how it affects our perception, in 
terms of regulating what we could call our “differential attention”: the frequent and usual 
elements of everyday life that are made habitual, and therefore taken out of the group of 
things in the world that require focused attention. These elements become, in a sense, 
“invisible” (something that historically has justified the use of participant observation as an 
ethnographic technique, as local informants usually would not mention such important 
elements in interviews or in questionnaires), and attention is instead focused on the least 
frequent or more strategically important events. This is one possible explanation for why 
intuitive statistical accounts of the world are usually marked by gross imprecision. One 
example, to be discussed later in this text, is that many meteorological agencies around the 
world have a local reputation for producing “imprecise climate forecasts,” even when 
statistics reflect a high rate of success. This can be understood in terms of successful 
forecasts being ‘invisible,’ while unsuccessful forecasts are overemphasized. This could also 
be a possible element in the processes of stigmatization of minorities. 
In Bourdieu’s theory, doxa and habitus are natural and complementary concepts that 
form part of the ‘naturalization of the arbitrary’ phenomenon. We mentioned above the 
limitations in the concept of habitus, from a Peircean perspective; here we shall also take the 
concept of doxa as being a less coherent and stable phenomenon than that depicted by 
Bourdieu. 
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From Peircean Semiotics to Metapragmatics 
A very interesting body of research exploring the sociosemiotic elements of social life has 
been developed, in the last two decades, by language anthropologists working in the field of 
pragmatics, which is a sub-area of linguistics that studies language in its contexts of use, and 
also studies the social uses of language. Michael Silverstein is one of the main contributors to 
this effort, having proposed useful analytical concepts in this line of reasoning, and by 
extending research in very specific and fruitful directions. We will present some key aspects 
of this theory, which has become known as metapragmatics, before we approach our 
ethnographic data. 
In the early 1970s, Silverstein argued for the extension of a theoretical understanding 
of meaning to outside the realm of semantics. Influenced by Peirce, Whorf, and Jakobson, 
Silverstein suggested that not only meaning depends on pragmatic variables as the practical, 
historical, and cultural bases of discourse, but he also argued that pragmatic elements, such 
as local perceptions of the social value attached to the use of specific registers or accents, 
may alter the structure of language itself. Language use is teleological, due to the fact that 
speakers conceptualize language as a socially purposeful action. This implies the need for the 
researcher to gain access to the speakers’ ideas about the meaning, function, and value of 
their language (Woolard, 1998, p. 12). Clues to the subliminal pervasiveness of certain 
semiotic arrangements emerge only when the researcher is willing and able to transcend “the 
semantico-referential grammatical perspective and open up to the constellation of a greater 
array of pragmatic variables” (Daniel, 1984, p. 46). Such clues, more often than not, are to be 
found not strictly in verbal communication, but rather in the way speakers organize their 
communicative interchange by using broader contextual elements as strategic variables. The 
participation of speakers in a verbal interchange may be organized by, among other things, 
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the signs he or she carries in his/her social being, that mark his/her language use, in relation 
to a broader social situation in which local social hierarchies stipulate the rules concerning 
who has the right to talk, and when. This kind of signaling is called indexicality.  
Indexicality is a term that comes from the Peircean term indexing, which was derived 
from the Latin for ‘pointing’; it makes reference to the deictic quality of language (deixis is 
Greek for ‘pointing’ or ‘indicating’), which refers to the function of personal and 
demonstrative pronouns, articles, some adverbial locutions, tenses, honorific and status 
indicators, and other language features that relate an utterance to its context (Crapanzano, 
1993, p. 296-297). Common examples can be found in situations where the specific use of 
pronouns indicates the hierarchical relation between speakers, or in situations where the 
language or register used may indicate the social status of a speaker in a specific context. 
Pronoun usage and choice of register are typical indexes of specific social statuses. 
According to Silverstein:  
 
Any linguistic configuration is potentially indexical. There is, to be sure, a trivial 
sense of this, in which any occurrence of speech minimally indexes the individual 
in the role of speaker; but there is also a nontrivial sense in which any particular 
abstractable feature(s) of speech might be discovered to be indexical of particular 
features of context, from ‘phoneme- or morpheme-sized’ chunks of language all 
the way ‘up’ to choice of a particular ‘language’ itself (Silverstein, 1979, p. 206). 
 
 
Recognition that a great deal of meaning (and therefore communicative value) of a 
linguistic form lies in indexical links between signs and contextual factors in which they are 
used, is one of the key advances of this approach (Kroskrity, 2000a). Many kinds of semiosis 
engage in indexical modes of meaningfulness. The concept of indexicality brings attention to 
the radical grounding of semiotic processes in the physical world: 
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Since these indexical parameters themselves partake of the concrete realities of 
space, time, and matter, and since the token occurrence of indexical sign types 
requires physically manifested, temporally experienceable sign vehicles, the 
operation of indexicals permits no absolute disjunction between meaningful and 
material worlds (Parmentier, 1994, p. 125). 
 
 
Another important aspect of the phenomenon of indexicality is the resultant dialectics 
between language (as code) and the context in which the verbal interaction takes place. 
Indexicality confers a teleological element to contextualized language use, in the sense that 
indexicality grounds both social practice and language use. The use of a particular pronoun, 
for instance, may be the defining factor for the whole dynamics of a verbal encounter (see 
Jacquemet, 1992). Literary genres, for example, have indexical elements that define their 
‘addressivity,’ that is, how the addressee will be conceptualized (as an individual or a social 
group, in a specific time frame and spatial location, etc. Hanks, 1987). According to Hanks:  
 
Indexicality is a semiotic mode in which signs stand for objects through a 
relation of actual contiguity with them. In language, such signs include pronouns, 
demonstratives, and other ‘shifters,’ which relate utterances to their speakers, 
addressees, actual referents, place and time of occurrence. Indexical centering is a 
primary part of the interpretation of discourse because it connects the evaluative 
and semantic code with the concrete circumstances of its use. Furthermore, since 
such elements are discrete parts of discourse form, they nicely illustrate the 
embedding of speech context within the linguistic code itself (1987, p. 682). 
 
 
The concept of indexicality is to some degree similar to what Gumperz called contextual 
cues, which are the “constellations of surface features of message form [that] are the means 
by which speakers signal and listeners interpret what the activity is, how semantic content is 
to be understood and how each sentence relates to what precedes or follows” (1982, p. 131). 
According to Mertz, it is often through “very subtle combinations of intonation, meta-level 
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framing devices, and so forth that speakers signal that an utterance is to be interpreted as a 
particular kind of talk (e.g., a friendly exchange, a request for help, an irritated signal to back 
off)” (1998, p. 152).  
It is of special relevance that Western ideologies concerning language tend to super-
emphasize the role of referential language and to ignore language’s indexical functions. 
There is a widespread tendency to see “reference or propositionality as the essence of 
language, to confuse or at least to merge the indexical functions of language with the 
referential function, and to assume that the divisions and structures of language should – and 
in the best circumstances do – transparently fit the structures of the ‘real world’” (Woolard, 
1998, p. 13). Many assume that referential communication is the only function of language; 
this is especially visible with the use of language in science when providing descriptive 
accounts of the social and natural worlds. 
 
Metapragmatics and Language Ideologies 
If language use enables indexical elements that connect language with context, language also 
has the power to help define the context for the interpretation of linguistic utterances. In 
other words, due to language’s metalinguistic function, verbal signs have a generalized 
capacity to incorporate meaning components in order to act as signals of how a sign should 
be interpreted (Hanks, 1989, p. 107). In this context, Silverstein distinguishes metasemantics (as 
language that refers to relatively decontextualized meanings) from metapragmatics (as 
language that refers to the indexical relationship between signs and contexts of use. 
Parmentier, 1994). According to Parmentier, “it is not merely a social fact that dialogicality 
characterizes linguistic utterances but it is also the case that linguistic structure and use 
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depend essentially on language’s ability to refer to itself along many dimensions” (Parmentier, 
1993, p. 261-262) 
Silverstein’s concept of metapragmatics “encompasses implicit and explicit 
commentary on and signaling about language in use” (Woolard, 1998, p. 4). Implicit 
metapragmatics refers to linguistic signaling that occurs in a stream of language in use, and it 
also refers to how we can interpret a language in use (Woolard, 1998, p. 9; Lucy, 1993; 
Silverstein, 1993). Explicit metapragmatics refers to the specific machinery in the relationship 
between signals and their context of use (Parmentier, 1993, p. 278; Silverstein, 1993), such as, 
for instance, the use of metapragmatic verbs to label types of speech acts, such as: ‘say,’ 
‘make decisions together,’ ‘speak,’ ‘complain,’ command,’ ‘enumerate,’ ‘clarify,’ ‘remind,’ 
‘hear,’ ‘ask questions,’ etc. (Parmentier, 1993, p. 278-279).  
In this sense, language has the power to be a comprehensive and flexible tool for 
defining the social context in which token utterances are to be interpreted, through the use 
of higher-level semiotic phenomena, such as through the manipulation of “semantic and 
pragmatic meaning (as in glossing), conventional rules of speaking (as in performatives), and 
the parameters of the contexts of speaking (as in deixis)” (Parmentier, 1994, p. 70). However, 
not all texts or utterances contain within themselves indications of how they should be 
interpreted; the metasemiotic organization of a communicative situation has to be studied 
through the dialectic interplay between how agents make strategic use of the indexicality of 
concepts according to their agendas, and broader configurations of semiotic habits, such as 
general ideological assumptions that transcend particular events and utterances (Parmentier, 
1994, p. 126). So semiotic analyses need to take in consideration not only the use of language 
in pragmatic contexts, but also the study of how local semiotic habits and conflictive agendas 
try to set the characteristics of the context in which utterances will be interpreted, in ways 
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related to local social and political circumstances. Parmentier exemplifies with an analysis of 
the usage of proverbs in political speech: 
 
The function of citing traditional proverbs can be understood … in terms of the 
speaker’s need to legitimize his own position as an authoritative voice. The 
proverbs not only contribute explicitly toward fixing the global metapragmatic 
theme of the speech … but also convey their presupposed naturalness (i.e., they 
are quoted exactly as prescribed) over to the other creative examples of quoted 
speech. In other words, a speaker who can perfectly recite proverbs is judged to 
be likely to report other utterances with the same transparent objectivity 
(Parmentier, 1993, p. 280). 
 
 
If a great deal of the organization of communication happens in the metapragmatic 
dimension of language, it is then of fundamental importance to understand how semiotic 
habits relate to specific ways of language functioning. This happens through what has 
become known as language ideologies. Language or linguistic ideology is not taken as a false 
frame that distorts the vision actors have of “reality,” but is rather part of language 
structures and praxis, in the sense that as people interact through language, they develop 
worldviews and epistemologies that guide them in deciding how language ought to be used 
in different circumstances (Mertz, 1998). These epistemologies include both Silverstein’s 
definition of language ideologies as “sets of beliefs about language articulated by users as a 
rationalization or justification of perceived language structure and use” (1979, p. 193), and 
Irvine’s definition of them as “the cultural system of ideas about social and linguistic 
relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interests” (1989, p. 255).  
Linguistic ideologies are the connection between language use and political processes. 
According to Susan Gal:  
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The task [of the researcher] is to explicate how linguistic forms, when interpreted 
through particular linguistic ideologies, come to be seen as evidence of the moral, 
intellectual, and aesthetic qualities of speakers and to demonstrate that, when 
linked to ideas about knowledge, identity, groupness, and beauty, linguistic 
ideologies provide the justification for widely varying political arrangements 
(1998, p. 329).  
 
 
In this sense, language ideologies are not seen as cultural givens, but are deeply 
intertwined with political-economic factors and political processes (Kroskrity, 2000a). 
Eagleton sees ideology as “a particular organization of signifying practices which goes to 
constitute human beings as social subjects, and which produces the lived relations by which 
such subjects are connected to the dominant relations of production in society” (1991, p. 18). 
This conception disperses ideology throughout social order and, at the same time, it implies 
clear connections with Bourdieu’s doxa (Woolard, 1998, p. 6), while also reflecting the 
instability of the political world. This is clearly stated in Silverstein’s argument that “[t]he 
total linguistic fact, the datum for a science of language, is irreducibly dialectic in nature. It is 
an unstable mutual interaction of meaningful sign forms contextualized to situations of 
interested human use mediated by the fact of cultural ideology” (Silverstein in Woolard, 1998, 
p. 12). Briggs (1998) advocates linguistic ideology as a contentious social process and as an 
interactional construction, rather than a cultural given. A similar position is also adopted by 
Kroskrity, who argues that: 
 
Language ideologies are profitably conceived as multiple because of the 
multiplicity of meaningful social divisions (class, gender, clan, elites, generations, 
and so on) within sociocultural groups that have the potential to produce 
divergent perspectives expressed as indices of group membership. Language 
ideologies are thus grounded in social experience which is never uniformly 
distributed throughout polities of any scale (2000a, p. 12). 
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According to Silverstein, interactions that take place in institutionalized rituals are 
particularly productive sites for the enactment of language ideology. This is due to the 
inherent value-setting characteristics of such events, and therefore they constitute an apt site 
for researching this topic (Woolard, 1998). Silverstein introduced the concept of sites, which 
refer to the language that is the object of metapragmatic discourse (Philips, 2000). One of 
the noteworthy qualities of many institutionalized rituals is that they involve a great deal of 
metapragmatic activity. In court proceedings, as shown by Philips (2000), language ideology 
is usually double-sited. The proceedings involve both pragmatic language use and 
metapragmatic commentary on items that constitute that language, such as the way 
categories (i.e. delict or perpetrator) are constituted not through narration, but are rather 
ideologically constituted in the metacommentaries that structure the ritual (Philips, 2000, p. 
244-245). 
Silverstein demonstrated that language ideologies have an important relationship with 
language, in the sense that they can effectively distort the linguistic structure they represent 
(Woolard, 1998). Language ideology, understood as rationalization, that is, as local (and at 
most times intuitive) theorizations about how language should be used, not only explains but 
actually affects linguistic structure by “rationalizing” it, i.e. making it more regular. According 
to Mertz: 
 
linguistic ideology is part of the structure and practice of speaking (or writing or 
signing), emergent in linguistic structure but not completely determinative of or 
identical with the linguistic praxis in process. Thus, linguistic ideology can 
simultaneously distort or misrepresent, and shape or reflect, linguistic practice. 
This approach to linguistic ideology allows us to examine the ways in which 
social power and change are implicated in language structure – often through this 
process of ideological reflection and refraction.” (1998, p. 151). 
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The relation between ideology and linguistic structure is demonstrated by Woolard, 
when she states:  
 
Ideology thus constitutes an essential moment of the phenomenon of analogical 
linguistic change. Ideological tenets are derived from some aspects of experience 
and then generalized beyond that core and secondarily imposed on a broader 
category of phenomena; this broader category then undergoes restructuring. 
Structure conditions ideology, which then reinforces and expands the original 
structure, distorting language in the name of making it more like itself (1998, p. 
12). 
 
 
 
Semiotic Regimentation and Actors’ Awareness 
It is of special interest to us here that discourses not only have the capacity to represent, but 
also to regulate, other discourses. According to Bauman and Briggs (2000), the power to 
represent and to constrain discourse clearly relates to more than the referential content of  
messages and to their stylistic characteristics; it is in the metadiscursive domain that 
processes of producing and receiving texts are shaped, affecting who is authorized to make 
use of the available means of communication, and to decontextualize and recontextualize 
speech (Bauman and Briggs, 2000, p. 142-143). Particular modes of producing and receiving 
texts are imbued with authority. The legitimization of certain metadiscursive practices, at the 
expense of others, generates hierarchical rankings of discourse, and defines modes of 
producing and receiving them. This is something that may have deep impact on local social 
hierarchies.  
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Silverstein introduces the term metasemioitc regimentation to account for the semiotic 
processes of stipulating, controlling or defining the contextual, indexical or pragmatic 
dimensions of the function of signs in texts and in discourses, through the construction of 
fixed interactional texts (Parmentier, 1994).  He proposes two kinds of such regimentation 
processes, and suggested that they can be extrapolated from linguistic phenomena in order 
to also “describe normative constraints on social behavior and understanding deriving from 
sociopolitical forces” (Ibid., p. 127). The first is related to institutionally enforced 
metasemiotic arrangements that regulate the range of acceptable interpretants for specific 
actions or events, which can be achieved through explicit metasemioitc framing (such as 
when one says that “the meaning of A is B”), or by creating an implicit systematic 
representational world that privileges specific groups and silences others. The second is 
known as ideological regimentation, and results from the creation of a relatively decontextualized 
atmosphere of perception, knowledge, and expectation in the world, through a metasemiotic 
discourse. In the words of Parmentier, “[w]hereas institutional regimentation controls the 
interpretability of specific discourse forms in context, ideological regimentation operates to 
create a presupposed cultural theory of semiosis” (Ibid., p. 128). 
Semiotic regimentation processes operate as a background for what Thibault calls 
meaning making practices: 
 
Texts do not tell us how to read them, nor are meanings simply contained ‘in’ 
texts, waiting for the reader to extract them during a purportedly asocial reading 
process. Textual meanings are made in and through specific socially and 
historically contingent meaning making practices, which enact specific systems of 
foreground meaning relations. Meaning making practices construct and index 
both local and global relations of equivalence, contrast, generality, and specificity 
in the partial hierarchies of thematic and actional resources in the social semiotic 
(1991, p. 233-234). 
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Mertz (1998) summarizes by arguing that one aspect of the dialectic between 
pragmatics and metapragmatics is the way in which metapragmatic discourse encapsulates 
ideologies of language use, and plays an obvious role in the institutionalization of discursive 
mechanisms in society (Silverstein, 1993; Mertz, 1998, p. 151). The ongoing pragmatic 
qualities of discourse achieve coherence through their metapragmatic structuring, “which 
construes the ongoing discourse as being a certain type of discursive event” (Mertz, 1998, p. 
152); the discourse itself, on a pragmatic level, may contribute to a continuing typification 
process. For example, the passive construction of a description concerning an event might 
lead the listener to typify a ‘denial of responsibility’ on behalf of the speaker. Typifications 
also occur on a metasemiotic level during ongoing pragmatic dynamics. The negotiation 
between the typifications occurring on pragmatic and metapragmatic levels is ongoing; and 
even metasemiotic signaling is subject to negotiation or contestation. Mertz points out 
another important aspect: 
 
Participants in the same event may, of course, construe it differently, so several 
metal-level interpretations may be ‘on the floor’ at the same time. Herein lies 
some of the potential for struggle over the construction of discourse in key 
institutional arenas. In order to move beyond idiosyncratic interpretations of 
individual interchanges to a broader social view of this regimenting process, 
however, it might be productive to focus on moments when this typification 
process becomes more generally shared and explicit, approaching what 
Silverstein calls ‘noncancelability’ or ‘interactional nondeniability.’ To use a crude 
example, it may always be possible to retrospectively alter a meta-level 
formulation (‘I didn’t mean to insult you’), but it becomes much harder to do so 
when one has used an explicit metapragmatic marker (‘I’m insulting you, you 
idiot’). An unfamiliar audience listening to an exchange like this might be able to 
rely less in individualized knowledge of the speakers and more on a socially 
shared interpretation of ‘what is happening’ (to the degree that explicit markers 
invoke that more overt and shared level). As struggles over ‘what is happening’ 
become part of institutional processes, the dialectic between pragmatics and 
metapragmatics becomes less an issue of the varieties of individual dynamics 
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among participants and more an articulation of general levels of social definition, 
redefinition, and contest. (Mertz, 1998, p. 152) 
 
 
Ideological formulations concerning language and its use originate in local linguistic 
ideologies, and have a central role in the definition of the types of indexes that suggest what 
type of event is taking place. According to Mertz, typologizing discourse permits its social 
functioning, in the sense that “ideological struggle over the social meaning of discourse takes 
place against the backdrop of explicitly typifying (i.e., socially sedimented) metapragmatic 
registers” (1998, p. 153). Due to the existence of alternative metapragmatic ideological 
formulations, spaces open up for resistance to set practices. According to Mertz:  
 
Where an exchange takes place within an institutional framework in which one 
kind of meta-level interpretation fits institutional interests in a particular way, 
invocation of an alternative metapragmatic filter through and in speech 
pragmatics may well signal resistance to these very institutional frames and 
processes. … [T]here is a point at which the institutionalization of language can 
be understood at once as constantly at work in the structuring of discourse and 
as dependent on an ongoing process of ideological sedimentation of 
metapragmatic types (Ibid., p. 153). 
 
 
From this understanding of metapragmatic phenomena we can see that there are parts 
of the ideological process that are more accessible to the speaker’s awareness (the 
sedimented discursive types, like genres), while others are less available to conscious reflection, 
and tend to orient speakers towards specific discursive patterns related in some way to the 
power configurations of the situation. This is why, when political processes are in operation, 
and are dependent upon metapragmatic regimentations, successful dissidence is possible 
only if one can summon the means to act upon metasemiotic levels, as well as participate in 
the pragmatic arena. One of the main barriers for dissidence is the interplay between 
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ideology, language use and linguistic structures, which produce what Silverstein calls referential 
projection or objectification (1979). This refers to the forms through which the structure of 
language is often reified and projected as the structure of the world. Through such 
projections, pragmatic categories are interpreted as referential, such as for instance when 
tense is understood as units of time and not as a discursive element (cf. Hill, 1998). Tension 
therefore exists between the tendency of language to produce its own reification, on one 
hand, and the intuitive capacity of individuals to make use of metalinguistic functions (such 
as using reported speech as an authoritative device), on the other. This means that language 
awareness, when related to the ability of individual’s or groups’ to use metapragmatic 
strategies and devices, is unevenly distributed in time (for instance, a group may learn to use 
these strategies and devices through trial and error, even if they are not conscious of their 
function), and among groups (for example, power disputes involve, among other things, 
keeping subordinate groups from gaining control over metapragmatic strategies). Yet it 
seems that individuals usually have some degree of metapragmatic awareness, and usually 
deploy such awareness to influence communicative processes, and also to call attention to 
the specific uses of linguistic mechanisms and strategies at play in a given interaction. This 
may involve, for instance, direct reference to language structure, such as when glossing a 
word, or it may make reference to other instances of speech, such as when using reported 
speech (cf. Jacquemet, 1994). Besides direct and explicit use of metapragmatic awareness, 
there is also what Silverstein calls implicit metapragmatic awareness (1979), which refers to 
the capacity to incorporate background meaning elements signaling how a sign should be 
interpreted in times of metapragmatic level manipulation of communication (Hanks, 1989; 
Jacquemet, 1994). Jacquemet argues: 
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Through these strategies interactants express their ideology, that is, their position 
vis-à-vis rules linking communicative behavior with certain speech situations. By 
communicating and sharing metalinguistic accounts, members set up the 
conditions that allow inferences and construct the referential world as a universe 
of asymmetrical relationships (Jacquemet, 1994, p. 303). 
 
 
Jacquemet also discusses, in a paper on verbal interactions during the trials for 
individuals linked to the Neapolitan mafia in Italy, how pronouns associated to hierarchical 
distinctions (T/V pronouns) were strategically used to negotiate each speaker’s status and 
authority. For instance, individuals who were downplayed (addressed by less formal 
pronouns) reacted by making explicit the other’s metapragmatic move (e.g., by asking “have 
we met before? So why then are you using the tu?”), and by demanding to be addressed by 
the more formal pronoun. Jacquemet calls these types of moves metapragmatic attacks. He 
argues: “[m]etapragmatic attacks based on linguistic norms unravel the raw fabric of 
communicative interactions, exposing the disputants’ maneuvers and their struggle for 
control, respect and interactional dominance” (1994, p. 314). 
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2. The Political Semiotics of Texts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We will now turn our attention to analyze how what Mertz calls sedimented discursive types, and 
what we will (following Hanks lead; see 1987) call texts, participate in political processes. 
Hanks defines texts, heuristically, as being: 
 
any configuration of signs that is coherently interpretable by some community of 
users. As vague as such a definition is, already it commits us to a certain line of 
inquiry. … The fact of interpretability by a community of users locates text not 
so much in the immanent structure of a discourse as in the social matrix within 
which the discourse is produced and understood. It also signals a social 
orientation according to which text, whatever else it is, is a communicative 
phenomenon. (1989, p. 95) 
 
 
The line of inquiry Hanks mentions above is described by Bauman and Briggs as a 
move from the study of texts to the study of the emergence of texts in contexts (1990, p. 66)14. 
                                                 
14 Hanks provides correlating and useful definitions: “Textuality, on a first reading, is the quality of coherence or 
connectivity that characterizes text. … ‘Co-text’ designates the accompanying discourse in a single text, the 
speech stream preceding and following an utterance-fraction. ‘Metatext’ is any discourse that refers to, 
describes, or frames the interpretation of text. ‘Con-text’ is the broader environment (linguistic, social, 
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This approach pushes forward and goes beyond Geertz’ proposal that “[t]he culture of a 
people is an ensemble of texts, themselves ensembles, which the anthropologist strains to 
read over the shoulders of those to whom they properly belong” (2000 [1973], p. 452): 
besides “‘saying something of something,’ and saying it to somebody” (Ibid., p. 453), textual 
dynamics are also part of the battle over what cannot or should not be said, and has to 
remain, to some degree, outside the range of conscious attention. 
Two concepts are important in such an approach: contextualization and entextualization. 
Contextualization takes the place of the notion of contexts in the study of how language and 
social practices are intertwined. Contextualization recognizes that communicative contexts 
are not fixed, but rather that they emerge from negotiations between participants in social 
interactions. Contextualization also takes into account that “context-free content disregards 
the multiplicity of indexical connections that enable verbal art to transform, not simply 
reflect, social life” (Bauman and Briggs, 1990, p. 69). In this sense, texts are anchored in, and 
are inseparable from, the contexts in which they are created. Texts also resist being debased 
from these same contexts due to the resulting loss of some of their constitutive qualities.   
On the other hand, entextualization is the process that makes text susceptible to a 
relative decontextualization, to the loosening of ties between text and context. 
Entextualization “is the process of rendering discourse extractable, of making a stretch of 
linguistic production into a unit – a text – that can be lifted out of its interactional setting. A 
text, then, from this vantage point, is discourse rendered decontextualizable. 
Entextualization may well incorporate aspects of context, such that the resultant text carries 
elements of its history of use within it” (Bauman and Briggs, 1990, p. 73). Through 
                                                                                                                                                 
psychological) to which text responds and on which it operates. What might me called ‘pre-text’ encompasses 
whatever prepares the ground for or justifies the production or interpretation of text” (Hanks, 1989, p. 96). 
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entextualization a discourse can cross the boundaries of a situation (or a group), in which it 
preferentially takes place, to be propagated in other realms. The fundamental element that 
renders a discourse entextualizable is its reflexive capacity, “the capacity it shares with all 
systems of signification ‘to turn or bend upon itself, to become an object to itself,’” through 
projections and parallelisms, such as in metalingual and poetic functions. As pointed out by 
Bakhtin, a key element in such a process is the capacity texts have to present themselves as 
unitary wholes, as ‘finalized’ cultural constructs, with varying degrees of completeness 
(Hanks, 1987; Bakhtin, 2000). According to Bauman and Briggs:  
 
The metalingual (or metadiscursive) function objectifies discourse by making 
discourse its own topic; the poetic function manipulates the formal features the 
discourse to call attention to the formal structures by which the discourse is 
organized. … Performance, the enactment of the poetic function, is a highly 
reflexive mode of communication. … By its very nature, then, performance 
potentiates decontextualization (1990, p. 73). 
 
 
The issue at hand here is the processes through which local textual productions – from 
single utterances to large-scale literary constructions - gain some degree of 
institutionalization and have their structural and stylistic qualities incorporated into the set of 
semiotic habits of a specific group, or population, as communicative types rather than tokens. 
One of the primary examples of such textual institutionalized constructions is the concept of 
genre. Genres are textual types characterized by their apparent detachment from the context 
in which they originated, but while still retaining traces of the sociohistorical circumstances 
in which they appeared. According to Bauman (1986), genres consist of regular groupings of 
thematic, stylistic, and compositional elements, constituting historically specific conventions 
and ideals according to which authors compose discourses and audiences receive them. 
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Genres are then orienting frameworks, interpretive procedures, and sets of expectations that 
integrate the way actors relate to and use language (Hanks, 1987; Woolard, 1998). 
According to Bakhtin, the extent to which the internal organization of a textual 
construction is affected by the characteristics of the genre used by its author correlates with 
the internal qualities of the genre that will leave their traces in the textual construct. In 
textual constructs reflecting a particular genre, even realistic descriptions would then be 
more or less selective refractions of what it portrays (Hanks, 1987). The exogenous influence 
of genre in textual production is manifested, not only in formal structural and stylistic 
aspects, but also in the way the latter incorporates ideological values rooted in broader social 
contexts. Genres, therefore, have their own value-laden orientation, and are an integral part 
of what Hanks calls ideological horizon, the background against which events of the world are 
intelligible, and that throughout this text we have been calling (after Peirce) semiotic habits. 
Textual constructions are therefore the result of an interplay between constitutive principles 
associated to genres found in play and in social values, and the objects or events in the 
material world that are being described (Ibid.). 
 
In addition to their thematic orientation, works are also oriented toward the 
action contexts in which they are produced, distributed, and received. Ideological 
creations become part of practical reality by being realized in action and this 
entails adapting them to concrete social circumstances. In this formulation, 
speech genres are seen as both the outcome of historically specific acts, and 
themselves among the constituting dimensions in terms of which action is 
possible. Genres then, as kinds of discourse, derive their thematic organization 
from the interplay between systems of social value, linguistic convention, and the 
world portrayed. They derive their practical reality from their relation to 
particular linguistic acts, of which they are both the products and the primary 
resource (Hanks, 1987, p. 671). 
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In this sense, to the extent that genres “correspond to typical situations of speech 
communication and consequently also to particular contacts between the meaning of words 
and actual concrete reality under certain typical circumstances” (Bakhtin in Hanks, 1987, p. 
680), they are metapragmatic instruments that organize perception and impose ways in 
which textual pieces are interpreted. At the same time, metalinguistic specification is itself 
one way texts achieving completeness, in higher level genres, are powerful metasemioitc 
regimenting devices. We can see that textual constructions tend to structurally organize 
themselves into relatively autonomous wholes as effective tools for the teleological 
construction of larger semiotic fields. According to Bauman and Briggs: 
 
A number of authors have argued that genre plays a crucial role in shaping 
illocutionary force. These works suggest that genres are far more than isolated 
and self-contained bundles of formal features. A shift of genre evokes 
contrastive communicative functions, participation structures, and modes of 
interpretation. Moreover, the social capacity of particular genres and the 
relationship between genres are themselves patterned in ways that shape and are 
shaped by gender, social class, ethnicity, age, time, space, and other factors. 
Similarly, pursuit of a particular interactive focus (teaching, exhorting, 
befriending, confronting, etc) generally involves negotiated changes of genre in 
which features of one genre are embedded within a token of another. .... The 
illocutionary force of an utterance often emerges not simply from its placement 
within a particular genre and social setting but also from the indexical relations 
between the performance and other speech events that precede and succeed it. 
The illocutionary force and perlocutionary effects of courtroom testimony are 
highly dependent, for example, on evidentiary rules and broader semiotic frames 
that specify admissible types of relations to other bodies of written and oral 
discourse (Bauman and Briggs, 1990, p. 63-64) 
 
 
Part of the illocutionary power of textual constructions comes from the fact that, as 
Morris reminds us, there is no genreless text (1997, p. 33). Genre imposes demands on the 
speaker; it is genre that tells us which language game we are playing. Genre, in this sense, is 
not only a detail, but rather functions as an underlying logic that organizes experience. The 
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idea of genre here, in its phenomenological sense, correlates with Alfred Schutz’s 
conceptualization of finite provinces of meaning (Schutz, 1967a). In Schutz’s model, a finite 
province of meaning constitutes the foundation of the multiple worlds in which we live (the 
world of work, the world of dreams, the world of science, etc.) and are defined by specific 
cognitive styles that bring about a specific tension in consciousness (from wide-awakeness to 
sleep), a specific form of experiencing one’s self, a specific form of sociality, and a specific 
time-perspective. At the same time, the power of genres to organize experience comes from 
the fact that they are internally constituted by sets of symbols that operate as what Ortner 
(1973) names key symbols. While some elements work as summarizing symbols, those which sum 
up, express or represent their objects in emotionally powerful and relatively undifferentiated 
ways, others function as elaborating symbols, which are those that sort out complex and 
undifferentiated feelings and ideas and make them socially usable in specific ways (Ibid., p. 
1339-1340). Elaborating symbols include root metaphors, i.e. symbols that order cultural 
experience, and provide cultural orientations, and key scenarios, which are symbols that order 
action, and provide cultural strategies (Ibid., p. 1344). 
In providing partial closure, in form and in temporal organization, to streams of 
communication and texts, genres manifest as both the teleology of semiotic habits and as the 
dynamism of social life as collective semiosis. Furthermore, there is usually more than one 
genre that can frame a situation, and this often leads to social dispute at the metapragmatic 
level. Since practice is inscribed in time, and is always de-totalizing and de-totalized, it 
continually remains unfinished and emergent (cf. Hanks, 1987; Bourdieu, 1977); these same 
characteristics of being unfinished and emergent make it difficult for a genre to achieve 
completeness. This leads us to understand genre within a less formalist approach, and to 
consider it as rather forming a part of social disputes, with an aim of structuring and closing 
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theories of reality in accordance with local political agendas. Genres concurrently become 
elements of existing semiotic habits (because of their illocutionary power), and they also 
become metapragmatic tools for political action on behalf of local agendas. “Like schemes 
for Bourdieu’s actors, genres according to Bakhtin are expertly used by speakers, even 
though they may be unaware of generic parameters. … [and] [b]ecause they are at least partly 
created in their enactment, then genres are schematic and incomplete resources on which 
speakers necessarily improvise in practice” (Hanks, 1987, p. 681). 
The power to impose a genre upon the textual productions to be utilized implies also 
the power to decontextualize and recontextualize textual constructions into new genres. 
Decontextualization and recontextualization are strategic semiotic transformations that impel 
textual forms to gain authority and legitimacy through their appearance as timeless, 
ahistorical and universal (Gal, 1998), and therefore they transcend the specific circumstances 
in which local encounters take place. This is why, according to Bauman and Briggs, 
participants in local disputes usually display a strong concern for the social management of 
entextualization, decontextualization and recontextualization: 
 
The decontextualization and recontextualization of performed discourse bear 
upon the political economy of texts, texts and power. Performance is a mode of 
social production: specific products include texts, decentered discourse. To 
decontextualize and recontextualize a text is thus an act of control, and in regard 
to the differential exercise of such control the issue of social power arises. More 
specifically, we may recognize differential access to texts, differential legitimacy 
in claims to and use of texts, differential competence in the use of texts, and 
differential values attaching to various types of texts. All of these elements, let us 
emphasize, are culturally constructed, socially constituted, and sustained by 
ideologies, and they accordingly may vary cross-culturally. None of these factors 
is a social or cultural given, for each may be subject to negotiation as part of the 
process of entextualization, decentering, and recentering (1990, p. 76) 
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These authors also analyze the dimensions of transformation that one can employ in 
the contextualization of texts. These dimensions are aspects of the strategic actions used to 
pursue such transformations. The first dimension is framing, or the metasemiotic 
management of the recontextualization of a text, in which the use of reported speech, of 
metapragmatic strategies, as well as the employment of a combination, or a mix of genres, 
are all commonly employed tools. The second dimension refers to form, which extends from 
phonology and grammar to larger structures of discourse such as genres. Of special interest 
here, according to these authors, is the recentering of text by means of metonymic 
substitution. In this situation, one element (such as a key part in a plot) is used to evoke the 
whole in the listener’s minds. The third dimension of transformation is function, referring to 
transformations that occur when texts cross generic or situational boundaries (such as when 
a ritual text is used in a pedagogic circumstance). The fourth dimension is the indexical 
grounding of a text and its transformations through implicit or explicit metapragmatic 
actions. The fifth dimension is translation (including both interlingual and intersemiotic 
translation), in which textual transformations occur when they are translated from one 
register, or medium, to another. Translation is analyzed according to the way in which it 
affects the semiotic organization of communication. Finally, the sixth dimension refers to 
emergent structures of a new context during a process of recontextualization (Bauman and 
Briggs, 1990, p. 75-76). 
 
Semiotic Regimentation and the Social Manipulation of Perceptibility 
We will now turn to some developments in the understanding of how semiotic 
regimentation, through the use of specific genres or other devices (such as 
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decontextualization and recontextualization), generates socially produced specific 
configurations of perceptibility that are strategically created and used in sociopolitical 
processes. Having above presented the main generative structural elements of semiotic 
regimentation, we will now turn to some of its important qualities and most prominent 
features. 
Semiotic regimentation takes place through semiotic operations that effect changes 
in the semiotic quality of a semiotic object – which refers to either a material object, an event, 
an individual or a group, ideas, or anything else that could count as a sign. These changes in 
semiotic quality occur as outlined in Peirce’s phenomenological categories, and also in his 
typology of signs (see tables one and two in chapter one). The case already mentioned, from 
Jappy, of the semiotic quality transformation of the ultramarine pigment used in Quattrocento 
paintings for different audiences over time, is only one example within the broader field of 
semiotic quality manipulations of key elements, forming an integral part of sociopolitical 
processes in general. For instance, semiotic manipulation can produce a rhetorical 
construction of identity (such as when politicians dress in clothes or use language associated 
with the perceived social class of their electors – see for instance Hill, 2000), or can produce 
‘otherness’ (such as through stigmatization and scapegoating processes; see Goffman, 1961; 
Garfinkel, 1972; Girard, 1977); manipulations may simplify semantic fields in strategic ways 
to produce discursive insulation (existing as an integral part of institutionalized and non-
institutionalized discourses on science, religion, ethics, morals and tradition (See Lyotard, 
1988; Rothleder, 1999). Manipulations can make groups invisible in time or space (like the 
way in which national bureaucracies impose simplifications over the complexities of a social 
world – see for instance Spitulnik, 1998), or they can define the limits for moral communities, 
outside of which individuals are dehumanized (one example being the Holocaust – see 
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Zygmut Bauman, 1989; and for a different issue, see Morris, 1997). Semiotic manipulations 
may reduce the emotional load of some political actions (as found in the aforementioned 
analysis of Z. Bauman, 1989; and see also Giddens, 1987), or amplify and direct emotional 
content towards specific subjects (see Taussig, 1987; Daniel, 1996, 1998). It may affect the 
collective perception of time, and its relation to culture, and in doing so generate what 
Hobsbawn calls invented traditions (1993), or it can foster the distinction between what 
Herzfeld calls social and monumental times (in Portis-Winner, 2002). Through effecting 
changes in the spatial and temporal organization of sociocultural dynamics, some semiotic 
manipulations may impact the manner in which individuals relate to their environment, and 
their way of being in place and time (see Collins, 1998); such manipulations may also be used 
as devices for constructing authority and legitimacy, such as when prophetic discourse is 
presented as historical fact, or when dates are rearranged to increase the political impact of 
narratives (see Hanks, 1987; Nordstrom, 1997). 
A particularly fruitful development in this line of theory has been the contribution 
from linguistic anthropologists Susan Gal and Judith Irvine, in a series of publications (Gal 
and Irvine, 1995; Gal, 1998; Irvine, 1998; Irvine and Gal, 2000). As an object of analysis, 
they focused on the way in which people conceive links between linguistic forms and social 
phenomena and by means of their study they detected the existence of certain semiotic 
operators generating transformations in the ways in which social identities are produced and 
positioned within sociopolitical dynamics (specifically in regards to language use and the 
linguistic features of specific groups). They went beyond the common idea in sociolinguistics, 
that linguistic forms index social identities, and tried instead to understand the mechanisms 
through which such ideological constructions come to exist. According to these authors: 
 
  
72
[S]peakers (and hearers) often notice, rationalize, and justify … linguistic indices, 
thereby creating linguistic ideologies that purport to explain the source and 
meaning of the linguistic differences. To put this another way, linguistic features 
are seen as reflecting and expressing broader cultural images of people and 
activities. Participants’ ideologies about language locate linguistic phenomena as 
part of, and evidence for, what they believe to be systematic behavioral, aesthetic, 
affective, and moral contrasts among the social groups indexed. That is, people 
have, and act in relation to, ideologically constructed representations of linguistic 
differences. In these ideological constructions, indexical relationships become the 
ground on which other sign relationships are built (Irvine and Gal, 2000, p. 37). 
 
 
They identified three semiotic processes that operate as semiotic regimenting devices 
upon social identities (in relation to language use), and that are means by which people 
construct ideological representations of linguistic difference. The first of such operators they 
refer to as iconization; this is the process by which linguistic differences, indexing social 
contrast, are reinterpreted as icons of these social contrasts (Gal, 1998, p. 328). In this 
process, ideological representation fuses some of the group’s linguistic qualities with some 
supposed qualities of the group, and it is then perceived that one is the cause or inherent 
essentiality of the other. “Participant’s ideologies about language locate – and sometimes 
even generate – linguistic phenomena as part of, and as evidence for, what they believe to be 
systematic behavior, aesthetic, affective, and moral contrasts among the social groups 
indexed” (Ibid., p. 328). Irvine provides an ethnographic example of the Wolof of Senegal in 
which caste differences are associated with differences in speech style (Irvine, 1989). The 
logic could be expanded to include other classes of phenomena that are not necessarily 
verbal, in which an iconic relationship may be established between certain behavioral 
patterns and represented essentializations. These could include patterns in cultural practices, 
different diets, different calendars, different sexual orientations, and the like. 
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Iconization involves a transformation of the sign relationship between linguistic 
features (or varieties) and the social image with which they are linked. Linguistic 
features that index social groups or activities appear to be iconic representations 
of them, as if a linguistic feature somehow depicted or displayed a social group’s 
inherent nature or essence. This process entails the attribution of cause and 
immediate necessity to a connection (between linguistic features and social 
groups) that may be only historical, contingent, or conventional. The iconicity of 
the ideological representation reinforces the implication of necessity. By picking 
out qualities supposedly shared by the social image and the linguistic image, the 
ideological representation – itself a sign – binds them together in a linkage that 
appears to be inherent (Irvine and Gal, 2000, p. 37-38) 
 
 
The semiotic process of fractal recursivity (or recursiveness) involves the projection of an 
opposition characteristic from one level of a relationship onto another. For example, 
intragroup distinction can be projected onto intergroup relations, or vice versa.  
 
[T]he dichotomizing and partitioning process that was involved in some 
understood opposition (between groups or linguistic varieties, for example) 
recurs at other levels, creating either subcategories on each side of a contrast or 
supercategories that include both sides but oppose them to something else. 
Reminiscent of fractals in geometry and the structure of segmentary kinship 
systems – as well as other phenomena anthropologists have seen as involving 
segmentation or schismogenesis, such as nationalist ideologies and gender rituals 
– the myriad oppositions that can create identity may be reproduced repeatedly, 
either within each side of a dichotomy or outside of it. When such oppositions 
are reproduced within a single person, they do not concern contrasting identities 
so much as oppositions between activities or roles associated with prototypical 
social persons. In any case, the oppositions do not define fixed or stable social 
groups, and the mimesis they suggest cannot be more than partial. Rather, they 
provide actors with the discursive or cultural resources to claim and thus attempt 
to create shifting ‘communities,’ identities, selves, and roles, at different levels of 
contrast, within a cultural field (Ibid., p. 38) 
 
 
Erasure refers to a situation in which an ideology simplifies a sociolinguistic field, by 
directing attention to specific parts of it, therefore rendering some linguistic forms or groups 
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invisible, or recasts the image of their presence and practices to better fit an ideological 
scheme (Gal, 1998).  These two authors explain that: 
 
Facts that are inconsistent with the ideological scheme either go unnoticed or get 
explained away. So, for example, a social group or a language may be imagined as 
homogeneous, its internal variation disregarded. Because a linguistic ideology is a 
totalizing vision, elements that do not fit its interpretive structure – that cannot 
be seen to fit – must be either ignored or transformed. Erasure in ideological 
representation does not, however, necessarily mean actual eradication of the 
awkward element, whose very existence may be unobserved or unattended to. It 
is probably only when the ‘problematic’ element is seen as fitting some 
alternative, threatening picture that the semiotic process involved in erasure 
might translate into some kind of practical action to remove that threat, if 
circumstances permit (Irvine and Gal, 2000, p. 38-39). 
 
 
Irvine and Gal’s erasure is a semiotic operator that generates, in radical circumstances, 
what Lyotard (1988) called différend. Différend is the situation in which there is no possible 
communication between two parties, because the terminology that one of the parties 
recognizes as being proper and with which they can identify is defined as illogical or as 
unintelligible by the other party. Lyotard exemplifies this by using the case of the Holocaust 
revisionist Faurisson, who affirmed to have never met a witness who could prove the 
existence of Holocaust gas chambers. Faurisson organizes his discourse in a way that 
logically excludes possibility of the existence of “reliable witnesses,” as those who “really” 
witnessed them are dead; in the same way, those who are alive “could not” have witnessed 
them. In situations of différend, by means of a semiotic organization of discursive struggle, 
the weak are silenced, his/her discourse is pre-diagnosed as logically impossible, and the 
victim’s situation is denied (through the use of complex discursive juridical technologies), 
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especially if he/she can legally benefit from it15. There is also a kind of silencing that comes 
from what Rothleder calls the paradox of acknowledgement: “To have one’s pain recognized and 
recognizable within language is to make it commonplace and seemingly comprehensible and 
therefore less awful” (1999, p. 98). This incommensurability found in discourse, further 
heightened by the heterogeneous configurations of power attached to them, transforms 
specific individuals involved in a discursive clash into preferential candidates for degradation 
(Garfinkel, 1972), and for social scapegoating processes (Girard, 1977). The notion of 
différend explores the relation between conflictive language-games and vocabularies, and the 
idea of transcendental justice. Justice, in the metaphysical sense, becomes an unreachable 
metanarrative. Inside multidiscursive and multicultural panoramas, different groups may 
have radically different ideas about, and may have very different linguistic constructions for, 
dealing with justice. Justice (as closure) in dominant discourse relegates the others to silence 
or to rebellion. Situations of différend can expose the limits of social philosophies that are 
deeply dependent on the communicative will and capability of individuals, but also on the 
referential function of language. Language and linguistic exchanges are, as Bourdieu 
explained (1996), relations of symbolic power where power relations between speakers and 
their respective groups are updated. Of course we should not only accept the possibility of 
the existence of, but also look for, inclusive narratives that use the reflexive capabilities of 
language to unset possible différend situations. In Derrida’s opinion, only the effort to think 
the unthinkable, to hear the silenced, the will to leave the world of reason for long enough to 
listen to what would usually be considered insane, would make the language a proper 
medium for justice (in Rothleder, 1999). 
                                                 
15 Such as, for example, contemporary discussions over the definition of what and who is a war refugee. 
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Iconization, recursiveness, and erasure usually work together. Recursiveness often 
leads to the erasure of many contextual elements, and iconization occurs within the same 
categorical distinctions that frame recursiveness processes. Through the action of these three 
semiotic operators, representations are attached to social groups, alternative representations 
are excluded, and discursive authority and political legitimation are constructed and 
contested. 
Irvine and Gal also point to the fact that these semiotic operators are part of identity 
formation processes that depend on the definition of the self against an imagined other; the 
other being a social group or just the opposition side of a contrast. In such processes, the 
other is often essentialized and imagined as being homogeneous. Such essentializations also 
include linguistic images, that is, social representations in which linguistic behaviors of 
others:  
 
are simplified and seen as if deriving from those persons’ essences rather than 
from historical accident. Such representations may serve to interpret linguistic 
differences that have arisen through drift or long-term separation. But they may 
also serve to influence or even generate linguistic differences in those cases 
where some sociological contrast (in presumed essential attributes of persons or 
activities) seem to require display (Irvine and Gal, 2000, p. 39).  
 
 
Iconization, recursiveness, and erasure also seem to be essential operators in the 
creation of ethnic identity narratives and in the creation of other kinds of identity discourses 
(Kroskrity, 2000a) such as orientalism. This is because these discourses are constructed upon 
semiotic manipulations. The power of such semiotic operators stems from the indexical links 
they create between social representations, language features and sociopolitical life. This 
addresses the important issue of “how and why language comes not only to stand for social 
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groups but to do so in a manner that is both dependably readable and nonetheless socially 
acceptable” (Woolard, 1998, p. 20). According to Woolard (Ibid.), it is during the 
transformation from first-order indexicality (the pragmatic domain, the context of use), to 
second-order indexicality (the metasemiotic domain, also the context of folk theorization), 
that particular instances of speech are typified as a particular way of speaking, and are 
schematized as being categorically associated with a particular type of people. From that 
association, between language features and kinds of people, there is a common further 
associated transformation in which such features become emblematic of social, moral, or 
political character. 
Irvine and Gal provide a couple of examples outlining perceived differences: the 
difference between Bantu and Khoi languages in Western Africa when being used as a basis 
for constructing difference between Bantu registers (an example of recursiveness); and 
European linguists creating an image of Macedonians as being backward and lacking cultural 
sophistication due to the perceived “disorderly and chaotic” structural features of their 
language, marked by code switching and multilingualism (an example of iconization). 
Another rich example comes from post-Enlightenment European colonial “language 
mapping” projects, when scholars, equipped with the ideology that there should be one 
language for each nation, engaged in the effort to create “language maps” that were, at the 
same time, maps of the spatial distribution of ethnic groups. Irvine and Gal comment that: 
 
the mapping project involves out three semiotic processes. The language map 
depicted the relationship ideologically supposed to obtain between language, 
population, and territory (iconization), but it could only do so by tidying up the 
linguistic situation, removing multilingualism and variation from the picture 
(erasure). The multilingualism was supposed to have been introduced, along with 
religious and political complexity, through a history of conquest and conversion 
that paralleled the European conquest and the hierarchical relationships thought 
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to obtain between Europeans and Africans – relationships of white to black, 
complex to simple, and dominant to subordinate. That is, relationships between 
Europeans and Africans were the implicit model for a history of relationships 
within Africa itself (recursivity) (2000, p. 55). 
 
 
In this sense, European linguists, unable to properly interpret local discourses on 
diversity, or to make sense of pervasive multilingualism and code switching, saw disorder 
where there  was really a different kind of cultural order, and “chose to ‘orientalize’” the 
regions in which they found such linguistic patterns (Kroskrity, 2000a, p. 16; Irvine and Gal, 
2000). 
Semiotic operators, and the way in which they can transform collective perceptions of 
time, space, group borders, and also the relationship among different types of categorical 
distinctions (from those associated with perception, to more complex categories related to 
identity narratives), can produce the naturalization (or what Bourdieu calls misrecognition) of 
discursive authority, and the achievement of political legitimation, through the use of specific 
representations in sociopolitical processes (Gal, 1998). On the other hand, due to the 
metapragmatic capacities of language, “iconization, recursiveness, and erasure can 
themselves sometimes become the object of attention, debate, and ideological contestation” 
(Ibid., p. 329). 
 
Semiotic Operators and the Manipulation of Social Identities 
These semiotic regimenting devices operate within many semiotic domains beyond language. 
We will now briefly demonstrate how they also exist in analyses that are not strictly 
linguistic, concerning social identity manipulation, using examples from Girard, Garfinkel, 
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and Goffman. All three authors, to some degree but in different ways, subscribe to the 
Durkheimian tradition, specifically in terms of the way in which deviance is constructed in, 
and through, social action16. For Durkheim, the social process that creates “crime” is the 
same process that creates “punishment”. Groups that better identify with moral standards in 
use, and who have better control of metapragmatic devices and technologies, will frame 
some behavior as criminal, so rituals of punishment act as a reminder of society’s ideals. It is 
the ritualized action of identifying criminal behavior at the margins that leads to the 
recognition, reaffirmation, and celebration of society, and of its “collective conscience” 
(Hilbert, 1992, p. 85). Recruitment, trial and punishment of crime within a society are 
essential for the continued provision of order within a given society and this process works 
as a ritual anomie17-prevention practice (Ibid., p. 182).  
Of the three authors mentioned, Rene Girard most subscribes to the Durkheimian 
model, by focusing on situations in which the anomie-prevention ritual involves sacrifice and 
scapegoating. The sacrifice of a scapegoat, in Girard’s line of argument, equates to society’s 
effort “to deflect upon a relatively indifferent, ‘sacrificeable’ victim, the violence that would 
otherwise be vented on its own members, the people it most desires to protect” (Girard, 
1977, p. 4). This passage resembles Freud’s argument that “it really seems as though it is 
necessary for us to destroy some other thing or person in order not to destroy ourselves, in 
order to guard against the impulsion to self-destruction” (in Suarez-Orozco and Robben, 
2000, p. 27). By “sacrificeable” Girard means that the victim must be in a position to be 
                                                 
16 It is important to point out that between these authors exists much theoretical dissonance. Goffman, for 
example, clearly disagreed with orthodox constructionist views of social reality (Goffman, 1974, 1983; 
Branaman, 1997), making him a clear opponent of ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism (Collins, 1985, p. 
319). Our reference to these authors comes to an end with the recognition and exploration of their analytical 
cases.  
17 Anomie refers to a situation in which social fabric starts to decompose and the social basis for community life 
starts to fade. 
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sacrificed without causing loss to the social group in question (neither symbolic not material). 
This implies the need to manipulate, in specific ways, the social identity of the victim. 
However, a degree of misunderstanding is required, and the victim has to be an outsider, or 
has to be understood as being extraordinary (such as an initiated individual or an individual 
in a special role, such as a king), and therefore the sacrificeable cannot be representative of 
the (taken to be) “normal” and “ordinary” social order. In this situation, the social order is 
the object for the ritual, and the ritual is the (meta)semiotic interpretant of the object. A 
“sacred” victim is therefore necessary, and the victim’s identity is framed through a semiotic 
operation enabling his-her sacrifice to operate as a function for solidarity. The victim is 
iconized to sacredness and all background elements that might reveal his-her pre-ceremonial 
ordinary identity are erased. In this context, symbols need to be properly ordered – bad 
blood, good blood, sacred perpetrator, sacred victim, etc. Concurrently, the covert 
appropriation by sacrifice of certain violent properties, particularly the transfer of violence 
from one object to another, is hidden from sight by the semiotic functioning of ritual. Rites 
of sacrifice polarize the community’s aggressive impulses, and redirect them toward victims: 
victims that may be actual or figurative, animate or inanimate, but always incapable of 
generating further vengeance. The system must also be marked by a general transcendental 
character, such as the way in which judicial systems extensively appropriate signs from 
religion (a sign of recursiveness). 
Another insightful analysis, carried out by Harold Garfinkel, explores the principles 
by which semiotic processes are put to work, through an investigation of degradation ceremonies 
(1972). To use the Durkheimian hypothesis, a degradation ceremony occurs when the 
necessity arises to find a deviant. The ceremony prepares the “victim” for criminalization by 
transforming the victim’s identity without doing harm to the social group, with the aim of 
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fortifying the group’s existence. By Garfinkel’s definition, the grounds, and the behavior that 
makes explicable a person’s conduct, constitute his or her identity (Ibid., p. 202). In order to 
be victimized, a person must be expelled from the group in question18, and this occurs 
through a process of identity transformation. “The work of the denunciation effects the 
recasting of the objective character of the perceived other: The other person becomes in the 
eyes of his condemners literally a different and new person” (Ibid., p. 204). But what are the 
programs of communicative tactics, the semiotic operators that undertake the work of status 
degradation? Interestingly, the first transformation that takes place occurs in the realm of the 
participants. The event, the denouncer, and the denounced are all removed from ordinary everyday 
life, and made to be “out of the ordinary.” Indexical elements of an ordinary context must 
be erased, even if momentarily, and substituted by extraordinary ones. Persons and events 
are essentialized (iconized); and types of people and types of events become units of analysis. 
Irvine and Gal’s erasure proposes that any unique or distinctive character held by people or 
by events, any sense of accident, coincidence, indeterminism, or chance, should all be 
discarded. The recursiveness process leads to the defining of “types” in a polarized way: “the 
profanity of an occurrence or a desire or a character trait, for example, is clarified by the 
reference it bears to its opposite, the sacred. The features of mad-dog murderer reverse the 
features of the peaceful citizen” (Ibid., p. 205). By the same logic, the status of “outcast” is 
imposed on the denounced, and functions alongside the close identification between the 
denouncer and the witnesses, in order to transform him into a public person, as an iconic, and 
at the same time indexical symbol, of a collective. As a public defender of order, the denouncer 
then makes salient the supra-personal values of the collectivity, and his denunciation is 
delivered in their name. The distance between the denouncer and denounced is also 
                                                 
18 Or in the case of collective victimization, a group is expelled by the social order.  
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experienced by witnesses. Finally, “the denounced person must be ritually separated from a 
place in the legitimate order, i.e. he must be defined as standing at a place opposed to it. He 
must be placed “outside,” he must be made “strange”” (p. 207). The set of indexical signs 
that originally connected the denounced to the group, are destroyed. The conditions are then 
in place for his victimization, as part of a ritual construction of deviance. 
Goffman, in his analysis of asylums (1961), explores how individual self-experience is 
indexically dependent upon social arrangements of home environments, environments that 
are profoundly transformed by confinement in a total institution, in which the self is mortified. 
Total institutions are those where all spheres of individuals’ lives are organized and guided 
according to one specific plan (such as in the case of mental hospitals, prisons, and some 
religious institutions). According to Goffman, the mortification of self occurs after going 
through a range of identity transformation processes. The first is dispossession, which refers to 
a disruption in the usual forms in which individuals change roles throughout everyday life 
and life cycles, due to a new social identity being imposed by a total institution that creates 
separation from the circumstances in which such role changing takes place, and imposing a 
longer stable role. Programming and identity trimming are also part of the process and refer to 
the actions that shape an individual into just one more aspect of an institution’s disciplinary 
and administrative routine (such as admission procedures in prisons and mental hospitals), 
erasing the elements used by the individual to structure their self-identification. A special 
part of such identity transformation takes place through the dispossession of key self-
identification elements, such as a person’s name, property, and personal clothing. Also, 
required degrading postures and stances (such as when being submitted to strip searches, or 
the necessity to beg, or to ask for cigarettes, or to use the telephone), and the use of 
deference patterns (as is insisted upon by institutional staff), are all imposed in a manner that 
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leads to self mortification. In this position, inmates can loose control of what Goffman calls 
territories of the self – objects of self-feeling, such as the body, immediate actions, thoughts and 
some possessions – and are exposed to environments in which no private space is allowed. 
Interpersonal contact is forced upon inmates, previous age and status differentiations are not 
taken into consideration, and this leads to, among other things, disruptions in habitual 
linguistic patterns (like not being able to use formal styles of address that could index 
internal status stratification among inmates). One further implication of loosing control of 
privacy is that even strategies for protecting the self from attack are disrupted: certain face-
saving reactive expressions, like the use of irony or sullenness, are not taken as self-defensive 
responses, but as iconic signs of the self, all of which reinforces the processes through which 
the individual is iconized to a social identity that is imposed by an institution (deviant, 
mentally ill, etc.). As a result, the internal dynamics of a total institution disrupt an 
individual’s ability to act in ways that, outside the institution’s walls, can be taken as signs of 
self-determination, autonomy and freedom of action (Branaman, 1997, p. liv-lvi).  
In all three cases, we can see the central importance of institutionalized rituals in the 
setting of the metapragmatic grounds in which the process of identity transformation will 
take place. 
 
Textual Constructs and Legitimizing Devices 
We can see that semiotic operators, like those proposed by Irvine and Gal, are part of the 
way in which we make metapragmatic use of signs in general, beyond the field of language 
use. Consider for example the use of recursiveness in anthropological theory, such as when 
Sahlins suggests that “actions could represent in social practices theories encoded in myths 
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and enacted in rites – the realm of the political appears as practical versions of the 
cosmological” (1994, p. 430). Semiotic manipulations (such as the reification of concepts, the 
transforming of arguments into rhemes, making background elements invisible, and vice 
versa) seem to be part of the way in which cognition occurs and reacts within social practice, 
forming part of the social life of meanings. Elements of performance along with the 
pragmatic structural organization of textual constructions (such as genre, time organization, 
and rhythm) imply a certain degree of iconization (or we might say semantic contraction) in 
the use of signs in society. In political arenas, these semiotic operations form an integral part 
of competition for authority and legitimacy.  
According to Bauman and Briggs (1990), in order to be able to operate, by design or 
by intuition, the semiotic transformation of a text (i.e., to be able to decontextualize and 
recontextualize textual constructions, in specific ways), agents need to deal with standards of 
inclusion and exclusion that are brought upon by institutional structures, and by social 
definitions of eligibility that control access to texts. Likewise, social and institutional 
apparatuses, such as cultural property rights and ritual initiation, affect legitimacy by 
controlling the social division of authority to center a text and make it legitimate. This state 
of affairs tends to be unstable. If on one hand institutional structures confer legitimate 
authority to undertake such semiotic manipulations, on the other, processes of discourse 
appropriation and use may instead be a base for institutional power, or at least a base from 
which to challenge institutional stability. Furthermore, efficient decontextualization and 
recontextualization requires specific skills and competences in order for a subject to be able 
to create effective links between their agendas and the surrounding cultural, institutional, 
political and economic environments’ specifics.  
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Semiotic operations focusing on legitimacy construction seem to be linked to three 
kinds of manipulations: 1) manipulations of semiotic quality (in reference to the types of signs 
used, such as Irvine and Gal’s iconization, or like the effects of Ortner’s summarizing and 
elaborating symbols); 2) manipulations in the relationality of contextual elements (i.e. how relation 
types among elements, such as scales in the case of recursiveness, are used as causal 
explanations and as guides for category construction); and 3) manipulations in the perceptibility 
of specific contextual element (as is exemplified by Irvine and Gal’s notions of erasure and 
Lyotard’s différend).  
In terms of Peirce’s phenomenological categories, in sociopolitical dynamics there 
seems to be a tension between what is perceived to be Firstness, i.e. the essential, the stable 
and the detached from the transactions of everyday life, and Secondness, i.e. the immediate, 
the unstable and the unresolved; this applies in the sense that the former denotes an 
authoritative quality of the absolutely certain, while the latter implies ambiguity, and a degree 
of unresolvedness, to be rectified through social action. Since most forms of verbal 
interchange have an inherently negotiable (and therefore unstable) character, social dynamics 
in general make strategic use of essentializations as anchoring devices for rhetorical moves. 
These strategies basically consist of establishing an iconic link between the notion of 
authoritativeness and another element (such as the past, history, truth, a specific social rank, 
or a specific gender), and use the union to structure discourse in a way that the link between 
the two legitimizes the argument being made. At the same time, the relationality of elements 
is rearranged according to the agenda of individuals making use of a discourse. Furthermore, 
part of the regimentation process includes the construction of specific and strategic relations 
between sets of oppositions, with the goal of polarizing attention and opinion. By creating a 
maximally distinctive representation, identity narratives are especially affected: 
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[A]n ethnic group may employ any part of its culture to bring to the fore (what it 
perceives as) its own specific and unique characteristics, and such particularities 
are always seen in contrast (and opposition) to the characteristics of cultures of 
other groups (Portis-Winner, 2002, p. 34). 
 
[I]ndividual or component ideological preferences such as indigenous purism and 
strict compartmentalization provide specific cultural resources for maintaining 
maximally distinctive languages that can serve as the symbolic and 
communicative vehicles for their indexically associated social identities (Kroskrity, 
2000b, p. 333). 
 
 
This process also involves a regimentation of perceptibility. It directs psychic energy 
towards fewer elements, and may also increase the efficacy of semiotic manipulation: some 
analyses show that the transformation of a chunk of speech into ritual speech, for instance, 
with the formalization that it implies, promotes a suppression of speech’s referential 
function, and therefore decreases the text’s accessibility to both audience and performers, 
while at the same time enhancing its efficacy (Bauman and Briggs, 1990). 
 The use of reported speech, as authoritative discourse, is of special relevance here 
(Lucy, 1993). A person who makes use of reported speech intends to attach the same 
authority attributed to the particular discourse being reported to their own discourse. 
However, in many ways, the simple process of locating the discourse in the past alone tends 
to increase the discourse’s perceived authority. This is reflected by the strong link that exists 
between what Bakhtin calls the authoritative word and the past: 
 
The authoritative word demands that we acknowledge it, that we make it our 
own; it binds us, quite independent of any power it might have to persuade us 
internally; we encounter it with its authority already fused to it. The authoritative 
word is located in a distanced zone, organically connected with a past that is felt 
to be hierarchically higher. It is, so to speak, the word of fathers. Its authority 
was already acknowledged in the past. It is a prior discourse. It is therefore not a 
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question of choosing it from among other possible discourses that are its equal. 
It is given (it sounds) in lofty spheres, not those of familiar contact. Its language 
is a special (as it were, hieratic) language. It can be profaned. It is akin to taboo, 
i.e., a name that must not be taken in vain (Bakhtin in Parmentier, 1993, p. 262) 
 
 
Bakhtin distinguishes between novelistic discourse and rhetorical genres by stating that, 
in the former, the stronger element is the influence of the author’s ideological perspective 
over the speech being reported, while the latter is marked by the fixity, objectivity, and 
authority of the reported speech and therefore resists manipulation and asserts its own 
power upon an outer frame. Parmentier contests this by arguing that there is a danger in 
underestimating the creative role a political speaker can play in reporting authoritative 
discourse. In many societies, prescribed genres, such as judicial formulae and ritual language, 
share social space with lesser predetermined political oratories, in which authoritative textual 
constructions like proverbs, traditional wisdom, or historically memorable utterances, are 
quoted for creative, and contextually specific, rhetorical effect (1994, p. 72). According to 
this author: 
 
The politician’s aim is to harness these ‘words of another’ for the purposes of the 
moment, and this is frequently accomplished by submitting instances of quoted 
speech to the regimenting organization imposed by the unfolding of the 
reporting or framing speech. In a sense, then, the quotation of authoritative 
discourse surrenders only momentarily to the hierarchical rank inherent in this 
reported discourse, for these official or traditional words are in fact put to uses 
unintended by their original authors or not implied in their initial contexts. 
Second, the use of direct rather indirect quotation, while certainly demonstrating 
appropriately reverential obeisance, can also be a mechanism for transferring the 
aura of historical objectivity and representational naturalness from the inner to 
the outer frame of the discourse. Here it is precisely the presumed ‘distancing’ of 
the reported utterance that allows the speaker to harness the authority attaching 
to the quotation without calling attention to the creative, rhetorical purpose of 
doing so. In other words, speakers can induce legitimacy upon their own speech 
through the juxtaposition of iconically represented authoritative speech (1993, p. 
263).  
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A metonymic association between the perceived authority of the reported discourse 
and the speech being delivered is therefore strategically created. The use of proverbs is 
exemplary: as mentioned, their use can be analyzed as a speaker’s attempt to legitimize his 
own claims to an authoritative voice, especially when a proverb contributes to the 
reorganization of the metapragmatic genre in use; this process also induces the presupposing 
of a degree of naturalness that in turn lends some of its perceived authority to the framing 
discourse. While proverbs appeal to a supposedly widely shared common sense view of the 
world, at the same time, they provide a sense of trust, and of predictability, due to the 
occurrence of another metonymical association in which the quoting of proverbs, exactly as 
prescribed by local traditions, may project a sense of transparent objectivity upon the other 
parts of the discourse (Parmentier, 1993, p. 280).  
 Another common semiotic strategy is the production of mixed genres, by overtly 
manifesting subscription to a genre, while covertly transforming parts of its structural 
elements. One clear example is the presentation of an argument as a historical narration, 
even though dates are manipulated, and other time indexes for historical facts are changed to 
affect interpretation in specific ways. The apparent “historical omniscience,” wrote 
Parmentier, “creates an aura of decontextualized wisdom, which is formally supported by … 
numerous switches in temporal reference within the speech itself” (Parmentier, 1994, p. 90). 
Hanks (1987) calls this strategic political use of dates (and also the treatment of different 
events from different times as being temporally equivalent), in rhetoric and official 
documents, telescoping. 
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 One particularly rich example of the use of semiotic strategies in the attempt to 
construct political legitimacy has been presented by Hanks (Ibid.) in his study of sixteenth 
century Mayan documents, in colonial Yucatan, Mexico. In these documents, local Mayan 
nobles attempt to construct themselves as legitimate local leaders to the Spanish crown, and 
therefore reproduced (and sometimes constructed) their positions as local elites in times of 
radical political instability. The texts make use of reported speech, metalinguistic framing, 
and persuasive rhetoric in an attempt to regiment their reception by the Spanish. They also 
make use of eclectic resources at hand, such as the perceived realism of existing land surveys, 
and the documentation of family lineages, communicated through novel genres introduced 
by colonial agents based on public declarations of heartfelt religious conversion and 
confession, and a manifested loyalty to the Spanish crown. But of particular relevance in 
these documents is the use of dates, where a mixture of pre- and post-conquest spatial and 
temporal indexes is found, implying a degree of continuity. These texts produced new hybrid 
genres that construct new forms of textual reception (Ibid., p. 688). Hanks argues: 
 
Official Maya discourse displays a strong orientation toward Spanish ideology 
and institutional structures, but it would be wrong to conclude from this that the 
Maya were ‘already converted’ and simply following the rules laid down by the 
conquerors. Rather, the display of hispanization in these works is at least in part 
a means of familiarizing them to the, primarily Spanish, addressees. The format, 
style, and thematic content of the documents all maximize the appearance that 
their authors honored the values of their conquerors and were themselves 
honorable. This involved, on the one hand, what Bourdieu (1977, p. 22) called 
‘regulation,’ whereby actors strategically make a show of their adherence to moral 
and ethical values of the group, in order to display their own impeccable 
character. On the other hand, the discourse is also ‘officialized,’ whereby it 
presents itself as a bona fide, witnessed document, authorized by specific, 
entitled actors. Both regularization and officialization are pragmatic processes 
that link individual works to dominant power structures. Both have a tangible 
influence on the linguistic forms through which genres are realized (…) These 
texts also display the traces of second-order strategies evidently directed toward 
regularizing the authors in terms of what they took to be the desires and 
expectations of the Spanish crown. For instance, the display of conversion in a 
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kind of regularization. In their letters to the king, Maya nobles deprecated 
themselves in terms of Franciscan morality, as idolaters mired by the devil, and 
took pains to display their reverent love of God and the King and their desired 
to be saved. Similarly, the assertion and display of peaceful solidarity among 
multiple, named witnesses (testigos) is a form of regularization, found in both 
letters and (at least the Yaxkukul) chronicles. It shows that the native nobles are 
tractable with the Spanish and prepared to exchange truth with them in front of 
witnesses. Insofar as [such officializing devices] brought the discourse within the 
scope of what the Spanish considered to be legitimate, they also contribute to 
regularization. Thus both modes of orienting toward dominant values and 
institutions have a broad impact on the constituting features of genres (Ibid., p. 
678) 
 
 
Through the dislocation of structures of address and temporal reference, in which 
colonial and indigenous frameworks are blended, the local Mayan elite not only were able to 
ground their discourse, but they also managed to produce new forms of official action, and 
by doing so, reproduced their distinctness in relation to the non-elite Maya society. At the 
same time, such hybrid genres made new Spanish forms of social regimentation intelligible 
to local populations by integrating them with familiar local practices. In Hank’s analysis, such 
new genre creations form part of intricate and dynamic processes of the naturalization of 
social experience, grounded in social practice in changing political fields19.  
Some performance strategies have the particular effect of creating an image of an 
established reality or truth, repetition being perhaps the most prominent one. Repetition is the 
basis for the cultural phenomenon Hobsbawn calls invented traditions, which are sets of 
practices, “normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules of a ritual or symbolic 
nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which 
automatically imply continuity with the past” (Hobsbawn, 1993, p. 1). As Hill (2000) 
                                                 
19 An also very interesting case of manipulation of semiotic representations of social hierarchies in times of 
radical social change, including through the use of official documents, was presented by Bond, referring to 
political transformations in the Uyombe of Northern Zambia (Bond, 2000, 2002). 
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demonstrates, repetition affects not only perception of reality, but also emotional and 
aesthetic realms of existence. In American political life, she argues, these form part of what 
she calls the theatrical perspective, where performance, rather than the direct referential 
dimensions of political agendas, is the key element. In the theatrical perspective of political 
campaigns, she purports, the key element is not density of information, but instead 
“penetration,” that is, familiarity gained through “constant repetition that sets up a complex 
performance-based resonance with critical groups of voters, a resonance that is at least as 
much aesthetic and affective as it is referential” (Ibid., p. 264).  
 
Political Fields and Multiple Genres: ritual and game as key metaphors. 
In such a panorama, the role institutions and institutionalized practices play is of special 
relevance. There are many studies concerning the ways in which institutions, such as 
schooling and law, instill truth and value upon some linguistic and semiotic patterns “while 
ruling others out of bonds” (Woolard, 1998, p. 15). Semiotic practices, linked as they are to 
ideological configurations, are central elements in the construction and legitimation of power 
positions, in the production of specific social relations, and in the creation of identity 
narratives, with all the usual cultural stereotypes attached to them. Therefore, semiotic 
regimentation is a central part of the mechanics through which discourses attempt to 
naturalize and universalize the ideologies that ground them, “disguising the conditions of 
their own production and their intimate and often strategic ties to power, interest, and the 
creation of cultural value.” (Spitulnik, 1998, p. 164). 
 These processes apply to a wide range of institutional configurations, from ritualized 
practices, to bureaucracies, to academic production. We can identify two opposed poles in 
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this aspect of social life: one directed towards closure and the structural fixation of the 
complexity of social relatins, which is the ritual, and one directed to openness and the 
deconstruction of previous structural configurations, which is referred to by the metaphor of 
the game. We can see ritual and game as two meta-genres of social action, inside of which 
other sub-genres will be enacted through different kinds of performance. Performance is a 
crucial aspect of this issue, as it has the power to define the genre that will metapragmatically 
organize the social action, when there is no external constraint imposing a specific genre 
upon it (like a court or church environment, in which it would be hard to change the genre 
of the social action in usual circumstances). Performance makes strategic use of shared 
values and semiotic habits, and that is why its efficiency is high even concerning the 
economy of words.  
While all political fields have elements of these two poles, specific genres reinforce 
some and reduce the importance of others. So while judicial systems, for example, depend 
strongly on ritualistic elements for their effectiveness, other types of political events, like a 
political debate, on the other hand, may instead end up resembling more of a game.  
   
Ritual 
Since ritual constitutes an arena of central importance for the cultural construction of 
authority and the dramatic display of the social lineament of power, it is not surprising that 
endowing a political event with some ritualistic qualities is a strategy that is widely employed. 
One of the most interesting theoretical accounts on rituals was presented by Tambiah (1985). 
According to this author, ritual performance has the dual aspect of stereotyped invariability, 
and variable contextual social anchoring. The power of ritual comes from its capacity to 
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function as iconic symbols of cosmologies, while indexically constructing and legitimating 
social hierarchies (Ibid., p. 155). Tambiah defines cosmologies as: 
 
[T]he body of conceptions that enumerate and classify the phenomena that 
compose the universe as an ordered whole and the norms and processes that 
govern it. From my point of view, a society’s principal cosmological notions are 
all those orienting principles and conceptions that are held to be sacrosanct, are 
constantly used as yardsticks, and are worthy of perpetuation relatively 
unchanged. As such, depending on the conceptions of the society in question, its 
legal codes, its political conventions, and its social class relations may be as 
integral to its cosmology as its “religious” beliefs concerning gods and 
supernaturals. In other words, in a discussion of enactments which are 
quintessentially rituals in a “focal” sense, the traditional distinction between 
religious and secular is of little relevance, and the idea of sacredness need not 
attach to religious things defined only in the Tylorian sense. Anything toward 
which an “unquestioned” and “traditionalizing” attitude is adopted can be 
viewed as sacred. Rituals that are built around the sacrosanct character of 
constitutions and legal charters or wars of independence and liberation, and that 
are devoted to their preservation as enshrined truths or to their invocation as 
great events, have … a “traditionalizing role,” and in this sense may share similar 
constitutive features with rituals devoted to gods or ancestors (Ibid., p. 130).  
 
 
In Parmentier’s view, paradox is a term that is more apt than dualism to describe ritual, 
because while action and language of ritual often appear highly structured and conventional, 
the powerful efficacy released by ritual is narrowly channeled or situationally patterned. (1994, p. 
129). He calls attention to teleological structurations of rituals, by coining the term 
hyperstructured in referring to the central role structural aspects play in rituals: “[R]itual can be 
interpreted as hyperstructured social action, in which segmentation, hierarchy, and stereotypy 
are not just contingent aspects of performance but are the means of calling attention to the 
structuredness of action.” At the same time, rituals are context specific, often assigned to 
very restricted temporal intervals, prescribed to certain places. “Ritual rules also define the 
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social roles allowed to participate in or take on assigned responsibilities for the performance, 
and specify the prior conditioning required for all participants” (Ibid., p. 130). 
The paradox arises once the characteristic contextual anchoring of rituals appears 
contradictory to the rituals’ formal structures and, as with any form of entextuation, leads to 
a certain degree of decontextualization. Parmentier points out that there are many different 
decontextualization processes usually present in rituals: the symbolic power of ritualistic 
elements (such as sacred texts) seem disconnected from participant intentions, from 
contingencies of the practical moment in which the ritual takes place and from any 
contextual specification or reference to elements that do not take part in the ritual itself. In 
this sense, rituals are self-contained and self-referenced social events, in which a 
phenomenological bracketing of the surrounding social world sustains the semiotic 
regimentation that provides grounds for the existence of narratives of eternal and universal 
truths (Ibid., p. 132). This is why ritual can survive spatial and temporal dislocation. A 
central quality of the awesome semiotic machinery of ritual is its capacity to enable 
entextualizations and to allow a great deal of emotional content to be attached to specific 
genres and narratives, in order to sustain symbolic configurations that would not prove to be 
valid in other genres and realms of existence. At the same time, ritual can also function as a 
legitimating device for social configurations that cross frontiers in time, space and genre and 
therefore exist outside of the ritual.    
In ritual, the feature of self-referentiallity is of special relevance, because it reveals the 
power of the teleological and tautological functioning of semiosis in social life. Parmentier 
notes that the hyperstructured components of ritual form a network of mutual implication 
and internal metareference, where the ritual makes reference to itself and, in its processual 
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development, ends up reproducing the same ideology that the ritual originally took as a 
prerequisite.  
Ritual actions, therefore, are not just conventional, but are also conventionalized in the 
way that conventional forms themselves become objects of ritual attention (such as when 
the precise mastery of performative action is a key element in the constitution of the 
transcendental power of the ritual) (Parmentier, 1994, p. 133). The problem with Tambiah’s 
account, in the opinion of Parmentier, is that in pointing to the effective power of rituals and 
suggesting that such power lies in their tokenness and indexicality, the hyperstructures are left 
unaccounted for (or at least undervalued): 
 
The socially effective power of ritual performances in context cannot be 
accounted for without noting the semiotic contribution of the highly structured, 
conventional, rule-governed character of ritual action. (…) But it is an illusion 
that the power comes de novo out of the moment of performance, despite the fact 
that participants in ritual events might feel that this power emerges at that 
moment. A moment’s event is simply a token, but a ritual event is a token which 
is an instance of a general regularity, that is, a Peircean ‘replica’ that brings into 
context the legitimized authority, divine precedent, or mythological charter 
behind ritual action. One of the results of ritual repetition is that the token 
quality of the action is lifted out of the category of ‘sinsign,’ that is, a token sign 
without a corresponding generative type, to be grasped as a replica, which is 
created by cultural rather than natural semiosis. In this way, ritual performance 
signals not just cultural conventions but conventionality itself. And this, then, is 
the function of the hyperstructure of ritual processes, since rituals call attention 
to the existence of cultural templates or predictive ‘blueprints’ derived from 
supernatural or transcendental sources existing beyond the moment of 
performance. So ritual does occur at the level of event, but these events are 
realizations of general patterns (1994, p. 132-134). 
 
 
The paradox between contextual anchoring and formal patterning is resolved when 
ritual action is understood as the contextual anchoring of hyper-conventional forms, which 
obtain their regimenting power through their association with cosmological and 
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transcendent cultural types (Ibid., p. 134). Therefore, the key point is not that ritual 
“symbolically and /or iconically represents the cosmos and at the same time indexically 
legitimates and realizes social hierarchies” (Tambiah, 1985, p. 155), but rather that ritual 
legitimizes social hierarchies because of how it affects the ongoing construction of the cosmos, while also 
constructing the conditions for presenting such a construction as its bona fide, iconic 
representation. It is precisely this amazing capacity of ritual, as a specific genre, to produce a 
shift from referentiallity and analytic-rational thinking, through the shrinking of semiotic 
complexity (iconization), towards the sacred, which is so appreciated by politicians, and links 
the ritualistic aspect of political life to its dramatic and performative dimensions.   
 
Game 
Actors do not deliver performances or attempt metapragmatic regimentations (of which 
ritualization is one type) because of the mechanical repetition of cultural habits; rather, actors 
use such devices, actively or reactively, in strategic and tactical ways, according to their 
perceptions of the field, while taking into account the background of their current status, 
and available resources and agendas. This occurs even when actors themselves believe that 
they are only mechanically repeating local conventions. The metaphor of game is perhaps 
the best one to apply to such a take on social dynamics.  
One of the first theorists in anthropology to make use of the metaphor of the game 
is Frederick Bailey. In a text that has become a classic in political anthropology (Stratagems 
and Spoils, 1969), Bailey stresses the necessity for social scientists to focus their attention on 
the pragmatic aspects of political life or, in his words, “how the game of politics is played in 
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the political arena.” Bailey insists that political action is fundamentally mediated by its 
relationship with the external environment (referring to larger political structures or arenas in 
which a game takes place) and with the driving force behind all political action, required for 
the survival of the game (that is, society). He recognizes the fact that flexibility is one of the 
most important elements of political structure and that boundaries are constantly re-created 
by unpredictable external factors as well as by the actions of individuals.  
Regarding shared values, Bailey states: “Values both create and regulate political 
competition” (Ibid., p. 21).  Without some sense of shared values, a competitive interaction 
turns into a chaotic fight.  Yet sharing is often limited: “it would be naïve to assume that 
every leader or member of a political community has thoroughly internalized its normative 
rules” (Ibid., p. 22). In other words, values cannot be the determining factor in political 
maneuvering because they are not entirely pervasive.  
Bailey equates political structure in a game to an analytical tool for highlighting the 
various elements that determine how decisions are made and how policies are carried out. 
One of the key analytical elements of his work is the argument that we must understand the 
balance between “normative” and “pragmatic” elements in order to appreciate how 
decisions are made and how change occurs. Bailey criticizes anthropologists for their bias 
toward focusing on normative systems: 
 
One of the great gaps in anthropology is that we have been too much interested 
in the ‘system’ and although we know that people live half their lives finding 
ways to ‘beat the system’ we tend to take serious notice of them only when they 
are caught out, brought to trial and punished. In fact of course sometimes people 
‘beat the system’ without being punished; that is how the systems change. The 
pressure of competition in politics drive them to find ways to win without 
actually cheating, or to cheat without being caught out, or, in the extremity, to 
fight to sweep that system away altogether and find one that suits them better 
(Ibid., p. 87). 
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Bailey criticizes the focus on normativity as being grounded in a top-down analysis, as 
opposed to looking at how groups of people operate within the constraints of a game. By 
neglecting how people regularly manipulate the system, we miss out on what we are seeking 
to understand, that is, an understanding of both the fluid nature of a system, and also how 
social change occurs. 
The notion of game for Bailey resembles what Sherry Ortner has called serious games. 
Her intention in using this concept is to capture simultaneously the fact that:  
 
[S]ocial life is culturally organized and constructed, in terms of defining 
categories of actors, rules and goals of the games, and so forth; that social life is 
precisely social, consisting of webs of relationship and interaction between 
multiple, shiftingly interrelated subject positions, none of which can be extracted 
as autonomous “agents”; and yet at the same time there is “agency,” that is, 
actors play with skill, intention, with, knowledge, intelligence. The idea that the 
game is “serious” is meant to add into the equation the idea that power and 
inequality pervade the games of life in multiple ways, and that, while there may 
be playfulness and pleasure in the process, the stakes of these games are often 
very high (1996, p. 12). 
 
 
The metaphor of the game is interesting due to the dynamic character it embellishes on 
social life: games have structures, but these structures do not predetermine their outcomes. 
One of the main elements in every game is to explore the possibilities to which the rules of 
the game make no specific reference. While the game’s structures may impose important 
restrictions and constraints on a course of action (like membership criteria or material 
resources that are unevenly distributed), games also suffer from inside and outside influences 
in the arenas in which they are played. The elements of a game that give it relative stability – 
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normative rules – usually do not define who will win, although it may limit possibilities of 
victory for some participants, while enhancing the possibilities for others20.  
Perhaps the main insight that the metaphor of games can give us is the integral role of 
uncertainty and unpredictability contained within them. Every game has a degree of 
imponderability and serendipity in its course of action and these are pre-conditions for a 
game to be accepted as being valid and legitimate. The same applies for describing the 
political world, as Arendt has reminded us: where Truth exists (as closure) there can be no 
politics and therefore no society either (Heller, 1991). This makes competition and conflict, 
with their necessary degree of imponderability, requirements for the existence of human 
culture-based society. Yet, since the creation of narratives, with their precise intent to 
downplay the role of uncertainty and unpredictability in social action, seem to be part of the 
sociopolitical world (in which these narratives themselves are created as strategies to manage 
the same ambiguity and uncertainty), it is of no surprise that ambiguity and chaos were 
systematically left unaccounted for in theoretical reconstructions of events and causes. This 
can be seen, for instance, in Lévi-Strauss’ assertion that “[w]hat is refractory to explanation is 
ipso facto unsuitable for use in explanation” (1963, p. 69). 
 Bailey calls this tendency to conceal the imponderable qualities of social life affecting 
the balance between what is perceived as normative and the requirements for pragmatic 
action (which are often in contradiction with established norms), the normative façade (2001). 
“The way to make sense of complexity is,” Bailey argues, “to pretend that it does not exist 
and to assume that matters are more simple than you know them to be. This is done by 
translating raw experience through ideas, which are elementary categories stripped clean of 
                                                 
20  On the other hand, open competitiveness may not be the central element of some games, but rather 
narratives of cooperation. 
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the complexities that in reality cling to them” (Ibid., p. 197). In this sense, ambiguity and 
uncertainty are dealt with through a good degree of conservatism: “Leaders try to meet new 
situations by forcing them into the categories of familiar situations, or by making minimal 
adjustments to well-tried plans” (Bailey, 1969, p. 69). Usually there is a need for pragmatic 
adjustments, since idealized categories rarely fit into the complex and multidimensional 
realities in which action unfolds. The normative façade is the result of efforts to pass 
normative patterns as if they were reality and to conceal that pragmatic departures are in fact 
deviations (Bailey, 2001, p. 206).  
 
The scriptural account of the way political systems work is protected by the 
commandment that whatever pragmatic things are done out of sight should be 
kept out of sight. (…) [W]hy do politicians – or the rest of us in our own lives, 
which follow a similar pattern – think the lie is needed? Why the ideal?  
The ideal sells itself because it is simple, clear, unambiguous, and reassuring. 
There is a psychological payoff to simplification: It is good for morale. It 
provides a sense of security, a feeling that someone – or some creed – is in 
control; there is a center; things will not fall disastrously apart. Certainly political 
persuaders exploit that feeling (Ibid., p. 207). 
 
 
Well established dominant groups will try to make use of as many pragmatic, non-
normative devices and strategies in order to sustain any fading normative patterns that they 
are usually identified with. Among other things, normativeness is used as a device for social 
distinction in sociopolitical arenas. 
Therefore, at all times, political rhetoric has the mark of bricolage. This bricolage 
activity takes place through the use of known ideas, concepts, or categories to enable the 
subject to act upon new situations (which may occur in entirely novel contexts), through 
existing genres, or through an artful combination of genres (Hanks, 1987). This process 
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usually results in the construction of new sets of meanings, or even whole new entextualized 
cultural constructs (i.e. decontextualizable and understood as types, as new genres, or styles of 
thinking and action).  
When the moment arrives to explore explanations, and to adjust conceptual tools in 
order to deal with the perceived characteristics of a situation at hand, is also the moment in 
which new categories and forms of action are materialized. Every single act in existence 
contains a quantum-moment of instability of meaning, of pre-cognition, of pre-semiosis, and 
of fertile ambiguity pregnant with possibilities and with anxiety and is thus faced with 
conservative regimenting attempts of semiosis, which may or may not be successful. At the 
heart of the tension between the phenomenologically novel and the conservative impulse of 
semiotic regimentation, lies the magma of history, instants of reproduction, deconstruction, 
or the creation of political realities and power configurations. 
One important dimension of all this can be seen when ambiguity itself becomes an 
element of metapragmatic manipulation: a strategy for achieving specific goals. Take the 
following example from Kulick, in which ambiguity is used as a cultural strategy for dealing 
with the potentially dangerous political forces found in communication: 
 
Gapun villagers’ language ideology, which privileges ambiguity, hidden meanings, 
and meanings construed by listeners rather than those conveyed by speakers, 
provides them with ways to traffic in knowledge without putting themselves or 
their interlocutors in too much danger. By oscillating between ‘inside’ talk and 
‘outside’ talk, by making deliberately ambiguous, self-contradictory statements, 
by pressing into service specific structural features such as codeswitching and 
diminutives, and by developing discursive features such as repetition and 
dissociation speakers in Gapun manage to reveal, discuss, and circulate 
knowledge even as they conceal it and thereby gingerly sidestep many of the 
potentially fatal consequences that stark, unmitigated knowledge is known to 
have (Kulick, 1998, p. 91). 
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There are also situations in which ambiguity is less a quality of a whole system or field, 
and is more a discrete element in social action. It seems to be true that agents, even under 
illusions created by a normative façade, develop a certain degree of mastery and confidence 
in dealing with the novel, to the degree that they may make use of ambiguity depending on 
their political agendas. According to Bailey, the political creation of ambiguity seems to be a 
necessary condition for social change: 
 
[T]o bring about a change of normative structure, one essential part of the 
process must be the blurring of hitherto firm categories, making it possible for 
people to say, at some stage, “they are and they are not” or “this is and this is 
not.” When there is no ambiguity, nothing can be moved (2001, p. 184).   
 
 
For this reason, when subjects intend to effect change in a political field, one way of 
doing so is attacking the certainties and the established patterns of actions associated with 
the field in question. This may occur when a subject, attempting to transform the current 
status quo, inserts some degree of disorder through his-her actions and disrupts some 
habitual patterns within the political arena, so that a new way of understanding and doing 
things evolves to reestablish order, while at the same time introducing the desired structural 
change21.  
                                                 
21 One of the most spectacular examples of this type of process can be found in Gandhi’s strategies to release 
India from British rule, as discussed by Bailey (1969, 1988, 2001). Gandhi used strategies for which the British 
administration had no ready-made effective response, by making use of breaches in the British law, and, in a 
politically effective metapragmatic move, imposing a new frame for the collective understating of legitimate 
politics that left no room for the stay of the British administration in India. Through the use of nonviolence as 
a normative rule, and civil disobedience as a pragmatic strategy, Gandhi circumvented British law, and in doing 
so, the same repressive means that could legitimately be used against armed rebels, could not be used against 
him (2001, p. 184). In this sense, Gandhi (who was a lawyer) played British normative respect for the rule of 
law against British rule. Furthermore, Gandhi profited politically from his image as a holy person (reinforced by 
his acts and lifestyle, and by the value that is collectively attributed in India to asceticism and religious life), and 
when he succeeded in his effort to push the idea that there was no real separation between religion and politics, 
into a higher political field, he left the British administration (with its normative rule of separating religion and 
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While normative themes - which in politics usually assume the rhetoric of acting 
honorably or in public interest - set the stage and tone for pragmatic maneuvering (1969, p. 
101), metapragmatic moves try to act upon these normative themes (2001, p. 13). This 
occurs through the insertion of new elements into the field – like new institutions and 
institutionalized rituals - that destroy the contextual anchoring of previous semiotic 
regimentations, providing new frameworks for interpretation and for action and new genres, 
therefore leading to a different configuration of a normative façade. 
The political game, therefore, is played at a pragmatic level, through direct action in an 
arena and there is always some degree of competition over who holds metapragmatic control 
of the field, that is, competition exists for the power to define the legitimate rules of the 
game. Furthermore, there is always a degree of player blindness, of limited vision due to 
different positions held in the field, of limited access to information and resources and of 
limited capability to forecast the future actions of others and of imponderables.  
 
We will now turn to our ethnographic cases, in which the central problematic lies in the ways 
transformations in institutional configurations and political processes, directly or indirectly 
generated by new economic development efforts, have led to the creation of new 
institutionalized rituals with the goal of regimenting collective representations of rain and 
water in the state of Ceará. We will start with an overview of the setting where the analyzed 
cases take place. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
political life) without viable alternatives of action. In politicizing religion, Gandhi managed to mobilize an 
enormous amount of people who were previously alienated from the political arenas (Ibid., p. 185). 
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Part 2 
The Political Semiotics of Climate and 
Water in the Brazilian Northeast 
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Background Notes
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3. The Setting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The state of Ceará is located in Brazil’s Northeast, a relatively highly populated and poorly 
economically developed region of the country22. Known for its paradisiacal beaches and for 
the periodic droughts that devastate the state’s hinterland, Ceará has around 7.1 million 
inhabitants, 39% of whom live in its capital’s (Fortaleza) metropolitan area (Governo do 
Estado do Ceará, 2000b). The rural population23, amounting to 48% of the population of the 
state, finds its livelihood mainly in agriculture, a sector that participates very marginally in the 
state’s economy. The socio-economic standards of the region are deeply connected, 
                                                 
22 The Brazilian Northeast semi-arid is considered to be the most populated semi-arid region in the world – the 
state of Ceará has a demographic density of around 50.3 inhabitants per square kilometer (Iplance, 2002b). 
While around 25% of the population of the country lives in the region, it accounts for around 50% of the 
national population below the poverty line. 
23 Although already widely criticized in Brazil, the official demographic data from the Brazilian Institute for 
Geography and Statistics - IBGE considers urban those individuals who live in the municipal main urban area, 
but also in small villages and districts that other classification criteria would consider rural. Data collected by the 
State of Ceará, for instance, show that the migration from rural areas to urban areas – what in Brazil became 
known as rural exodus – affects small municipalities in the same way it affects rural areas. Between 1991 and 
2000, for instance, the population of municipalities with less than five thousand inhabitants in Ceará decreased 
by 4.3%, while the population of those with more than twenty thousand inhabitants grew by over 30% 
(IPLANCE, 2002b, p. 16). In this text, we will consider rural the population of those municipalities with less 
than five thousand inhabitants who take their main livelihood from rural activities (which tends to be most of 
the population of such municipalities), and also those from larger municipalities who do not live in its urban 
center, but in small districts.  
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according to Costa, Kottak, and Prado (1997), to a reality of “periodic severe droughts, poor 
soils, skewed land distribution, low levels of education, high levels of poverty and 
underemployment, and limited physical and social infrastructure” (p. 138). 
Data from 1999 show that, of the rural population, 79% were employed in 
agricultural activities and 76% were considered poor by local standards24. While state GDP 
has undergone substantial growth in the last fifteen years, rising at rates that are higher than 
national average growth rates, the productivity of agriculture has been relatively low. The 
percentage of agriculture in the state’s GDP has dropped from 30% in the 1950s to 
approximately 7%. The Fortaleza metropolitan area, where most of the industry and service 
jobs are located, is responsible for 85% of the GDP, although urban poverty is still 
estimated to be at a level of 58%25. In 1999, the rural illiteracy rate was 44% while the urban 
rate was 20.4% (Governo do Estado do Ceará, 2000b). Rural areas are destitute of basic services 
like sewage and water treatment and distribution (even in Fortaleza currently less than 45% 
of households are linked to the municipal sewage system), although in the last ten years the 
road and electricity rural networks developed to a great extent. Figure 1 in appendix 1 
illustrates the situation of poverty for rural Ceará.  
Recurring multi-year droughts have been identified as critical factors in Ceará’s 
current low state of development (Girão, 1986; Prado Júnior, 1989; Parente, 2000, 2002; 
Neves, 2002; Magalhães, 2002). It is claimed that droughts have shaped the ecological and 
sociopolitical landscape since the first inhabitants settled in the region. Climatic variability 
                                                 
24 Living on less than US$1.5 per day (local institutions like Ipece define the poverty line at half a national 
minimum wage – which in September 2004 was around US$ 90 – per capita. Diário do Nordeste, April 24th, 
2004). The average monthly income per capita for the rural population of the state was R$ 75.40 (around 
US$ 35) in 1999, less than half of the then national minimum wage (Iplance, 2002b, p. 136).  
25 For the sake of comparison, in 1992, 36% of the Brazilian population was considered to be living below the 
poverty line, a number that may have fallen to around 30%. 
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has been linked to cyclical migrations by native populations prior to the arrival of Europeans 
(Villa, 2000; Montenegro, 2001; Neves, 2002), to religious practices, including the 
importance of rain gods in local cosmologies (Couper-Johnston in Magalhães, 2002), and to 
economic and demographic instability from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries 
(Girão, 1986; Parente, 2000; Montenegro, 2001; Greenfield, 2001)26. 
The rains in this region extend from January to June, a period in which there is 
abundant stream flow in the rivers. During the rest of the year there is no representative 
precipitation, and before the construction of reservoirs, rivers commonly dried out. As 
explained by local populations, from January to June they live with the uncertainty of rainfall, 
and from July to December, with the certainty of the absence of rain. Despite the period in 
which rains actually occur, the local population usually calls the rainy season “winter” 
(inverno), and the dry season “summer” (verão). This is due to the fact that in Portugal rains 
fall in the winter, and this habit of associating rains with the idea of “winter” was then 
exported to the Brazilian northeast, during colonial times. 
 
Historical notes: the environment and the formation of Ceará 
Ceará’s territory was occupied in a violent manner by Europeans and their descendants 
through the expulsion and decimation of the indigenous populations, and later through the 
introduction of Catholic missions, and the introduction of large cattle ranches. Cattle 
ranching developed as the main economic activity in the hinterland, and was structured 
around large properties (fazendas), whose owners descended from individuals who received 
                                                 
26 There are records of grandchildren of wealthy eighteenth century oligarchs participating in the invasion of 
towns and of Fortaleza by hungry and desperate populations escaping the effects of drought in the hinterland 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Girão, 1986; Villa, 2000). 
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from the Portuguese crown the right to occupy and explore the land (sesmarias) during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The social organization of these first ranches revolved 
around a leading patriarchal figure, whose power was based upon land ownership, and was 
exercised through a private army of vaqueiros or jagunços (cowboys). Some communities 
received permission to occupy parts of such lands and cultivate them, in exchange for a part 
of the agricultural produce, using a sharecropping system, and also in exchange for their 
cultivation labor on the patron’s lands a number of days a week. These lands were usually 
located alongside rivers or close to wells or small lakes (and later around reservoirs). Part of 
the population lived in far-away places in an attempt to live as invisible “invaders” or posseiros. 
By cultivating these “in-between” lands, the posseiros escaped the exploitation and 
arbitrariness of a landlord. Patrões (landlords), vaqueiros (cowboys) and moradores (local 
communities) mutually related through clientalistic relations, in which the landlord offered 
shelter, land, and protection in exchange for work and loyalty from those under his guard, 
that is, through their willingness to participate as members of private army groups in local 
conflicts, if necessary. The status of cowboy, when not a slave, offered the advantage of 
taking part in the “quarter” system (quarta): for every four calves born in a year, he was given 
one. This system allowed some cowboys independence from a landlord after many years of 
service. Moradores had a less advantageous economic relationship: without control over 
production, they remained under the domination of a landlord and were also without the 
capacity to increase their assets in order to reduce their vulnerability27 to climatic variation, 
such as in times of drought. Families spread over the territory were also devoid of the means 
                                                 
27  We will use the definition of vulnerability proposed by Blaikie et al.: “By vulnerability we mean the 
characteristics of a person or group in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from 
the impacts of a natural hazard. It involves a combination of factors that determine the degree to which 
someone’s life and livelihood is put at risk by a discrete and identifiable event in nature or in society” (in 
Oliver-Smith, 2002, p. 28). Vulnerability can be extended to other domains beyond natural hazards, such as in 
the case of economic and political vulnerabilities. 
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to accumulate assets, lived by means of subsistence agriculture and were very close to, and at 
times below, the hunger line. 
Another sector of the population lived in small urban nuclei in the hinterland. These 
populations were usually located close to water sources that were frequented by cattle during 
their long trips to the consumption centers of the eastern Northeast. These cattle routes 
generated the first urban centers for the region, in which weekly street markets constituted 
an event of great economic, political and cultural importance. Local artists performed, tools 
and agricultural implements were brought in from larger cities and sold, and all sorts of news 
circulated and were discussed, among which were climate forecasts. Blacksmiths, carpenters, 
barbers and local healers, for example, all offered their services on these days. 
Throughout the colonial period Ceará was always seen as a kind of frontier area, very 
weakly linked to the main economic and political life of the colony, yet at the same time it 
drew attention because of attempts by the Dutch and French to gain control of its territory. 
The continued occupation of the Northeastern hinterland by the Portuguese crown was a 
strategy to guarantee the possession of the colony’s territory, which was also partly 
threatened by the Spanish who occupied western South America. Furthermore, the 
hinterland was the main source of meat for eastern parts of the Northeast. Recife and 
Salvador, the main destinations for that meat, were the richest centers of the colony due to a 
profitable sugar industry based on patriarchy, monoculture and slavery (Freyre, 2002), a 
situation that remained unchanged until the eighteenth century when gold mining, and later 
coffee, took the place of the sugar industry, and the political and economic center moved to 
the southeast part of the country, to Rio de Janeiro and to São Paulo. 
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During the second half of the eighteenth century, patriarchs of local clans were 
transformed into agents of the colonial government (oficiais de ordenança), responsible for tax 
collection and local administration of the areas under their control (Prado Junior, 1965, p. 
325). Later on, local landlords would become National Guard colonels (coronéis) (Martins, 
1999, p. 27), from where the term coronelismo has been taken, and represents for Brazilian 
history what caudillismo is for Spanish-speaking Latin America. The bureaucratic fragility of 
the colonial administration, together with the need to guarantee the occupation of its 
territory and to collect taxes, conferred, to the will of local leaders, the force of law. From 
the very first moment in the creation of a de facto political structure, which extended to the 
farthest provinces of the territory, the fiscal unit, which was also the first political unit, 
coincided with the holdings of local landlords. This structure strengthened patrimonialistic28 
relations that marked the rest of Brazilian political history (Ibid., p. 25). For the populations 
of cowboys and moradores there was no difference between the law and the arbitrary and 
capricious agendas of landlords, a fact that deeply marked the collective comprehension of 
one’s place in society and has served as a historical background against which local ideas 
concerning the exercise of power, the role of the state, citizenship and justice have been 
configured.  
This social order was nevertheless inherently unstable due to continuous armed 
conflicts among local landlords. According to Wolf and Hansen (1972, p. 223), this form of 
political order is structured around certain elements: first, there was competition among the 
wealthy and their unwillingness to finance a strong central political machine. At the same 
time, since military power was not concentrated in a national army or police, but rather arms 
                                                 
28 The term patrimonialism refers to the treatment of matters of public office as part of the private world of elite 
groups (Faoro, 1984; Martins, 1999; Parente, 2000, 2002).  
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were found everywhere and in all social groups, many informal and private armies existed. 
The rule of landlords (caudillos or coronéis) was not a strong-man rule, but rather the opposite, in 
the sense that competition for power generated a high degree of turnover in the political 
leadership of the area29 (Wolf and Hansen call this the paradox of caudillo power). And finally, 
local leaders made up for their deficit in resources through the projection of their personal 
images. Personality became a central element in retaining support and in defending against 
potential opposition. According to Wolf and Hansen:  
 
The caudillo had to be bold and able to dominate other men by force of his 
personality. He must be, as Latin Americans say, macho – male or masculine. Men 
must be dominant over women – this is one aspect of being a macho. But equally 
important is the ability to show dominance over other men. […] In the public 
sphere, where men deal with men, rewards go to the men able to subdue and 
dominate other men. In this he must be willing to play the game to the limit, to 
be ready to use violence, even to kill. […] The successful caudillo must be ready 
to imponerse, impose himself on others, or be conquered by others in turn (1972, 
p. 223-224). 
 
 
Such features of political leadership became part of local political genres that enacted 
an association between leadership, straightness of character, masculinity and violence. 
Giddens argues that, in circumstances similar to that, some powerful leaders are trusted 
because of their very authoritarianism, not in spite of it (1987, p. 305).  
Yet the model that organizes society into two groups, the elites who control the state 
political machine, and the masses, cannot account for the local socio-political reality of the 
hinterland. According to O’Donnell, in Latin America: 
 
                                                 
29 This applies more to the analysis of State and of national leaders. At the municipality level, local powerful 
families tended to remain in control of local politics for long periods of time, and their turnover was restricted 
to competition from members of other local powerful families (see Lemenhe, 1995). 
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A forma principal de articulação da sociedade e de vinculação desta ao Estado é o clientelismo. 
Clientes e patrões se conectam mediante uma rede de relações sociais nas quais, por sua vez, os 
patrões de nível mais baixo se agrupam clientelisticamente ao redor de outros de nível mais alto 
até chegar ao Estado, ponto de confluência de confederações e patrões... o Estado, embora tenda 
a ser autoritário e a projetar uma imagem de força como “patrão dos patrões”, mostra pouca 
penetração na sociedade civil, restringindo-se quase sempre ao que pode fazer por intermédio de 
coalizão de patrões, que parcelam o controle efetivo do teritório... [e]... as classes se atomizam ao 
redor dos sistemas clientelísticos... (In Lemenhe, 1995, p. 25-26). 
 
The main form of social organization and linkage between society and State is 
clientalism. Clients and patrons are connected through a net of social relations in 
which lower level patrons are clientalistically grouped around higher level patrons, 
up to the State level, which is the confluence point for a confederation of 
patrons… the State, although possessing an authoritarian tendency and 
projecting the image of a powerful “patron of patrons,” has little penetration in 
civil society, and is restricted to what it can do through the intermediation of a 
coalition of patrons, that divides the effective control of the territory … [and] … 
the classes atomize around clientalistic systems…    
 
 
In this sense, central power historically has had little direct hold over local populations, 
and has depended on complex networks of power relations connecting different power 
scales. 
As I mentioned earlier, there is evidence of an awareness of the cyclical nature of 
drought in the region prior to colonial conquest. Historical records show that during the 
seventeenth century, there were six periods of intense drought: 1603, 1605-1607, 1614, 1652 
and 1692. During the following century, a larger population felt the devastating effects of 
drought periods occurring during 1710-1711, 1721, 1723-1727, 1736-1737, 1745-1746, 1777-
1778 and 1791-1793 (Villa, 2000, p. 18-19). The drought of 1777-1778 is said to have caused 
the loss of almost all of the state’s cattle (reducing herds to one eighth of what they were in 
1776) and ended a short term economic boom in which Ceará had become the most 
important beef producer within the colony. During the drought of 1791-1793, one third of 
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the population of the capitania (province) of Pernambuco died due to hunger, or due to 
epidemics that usually follow such extreme climatic events.   
Between the end of the eighteenth and the early decades of the nineteenth century, 
Ceará experienced a strong and impacting economic cycle linked to cotton farming. Local 
cotton production developed in the international economic vacuum created by the American 
Secession War and spread over the hinterland due to the fact that cotton farming was well 
suited to the local ecosystem (because it grows like a bush) and cotton was grown and 
produced without the need of special care. This made it possible for the lower strata of 
society to experience an unprecedented degree of economic success. However, this cotton 
production cycle was very short, and ended once American production was re-established 
and when new and more efficient international production methods were introduced. The 
outcome, nevertheless, was a higher population density in the hinterland, which in turn 
increased the degree of social suffering during subsequent drought periods.  
During the nineteenth century, the first systematic efforts were made in order to 
approach problems linked to drought, but these attempts showed little effectiveness. Wells 
were dug in the hinterlands and roads were opened. In 1837 state officials in Fortaleza 
created a law that required the import of camels from North Africa to Ceará; however this 
did not end up occurring until 1859, and when it did, it resulted in a total fiasco (Villa, 2000). 
Many droughts took place during the nineteenth century. The most severe drought to hit the 
state of Ceará took place between 1877 and 1879, and is alleged to have killed over five 
hundred thousand people (Neves, 2000; Villa, 2000; Greenfield, 1986, 1992, 2001; Davis, 
2001). The city of Fortaleza, which at that time had roughly twenty-five thousand inhabitants, 
was invaded by more than one hundred and ten thousand people who fled the ruined fields 
of the hinterlands in search of help in the capital. Fortaleza was not prepared to receive such 
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a massive influx of people. There is evidence that during the height of this crisis, Fortaleza 
faced an enormous amount of deaths due to starvation and illnesses: during the whole 
month of December of 1878, there was no day with less than five hundred deaths; on the 
tenth, one thousand and four dead bodies were taken to the cemetery, and around two 
hundred remained unburied for lack of human resources (Villa, 2000, p. 71-72; Neves, 2000, 
2002). 
The scale of the Great Drought of 1877 is said to have transformed drought from a 
private matter (i.e. external to the issues that held the attention of imperial politicians and of 
administrators) to a public matter. The imperial (later federal30) government decided to send 
technicians and scientists to the area in order to propose technological solutions. There were 
always heated debates among Brazilian elites around how to approach the issue; some 
intellectuals proposed that the best way to deal with the problem was to induce migration to 
other areas. This was carried out during many different drought periods and resulted in the 
occupation of parts of the Brazilian Amazon, and later resulted in mass migrations to 
different southern states. Official efforts ended up focusing on water accumulation 
infrastructure, with the construction of reservoirs, wells and canals31 beginning under the 
reign of Emperor Pedro II. The construction of the first public reservoir in Brazil, named 
the Cedro Reservoir, in Quixadá (Ceará), was initiated by order of Emperor Pedro II, in 
1886; an enterprise which took twenty years to complete. Such efforts were later continued 
by the federal Inspetoria de Obras Contra a Seca (IOCS, or Inspectorate for Works against 
Drought) created in 1909. The organization was formed due to a union of smaller 
                                                 
30 Brazil became independent from Portugal on September 7, 1822, but remained a monarchy until November 
15, 1889, when the country’s republican era began.  
31 The controversial project of diverting part of the São Francisco River to Ceará was first proposed in the 
nineteenth century. 
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commissions for the study of the geomorphology of the semi-arid region, and to 
recommend infrastructural options for water accumulation. This became known as the 
hydraulic approach (Souza Filho, 2001), which consisted of the idea that suffering from 
droughts could be mitigated by means of water accumulation. IOCS later became the 
Departamento Nacional de Obras Contra as Secas (DNOCS or the National Department for 
Works against Drought), whose responsibilities are to research infrastructure, construction 
and reservoir operations. The political history of DNOCS is melded with the political history 
of Ceará; with its past activities being linked to clientalism and patrimonialism (Costa et al., 
1997; Parente, 2000; Villa, 2000; Kenny, 2002; Elias, 2002; Diniz, 2002) that have also 
characterized the political life of the state; both in the capital and in the hinterlands. Local 
political elites’ control over DNOCS activities resulted recurrently in infrastructural changes 
that usually benefited these elite groups. 
Fortaleza developed, especially from the second half of eighteenth century, as the 
urban political center of the province. Although political power remained in the hands of 
rural oligarchies, groups of urban intellectuals developed, and sometimes posed, political 
challenges to established political powers - as was the case with the unsuccessful Equator 
Confederation in which intellectuals from Ceará and other states fought for independence, and 
to create a republic in the Northeast in 1824.  
With the transfer of colonial administration to the south of the country, the political 
power of large estate owners of the Northeast was reduced. Furthermore, later in the 
twentieth century, the centralization of political power in the hands of the president during 
the 1930s (Vargas government) was a decisive blow to the oligarchies of the Northeast in 
terms of space in the national political arena. Groups that were linked to state rural 
oligarchies managed to maintain control over the Ceará state government until the 1980s. In 
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the last thirty years of the twentieth century, some industrial centers developed in the 
Northeast, and tourism flourished. Old rural oligarchs started to invest in industrial activities 
and became members of the new industrial elite. The importance of agriculture was 
considerably reduced in the local economy, and some large land-owners decided to 
modernize their production in terms of technology32.  
Throughout the twentieth century, water accumulation infrastructure improved but the 
degree of suffering in moments of drought did not improve proportionally. As lands were 
concentrated in the hands of a few powerful families, the same occurred in terms of water 
resources. In Ceará, in the southern area of Cariri, a small local water market developed and 
landowners sold water from sources located on their lands; something that still occurs 
despite going against current national and state laws concerning water usage (Garjulli et al., 
2002; Campos and Simpson, 2001).  
A noticeable increase in water accumulation infrastructure took place after 1960, due 
to the construction of the Orós Reservoir on the largest river in Ceará, the Jaguaribe River. 
Today there are over eight thousand dams in the approximately one hundred and forty 
thousand square kilometers of the state, and of those, only one hundred and twenty-three 
are publicly managed by the state. These one hundred and twenty-three include the largest 
dams, which accumulate the majority of the water for the state in terms of total volume. 
Another important factor is that although the amount of water accumulated in dams is now 
incomparably higher than what it was in the 1960s and 1970s, due to the recent construction 
of massive dams such as the Castanhão (also located on the Jaguaribe  
River, and with a capacity of around 6.7 billion cubic meters of water), the number of 
                                                 
32 Something that in most cases was not repeated in work relations – see Lemenhe, 1995. 
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municipalities33 and districts that request emergency water supply from the state civil defense 
during average dry seasons is still very high (reaching above 25% of the municipalities of the 
state, as in 2003). This suggests a high degree of concentration and selective use of the 
accumulated water34. 
During the last century local urban centers have grown, and the hinterland has become 
increasingly urban, with the development of a small professional and bureaucratic middle 
class. Yet at the turn of the millennium, half of the population has continued to live in rural 
areas. In the 1970s DNOCS created irrigation projects in the Jaguaribe Valley thanks to the 
acquisition of large land holdings and their division into plots and their distribution among 
peasants. This took place during the military rule that began in 1964 (and was in power until 
1984), in order to prevent the growth of potential revolutionary social movements in rural 
areas, such as the Ligas Camponesas - Peasant Leagues - of the 1960s. However, this 
functioned more as propaganda than as an effective economic effort, due to the small scale 
of the official irrigation projects. In Ceará, projects were created in the municipalities of 
Paraipaba and Icó, and later in Morada Nova, Jaguaruana, and Limoeiro do Norte, which all 
together do not total more than fifteen thousand hectares of effectively cultivated land. 
DNOCS adopted a highly centralized management scheme for the irrigation projects, with a 
very high degree of subsidization.  
In the 1990s, DNOCS recognized that the management scheme they had adopted 
since the 1970s, and throughout the 1980s, was not self-sustainable, and announced its 
                                                 
33 In Brazil the smallest autonomous political unit is the município, which includes an urban center, some smaller 
centers of population concentration (districts), and the rural areas around them. In the US, the concept of 
county is most similar to that of Brazilian municípios. 
34 This is obvious especially when we take into consideration that new infrastructure developments, such as the 
Castanhão Reservoir, do not target areas with high levels of historical scarcity, but rather target industrial 
centers around Fortaleza. 
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decision to transfer the titles of land to producers, and to abandon its management of 
projects. Lately new irrigation areas are created not only for landless producers, but rather 
projects are divided into areas for agribusiness investors, for medium size producers, and for 
small farmers. In other parts of the region, agribusiness companies, such as the 
multinationals Del Monte and Nolen, have been buying the most fertile lands, and generate 
what Elias calls excluding modernization (Elias, 2002a, 2002b), in which agricultural economic 
development is linked to the privatization of fertile areas that were acquired by the 
government for land reform projects in the past, and which are now structured around 
wealth-concentrating activities (with reduced workers per hectare rates), and which has 
increased the pace of rural workforce proletarianization. 
Nevertheless, spread throughout the hinterland, large landholdings still exist in which 
moradores live and work on the lands of a patron as part of a sharecropping system - the most 
usual being the system of meia, “half,” in which the patron is given half of the production 
and is partially responsible for soil preparation, the buying of implements, and the hiring of 
extra labor; or terça, “third,” in which the farmer provides everything, and the patron receives 
a third of the production. On such properties there is usually only a small fraction of fertile 
land which forms part of a larger dry area littered with stones and cacti, where skinny cattle 
graze in the open, and where the micro-industries of cheese and milk, together with the 
small scale production of rice, maize and beans, are the motors of this farm economy that 
lost its place as one of the most important nodes in state economic networks a long time ago. 
Besides these large holdings, which are few in number but occupy the majority of the 
physical space, there are small properties of less than ten hectares on average, in which a 
dryland family-based subsistence agriculture is developed. Such small areas account for 
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around 70% of the number of rural properties in the state, but represent only 5.4% of the 
total land area.  
It is in such rural enclaves that traces of traditional political genre marked by 
patriarchal domination manifest with greater clarity. Violence is still part of communicative 
strategies for domination. Such semiotic use of violence is as old as the dawn of colonialism 
in Brazil: since their early days in this part of the country, Portuguese colonial agents created, 
as a communicative and managerial strategy, a violent image of themselves in order to keep 
indigenous populations “friendly” (Barros, 2002). According to Silva, a local historian from 
the town of Jaguaribara, some violent aspects of social interaction in part were sustained 
throughout recent history due to the absence of law enforcement and judicial state 
institutions in the area: it was only in 1968 that the first police commissioner was posted to 
his home town35. 
 
Era muito comum, na década de 40, os habitantes de Jaguaribara andarem portando armas de 
fogo, ou faca do tipo peixeira, provavelmente para mostrar o símbolo de masculinidade, (cabra 
macho), uma tradição da região do Jaguaribe. As brigas eram comuns, seguidas de homicídios 
por questões banais ou por disputa de terras. A lei que reinava dava privilégios aos mais fortes 
(Silva, 1999, p. 16). 
 
It was common in the 1940s for the inhabitants of the municipality of 
Jaguaribara to carry firearms or peixeira36 knives, as a sign of masculinity (to be a 
cabra macho37), a tradition in the Jaguaribe region. Fights were common, followed 
                                                 
35 Violence as semiotic strategy is common in local political anecdotes. For example, during fieldwork, we were 
told about a technician from the State Water Resources Secretariat, who is also a member of a traditional and 
feared family of the Jaguaribe Valley, and who spends some of his time taking care of family properties. 
Recently he was visited on one of his properties by an employee of the Banco do Brasil, who made the visit to 
discuss unpaid debts. When the bank employee arrived, the owner invited him for a walk around the property. 
At a specific moment during the walk, the owner took out a gun he had with him and shot a large turkey in 
they head, which was located in a pen in front of them. The two men continued on the walk, with no words 
exchanged about what had just happened, and the bank employee left without further mention of the debts. 
36 A Peixeira is a large knife, of over fifteen inches, used to clean fish and open coconuts. Besides being a work 
tool, it is also used as a local weapon. 
37 Cabra macho is the local expression for a macho man. 
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by homicides over banal issues or because of land disputes. The prevalent law 
privileged the powerful.  
 
 
Political violence is also linked to what is locally known as pistolagem: the hiring of 
mercenaries to kill political opponents. Between 1997 and 2003 in the state of Ceará, over 
two hundred and twelve people were victim to this kind of crime, and although not all 
incidents can be considered political, the annual rate of this type of death rises up to 100% in 
election years, with 53% of these killings occurring in the Jaguaribe Valley38.  
Rural distance, along with illiteracy and participation in local political games by means 
of alliances with powerful clans, has led to the “Nation” and the “State” being unfinished, 
fragmentary projects, as is observed in so many rural regions of developing countries (e.g. 
Nordstrom, 1997, p. 82). Furthermore, the construction of the state’s social image as a 
legitimate bureaucratic apparatus, entitled to regulate and to manage individuals’ lives in the 
name of “collective good”, is challenged by the manner in which some representatives of 
official institutions, or the “face” of the state in the hinterland (mainly government agents 
and police officers), take part in clientalistic and corrupt schemes, which often involve the 
use of violence. In the words of Scheper-Hughes, referring to the Brazilian Northeast: “the 
process of democratization has been painfully slow and has yet to challenge the local 
presence and the fearful psychological hold of the military police over the poorer 
populations (1992, p. 223).” 
Despite the relatively small economic importance of rural contribution to the area’s 
current circumstances, the fact that water accumulation takes place in the hinterland, and 
that local political structures have developed around the control of water resources, makes 
                                                 
38 See Diário do Nordeste, September 20, 2003. 
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certain sectors of the rural population important political agents in conflicts concerning 
water, especially when industrial development requires great amounts of water to be 
extracted from the relatively water-poor hinterland to the already water-rich metropolitan 
area.  
 
Droughts and Social Dynamics: impacts in local economy and society 
It is important to complement the brief outline provided above, of historical socio-economic 
structures and processes, with an account of how extreme climate events impact local 
economy and society. Common stereotypical images of drought include the total absence of 
rain, dry, dusty and cracked soil, thirsty animals dying, and populations migrating. However, 
there are, in reality, a wider range of situations classified as drought. For instance, the total 
absence of rains during the rainy season is known as pluviometric drought. While hydrologic 
drought occurs when precipitation is not sufficient to fill local dams and therefore water 
quantities needed for human consumption and for economic activity do not last through the 
dry season. Alternatively, sometimes there is irregular distribution of rain within a time and 
space frame that does not coincide with the agricultural calendar, and this leads to the loss of 
many crop fields. These veranicos (“little summers” or dry spells of ten or more days without 
rain fall) cause drought even when at the end of the season the amount of precipitation is 
statistically close to the historical average for the region. This last situation is called green 
drought because, despite the lack of coordination between rains and agricultural activities, 
precipitation turns vegetation in the hinterland green; a color it will then lose during the dry 
season.  
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When a pluviometric drought occurs - which commonly leads to a hydrological drought -, 
the decrease of river streams and of reservoir levels has a practical impact on the entire 
region. As the allocation of the waters from public reservoirs is a considerable source of 
conflict during years of average precipitation, during times of drought such conflicts increase 
markedly. During these times, municipal water agencies of the hinterland, different irrigation 
sectors, other activities that make extensive use of water (for instance shrimp farming), cattle 
ranching, and small cheese and milk industries, dispute over the limited water availablity 
from local reservoirs. 
Subsistence for families in the poorest strata of the population, is a challenge even in 
times of average rains, and therefore is profoundly affected during times of drought. These 
rural families try to decrease their vulnerability to climatic events by diversifying their 
subsistence activities (a phenomenon named occupational multiplicity by Comitas, 1973): if 
located in close proximity to a river, lake or reservoir, these families often create vegetable 
gardens (roças) on areas not covered by water (vazantes) to make use of the humidity in the 
soil close to the stream. Often, these groups also cultivate non-irrigable lands with maize and 
beans during the rainy season, which is also known as dryland or rainfed agriculture. Quite 
often these sectors of society also raise chicken and pigs in the open. Better-off families may 
also have goats or even cows. Water supply for these families is usually carried from the 
closest river or dam (or more recently from desalinization posts) on the backs of donkeys or 
in carts (see picture 1 in appendix 1). 
During soil preparation times, before an upcoming rainy season, youths and adults 
(usually men) work daily as laborers in the irrigation areas of the region39, while some fish in 
rivers or in the closest dam. Part of the grains produced in the “winter” harvest is stored to 
                                                 
39 In 2003 the daily wage for in the Jaguaribe Valley was between R$ 7 and 10 (US$ 2.30 to 3.30). 
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be used for cultivation during next year’s rainy season (picture 2). The rest is consumed by 
the family and, if possible, part is sold in exchange for money.  
During the 1990s, the federal government created a rural retirement pension 
program, in which elders and handicapped individuals became entitled to a monthly payment 
of the minimum wage. Recent surveys revealed that around 36% of the rural population 
receives such pensions as their main source of income (Lemos et al., 1999; Finan, 2001).  
As we can see, everyday life is not easy in the hinterlands, and it becomes even more 
difficult during drought periods. In these hard times, the household economy is immediately 
affected because of the impossibility of extracting subsistence from dryland cultivation. If a 
local dam hasn’t much water, then the irrigation sector will decrease their activity, and with 
this in turn decreases the demand for daily labor. There is also a reduction is the amount of 
fish in the reservoirs due to the negative effects of drought upon water quality. In many 
districts and municipalities, water for human consumption is also exhausted. Rivers, creeks 
and small streams dry up, making the cultivation of vazantes impossible. Animals are 
consumed or sold. The hunger line is crossed, and children and elders become especially 
vulnerable to dehydratation and illness. Malnutrition in times of drought becomes a 
phenomenon of epidemic proportions40. 
Agricultural crisis immediately generates a rise in the price of basic foodstuffs such as 
beans and meat. Even families living off the elderly’s pension experience a fall in living 
standards during drought because of these price rises. The already intense activity of tanker 
                                                 
40 In his classic study Geografia da Fome (Geography of Hunger), Josué de Castro classifies the Northeastern 
hinterland (the Sertão) as an area in which hunger exists as an epidemic phenomenon during drought periods.  
Although the hinterlanders’ alimentation is generally richer in proteins than it is in the Amazon and in the 
eastern Northeast where hunger manifests in an endemic form, recent studies in the Fortaleza metropolitan 
area show that over 44% of families experience hunger at least once a week, making the region’s hunger also 
endemic (O Povo, August 4th, 2002; Diário do Nordeste, February 21st, 2003). 
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trucks for the transportation of water throughout the hinterland is intensified but still cannot 
meet the demand. In 2003 for instance, a year in which the rainy season was good and 
agricultural production was at a record high for the state, the civil defense tanker trucks 
could not attend to the demand for water during its dry season. Municipal and state civil 
defenses are called in to participate in water and food distribution schemes, the latter sent by 
the federal government or by national and international NGOs.  
Due to the high spatial and temporal variability of rains, that is, the fact that 
precipitation may be very different in two localities that are closely situated, and may also be 
unevenly distributed over time, the civil defense cannot anticipate which places will be 
affected by drought. When drought hits the region, a wave of state of emergency41 declarations 
are received from municipalities forming part of the hinterland, and rapidly overwhelm the 
state civil defense’s capacity for action.   
Household heads, or even whole families, migrate to urban centers of the country. 
Such migration implies a difficult tradeoff: while underemployment and even begging may 
keep individuals from starving, the shelter and health conditions in city slums such as São 
Paulo or Rio de Janiero are atrocious, violence rates are high, and there is a high degree of 
discrimination and racism against Northeasterners. For these reasons, news of returning 
rains drives many people back to the hinterlands where cultivation is reinitiated42. It is rare to 
come across someone in Fortaleza or in the hinterland who has never been to São Paulo or 
                                                 
41 According to Brazilian federal regulations, there are two possible ways in which municipalities can request 
federal help. They are the emergency situation and the state of public calamity. Both apply to situations of natural or 
artificially produced disasters. In declaring emergency situation, the municipality becomes free from some legal 
requirements in terms of purchases made by the municipal government, and also from the Fiscal Responsibility 
Law that makes the mayor accountable for the financial situation of the municipality. The municipality has to 
contribute with 7 to 10% of the total amount of relief funds sent by the government. In case of declaration of 
state of public calamity, the municipal contribution is reduced to 3%. See O Povo, February 1st, 2005. 
42 See Diário do Nordeste, September 13th, 2004. 
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Rio de Janeiro, or who does not have a relative living in these southern urban centers. It is 
also rare to come across someone who has had an enjoyable migration experience. As even 
the crumbs of the economy of the Brazilian Southeast impress the imagination of Ceará’s 
population, in the hinterland opinions are usually “São Paulo is good because we gain weight 
there” or even more commonly “in São Paulo we find work.” 
The phenomena of migration and transmigration create networks of social support 
and economic exchange, serving as mechanisms for a reduction in hinterland population 
vulnerability during times of drought. This is reflected in greater intensity in movement of 
goods and resources from urban centers to the hinterland during drought periods. 
Irrigation sectors of the local economy are affected by water rationing schemes, and 
also by the price fluctuation of grains and implements. Usually the economy of irrigation 
agriculture is more robust than dryland agriculture, and even if part of production is used for 
family subsistence, there is usually a surplus that is exchanged for money. Access to micro-
credit programs and to the ownership of equipment, motorcycles, and a larger amount of 
livestock reduces the vulnerability of small irrigators. As I will discuss in detail in chapters 
nine to eleven, water rationing schemes are usually negotiated in water committees 
representing different river sections (the Jaguaribe River, for instance, has five water 
committees, one per basin subsection). This type of participatory institution was created 
during the 1990s to negotiate water allocation and to solve conflicts. Sometimes, water 
rationing affects all producers equally, as occurred in 1999 in the Banabuiú Valley (a sub-
section of the Jaguaribe Basin), in which a 50% reduction in water usage was negotiated and 
approved by all irrigators, regardless of land size or crop type. On other occasions, the 
rationing can be negotiated by sectors. For example in 2001, rice producers received a 
monetary compensation not to produce, while the small available water supply was re-
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directed to fruit and shrimp production, which were then billed for the water they received. 
The Ceará Water Resources Management Company (COGERH), which is institutionally 
linked to the Ceará State Water Resources Secretariat (SRH), coordinates the activities of 
such committees.  
Irrigators tend to have more visibility than other producers in moments of 
contingency action because they are fewer in number and are linked to the state’s network of 
rivers and constructed hydraulic infrastructure, which is well known and mapped. On the 
other hand, dryland producers are spread around the hinterland and most times are invisible 
to state bureaucracy. It is useful here to compare figures in order to gain a better 
understanding of the demographic difference between dryland farmers and irrigators: just in 
the Jaguaribe Valley alone (which represents all the eastern half of the physical space of the 
state), the population linked to dryland agriculture is estimated at eight hundred thousand to 
a million individuals, while only around forty to fifty thousand individuals are directly linked 
to the twenty-eight thousand irrigated hectares of the valley. 
Larger producers, with many more assets, and with a greater range of investments, 
make up the less vulnerable sector of the region (Villa, 2000, p. 213). Many are store owners 
in local urban centers, employees of the municipal government, or are in office as local 
politicians; also, some have apartments in Fortaleza, to which they move their families in 
times of rural hardship. They also tend to make use of more sophisticated strategies in order 
to reduce their economic vulnerability, like the monitoring of climate forecasts (it is not 
unusual to find large producers visiting FUNCEME throughout the year), or the 
construction of small reservoirs on their private lands43.  
                                                 
43  If these private dam constructions are done without careful planning, the hydro-system as a whole is 
impacted negatively. For example, if someone constructs a dam, it affects the economy of all areas located 
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The economy of hinterland urban centers is directly affected by variations in 
agricultural outcomes, and therefore by extreme climatic variations, because in most of these 
towns a great deal of local commerce depends on the selling of equipment, tools, seeds, and 
agricultural implements. This leads to the monitoring of climate forecasts by municipal 
managers. In the town of Quixadá, for instance, since 1997 the Shop Owners Association 
(CDL) has promoted the annual meeting of rain prophets, to which they also invite 
university researchers and meteorologists from the state’s official meteorology agency, 
FUNCEME. According to the organizers, one of the event’s goals is to help local business 
owners plan the investments they make just before the rainy season44. 
In extreme drought situations, towns are invaded by crowds of desperate and hungry 
rural people who press local officials for help, and sometimes loot local markets and 
storehouses. Such events occurred systematically throughout the twentieth century, including 
during the 1979-1983 drought (Villa, 2000; Neves, 1998, 2000, 2002). During the drought of 
1998, a group of farmers and landless peasants, organized by the local Rural Workers Union, 
invaded Limoeiro do Norte. Records also show that at least one case of food looting 
occurred in January 2003, in the town of Maurity45. 
Urban centers tend to suffer less in terms of water provision, due to the small 
amounts they consume in comparison with other areas, whose water provision is principally 
for irrigation purposes. In the Banabuiú Valley, for instance, in 2001, during the most 
extreme rationing scheme that has been put into place in recent years, the stream flow 
released from the reservoir was 1.3 cubic meters per second (having been ten times more 
                                                                                                                                                 
downstream. Although state law 11.996/1992 created the need for licenses for infrastructure construction, 
there are no state mechanisms in place to enforce this law. 
44 See O Povo, January 12th, 2004. 
45 See O Povo, January 18th, 2003. 
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than that just three years earlier), while municipalities who use the Banabuiú Reservoir as 
their main water source usually consume no more than 0.15 cubic meters per second. The 
situation is reversed for municipalities that do not have water sources close by, or when their 
local reservoirs are depleted. This is also the case for the majority of the rural communities 
in the state that depend on water supply from wells with little reliability, on water with 
dubious quality, and on occasional water availability provided by tanker trucks. Private 
tanker trucks operate in the hinterland with the average cost of renting and full delivery of 
around R$ 50 (US$ 1646). Water is also sold in latas - containers with storage capacity of 
twenty liters. In January 2003, for example, in the area of Irauçuba, the market price for sixty 
liters of water was R$ 1,00 (around US$ 0,3547), while in January 2004, in Crato, prices 
reached R$ 0,80 for twenty liters48.  
The situation in Fortaleza is a very different one. Because the metropolitan area has a 
population of around 2.7 million people, some water crises end up having enormous impact. 
The city recurrently had its water provision severely affected during the principal droughts of 
the twentieth century. The last water supply crisis took place in 1993. For this reason, in the 
last ten years, a great deal of investment has been made to increase the reliability of the 
metropolitan area water supply. This led to the construction, in 1993, of the one hundred 
and ten kilometer Canal do Trabalhador (Workers’ Canal), linking the Jaguaribe River with 
metropolitan area dams. In 2004 the Castanhão Reservoir, the largest in the state, and 
second largest in the Northeast, was inaugurated. Currently, there is also a large canal being 
constructed (called the Canal da Integração, The Integration Canal) to take water from the 
Castanhão Reservoir to the metropolitan area. 
                                                 
46 See Diário do Nordeste, January 9th, 2004 
47 See Diário do Nordeste, January 22nd, 2003. 
48 See O Povo, January 7th, 2004 
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4. Climate, Water, and Development: Imaginaries in the making 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The imaginary of rains and water in Ceará is an assemblage of texts in which ecological, 
socio-historical and psychological factors imbricate, and is manifested and enacted through 
multiple forms. This semi-arid region is marked by pulses of life and death, which affect 
local hydrology, fauna, flora and society. Ceará is located in the northern part of the Brazilian 
Northeast, in which the rainy season runs from February to May. Outside the wet season, 
occasional rains originate from the cold fronts of the south, reaching the state in late 
December and early January, and are called Pre-season Rains in meteorological terminology. 
Also, the somewhat rare rains that reach the state after May usually originate from the 
eastern fronts, and bring rains to the eastern part of the Northeast, where Salvador and 
Recife are located. Both these pre-season and post-season rains are to some degree 
infrequent and have low predictability. Aside from these off-season rains, the main 
meteorological system that brings rain to Ceará is known by technicians as the ITCZ – the 
Inter-tropical Convergence Zone (see figure 2), and is the encounter between air masses 
from the Northern and Southern Hemispheres above the Equatorial Atlantic. This system is 
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well known and modeled, and presents clear signs that it works in direct relationship with 
the Tropical Pacific (especially the phenomenon known as El Niño/La Niña, or ENSO), 
and with the Atlantic49.  
There are no natural perennial rivers in the state of Ceará and, in the past, all hydro-
systems dried up during the dry seasons, until water storage projects were designed and 
constructed. The vegetation of this semi-arid region adapted to the pattern of precipitation 
through the transformation of plant morphologies in order to decrease water consumption 
and evaporation, and maximize the efficiency in the use of the scarce water available. This 
vegetation is a type of xerophyte, which is characterized by a more developed root system, 
small stature, and spines in the place of flowers. In Ceará, after the long dry period, at the 
very beginning of the wet season, green vegetation reappears, and covers the hinterland, 
which again promptly disappears once the rainy season is over. The satellite pictures in 
appendix 1 (figure 3) illustrate this rapid disappearance of green vegetation over a period of 
one month, at the beginning of the dry season of 2003. 
Migration, due to the seasonality of climate, can also be observed among animals. 
Some species of birds, as well as some terrestrial animals, migrate to the hills and to the 
humid valleys during the dry season. Many insects also have their reproduction cycles linked 
to the beginning and to the end of the rainy season. Governmental health agencies need to 
pay special attention to the onset of rains due to the implications for the spread and 
multiplication of dengue cases.  
Even today, smaller rivers and creek beds dry-out during the dry season. Only major 
rivers are perennialized through the construction of dams and the regulation of flow through 
                                                 
49 See chapter five for more details on meteorological forecast methods. 
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dams’ water-release valves. Dams are very rarely found full of water. Evaporation rates are 
very high in the region, due to high average temperatures and to intense solar radiation, 
especially during the dry season. Some dams have their water levels decreased by several 
centimeters per day only because of evaporation. As an example of the magnitude of this 
phenomenon, the Orós Reservoir, at the beginning of 2003, held less than 21% of its water 
capacity, the equivalent of four hundred and twenty billion liters. At the time, it was loosing 
over ten billion liters of water monthly due to evaporation, or around 2.4% of its capacity. 
This monthly evaporated volume would have been enough to meet the demand of the 
metropolitan area of Fortaleza for around sixteen days. A dam can easily reach depletion 
levels if there is no water refill after a poor rainy season, or if there is water overusage by 
production activities such as irrigation (figure 5 illustrates the water levels of the Orós Dam 
between the years of 1981 and 2003). 
This cyclical character of climate is clearly expressed in the passage below, extracted 
from an article about vegetation in the semi-arid – locally called caatinga – that was run in the 
newspaper Diário do Nordeste: 
 
Nos sertões nordestinos o “inverno” é sempre bem-vindo, trazendo chuvas, a floração das 
plantas, enchendo açudes, lagoas e fazendo os rios correrem sem interrupção. Ali nasce o Rio 
Jaguaribe, maior rio seco do Nordeste, que abastece o Açude Orós que está transbordando. 
É também nessa época, que os frutos amadurecem e os insetos proliferam, produzindo 
alimentação abundante para aves e mamíferos que constroem seus ninhos e criam sua prole. A 
Caatinga, vegetação típica dessas regiões, fica toda verde, bela e exuberante como as florestas 
úmidas: o milagre da chuva que transforma a natureza e enche o homem de esperança. 
Mas o tempo passa, o verão chega e o sol inclemente castiga o sertão. Em agosto as águas já 
estão escassas e os rios temporários já mostram seus leitos secos. As folhas estão amarelas e 
começando a cair, desnudando as árvores. Caatinga que, na língua tupi significa mata branca, 
retoma a tonalidade acinzentada da vegetação seca (April 28th, 2004). 
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In the northeastern sertões (hinterlands), the “winter” is always welcome, bringing 
rain, the flowering of plants, filling dams, and making rivers flow without 
interruption. There, the Jaguaribe River, the largest dry river of the Northeast, 
originates and feeds into the Orós Reservoir, which is currently overflowing. 
It is also in this period that fruits ripen and insects proliferate, producing 
abundant food for birds and mammals, to make their nests and raise their 
offspring. Caatinga, the typical vegetation of this region, turns green, beautiful 
and exuberant as the humid forests: the miracle of rain transforms nature and 
fills one with hope. 
But time passes, summer arrives and the inclement sun punishes the hinterland. 
In August, water is already scarce and intermittent river beds are dry. Leaves turn 
yellow and start to fall, stripping trees. Caatinga, which in the Tupi language 
means white vegetation, takes on the gray tone of dry vegetation. 
 
 
Through this natural rhythm of alternating abundance and scarcity, the appreciation of 
events related to water has gained special meaning for rural populations, in which water 
generates emotional reactions and induces specific forms of esthetic appreciation and 
cultural manifestations (Montenegro calls this the cultural water complex - 2001, p. 17). For 
instance, a heavily clouded sky, announcing the approach of a storm, in other parts of Brazil 
inspires fear and is considered an ugly spectacle; in Ceará, however, an oncoming storm is 
considered to be a beautiful phenomenon (cf. Carvalho, 2003, p. 4). “Ainda hoje não há para 
mim espetáculo mais belo do que o de uma nuvem que se avoluma no horizonte [Even today there exists 
no spectacle more beautiful to me than a cloud swelling on the horizon]”, is a phrase 
attributed to the Ceará-born Brazilian philosopher Farias Brito (Montenegro, 2001, p. 18). 
Times of rain can also be happy and festive. Children and adults alike come out of their 
homes to appreciate any rainshower (banho de chuva). Jesus Jeso, the president of the 
Association of Neighbors of the municipality of Jaguaribara, explains: “É muita seca, quando 
aparece água é uma alegria! Aqui o pessoal diz, ‘o açude tal tá sangrando’, já é festa! [It is too dry; when 
rains appear, what happiness! People around will exclaim, ‘such and such a dam is 
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overflowing,’ and straight away there is partying!].” Ceará’s people dance “com os primeiros 
acordes dos pingos de chuva [to the melody of the first drops of rain],” affirms Carneiro (2003, p. 
273). 
The water complex is also manifested in a collective repulsion against water wastage. 
This tendency is historically reinforced by the ideology that dam construction would be the 
redemption for people in Ceará, and would be their definitive solution to problems caused 
by drought. This conservative tendency is manifested in many ways. In the opinion of Lauro 
Bernardes: “[a]rmazenar água é parte da cultura do Nordeste ... Desde sempre o nordestino fez calhas ao 
redor das casas para encher cacimba [storing water forms part of Northeastern culture… From 
time immemorial the Northeasterner has constructed gutters around their houses in order to 
fill tanks]” 50 . This phenomenon can also be observed in children’s play, with kids 
constructing small barriers alongside sidewalk curbs, and in local creeks, trying to impede the 
stream of water after rains (Montenegro, 2001, p. 17).  
In the Orós Reservoir, there is an observatory constructed just behind the reservoir 
wall for visitors and tourist’s public viewing. The dam is the main attraction in the small 
municipality, which carries the same name as the dam. In the observatory, one can read a 
fragment of a poem written by Demócrito Rocha, transcribed below, in which water is 
compared to the blood of the state of Ceará, and the loss of water to the ocean as a 
hemorrhage that must be stopped at all costs: 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 See Gazeta Mercantil, October 27th, 1998. 
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O Rio Jaguaribe é uma artéria aberta 
Por onde escorre e se perde 
O sangue do Ceará 
O sangue a correr e ninguém estanca... 
Homens da pátria – ouví: salvai o Ceará! 
Quem é o Presidente da República? 
Depressa 
Uma pinça hemostática em Orós! 
The Jaguaribe River is an open artery 
Through which Ceará’s blood  
Flows and is lost 
The blood flows and nobody stops it… 
Men of the nation – listen: save Ceará! 
Who is the president of the Republic? 
Quickly 
A haemostatic pincer for Orós! 
 
 
Locally, “bleeding” (sangrando) is an analogy used to describe when a dam overflows. 
The bleeding of a reservoir constitutes an event of major importance for local populations. 
Agencies responsible for the monitoring of dams make predictions of the exact moment in 
which the water level will reach bleeding point, that is, an overflow will occur. Local 
populations then go to the dam wall, and celebrate with music and fireworks. Visiting bleeding 
reservoirs turns into a weekend activity for families from Ceará of all social classes. From 
Fortaleza, groups often rent vans and small buses for an excursion to a dam, which 
sometimes – such as in the case for the Orós Reservoir - is located over seven hours away 
from the state capital. Beverage and fried fish stalls are organized on the banks of the dam; 
tourists spend the day swimming in its waters; the demand for motorcycle-taxis (moto-taxis, 
as they are known locally) for the trip between the bus terminal and the dam increases 
considerably.  
On February 5th, 2004, the Orós Reservoir overflowed after fifteen years had passed 
since its last bleeding (see pictures 6 and 7). The local media commented on popular reactions 
to the event: 
 
AÇUDE É ATRAÇÃO NO FINAL DE SEMANA 
A sangria do açude Orós atraiu no último domingo milhares de visitantes. A parede do 
reservatório ficou repleta de carros e as pessoas lotaram o mirante para assistir ao espetáculo da 
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água em correnteza caindo no sangradouro. O açude Orós começou a transbordar na última 
quinta-feira, dia 5, com uma lâmina de 10 cm, mas anteontem o nível era de 1,70 m. 
Quanto mais elevado o nível no sangradouro mais bonito é o espetáculo da queda dágua. Há 
15 anos que o Açude Orós, o segundo maior do Estado, não sangrava. A sua capacidade é de 
2 bilhões de metros cúbicos. A demora contribuiu mais ainda para atrair os visitantes ao 
reservatório. A expectativa era enorme na região. No sábado já houve o registro de milhares de 
pessoas, mas no domingo, a Polícia Militar calcula que cerca de seis mil pessoas passaram pela 
parede das 8 às 16 horas. 
O movimento foi mais intenso até as 14 horas. Além dos moradores da região Centro-Sul 
vieram pessoas do Cariri, da Paraíba e da Região Metropolitana de Fortaleza. “Trouxe meus 
filhos para conhecer o açude e ver o espetáculo da sangria”, disse o funcionário público 
aposentado, Valmir Lopes, da cidade de Cajazeiras, na Paraíba. “Tudo isso aqui é muito 
bonito”. 
Pessoas acostumadas a ver o Orós sangrar ficaram emocionadas. “Cheguei a pensar que o açude 
não sangrava mais, depois de tanto tempo de espera”, disse o pescador Raimundo de Souza. 
“Estava precisando porque a água estava muito suja, todo esse tempo parada”. Os pescadores 
esperam que com a renovação da água, ocorra um aumento na produção de pescado, que nos 
últimos anos sofreu enorme redução. “Aqui só dá pirambeba”. 
O Orós havia sangrado pela última vez em dezembro de 1989, um mês atípico na sua história. 
Agora em janeiro também ocorreu um fato inesperado. Até a primeira quinzena de janeiro 
passado, o Orós acumulava apenas 400 milhões de metros cúbicos, cerca de 20%. Mas em 
apenas 20 dias recebeu uma recarga superior a 1,6 bilhão de metros cúbicos. Resultado: está 
sangrando no início do inverno. 
O nível no sangradouro continua subindo, mas é provável que a partir de amanhã ocorra uma 
redução, porque o Rio Jaguaribe, principal afluente, baixou o nível na cidade de Iguatu. Tudo 
vai depender da ocorrência ou não de fortes chuvas. O Orós é um dos atrativos turísticos da 
região. Bares, lanchonetes e restaurantes ficaram lotados. O balneário recebeu um elevado 
número de consumidores. No distrito de Lima Campos, onde há tradicionais peixarias, os 
clientes tiveram que esperar por até duas horas para serem atendidos. Muitos desistiram. A 
sangria do açude deve atrair grande público no carnaval (Diário do Nordeste, February 
10th, 2004b). 
 
THE DAM IS THE WEEKEND’S ATTRACTION 
The Orós Reservoir bleeding attracted thousands of visitors last Sunday. The 
dam’s wall was lined with cars, and people crowded the observatory in order to 
witness the spectacle of the waterfall. The Orós Reservoir began to overflow last 
Thursday the 5th, with a spillage film of ten centimeters, however yesterday the 
level reached 1.7 meters. 
The higher the level of bleeding the more beautiful the spectacle of the waterfalls. 
It has been fifteen years since the Orós Reservoir, the second largest in the state, 
has bled. It has a capacity of two billion cubic meters. Such a large time lapse 
greatly contributed to the visitors’ attraction to the dam. The expectation was 
enormous in the region. On Saturday, a visitation rate of thousands of people 
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was recorded, and on Sunday the Military Police estimate that six thousand 
people visited the dam’s wall between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. 
Visitation was especially intense before 2 p.m. Besides the inhabitants of the 
central-southern region of the state, people from Cariri, from the state of Paraíba 
and from the Fortaleza Metropolitan Area made the journey to visit the dam. “I 
brought my kids so that they could see the dam and the spectacle of its bleeding”, 
said retired government employee Valmir Lopes from the municipality of 
Cajazeiras, in the state of Paraíba. “It is all very beautiful.” 
Even people who are used to seeing the Orós Reservoir were touched. “I 
thought the dam would never bleed again, after so much time waiting,” said 
fisherman Raimundo de Souza. “It was needed because the water was too dirty, 
all that time still.” Fishermen expect that with the replenished water supply there 
will be an increase in fish reproduction, which in the last few years has suffered 
enormous reductions. “Here we can only catch pirambeba51.” 
The last time the Orós Reservoir overflowed was in December, 1989, an atypical 
month for the history of the area. Now in January, it has also occurred 
unexpectedly. During the first half of the month, the Orós Reservoir 
accumulated only four hundred million cubic meters of water, or around 20% (of 
its capacity). But in only twenty days it refilled to over 1.6 billion cubic meters. 
This has resulted in a bleeding at the beginning of winter. 
The level of overflow keeps rising, but it is likely that a reduction will take place 
starting tomorrow, because the level of the Jaguaribe River, its most important 
source, has dropped in the municipality of Iguatú. It will all depend on whether 
heavy rains fall. The Orós Reservoir is one of the tourist attractions for the 
region. Bars and restaurants were packed. The dam received a high number of 
visitors. In the Lima Campos district, where there are traditional restaurants 
specializing in fish dishes, clients had to wait up to two hours to be served. Many 
gave up. The dam bleeding should also attract considerable visitation during 
carnival. 
 
 
A measure of the symbolic importance of reservoir bleeding is the manner in which such 
events appear in local aesthetic and historical discourse. During the overflow of the Orós 
Reservoir, locals were selling souvenirs, such as key rings with images of the dam bleeding. In 
the Ceará Museum (Museu do Ceará), in Fortaleza, the visitor finds on display a glass 
receptacle with water held inside from the first bleeding of the Cedro Reservoir, which took 
                                                 
51 Pirambeba is a type of fish that eats other fish, therefore negatively affecting fisheries. 
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place at 2 a.m. on April 24th, 1924.  Also on display is the inauguration ribbon from the 
official opening of the Feiticeiro Reservoir, which took place in 1933 (see pictures 8 and 9). 
For the local press, rain and water are issues that receive continuous attention. In 
addition to the detailed reports of dam bleeding celebrations (especially in the two newspapers 
that receive wider circulation around Ceará – the Diário do Nordeste and the O Povo 
newspapers), daily bulletins issued by FUNCEME are published in full, outlining the amount 
of rainfall, in millimeters, for the previous twenty-four hours in every municipality (figure 6). 
Another example of the population’s water conservation initiatives took place in 2003, 
during the construction of what is now the largest dam in Ceará, and the second largest in 
the Northeast, the Castanhão Reservoir. At the end of the rainy season of that year, the 
water level of the reservoir reached the road that crosses the region and links Fortaleza to 
the south of the state. At this time, the construction of the new road was not yet complete, 
so DNOCS and COGERH were obliged to open the reservoir’s valve to release a small 
amount of water, just enough to prevent the road from being covered by water, interrupting 
the local traffic of vehicles. This release led to a public outcry throughout the entire valley, 
even though the volume released totalled no more than 700 thousand liters. 
 
Fortaleza and the noveau rich of water 
The combination of the hyper-valuation of water in local cultural and esthetic standards, and 
the successful governmental effort to prevent water shortages in Fortaleza at all costs, are 
generating, in the capital city, changing patterns in local perception and water usage. The 
complete absence of educational campaigns or official communication efforts to promote 
public consciousness of the need for efficient and parsimonious water use is slowly erasing 
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the idea and the feeling of water scarcity from the capital’s collective memory, especially in 
wealthier neighborhoods and among younger populations. One agribusiness producer from 
the municipality of Limoeiro do Norte told us of his surprise when one of his children, 
raised in Fortaleza, asked him why he shut off the water many times during his shower. He 
realized, from the comment, that there was no official campaign for water economizing in 
Fortaleza; a different story from other cities in Brazil, with even higher water availability than 
Fortaleza.  
This reveals a potentially disastrous confrontation between the cultural water complex (as 
a background and sometimes unconscious feature of local habits), and an absence of 
consciousness concerning water scarcity: Artificial lakes and pools are hyper-valued 
architectural elements in elite areas of the city. Gardens in buildings and fancy stores are 
covered with green grass, demanding a great deal of watering that occurs during business 
hours, when the sun is intense and evaporation rates are at their highest (pictures 10 and 11), 
rather than at night, as occurs in most irrigation areas throughout the Jaguaribe Valley. 
Additionally, Fortaleza has become nationally known throughout Brazil for hosting the 
largest Orlando-style water park in the country. 
All this non-essential water-use forms part of what local water management schemes 
consider fits into the category of “human consumption,” which, under state water law, is 
given highest priority over other categories of water use. In practice, this means that in an 
eventual dispute for water between rice growers in the Jaguaribe Valley and Fortaleza water 
managers, the latter will receive legal priority. That means that water usage for esthetic, 
architectural purposes in the wealthier areas of Fortaleza would be legally prioritized over 
water usage for rice cultivation in rural areas, a key activity in the subsistence of large 
populations in the hinterland.  
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The Drought Industry and the Political Semiotics of Drought 
Climate events, and the ways in which they exacerbate vulnerabilities, are integral elements 
of how cultural and political structures have developed throughout the state’s history. On 
one hand, paternalistic patriarchal structures were moulded around the fragility of the 
populations’ general situation, through the control of available goods and resources, and 
their usage according to the ideology of patrimonialism based on clan loyalty (Cunniff, 1975; 
Coelho, 1985; Medeiros Filho e Souza, 1988; Kenny, 2002). These structures were also 
shaped by marked class divisions, and by the radical verticality of hierarchies. The use of 
contingency funds and actions for private means has become, since the 19th century, known 
as the drought industry (Callado, 1960). This has historically occurred through the distribution 
of such funds along political party lines, with loyalty to local clans in power who are in 
control of such funds. On many occasions, these funds have been used to employ locals 
affected by the drought in the construction of infrastructure that benefits the areas or lands 
controlled by local politicians. The phenomenon is, nevertheless, no more than the 
manifestation of patrimonialism that marks the political history of Brazil, in which public 
office is confounded with private business, and in which political leaders are recognized as 
such due to their assets and the paternalistic use they make of it (Faoro, 1984; Barreira, 1992; 
Lemenhe, 1995; Martins, 1999; Parente, 2000).  
More recently, a wider range of practices has been referred to as the drought industry. 
These include the illegal use of public money by local politicians, the use of emergency jobs 
that are created locally for contingency schemes but are then used to undertake construction 
work on the private lands of local elites; and also distribution of relief money along party 
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lines (Cunniff, 1975; Coelho, 1985; Medeiros Filho and Souza, 1988; Villa, 2000; Neves, 
2000). However, in spite of all this, it is important to remember that local elites and the 
poorer populations don’t have opposite frames of mind regarding the ways public funds are 
accessed along patrimonialistic lines. There are cases, for instance, in which some sectors 
from the poorest areas push local mayors to quickly declare an “emergency situation” in 
order to pressure the state government for relief money because in some of these areas the 
average standard of living is so low that any inflow of relief money makes a real impact on 
their local economy52. This is paralleled by past cases of food riots, in which towns were 
invaded and markets looted during drought periods of the late 19th and throughout the 20th 
century. According to Neves (2000), when sectors of the rural population realized that such 
mass actions were usually framed as desperate, therefore morally justifiable actions, and not 
criminal ones - although they have been known to involve many mortal confrontations with 
police -, such uprisings started to occur in a more systematic and organized fashion. 
Therefore, not only the wealthy, but also poor sectors of society take part in finding creative 
ways of making use of the law, as well as finding gaps in the law and in political structures, to 
manage patterns of visibilities and invisibilities, and to alter perceptions and beliefs in order 
to improve living standards53.  
One of the strategies used by the state to defend itself from any financial and 
managerial chaos that this situation can create is what is known as political insulation for the 
agencies responsible for relief. The state civil defense agency defined, in the early 1990s, a 
new set of rules to guide relief actions, not linked to the political logic of the hinterland, and 
a political firewall was created in the top levels of the government to support their agency. 
                                                 
52 See footnote forty-one on page one hundred and twenty-four. 
53  This has not only taken place in Ceará. For instance, Besteman observed the occurrence of a similar 
phenomenon in Somalia (1999, p. 150). 
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New rules were created based on definitions using technical criteria in order to evaluate the 
degree of seriousness of any emergency declaration, and also to sort cases in terms of 
priority, with worst cases given higher priority; within this context a firewall was created to 
keep technicians and local politicians separate from each other (Lemos, 2003). Since 
prioritization was said to be based on technical (and therefore “politically neutral”) criteria, 
and these were presented as being more sophisticated than the criteria used in usually 
clientalistic operations (something that, although still widely practiced, has gained a bad 
reputation and is usually conceptually opposed to the desired bureaucratic model of public 
management), very few mayors overtly manifested opposition to the introduction of these 
new criteria for guiding relief activities54.  
                                                 
54 The Federal Government decided to follow the example of the state of Ceará, with ten years of delay. In 
2005, the Ministry of National Integration decided to adopt criteria referred to as “objective,” to analyze the 
municipal declaration of a state of emergency. The criteria elected, nevertheless, showed to be unrealistic. 
According to the head of the National Civil Defense Secretariat, colonel José Pimentel, requests for 
emergencial help would only be accepted if meteorological records show the area to have received less than 
historical average precipitation, and after the Federal Rural Extension Office (EMATER) attests the harvest to 
have been lost. That does not consider the main problem of the municipalities of the semi-arid: water for 
human consumption in rural districts destitute of water accumulation infrastructure. According to Ceará’s Civil 
Defense, in January 2005, 22 municipalities experienced some degree of shortage of water for human 
consumption. 
Colonel Pimentel himself explains how the new set of criteria will reduce dramatically the number of 
declarations of emergency situation that are recognized as legitimate by the Federal Government: “Ninguém 
planta na seca. Se não há plantio, não há quebra de safra [No one plants during the dry season. If there is no 
cultivation, there is no lost harvest].” He continues: “O Brasil vulgarizou muito a calamidade pública [Brazil 
vulgarized the declaration of situation of public calamity].” In 2003, 1,462 requests for contingency funds were 
approved by the government; in 2004, this number reached 1,763. “Era tudo emocional, a indústria do carro-pipa [It 
was all emotional, the tanker truck industry],” said Pimentel. Only in January 2005, the number of emergency 
declarations surpassed 600, with more than 300 having already been received by the Federal Government. Of 
these, two-thirds come from the Brazilian Northeast. Colonel Pimental affirmed that only 47 will be recognized 
as legitimate and approved by the Federal Government. See O Povo, February 1st, 2005.  
One day after Pimentel’s declarations, the Ceará’s Civil Defense declared having conducted field 
inspections in each of the municipalities requesting federal help, attesting the legitimacy of all 22 cases. The 
president of the Association of Mayors of the State of Ceará (APRECE), Fradique Accioly, declared that the 
population of the municipalities going through water shortages cannot stay vulnerable to the bureaucratic 
decision of “técnicos que ficam no ar-condicionado [technicians who remain in the air-conditioned]”, creating 
increasingly rigid barriers for the provision of help for communities affected by water shortage. According to 
Accioly, “Claro que abusos existem, (mas) primeiro deve-se socorrer com recursos e ações emergenciais, depois, se houver 
comprovação da fraude, que este gestor seja punido. O que o Ministério está fazendo é o contrário: aumenta a burocracia, generaliza 
suspeitas e coloca em risco as pessoas [Of course there are cases of abuse, (but) first you have to help with funds and 
emergency actions, and after, if frauds are proved to have taken place, the mayor has to be punished. What the 
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It is important to see here how symbols are used as framing devices to induce the 
use of specific interpretive genres, and in doing so, affect the next stages of the game in 
specific intended ways. Technique in the example above worked as an elaborating symbol (Ortner, 
1973; see chapter two of this text), both as a root metaphor (qualifying the technicality of the 
new rules into established sets of oppositions, such as old:new, traditional:modern, 
clientalistic:bureaucratic) and as a key scenario (preventing the majority of local politicians 
from overtly manifesting against it).  
However, the most impressive and efficient semiotic regimentation linked to the 
politics of climate is the naturalization of misery, i.e. the presentation of rural poverty as a 
direct effect of lack of rain. Although there has always been some degree of understanding 
that the social distribution of resources was an important aspect contributing to the hardship 
of the poor masses, the discourse advocating drought as a purely climatic event has always 
been relatively dominant over competing discourses. Nature, as an abstract and unreachable 
agent, was (and in many contemporary discourses still is) represented as being responsible 
for collective suffering, and therefore leaving out of the equation discussions on how 
established social and economic structures contribute to the suffering of the poorest sectors. 
Furthermore, this approach gives the construction of large dams the characteristic of being a 
necessary and pressing moral duty. This directly benefits the construction sector, which, on 
its turn, is the the main funding source for political campaigns during election times55. At the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ministry is doing is the opposite: increases bureaucracy, generalizes suspicion and put the population at risk].” 
See Diário do Nordeste, February 2nd, 2005. 
55 It is important to note that currently Ceará’s water storage capacity – just in the one hundred and twenty 
three dams managed by the government (and therefore not including the other around eight thousand small 
dams) - is of 17.5 billion cubic meters for a population of 7.1 million inhabitants, giving a storage/inhabitant 
ratio that is better than in many European countries. In 2004 the hydro-system was using over 90% of its 
storage capacity, but on average it generally remains at around 50%. The average rain precipitation in Ceará – 
around seven hundred millimeters per year – is also not so different from most parts of Western Europe. The 
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same time, equating misery with rains caused the federal government to stop transferring 
relief funds to the Northeast at the first signs of rains, in many different drought periods 
(Villa, 2000, p. 235). In these circumstances, the government did not consider the fact that 
communities still required aid as the first harvests would take place only three months later 
(and even if it was decided that aid should be given, often seeds were unavailable). 
An interesting feature of this “naturalization” of the life of the poor masses involves 
the way it affects the understanding of gender, through the construction of narratives 
structured around the idea that to live in such a harsh and drought-prone semi-arid 
environment requires, from men and women alike, an unmatched degree of endurance and 
bravery. “Dessas  mulheres se espera que demonstrem força, coragem e destemor para viver nesse lugar cheio 
de agruras e sofrimento [Of these women a display of strength, courage and fearlessness is 
required in order to live in this place full of misadventure and suffering]” (Duarte, 2003, p. 
236). From such narratives, possessing masculine characteristics becomes an inevitable 
outcome of such a hard life. If, as Catherine Lutz puts it, “any discourse on emotions is also, 
at least implicitly, a discourse on gender” (In Kulick, 1998, p. 87), then this narrative has 
great potential to generate différend situations; situations in which a specific understanding of 
the relationship between the environment and forms of being in the world leave no room 
for behaviors understood as being feminine. 
 
Só um macho poderia se defrontar com uma natureza tão hostil, só uma exagerada dose de 
virilidade para se conseguir sobreviver a uma natureza adusta, ressequida, áspera, árida, rude, 
traços que se identificariam com a própria masculinidade. Por isso, até a mulher sertaneja seria 
masculinizada, pelo contato embrutecedor com um mundo hostil, que exigia valentia, destemor e 
resistência. Só os fortes venciam em terra assim. A masculinidade nordestina forjara na luta 
incessante contra um meio em que apenas os mais potentes, os mais “membrudos”, os mais rijos, 
                                                                                                                                                 
major problems in Ceará is the poor distribution of rains throughout the year, the inefficient use of water, and 
the concentration of water use in the hands of some social groups. 
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homens que nunca se vergaram, nunca amoleciam diante de qualquer dificuldade, conseguiam 
vencer. Os homens fracos, débeis, delicados, impotentes, frágeis, afeminados não teriam lugar 
numa terra assim, não sobreviveriam. Ser macho era, pois, a própria natureza do nordestino 
(Albuquerque Júnior in Duarte, 2003, p. 238). 
 
Only a macho man could confront such hostile nature; only an exaggerated dose 
of virility enables survival in such a burning, dry, rough, arid, crude nature, 
characteristics that are identified with masculinity itself. For this reason, even the 
hinterland woman was masculinized, due to the brute contact with the hostile 
world that required bravery, fearlessness and resistance. Only the strong won in 
such a land. Northeastern masculinity was forged in the ceaseless fight against 
the elements, in which only the most potent, the largest bodied, the wiriest, men 
that never buckled, that never softened before any difficulty, could win. The 
weak, feeble, delicate, impotent, fragile, effeminate men had no place in such a 
land; they could not survive. To be macho was, well, the very nature of the 
Northeasterner. 
 
 
Albuquerque Júnior argues that the sociological nexus for the survival of such 
narratives concerning the nature of Northeasterners as being tough and masculine, lies in the 
fact that it is socially constructed by local traditional elites as a reaction to the their loss of 
prestige in national political arenas to southern elites, who historically have been identified 
with industrialism and modernity (Albuquerque Júnior, 2004; Duarte, 2003). While southern 
industrial elites have historically been politically opposed to Northeastern rural oligarchies, 
for the Northeastern elites, “modern” ways of being in the world – such as transformations 
in clothing, in manners, in patterns of consumption and etiquette in the urban centers of the 
country - were seen as a de-virilization of society. In the face of a larger political order, in 
which the power of Northeastern patriarchal oligarchies were in frank decay, the 
“quintessential Northeasterner” – on the one hand, macho, rude and adapted to the harsh 
environment; on the other, honorable and faithful to local traditions - is constructed by local 
Northeastern elites as a conservative hero, “um tipo regional capaz de se contrapor às transformações 
históricas ‘feminizadoras’ da sociedade que, em curso desde o começo do século, ameaçava levar a região ao 
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declínio [a regional type capable of standing up against historical ‘feminizing’ social 
transformations taking place since the beginning of the century, and that have been a 
menacing force to drive the region into decline]” (Duarte, 2003, p. 237). 
Still according to Albuquerque Junior (1995), it is a mistake to believe that it was the 
degree of collective suffering during the 1877-1879 drought that caused the sensitization of 
national elites and the inclusion of the issue in the national government’s agenda of 
discussions. Even though the government knew about previous droughts (official 
documents going back to 1552 constantly make reference to drought and its impacts on local 
society and economy; Villa, 2000, p. 17) it still largely ignored the appeals from Northeastern 
leaders throughout the entire 1877-1879 drought. Real transformations occurred once the 
local elites of the Northeast were deeply affected by the climate event, and constructed a 
representation of the situation that proved politically effective in the national arena. Local 
rural elites saw the drought disorganizing the core of the social structure, on which it based 
its power. With the destruction of crops and with the death of animals, patrons momentarily 
lost their capacity to fulfill their roles within the tacit social contract of clientalism. The poor 
population, such as vaqueiros and slaves, saw themselves as being abandoned by their patrons, 
who could hardly provide for themselves either. Conscious of the potential detrimental long 
term effects such social disorganization could have on local social dynamics, local elites have 
managed to create a discourse concerning drought that presents it as an unavoidable climate 
event affecting Brazilian citizens that were in turn entitled to receive aid and support from 
the national government. Through many communications with media from the south, such 
as detailed descriptions of the horrors of the drought that were repeatedly published in 
major southern Brazilian newspapers, and also through their presence in the National 
Congress in order to create necessary sensitization in the minds of politicians from other 
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parts of the country, local elites managed to transform the drought into something 
understood as a national problem, changing governmental attitudes towards the northeast 
region.  
At the same time, drought discourse fulfills an important function in the national 
political game, in which Northeastern elites have since the 19th century felt disadvantaged 
and discriminated against: the drought has been made the battle horse upon which the 
Northeastern elites continue to request their share of national wealth in terms of the division 
of economic benefits and of political offices within the national arena (Albuquerque Júnior, 
1995, p. 120). In the words of Albuquerque Júnior: 
 
A seca passa a ser a temática central de uma série de discursos de grupos e instituições sociais 
que vão se cruzando e enformando um “discurso da seca”, feixe de imagens, enunciados e 
significados que a tornam uma seca particular, uma seca que só o Norte e depois o Nordeste 
terão. Esses vários discursos se preocupam em definir a singularidade dessa seca, suas causas e 
em propor soluções que venham sempre ao encontro das aspirações momentâneas de suas elites. 
Se, no final do século XIX, as elites no Norte reivindicavam estradas-de-ferro, estão são 
apresentadas como solução para a seca; se querem estradas de rodagem, estas se tornam solução 
para a seca; se hoje as elites do Nordeste querem a instalação de Zonas de Exportação, elas são 
também apresentadas como solução para a seca (ibid., p. 119). 
 
For social groups and institutions, drought becomes a central theme for a series 
of discourses that cross each other to form a “drought discourse,” a cluster of 
images, enunciations, and significations that gives the drought a particular 
character, which only the North, and later the Northeast, could have56. These 
multiple discourses manage to define the special quality of drought in the region, 
and its causes, and to propose solutions that have always converged with the 
momentary aspirations of its elites. If, at the end of the 19th century, the 
Northern elites wanted railroads, these were then presented as solutions to  
drought; if [later] they wanted roads, these then became drought solutions; if 
today the Northeastern elites want to install Zones for Export, these will also be  
presented as solutions to drought. 
 
                                                 
56 The region that is currently known as the Northeast was, up to the end of the 19th century, referred to as part 
of the North of Brazil. 
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In the past two decades, this equation has also included the World Bank. The World 
Bank is the main source of funding for the construction of recent developments in state 
water accumulation infrastructure (for instance the construction of a water way - the 
Integration Canal – going from the Castanhão Reservoir to the industrial complex and port of 
Pecém, the future most important industrial and export center for the state). State efforts are 
generally directed towards the development of its industrial sectors. Many local activists and 
opposition leaders complain that industrial water consumption is officially given higher 
priority than that given to water for human consumption in the hinterlands. Water storage 
capacity has grown from eleven to seventeen billion cubic meters within the past ten years; 
however, since most of this water is directed to urban, industrial, and agricultural 
consumption, the reduction of rural vulnerability to drinking water scarcity was less than 
proportional. It is still not unusual for many municipalities of the hinterland to face scarcity 
of drinking water even during years of regular rains. In January 2003, for instance, fifty-seven 
of the one hundred and eighty-three municipalities solicited the delivery of civil defense 
emergency drinking water57. At the same time, the justification for receiving international 
loans comes, naturally, from the fact that Ceará is one of the poorest regions of Latin 
America.  
The inherent paradox linked to the drought discourse is that the greater the investment 
the state makes in water accumulation and other basic infrastructural aspects, the harder it is 
to maintain that it is the drought that keeps the population poor. As mentioned above, 
endemic hunger is a phenomenon that affects over 40% of the population of Fortaleza, a 
place where water is now in general more abundant than in the hinterland, regardless of 
                                                 
57 See Diário do Nordeste, January 6th, 2003. 
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climate issues. It also seems that migration does not cease in years of good rains. Dagmar 
Fuhr et al. (2003) found out that the relation between climate changes and migration is 
rather an indirect one, through economic impacts. Factors like the availability of credit, 
agricultural assistance, improvement in infrastructure, and the local availability of jobs stand 
in between migration and climatic variations (Ibid., p. 360). During the 1990s, the number of 
individuals born in Ceará but living in other states of Brazil grew by 16.8%, even though the 
decade is considered to be relatively mild in terms of drought. For Luiz Bassegio, from the 
Catholic Church Migration Service:  
 
Estes números, entretanto, não têm sido suficientes para desatar o nó entre a seca e a migração. 
[…] Pessoas famintas, plantas e animais morrendo sensibilizam mais se for devido a um 
fenômeno da natureza - contra o qual o homem não pode fazer nada - do que pela falta de ação 
pública. No primeiro caso, tanto a sociedade civil ajuda como se consegue verbas do governo 
federal (Diário do Nordeste, September 13th, 2004). 
 
These numbers, meanwhile, have not been sufficient to break the strong link 
between drought and migration [in political discourse]. […] Famished people, 
plants and animals dying are more touching images if they are attributed to a 
natural event, against which no one can do anything - rather than being due to 
lack of public action. In the first case, aid is received just as much from civil 
society as it is from the federal government.  
 
 
The recent strategy to tackle misery through economic development induced a change 
in official rhetoric on drought, especially rhetoric directed towards private investors. 
Although descriptions of human suffering help to bring federal funds to the state, the 
mention of drought has to be done carefully or completely avoided among other types of 
audiences.  The image of water scarcity scares private investor audiences away. As early as 
1970, during a drought that took place at the beginning of a period that became known as 
the Brazilian Miracle (due to high rates of national economy growth), government officials 
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refused to publicly accept the fact that agricultural fields were devastated and hunger had 
spread over the Northeastern territory, and continued to brush off accounts of human 
suffering as exaggerations. The president of the Bank of the Northeast of Brazil (BNB) 
declared that divulging such fictional catastrophic accounts “contribui apenas para afastar os 
investimentos industriais e especialmente os agrícolas [only contributes to turning away investments 
in the industrial sector, and especially in agriculture] (Villa, 2000, p. 202).” The story was 
repeated in 1979, when a multi-year drought forecast issued by CTA was called sensationalist 
and then “filed,” that is, discarded (França Júnior, 2003, p. 133).  
In the long run, the discourse on drought backfired, in the sense that transforming the 
Northeast into a “problematic region” in the eyes of the rest of Brazil (in order to receive 
aid), instead resulted in a lowing amount of investment concentrated in the region (ibid., p. 
250). This exacerbated the already intensely economic unevenness between Southern and 
Northern Brazil. 
 
Developing the Northeast: Game Playing through the Myth of Modernity 
The agenda for industrial development adopted by the state government requires the flow of 
natural resources - most importantly water - from the hinterland to the metropolitan area 
(Garjulli et al., 2002). Water, in a semi-arid environment such as Ceará, is the most important 
limiting factor in economic development. Therefore, moving water from one place to 
another signifies shifts in the potential for local development. This is even more so in 
situations where local water supply and demand are more or less balanced. Besides the 
effects of water transference, high hinterland poverty rates have led to a practically unlimited 
pool of cheap unskilled labor. If we add to this equation the government’s control of law-
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making apparatus, in which many decrees have been passed in the last few years favoring the 
techno-economicist take on water management58, the Fortaleza-hinterland relationship can 
be said to be moving towards a modern form of internal colonialism. However, the micro-
mechanisms of such political relations are outcomes of greater interest: the situation is being 
constructed (and can only be maintained) through a considerable amount of energy being 
fed into metapragmatic controls and semiotic operations that define new interpretive 
contexts for the concepts of water, development, and politics. Even though the state 
controls law-making processes, it lacks infrastructure for law enforcement, therefore there is 
also a need to make use of sociosemiotic political strategies. The implementation of these 
strategies has required new forms of communication and control between government and 
local populations, something that has developed serendipitously through recently introduced 
conflict resolution mechanisms (such as the participatory water committees) created in the 
Jaguaribe Valley, as I will discuss later in this text.  
Economic development meets the local realm not only through the reorganization of 
economic patterns and flows, but also through the always more or less successful attempt to 
reorganize symbols. The group of business people who won the state elections of 1986, 
under the leadership of Tasso Jereissati had, as their main campaign message, the renewal of 
political practices, the adoption of modern, efficient business enterprise-like management 
attitudes towards public administration, and to combat “corrupt” political practices such as 
clientalism and nepotism. They called themselves the Government of Changes (Governo das 
Mudanças), and in order to make their message even more powerful they depicted previous 
                                                 
58 For instance decree 27.271, of November 28th, 2003, which includes the introduction of tariffs for bulk, 
untreated water usage by diverse economic sectors, such as small scale commercial agriculture. The decree was 
passed despite the repeated appeals from local water committees to the SRH not to create it. See R. Taddei, 
2004. 
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governments as representing the extreme opposite of the spectrum, in terms of being 
traditional and corrupt leaders linked to traditional rural oligarchies and to the military. That 
was so even when the previous governors, while to some extend linked to those oligarchies, 
were in fact business owners in Fortaleza and responsible for much of the modernization of 
the infrastructure for the state in the previous years (Lemenhe, 1995; Barreira, 2002, p. 69). 
Virgílio Távora, for instance, one of the main political leaders during the previous decade, 
and considered to be one of the coronéis of Ceará, was responsible for transforming the state 
into the third largest industrial region of the Northeast (Parente, 2002b, p. 128). 
The mid-1980s was an important moment in Brazilian history. In 1984, the era of 
military dictatorship came to an end, and the national political world was dominated by the 
discourse of the reconstruction of democratic order and of the national economy. The 
recent past and the prospective future were represented in this discourse, by national 
political elites, as opposite poles within the political symbolization of that moment. 
Backwardness and underdevelopment were rendered meaningful against the concepts of modernity 
and progress; terms that are fuzzy in meaning but powerful in the feelings they invoke (acting 
as summarizing symbols). In the local state elections of 1986, change and progress were the key 
elements organizing the discourses of new, young political elites, offering the poor masses 
the illusion that the miraculous schemes brought by these new figures would reduce their 
economic vulnerability and increase their social status. In Ceará, these schemes were based 
on plans to reorganize the state according to principles of bureaucratic rationality: to combat 
traditional political practices seen as corrupt and inefficient, to promote economic 
development through the awarding of incentives to capitalistic enterprises, and to modernize 
the state’s physical infrastructure and services. In the eyes of new leaders, the reduction of 
poverty would be a natural outcome of such a combination of elements.  
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This newly espoused symbolic order also proposed the adoption of horizontal 
organizational structures - such as markets - in economic relations, and for participatory 
commissions in decision making. This ended up being carried out more thoroughly in the 
economic area (mostly due to the constant state of financial crises within which the 
government found itself), where markets and liberalism guided economic strategies, rather 
than in the political area, where centralization remained strong - although a few local 
commissions were created to deal with many issues, civil defense and water allocation being 
two of the most prominent. Subsistence activities gained a negative connotation of 
backwardness, and were associated with ideas of poverty, hunger, and vulnerability. Whereas 
market production (especially for export), with its connotations of modernity and of 
participation in the global economy, was represented as a positive alternative. This 
configuration of values transforms collective perceptions in a way that penalizes the poorer 
sectors, which in general have no means to change their economic activities, by lumping on 
them the image of being a burden to the state59.  
While clientalism and modernity may be used as opposites in political rhetoric, they are 
clearly not so in practice. Images of clientalism as being linked to the “traditional” rural 
world standing in opposition to “modernity” brought to the government by industrialists 
                                                 
59 This symbolic order constitutes a double violence against the poorest strata of the population, once it 
touches on the issue of the historical ties local communities have with food markets, on which they are often 
dependant in times of drought, when their subsistence activities are ruined, and by which they are affected 
negatively when prices go up, increasing their vulnerability (Neves, 2000; Villa, 2000). Reflecting this idea, 
Davis has shown how in some historical circumstances (referring specifically to British colonialism in India), 
liberal economic networks may drain resources from poor areas rather than reducing local communities 
vulnerabilities, especially in the ways in which droughts affect prices and markets (Davis, 2001). In a similar 
vein Bourdieu states: “The unification of the economic field tends, especially through monetary unification and 
the generalization of monetary exchanges that follow, to throw all social agents into an economic game for 
which they are not equally prepared and equipped, culturally and economically; it tends at the same time to 
submit them to standards objectively imposed by the competition of productive forces and the more efficient 
means of production, as one sees clearly with small rural producers more and more completely torn away from 
self-sufficiency. In short, unification profits the dominant. The difference is constituted in capital simply by the fact 
of being placed in relationship” (2001, p. 1, emphasis in the original). 
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and characterized by rational bureaucracy, are, in Ceará, an engineered political illusion. As 
shown by Lemenhe (1995), the (small amount of) industrialization achieved in some areas of 
the Northeast, beginning in the 1960s, was not due to the local bourgeoisie becoming 
politically organized and creating an environment for the flourishing of capitalistic 
enterprises, but rather to the action of state governors who, due to their ties with individuals 
in the top spheres of national power (which were forged during the military rule, a period of 
extreme political centralism), could get access to some funding for local investments by 
means of alliances and favors (Ibid., p. 34-35; also Barreira, 1992). At the same time, these 
same state level politicians were moving their capital from agriculture to the industrial and 
service sectors. 
Within the processes of state structural transformation, the mixing of eclectic political 
styles divides space and leads to competition for the political pie. The old rural oligarchies 
are witnessing the continuous shrinking of their influence, while new leading figures are 
owners of media companies, directors of large foreign companies, and individuals occupying 
high ranks within the state judiciary. Throughout these changes patrimonialism has survived 
and power is often established by acting through networks of friends in powerful posts in 
both private and public sectors (Barreira, 1992; Lemenhe, 1995; Martins, 1999; Cavalcante, 
2003). Clientalism is not only a feature of a distinct social structure, it is also a political genre. 
This accounts for its continued pervasive presence, even in situations in which patriarchal 
structures are not as evident, such as in modern bureaucracies, which are supposedly 
organized according to meritocratic principles60.  
                                                 
60 Nepotism and patron-client relationships inside “modern” bureaucratic institutions (such as industry and 
governmental agencies) have also been observed in other parts of Latin America (cf. Hansen and Wolf, 1972, p. 
157). 
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Even today, traces of clientalistic relations are manifested in many situations of local 
political life. I could observe a clear example of that during fieldwork: In the second half of 
2004, Ceará held its municipal elections for mayors and municipal representatives (vereadores). 
During the weeks preceding elections, the number of ambulances arriving from these 
hinterland municipalities, to bring individuals in for treatment at Fortaleza hospitals, doubled 
from the average during non-electoral periods, and caused congestion in the public health 
system of the city61. The ambulances were used as favors to create local political obligation in 
exchange for votes. These ambulances were either hired by local candidates, or in the case of 
mayors running for re-election, were ambulances from the municipal health system. In the 
municipalities of Quixadá, Morada Nova, and Icó, I observed cases in which employees were 
fired and moradores expelled from patrons’ lands for not having voted for their political allies 
in recent elections. Other authors also make reference to such cases (e.g. Barreira, 1992). The 
situation is also harsh for employees of municipal governments: if they are believed not to be 
politically aligned with the winning candidate, they will be fired in order to free positions to 
be filled by allies of the new mayor62. Locals say that this is a widespread pattern in the 
Jaguaribe Valley.  
In the state government, even technical posts are treated as political ones.  For instance, 
individuals occupying the presidency of FUNCEME and of COGERH, the government 
agencies most distanced from the core of the political world and with agendas dedicated 
primarily to technical subjects as climate and water, are usually changed when a new group 
takes power. As I will discuss in greater detail later in this text, although the political party 
                                                 
61 See Diário do Nordeste, September 23rd, 2004. 
62 In the public service of Brazil, if an individual is granted a position by means of a public competitive 
examination (concurso público), he or she has some degree of protection against such political manipulations. 
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PSDB remained in power after the 2002 state elections, internal conflicts within the party led 
to the change of leadership at COGERH and at the Water Resources Secretariat (SRH)63.  
 
After eighteen years in government for the current political group, the industrial base of the 
state is stronger, the state is enjoying a shrimp production boom 64 , the government 
structures have been reorganized and rationalized, the state GDP grows at a slightly faster 
pace than regional and national GDP, and an extended network of roads and electricity now 
links rural areas to main urban centers. However, social development did not follow this 
economic boom. Although certain social advances have occurred, such as a drastic reduction 
in infant mortality rates by 36% (Tendler, 1997, p. 22), more than half of the state’s 
population still lives under the poverty line, and in rural areas, this number exceeds 75%65. 
                                                 
63 While the president of FUNCEME (who is recognized as a technically competent individual but is not 
identified with the core of the PSDB in the state) was not removed from office, the whole agency was moved 
from the Water Resources Secretariat to the Science and Technology Secretariat, a government sector with no 
power over infrastructure investments. 
64 Not without serious ecological damage to coastal ecosystems. 
65 According to Cohn: As políticas sociais acabam sendo condenadas aos limites restritos do alívio da pobreza e, portanto, 
sempre fadadas ao insucesso, uma vez que constituem políticas e programas destinados exatamente ao combate a determinadas 
carências a que estão submetidos determinados grupos sociais, produtos, por sua vez, da desigualdade gerada pelo próprio mercado e 
pelas políticas macroeconômicas (Cohn in Barreira, 2002, p. 78) [Social policies end up being condemned to be no 
more than poverty alleviation, and always condemned to failure, once they constitute programs and policies 
that are destined to meet certain needs affecting certain social groups, and that are in fact products of the 
inequity generated by the market itself and by macroeconomic policies.] 
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5. Meteorological Battles: the Social Life of Representations of Climate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the large population of dryland farmers of the Jaguaribe Valley, there is no official ritual 
to mark the end of the rainy season, although there are harvest rituals that coincide with the 
end of rains. In a typical rainy season, rains that start in late February or early March will 
sustain the maize and bean crops, which have a production cycle of around one hundred and 
twenty days, until late May, when the amount of rain start to decrease until it disappears, by 
mid June. If rains start early (in January or February), harvest celebrations will coincide with 
the June festivals dedicated to Saint Anthony (June 13th), Saint John (June 24th), and Saint 
Peter (June 29th). If rains start later, harvest festivities will take place most likely in July. If 
rains do not fall until Saint Joseph’s day (March 19th), then the local populations know they 
are experiencing a drought situation. 
As early as the first days of July, a few individuals, locally considered knowledgeable 
on climate issues of the hinterlands, start their observations of nature, in search of signs of a 
hopefully imminent rainy season, approximately six months thence. In September, the 
presence of such ethnosemioticians looking for signs of rain increases considerably. Some of 
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them explain that it is because September and March are connected by the spring and fall 
equinoxes, that is, examining one will give clues of what will occur with the other. When 
December comes around, not only regular observers, but also the whole population of the 
semi-arid becomes anxious. Pages of the local newspapers are dedicated to these individuals 
who are knowledgeable on local climate 66 . The number of forecasts one finds in the 
hinterland and in the cities increases by a staggering amount. Saint Luzia’s day (December 
13th) is a special time at which thousands of individuals in different places of the hinterland 
enact an old forecast ritual using rocks of salt. In a banana leaf, six small rocks of salt are 
positioned in line, each one representing a month of the coming rainy season, from January 
to June. The leaf with the salt rocks is left outside overnight, from December 12th to the 13th, 
sometimes on the porch, sometimes on the roof. The next day, the leaf is consulted; the 
melted rocks represent the rainy months ahead, and the intact rocks represent forecasted dry 
months.  
On Christmas day, the colors of the horizon and of the sun during dawn are 
observed, and the same occurs on New Year’s Day. Throughout the whole month of 
December, and sometimes even earlier, animals and plants, and also the stars and the sky, are 
carefully observed. Signs of approaching rains include ants “cleaning out” their nests, that is, 
taking the old leaves out. Also, cats and armadillos giving birth in December and not eating 
their offspring is also considered a good sign (however if they do eat them, it is a sign of 
drought). Some people from the hinterlands look to see if fish have eggs in them, others 
read the sweaty testicles of donkeys, or look for “sweaty” (humid) rocks as a sign of 
approaching rains. Forecast methods vary from place to place, from family to family. 
                                                 
66 See for instance Diário do Nordeste, September 18th, 2004, and February 18th, 2005; Folha de S.Paulo, 
January 18th, 2004; O Povo, January 12th, 2004. 
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Particularly in late December, not only those who have gained the status of being 
knowledgeable persons perform such observations; it is rare to find a single rural individual 
who does not know about some of these techniques and who does not undertake some of 
their own observations, even if they are later compared and adjusted against other forecasts. 
Finan mentions the anxiety that pervades the region waiting for rains in the following 
passage: 
 
It is important to understand the collective angst that overcomes the rural 
population as the impending winter draws near. The hunger, the moldy saline 
water from the shrinking reservoirs, the skeleton vegetation, the dying livestock, 
and the forced migration are vivid realities for most rural Cearenses. The 
presence of rain prophets (profetas da chuva) and the many natural “signs of rain” 
to which rural people attribute great significance are testimonies to the 
psychological anxiety that the thread of drought engenders (2001, p. 6). 
 
 
Since 1997, the Shop Owners Association (Câmara dos Dirigentes Lojistas – CDL) of the 
municipality of Quixadá has organized an annual rain prophets 67  meeting. The meeting 
usually takes place in mid-January, with local knowledgeable individuals from the town and 
surrounding municipalities invited to announce their forecasts to an auditorium full of 
journalists, TV crews, radio reporters, and curious and interested local folk. Particularly in 
2004, there was an even greater range of journalists from the southern Brazilian city of São 
Paulo, from the largest Brazilian TV company, TV Globo, as well as a documentary crew 
filming the event, and scholars from local and international universities. During these 
meetings the so called rain prophets make public the results of their observations, and 
                                                 
67 Rain prophet is a label most of the local individuals taken as knowledgeable on climate do not like, as we will 
discuss later. We will make usage of the expression rain prophet, through this text, once it is widely used by locals, 
by local media, and by local artists, as we can see in the poem Great Saint Joseph, the Saint of Rains, transcribed 
below. In this text the expression was used to denote local ethnosemioticians who read the signs of nature and 
interpret then according to their beliefs on the connection between those signs and the occurrence of rains.  
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sometimes, as in the 2004 meeting, are asked to reveal their forecast methods. Although a 
meteorologist from FUNCEME is usually invited, during the 2004 meeting there was no 
scientific forecast given because the annual meeting of meteorologists, which takes place in 
Fortaleza, did not occur until two weeks later. The CDL president explains that the idea of 
sponsoring the meeting stems from the fact that a great deal of the local commerce trades in 
agricultural implements and tools, and that local businesses needed some indication of when 
to expect rains in order to prepare for the demand that usually accompanies them.  
Meteorologists from all over the Northeast, and from research institutes from São 
Paulo, Brasília and abroad, met in Fortaleza on January 22nd, 2004, under pouring rains. It 
was the 6th Climate Outlook Forum, a meeting that takes place annually in Fortaleza. In 2004, 
the meeting was scheduled for a later date than usual (the previous meeting took place on 
December 19th, 2002) because in the past there have been sudden changes in climate 
indicators after the meeting has taken place, creating the need for corrections in the first 
announced forecasts. This is considered normal for the meteorological world but often 
creates, among the consumers of climate forecasts, the idea that the first forecasts released 
were “wrong.” During the 2004 meeting, as in past meetings, mathematical models, satellite 
images, graphs and maps were presented and discussed, and at the end a final report of the 
“official” forecast was released and distributed to the press. 
In order to understand the fate of the many competing forecast methods in Ceará’s 
society, as mentioned above, there is a need to analyze some background elements that 
frame the ways in which issues of water and rain are contextualized, and through which they 
are attributed specific meanings.  
 
  
161
Climate, Anxiety and Religion 
As we saw in the previous section, a general feeling of vulnerability forms part of the 
everyday existence of the population of the hinterland, especially when concerning collective 
representations of climate. This vulnerability is also an important element in how political 
structures and conceptual paradigms have developed historically. A representation of the 
world as being based on a division between the vulnerable, and those who protect the 
vulnerable, is paramount to the formation of clientalistic relations and, in political and 
economic arenas, is the grounds for local oligarchic structures. This division is also found to 
correlate with metaphysical narratives. The religious field finds, in the difficult material 
reality of the hinterland, a wide space for its activity. Throughout the region, elaborate 
religious complexes have been developed around the figures of Padre Cícero (Father Cicero; 
see Della Cava, 1970; Ramos, 2003; see pictures 12 and 13 in appendix 1) and Frei Damião 
(Friar Damian), who have been transformed by popular religiosity into icons of metaphysical 
protection for the masses against the inclemency of the climate. In the Northeast, religious 
narratives make constant references to economic factors of production and harvest, areas in 
which rural people feel the need for protection. Water as a Source of Life, for instance, was the 
main theme of the annual campaign of the CNBB – the National Conference of Brazilian 
Bishops, in 200468. Although the motto retains an intrinsic metaphorical aspect for the 
southern urban population, it is almost a strictly referential message, with strong political and 
economic appeal, for the rural population of the semi-arid. 
In hinterland imagery, not only does climate enter religious discourse, but religion 
also interferes in the business of climate. Or rather, climate cannot be dissociated from the 
metaphysical world. It is intrinsically understood that the material and spiritual worlds are 
                                                 
68 See O Povo, February 24th, 2004. 
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profoundly interconnected and the divine creator’s moral order is the principle that regulates 
both. God controls the rains and sends signs of their approach. The occurrence or the 
absence of rain, and the implications of this, find meaning in the religious moral order. 
Within this framework, technological actions that alter climate regimes are seen by many as  
interference in a non-human realm in which God can bring disgrace to society as a form of 
divine punishment. On April 22nd, 1877, during the early days of the Great Drought, the 
bishop of Ceará issued a pastoral letter in which the drought was identified as divine 
punishment for sins committed against divine will, namely the abandonment by many 
individuals of religious morality, and as a disciplinary measure against a libertine anti-
religious life (Villa, 2000, p. 46). One hundred and twenty seven years later, during the huge 
flooding of the Jaguaribe River in January 2004, which left behind a trail of destruction and 
at least fifteen people dead69, informants in the Jaguaribe Valley manifested the idea that 
such an extreme climate event had its roots in the human insistence upon interfering with 
the plans of the creator, as punishment, for instance, for going to Mars, developing cloning 
technology and waging war against Iraq70. Pedro Nogueira Lima, considered a knowledgeable 
man on issues of traditional climate forecasts in the municipality of Ubajara, affirmed that 
the 2004 calamities were caused by man’s disobedience of God’s will (Diário do Nordeste, 
September 18th, 2004b). 
Cloud seeding activities carried out by FUNCEME during the 1980s were seen by 
the rural population with a mix of distrust and admiration. Opinions varied from the fear of 
divine punishment to that which held that if FUNCEME knew how to produce rains 
                                                 
69 See Diário do Nordeste, January 30th, 2004. 
70 I thank Mary Kenny for this information, which was relayed to me through personal communication. These 
ideas reflect the arrival of rural electricity supply allowing for the effective spread of television viewing, by 
which means mediatic elements were incorporated into local narratives.  
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artificially, if it didn’t rain it was because the government was somehow profiting from 
keeping the population impoverished. Here the government is depicted inside the logic that 
polarizes subjects as either impotent or as all-powerful, as capable or incapable of bringing 
rains, without including, in such discourse, the nuances that mark the ways in which 
researchers and scientists represent themselves and their activities - by saying, for instance, 
that meteorology is an experimental science and that climate models are in constant 
development and refinement. Mr. Lima (mentioned above) also suffers the effects of this 
perceived relation between knowledge and absolute power: “quando o inverno é ruim, muita gente 
me responsabiliza por isto. Eu não sou dono do inverno, peço a Deus que venha a chuva [when the winter 
is bad, many people hold me responsible for it. I am not the owner of the winter, I also pray 
to God for the rains to come]” (Ibid.). For some sectors of the rural population, evil stems 
not from the power one has, but from the use made of it. Admittedly scientists may have the 
power to make rain; however, the problem lies in the fact that neither science nor 
government grounds its actions in the moral and religious order, which establishes legitimate 
space for human and divine intervention. 
It is crucial here to analyze the role of teleological and tautological aspects of 
religious thinking in the hinterland of Ceará, in order to comprehend how abstract models of 
climate are enacted in practice. Since local religious narratives depict climate as being under 
the control of God, believers directly request rain from saints, from religious icons like Padre 
Cícero (considered to be a local saint but who has not formally been canonized by the 
Catholic Church) and directly to God. A fragment of a poem called the ABC of the Scourged 
Northeast, written by the best known popular poet of Ceará, Patativa do Assaré, exemplifies 
this: 
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Ai como é duro vivê 
Nos Estados do Nordeste, 
Quando o nosso Pai Celeste 
Não manda as nuve chuvê. 
É bem triste a gente vê 
Findá o mês de janêro, 
Depois passá feverêro 
E março também passá, 
Sem o inverno começá 
No Nordeste brasileiro. 
 
(...) 
 
Raquita, triste e doente, 
Vai ficando a criatura 
E a boca da sipultura 
Ingulindo os inocente. 
Meu Jesus, meu Pai Potente, 
Que da humanidade é dono, 
Desça do seu alto trono, 
Da sua corte celeste 
E venha vê o seu Nordeste 
Como ele ta no abandono. 
 
(Assaré, 2003 [1956], p. 281-289). 
Oh, how hard it is to live 
In the states of the Northeast 
When our Celestial Father 
Does not order clouds to rain. 
It is so sad for us to see 
January reaching its end 
Then February passing 
And also March passing, 
Without the beginning of winter 
In the Brazilian Northeast. 
 
(…) 
 
Raquitic, sad and sick, 
Becomes the creature 
And the mouth of the sepulture 
Swallows the innocent. 
My Jesus, my Powerful Father, 
Who is the owner of humanity, 
Get down from your high throne, 
From your celestial court, 
And come see your Northeast 
How abandoned it is. 
 
 
Another printed poem (cordel) entitled Great Saint Joseph, the Saint of Rains, reads: 
 
Ó, meu grande São José 
Dai-me luz e inspiração 
Eis que sou homem de fé 
Morador da região 
Neste inverno, te suplico 
Por tudo que for bendito 
Mandar chuva pro sertão 
 
    Neste dia dezenove 
    Te fazemos louvação 
    Se quiseres bem que pode 
    Resolver esta questão 
    És dos Santos, o mais nobre 
    Protegei o homem pobre 
    Ceder nossa, intercessão 
 
Oh, my great Saint Joseph 
Give me light and inspiration 
I am man of faith 
Inhabitant of the region 
In this winter, I ask of you 
For all that has been blessed 
To send rain to the sertão71 
 
    On this day, the nineteenth, 
    We appeal to you 
    If you really want, you can 
    Solve this problem 
    Of the saints, you are the noblest 
    Protect the poor man 
    Give us what we ask 
 
                                                 
71 The Sertão refers to the semi-arid geographical and cultural region of the Brazilian Northeast hinterlands. See 
footnote 2. 
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Neste nordeste querido 
Vivemos grande aventura 
Enfim tudo é mais bonito 
No ano que tem fartura 
Quando não temos inverno 
De calor vira o inferno 
Morre toda criatura 
 
    Quem conhece o Sertão 
    Dele tem conhecimento 
    Quem vive da plantação 
    Como forma de sustento 
    Chega até virar profeta 
    Rouba Santo, faz promessa 
    Com medo do sofrimento 
 
Quem confia em S. José 
Nunca perde a confiança 
Nele nunca perde a fé 
Inda mais a esperança 
Vendo no chão a poeira 
No milho só tamboeira 
Dinheiro, só na lembrança. 
(...) 
In this beloved Northeast 
We live a great adventure 
In the end everything is prettier 
In a year of abundance 
When we don’t have winter 
From heat comes hell 
All creatures die 
 
    Those who know the sertão 
    And have knowledge of it 
    Those who live from agriculture 
    As a form of subsistence 
    Become prophets even 
    Steal saints, make promises 
    With the fear of suffering 
 
Those who trust in Saint Joseph 
Never lose confidence 
In him faith will never be lost 
Even more so hope 
When seeing on the ground the dust 
and in corn fields only tamboeira72 
Money, only in his memory. 
(…) 
(Carvalho, 2002, p. 1-2) 
 
 
Local believers, through prayers, offerings, and pilgrimages 73 , participate in a 
relationship with the metaphysical spheres in which, through the bringing of social action 
into the moral religious order (i.e. through the correction and avoidance of sin), the climate 
itself can return to a state of equilibrium in which production can be sustained. One 
illustrative example of how teleological processes are present in this configuration of action 
and ideas is found in an analysis undertaken by Ramos on correspondence between Padre 
                                                                                                                                                 
72 Tamboeira is the corn cob without kernels.  
73 Tens of thousands of individuals cross the Brazilian Northeast in direction of the main pilgrimage centers, 
being the most important, in Ceará, the municipality of Juazeiro do Norte, land of the Padre Cícero. The main 
dates of peregrination are July 20th, date of death of the saint (1934), November 2nd (Finados, or All Souls Day), 
and February 2nd, the pilgrimage of Candlemas Day, a religious ritual instituted in Juazeiro by Padre Cícero 
himself. Due to the proximity with the rainy season, the pilgrimage of Candlemas Day became the preferential 
one for asking God and the saint for rains. See Diário do Nordeste, February 3rd, 2005. 
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Cícero and his followers (especially concerning the requests made by the latter to the priest). 
According to this author: 
 
Na hora do pedido, todos esperam a dádiva que julgam ser merecida. Quando o desejado não 
acontece, entram em cena as forças de defesa contra a dúvida, e a falta de êxito encontra uma 
explicação. Em geral, a crença se reproduz, se autoconfirma em duas explicações básicas: o 
milagre não veio porque “a fé foi pouca” ou “os pecados não deixaram”. Com a fé praticamente 
intacta, o devoto que não ganhou o milagre, volta a solicitar, dentro de pouco tempo, outra ajuda 
do santo. 
Com ou sem êxito, o devoto continua a cultivar o ideal da proteção, cultuando alguns princípios, 
remodelando outros, misturando-os com outros matizes [religiosos] (Ramos, 2003, p. 95). 
 
At the time of this request, all wait for the godsend they judge is deserved. 
However, when the desired does not come to fruition, forces against doubt are 
set in motion and despite the lack of success, an explanation will be found. In 
general, belief is reproduced, and is self-confirmed by two basic explanations: the 
miracle did not occur because “there was little faith” or because “sinning didn’t 
allow for it”. With faith practically intact, the devotee who did not receive the 
miracle once again requests, within a short time, more help from the saint. 
With or without success, the devotee continues to nurture the ideal of protection, 
cultivating some principles, remodeling others, mixing them with other religious 
variations. 
 
 
He continues: 
 
Mais do que um milagre ou o fim do sofrimento, os devotos esperam do Padre Cícero o laço de 
proteção. O que está em jogo não é somente a solução dos problemas. O mais importante, nesse 
sentido, é reconhecer-se como componente de uma ordem ligada às forças do sagrado, é sentir-se 
parte de um universo coerente, justo e previsível (Ibid., p. 98). 
 
More than a miracle or the end of suffering, Father Cícero’s devotees want a veil 
of protection. What is at stake is not only the solution to their problems. The 
most important element is to re-affirm oneself as a component of an order 
linked to the powers of sacred spheres; to feel part of a coherent, just, and 
predictable universe. 
 
 
  
167
In this sense, the internal structure of these religious narratives is rarely put to test, as 
neither is the belief in the effectiveness of traditional forecast methods of rain prophets, or 
the functioning of local political structures. Obviously the inconsistencies that always exist 
between collective representations and external elements to such narratives, such as 
pressures from the material world or from other narratives, cause changes in the way things 
are symbolized, but such transformations rarely assume the form of a rational questioning 
about the efficacy of such symbologies and sets of beliefs. The Western logical rationalism, 
despite the efforts of science enthusiasts and of the promoters of economic efficiency, is no 
more than one narrative among many others, being by no means the most evident, and 
rarely the most powerful.    
As we can see, popular reactions toward themes linked to rain and water are 
profoundly marked by habitual forms of comprehension and interpretation. Such 
interpretative patterns developed throughout history, in direct relation with ecosystems and 
with political and economic processes, are structured around specific narratives that function 
as organizing devices for life in the hinterlands. Such interpretive schemes are part of a local 
genre that is an assemblage of texts, to use Geertz’s expression, with the most important being 
the cultural complex of water, religious narratives, and other narratives that carry ideological 
content about the proper place of each individual in local social hierarchies, where subjects 
are represented as being either protected or protectors, vulnerable or powerful.  
 
Knowledge on climate: science 
Given the central role of climate in diverse aspects of life in this semi-arid region, it is not 
surprising that efforts to combat drought have included intense scientific endeavors. In 
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addition to past applications of cloud seeding technology, reservoir building, and the 
adoption of efficiency-driven water management models for the state hydro-system, one 
recent technical response has been the attempt to improve climate prediction. Climate and 
meteorological research on atmospheric and oceanic influences reveal two primary factors 
that control regional precipitation: the state of the tropical Pacific Ocean (El Niño-Southern 
Oscillation, otherwise known as an ENSO warming phase; of special relevance is a region of 
the Pacific known as El Niño 3.4); and tropical Atlantic Ocean surface temperatures. 
Extreme droughts in the Brazilian Northeast are often associated with extreme El Niño 
events. That means to say that when the surface temperature of the tropical Pacific Ocean is 
higher than usual, the way it changes the atmospheric circulation of air masses over the 
Pacific also affects the atmospheric regimes above Northeastern South America, tending 
towards a decrease in the amount of observed rainfall. The state of the Atlantic Ocean and 
other weather factors may also affect that correlation. With regard to the Atlantic, the main 
factor seems to be the difference of surface temperature between the North and South 
Atlantic Oceans. When the North Equatorial Atlantic – i.e. the area of the Atlantic Ocean 
going from the Equator line to around parallel 20 North – is colder than the South 
Equatorial Atlantic, the stronger winds coming from the North bring the already mentioned 
Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) further south, increasing the amount of rain over 
the northern part of the Brazilian Northeast. If the temperature difference is the opposite, 
and the Southern Atlantic is colder that the Northern Atlantic, the amount of rain for the 
area tends to decrease. There are other meteorological systems that bring rain to the 
Brazilian Northeast, such as cold fronts that come from Southern Brazil (bringing to Ceará 
what meteorologists call pre-seasonal rains) or from the East, from the South Atlantic (post-
seasonal rains), but both are less frequent and less influential than the ITCZ, and most 
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importantly, since they are very ephemeral meteorological systems, they are much more 
difficult to forecast. 
The ability to predict general patterns of climate variability has improved over the past 
twenty years, especially after the El Niño phenomenon was modeled and studied in depth. 
Towards the end of the 1990s, FUNCEME became part of a network of national and 
international institutions that jointly monitor meteorological indicators and issue forecasts 
for the Brazilian Northeast. These institutions include the Brazilian National Meteorological 
Institute (INMET), located in Brasília; the Center for Weather Forecast and Climate Studies 
of the National Institute for Spatial Research (CPTEC/INPE), located in São José dos 
Campos, in the state of São Paulo; the International Research Institute for Climate 
Prediction (IRI), located at Columbia University, New York; and many local official 
institutions from other Brazilian Northeastern states. FUNCEME is also recognized in the 
meteorological world as the most capable regional institution in Brazil not directly sponsored 
by the national government, but rather linked to a state level political apparatus74. Funded 
mainly by the BNB, World Bank, and Brazilian Ministry of Science and Technology (CNPq), 
FUNCEME achieved computational power to run sophisticated mathematical models 
developed jointly with meteorologists based in New York (at IRI). The institution also 
managed to create the largest monitoring system in Brazil, distributing more than 540 
meteorological stations over the one hundred and forty thousand square kilometers of the 
state, in its one hundred and eighty four municipalities. That gives an average of one 
meteorological station for every two hundred and sixty square kilometers, and almost three 
stations per municipality. Additionally, FUNCEME receives satellite images, updated every 
                                                 
74 Although being part of the governmental structures, FUNCEME is not located inside the administrative 
headquarters of the state government, called Cambeba. It is instead located in a building that was a monastery 
previously, and that is rented from the Catholic Church, in the neighborhood of Aldeota, in Fortaleza. 
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thirty minutes, from an American satellite owned by the National Oceanographic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and from a Brazilian meteorological satellite.  
All these infrastructural aspects do not solve one of the main problems Brazilian 
meteorologists have: the lack of historical data on climate. Information about what 
happened in the past is the main input for the mathematical models used to predict future 
climate conditions. But the gathering of climate data in the Brazilian Northeast began to 
happen in a systematic way in the 1960s, which leads to a historical series of data of a little 
more than forty years. In meteorological terms, that is too little. In the Northeast of the 
United States, for example, the historical series have more than one hundred years of data, 
increasing the precision of the results of forecasts. Additionally, there are many 
meteorological phenomena of short duration (although of potentially catastrophic effects), 
like the cold fronts, cyclonic vortices, lines of instability, to name just a few, for which there 
are no forecast models available. And finally, climate is one aspect of the environment in 
which the number of variables is so high and the phenomena involved so complex, that 
mathematicians usually associate it with what became known as chaos theory. That means that 
no computational apparatus running mathematical models can provide a climate forecast 
that is any more than a certain distribution of probabilities that specific climate events may 
occur. In Ceará, for example, forecasts for the rainy season are presented as a distribution of 
probabilities that the rain observed in the season would be above, similar to, or below what 
is calculated as the historical average of precipitation for the region (using the 
aforementioned historical series of meteorological data). The forecast for the rainy season of 
2005, for instance, was: a 25% chance of rains above the historical average; 35% chance of 
rains similar to the historical average; and 40% chance of rains below the historical average. 
That was so because in early January 2005, there was a “weak” El Niño (that is, the sea 
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surface temperature was slightly above the usual) located in the western part of the Pacific 
Ocean, and the difference of temperatures between the North and South Equatorial Atlantic 
was unfavorable for rains in the Northeast. While the Northern Equatorial Atlantic was 
warmer than usual, the Southern Equatorial Atlantic presented its usual average temperature. 
The likelihood was then for rains below the historical average.  
 
Knowledge on climate: traditional forecast methods 
Yet, as I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the scientific forecast is not the only 
forecast available in Ceará. Many individuals from the rural population know indigenous 
forecast methods. Those who become especially popular in their communities due to their 
forecasting sometimes gain the title of rain prophet.  
In the first weeks of January, 2004, I visited Chico Leiteiro at his home, in Quixadá, 
and he took me for a walk in the fields. Chico Leiteiro is one of the best-known rain 
prophets of Quixadá. I asked him to show me exactly where he looks for signs. I was 
astonished by the fact that his sources are almost unrestricted. It turns out that his readings 
tend to follow some principles, rather than be strictly based on particular material objects or 
living things. He looked at the patterns of nature in renewing its food sources and for signs 
of reproduction. He pointed out different kinds of insects – ants, bees and spiders - and 
explained the ways in which these insects behave, when they are preparing for an upcoming 
rainy season, in terms of food provision. If insects are getting rid of old food, it is a sign of a 
good rainy season approaching. He also pointed to the reproductive cycles of many different 
types of animals – fish, birds and mammals. For instance, an increase in the local population 
of birds in December, or the existence of a large amount of fish full of eggs in the lakes and 
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rivers, are both signs of approaching rains. He could apply such principles to whichever 
aspect of the ecosystem he was familiar with, these being considerable since he, who is now 
sixty-seven, was born and raised in the same area. Because of his experience, at particular 
times of the year, he can see signs of drought or of rain almost anywhere he looks.  
There are many different traditional forecasting methods. Based on the descriptions 
given by the prophets during interviews, on records of previous annual meetings of Quixadá, 
and on the attendance of the 2004 and 2005 meetings, I identified some common features 
behind their forecast methods. There are three basic elements that guide their predictions: 1) 
The natural environment is perceived as being systemic, in the sense that its elements are 
interrelated in specific ways; 2) An important way in which such systematicity manifests itself 
is through the establishment of proportions and correlations amongst its different elements; 
and 3) For most of the individuals, the metaphysical realm is part of such a system. 
As Chico Leiteiro does in Quixadá and Gilton de Araújo does in the Seridó region, a 
large group of individuals make direct observations concerning the behavior and states of 
animals, plants and stones in December and early January. Signs are also take from the 
observation, as mentioned above, that animals behave differently because nature provides 
them with the means to survive another season, that a large number of animals give birth or 
fall pregnant in December (birds, cats, armadillos, fish and donkeys), and that some trees 
flower during these same months (such as the local cactus mandacarú, that has a flower which 
is widely recognized as a sign of rain). According to Renato Lima de Souza, also from 
Quixadá, the fact that chicken leave their nests to eat during the night, before dawn, is a sign 
that they are trying to gain weight in order to survive a bad rainy season. Signs are also linked 
to when animals are “cleaning out” their nests in preparation for the arrival of rains and new 
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vegetation (this is especially the case with insects such as ants and wasps). The already 
mentioned case of ants migrating to higher lands is also a very commonly observed case.  
Another indicator of the approach of rain is the presence of humidity in the ecosystem, 
which can be observed in the early morning when there is mist steaming out of holes in the 
soil or when a stone is taken from the soil and it is damp or “sweaty.” One more correlated 
observed technique consists in burying a bottle containing water up to three quarters of its 
capacity, and making a fire on top of it. The next morning, the bottle is unearthed and the 
level of the water observed: if it decreased it points to drought; if it increased it points to 
abundant rains. If it did not change, it indicates an average amount of precipitation. Some 
people perform this experiment as early as during the night before Saint John’s day75 (June 
24th); others do it in December.  
This constellation of signs can be understood as the ecosystemic dimension of rain 
forecasting activities. 
There is another representative group of prophets that tends to observe the sky, the 
appearance and colors of the sun and the horizon during dawn, and the appearance of 
specific stars at night. According to Chico Mariano, also from the municipality of Quixadá, a 
vividly red horizon or sun at dawn is a sign of scarce rains; a non-vivid horizon is sign of 
abundant rains. Some observers pay attention to the constellation of Orion, others to the 
planet Venus (Estrela Dalva). This group of signs constitutes the astronomic-atmospheric 
dimension of forecasting.  
                                                 
75 In rural Ceará, many individuals light fires on the night before Saint John’s day, as a religious ritual to 
commemorate the birth of the Saint. Catholic tradition says that when Isabel gave birth to the boy who would 
later become Saint John the Baptist, she lighted a fire as to send a sign to her cousin Mary, who would later 
become mother of Jesus. 
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Another popular technique is that of establishing correlations between the 
meteorological events of specific days during the dry season with particular days in the 
following rainy season. Many individuals use the following system of correlation: the first 
day of July (symbolically taken as the first day of the dry season)76 stands for the month of 
January of the following year, the second day to February, and so on until the sixth day that 
stands for June. If it is cloudy, or if it rains, or if there is thunder and lightning, these are 
taken as signs of rain in the projected month. Some individuals even establish correlations 
between a specific time of the day and days in a referent month. Chico Mariano, for instance, 
said in the 2004 meeting that because it rained at 10 a.m. on July 1st 2003, it would rain 
around January 15th, 2004 - he starts counting hours from midnight, so 10 a.m. is almost the 
middle of the day, which therefore leads to the projecting of rains in the middle of the 
month. Others prefer to use five day intervals; for instance, what occurs from July 1st to 5th 
mirrors what will happen next January, with July 1st used as reference for January 1st to 6th, 
and so on. Others combine techniques and use the whole month of July as a reflection of 
the month of January, August for February, and so on. Others compare what occurred at 
specific years and extrapolate cycles based on perceived variations and similarities: years 
ending in four, such as 2004, 1974 and 1994, are good years for rain. I will name this set of 
practices the mathematical dimension of forecasting.  
Then there are those who make use of the Catholic calendar to perform specific rituals. 
For example, the ritual of Saint Luzia, also known as the ritual of the salt stones, which I 
described above, is of this kind. The religious calendar acts as a temporal guide for those 
who make observations based on the sun and the horizon. Christmas Day is a special day for 
making observations based on the appearance of the horizon and of the sun, and also of the 
                                                 
76 Some people use the same technique taking Saint Luzia’s Day as the first day in the series. 
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stars. The same is the case for New Years’ Day. A concrete example of an individual who 
performs these kinds of rituals is Paulo Costa, who is a local dentist in Quixadá, and also a 
rain prophet. He performs an elaborate religious based ritual, which he calls Noah’s Vigil, and 
performs it for forty days between the 20th of August and the 30th of September. In this ritual 
he draws a representation of Noah’s Arc in the soil of his backyard, and prays there every 
night for God to give him powers to see in the stars the possibility of future rains. He 
particularly observes certain stars in the Orion constellation, but resists giving specific details 
of the signs for which he looks. The first ten days of the vigil are conducted for purposes of 
spiritual purification. Between September 1st and 30th, each period of five days represents a 
month in the next year’s rainy season. He also makes forecasts with the precision of giving 
the exact days on which rain will occur.  
Another example of an individual who makes extensive use of religion in his 
forecasting techniques is Expedito Epifânio da Silva, who prays to God to send him signs 
during his dreams and to inspire him. In 1998, he dreamt of loud winds coming from the 
east (nascente), and in the dream he met a friend all wet, and from that he concluded that the 
winter would be good77. I will call this group of practices the mystic dimension within this 
semiotic phenomenon. 
There is also the case of Luiz Gonzaga, from the town of Camocim, who is a retired 
captain from the merchant navy and has a meteorological station in his house. He dedicates 
his time to the study of winds and elaborates forecasts based on these observations and also 
on other meteorological indicators, which pretty much form part of scientific meteorology. 
                                                 
77 From Lemos Júnior, 2000, p. 29. Due to an intense El Niño phenomenon in the Pacific Ocean, 1998 was 
one of the two driest years of the 1990s, together with 1993. A generalized drought caused the lost of crops in 
the majority of the municipalities of the state. 
  
176
He is the individual who most distances himself from the popular stereotypes of “prophets” 
in that he is more like an amateur meteorologist. 
As we can see in the cases of Chico Leiteiro, Paulo Costa and others, most individuals 
use a combination of many dimensions, observing the ecosystem and stars on specific days 
of the Catholic calendar, combining calculations with direct observation, and so on.  
Now let’s briefly analyze the forms in which traditional forecasts are usually socially 
distributed. Firstly, in a state in which practically every rural person knows at least one or 
two traditional forecasting techniques, with the Saint Luzia experience being the most 
popular, calling someone a rain prophet can be somewhat problematic. Those individuals 
who take part in the Quixadá meeting are unanimous in declaring that they are not “real” 
prophets, i.e. they do not depend on divine revelation for the elaboration of their forecasts. 
Even Paulo Costa and Epifânio, the two for whom religious inspiration plays a central role 
in their forecast activities, resist the label of prophet. Preferred expressions are “observers” 
(observador or reparador) or “students of nature and of the stars.” Yet some individuals are able 
to greatly develop their observation techniques, their communication strategies and their 
ability to perform the role of “prophet” to achieve the status, at least at a local level, of being 
knowledgeable on climate issues.  
It is interesting to analyze the way in which the authority of rain prophets is 
constructed. First of all, those who participate in the Quixadá meetings are all men78. For 
those who base their forecasts purely on semiotic readings of nature, their age and their 
image of being an experienced individual also seem to be crucial for their legitimacy. In a 
                                                 
78 When I questioned the organizers of the event about this, they could not give me an answer. It seems that a 
former mayor of a neighboring city (Aracoiaba) makes forecasts, but she was not present in any of the attended 
meetings. 
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sample of thirteen prophets, which corresponds to around 65% of the prophets who 
participate in the annual meetings, the average age is sixty-six79. As a parameter for analysis, 
it is important to mention that in 1996, the average life expectancy at birth for men in Ceará 
was 58.6 years (IPLANCE, 2002b, p. 37). If we take those for whom age (and therefore 
experience) is not such an important factor, that is, those who claim they are mystically 
inspired, namely Paulo Costa and Expedito Epifânio da Silva, or who base their knowledge 
on technology, like Luiz Gonzaga from Camocim, out of the sample, the average age goes to 
69.3. In fact, Paulo Costa and Luiz Gonzaga were among the three youngest prophets taking 
part in the 2005 Quixadá meeting80.  
Having extensive experience in the natural environment, which is obtained from a 
long life in the rural area, is a recurrent idea used to explain why a rain prophet – at least 
those who read the signs of nature, instead of being mystically inspired or having second 
hand access to information (such as through machines and technology) - is to be trusted. 
Behind this fact, there is the widespread pattern, present in the poor rural imagination, of 
representing the world of the city as fundamentally different from that of the rural areas. I 
will call it the discourse of indexical authority, that is, the discourse in which the idea of authority 
is constructed upon the idea of long and direct contact with the object in question (in this 
case, the environment in the rural world). The reason for calling it a discourse lies in the fact 
that it is used politically in the relationship between rural populations and some other sectors 
of society (like governmental structures), as we will see in a while.  
                                                 
79 Chico Leiteiro is sixty-seven, Chico Mariano is seventy-one, Pedro Nogueira Lima is eighty, João Ferreira de 
Lima is seventy-six, Airton Caititi is sixty-one, Raimundo Mota Silva is seventy-nine, Joaquim Ferreira Santiago 
is seventy-seven, Renato Lima de Souza is fifty-seven, Chico Leite is forty-eight, Paulo Costa is fifty-nine, Luiz 
Gonzaga is fifty-two, Antonio Lima is seventy-four, Expedito Epifânio da Silva is fifty-four. 
80 The third is Chico Leite, and he is only forty-eight. Despite of his age, he is seen as disciple of his deceased 
father, who was known by the same name and who was seen as one of the best rain prophets of the Quixadá 
area. He then “inherited” the experience of many decades of rural life of his father, in the perception of the 
local population. Expedito Epifânio da Silva did not participate in the 2005 meeting.  
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Evidence about this discursive pattern was found not only in interviews, in 
newspaper articles and recorded local radio programs, but also in local popular poetry. 
Transcribed in appendix B, is a poem entitled Cante lá, que eu canto cá [Sing there, while I sing 
here], by Patativa do Assaré, a local genius who attended no more than four months of 
formal schooling in his life. Patativa, who passed away in 2002, at the age of ninety-three, 
was, throughout his whole life, a peasant who cultivated, for his own subsistence, a small 
piece of land in the mountains, in the southern part of Ceará. Although having dictated 
(since he was not only semi-literate but also had serious vision problems) more than a 
thousand poems and published ten books, he died as poor as he was in 1909, when he was 
born. In the aforementioned poem, the author, by his own definition a poet from the 
hinterlands (Sertão), addresses the urban poet and by comparing the differences in their 
poems and in the circumstances in which they are produced, he traces a comparative view 
between the world of the city and the world of peasantry, concluding that those who do not 
live in intense and daily contact with hinterland life can not accurately talk about it. This can 
be clearly seen in the following fragment: 
 
Poeta, cantô de rua, 
Que na cidade nasceu, 
Cante a cidade que é sua, 
Que eu canto o sertão que é meu. 
Se aí você teve estudo, 
Aqui Deus me ensinou tudo, 
Sem de livro precisá. 
Por favo, não mexa aqui, 
Que eu também não mexo aí, 
Cante lá, que eu canto cá. 
 
Você teve inducação, 
Aprendeu munta ciença, 
Mas das coisas do meu sertão 
Não tem boa esperiença. 
Poet, street singer, 
Born in the city, 
Sing of the city that is yours, 
And I’ll sing of the sertão that is mine. 
There you received formal education, 
Here God taught me everything, 
Without the need of books. 
Please, don’t come and meddle here, 
And I will not meddle there either, 
Sing there, while I sing here. 
 
You received education, 
You’ve learned a lot about science, 
But of the things concerning my sertão 
You don’t have the experience. 
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Nunca fez uma paioça, 
Nunca trabaiou na roça, 
Não pode conhecê bem, 
Pois nesta penosa vida, 
Só o que provou da comida 
Sabe o gosto que tem.  
 
Pra gente cantá o sertão, 
Precisa nele mora, 
Tê armoço de feijão 
E a janta de mucunzá, 
Vivê pobre sem dinhêro, 
Trabaiando o dia intero, 
Socado dentro do mato, 
De apragata currulepe, 
Pisando inriba do estrepe, 
Brocando a unha-de-gato. 
 
(...) 
You’ve never made a paioça81, 
You never worked in the fields, 
You cannot know it well, 
Because in this life, 
Only those who have tried the food 
Know its taste. 
 
In order for us to sing of the sertão, 
In it we need to have lived, 
To have had its beans for lunch, 
And have had its mucunzá82 for dinner, 
To have known poverty, without money, 
Working the entire day, 
Stuck inside the brush, 
Wearing simple, cheap sandals, 
Stepping on thorns, 
Cutting through the unha-de-gato83. 
 
(…) 
 
The poem shows how nature, poverty, religion and social stratification are 
interconnected, forming part of this hybrid genre of rural poetry in the Brazilian Northeast. 
On more than one occasion, the author reaffirmed one of the main ideas present in the 
poem: “para ser poeta de vera é preciso ter sofrimento [to be a real poet one must suffer].”84 
One can find evidence of the discourse of indexical authority in almost every cultural 
manifestation that has the climate as object, in the hinterland. On two different occasions, 
during the months of January and February of 2004, I recorded public poetic improvisations 
(locally called repentes), in the municipality of Quixadá, in Ceará, and in Caicó, in the 
neighboring state of Rio Grande do Norte. Both places are known as the places where the 
main rain prophets of each state live. The recordings took place at a moment in which 
excessive rains had devastated large areas of the Brazilian Northeast, ruining agricultural 
                                                 
81 A Paioça is a house made from grasses of the region. 
82 Mucunzá is a corn based dish. 
83 Unha-de-gato is a type of local bush. 
84 See Diário do Nordeste, March 1st, 2004. 
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fields and filling local dams. The transcriptions, presented below, make explicit reference to 
how the activity of forecasting climate is framed by the confrontation between “local” and 
“official” ways of thinking about the environment. The former are represented in popular 
discourse as being superior to scientific ways of thinking due to, among other things, the 
close connection they have with local traditions and cosmologies (of which religion is an 
important part), elements for which scientists sometimes do not try to hide their contempt. 
In the poetry below, the bracketed parts indicate tentative transcription due to external 
interference with the recordings:  
Antonio da Silva e Silvio do Nascimento, Caicó, Seridó region, Rio Grande do Norte: 
 
O sertão já está tão diferente 
A chegada da gente no inverno 
Deixa a mata [inaudível] 
E o povo se encontra sorridente 
Já tem água sobrando na vertente 
Já encheu o açude Boqueirão 
E quando escuta a cantiga do carão 
Dez minutos após chega a neblina 
Jesus salva a pobreza nordestina 
Com três meses de chuva no sertão 
 
 Eu apóio o que disse [Aldoar] 
 Porque ele é conhecedor 
 Foi um homem filho de agricultor 
 E reconhece demais o nosso lugar 
 [Há um respeito dos] potiguares 
 Porque ele em tudo dá atenção 
 E reconhece que nossa região 
 É Jesus quem conhece e quem domina 
 Jesus salva a pobreza nordestina 
 Com três meses de chuva no sertão 
 
Nas primeiras chuvadas de janeiro 
O sertanejo gargalha de contente 
Pra plantar preparando uma semente 
Me admira demais o forrozeiro 
Escutando o aboio do vaqueiro 
The sertão is already so different 
With the arrival of winter 
The brush is left [inaudible] 
You find people smiling  
Water is abundant in the cane fields 
The Boqueirão Dam is full 
And when you hear the singing of the carão85 
Ten minutes later the fog arrives 
Jesus saves the northeastern poor 
With three months of rain in the sertão 
 
    I support what he [Aldoar] said 
    Because he is wise 
    He was the son of farmers 
    And knows our place well 
    Inhabitants of the state [respect him] 
    Because he pays attention to everything  
    And knows that in our region 
    It is Jesus who knows and who dominates 
    Jesus saves the northeastern poverty 
    With three months of rain in the sertão 
 
With the first rains of January 
The sertanejo86 brims with happiness 
To prepare a seed for cultivation 
I admire so much the forró87 singer 
Listening to the cowboy’s singing 
                                                 
85 Carão is a local bird which singing is taken as a sign of rain.  
86 Sertanejo is a person from the Sertão. 
87 Forró is a local style of music and dance. 
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Todo dia profetiza o sertão 
Sei que a chuva caiu, molhou o chão 
E inundou a cidade de Teresina 
Jesus salva a pobreza nordestina 
Com três meses de chuva no sertão 
 
 Pensa o homem que sabe muito 
 Mas o homem com si combina errado 
 Tudo quanto já tem estudado 
 Muitas vezes não sabe o que ele faz 
 Seus estudos terminam para trás 
 Com história de fazer irrigação 
 E mandar chuva até de avião 
 Onde é sujeito acabasse a gasolina 
 Jesus salva a pobreza nordestina 
 Com três meses de chuva no sertão 
Daily prophesizing the sertão 
I know that the rains fell, wet the soil 
And flooded the city of Teresina 
Jesus saves the northeastern poor 
With three months of rain in the sertão 
 
    Man thinks he knows a lot 
    But he combines incorrectly 
    Everything he has studied 
    Often doesn’t know what he is doing 
    His studies backfire 
    With the history of irrigation plans 
    And sending rains from airplanes 
    Where it is possible to run out of gasoline  
    Jesus saves the northeastern poor 
    With three months of rains in the sertão 
 
Guilherme Calixto e Valdir de Lima, Quixadá, Sertão Central, Ceará: 
 
Quando é pra chuva chegar 
E o tempo ficar sadio 
A nuvem enfeita o espaço 
Por mais que seja no estio 
Qualquer fiapo de nuvem 
Sacode a água no rio 
 
 Falar de inverno e frio 
 Me deixa até comovido 
 Falar de seca eu não quero 
 Que eu me acho entristecido 
 Eu não quero magoar 
 O sertanejo sofrido (...) 
 
Mas por tratar de cultura 
Cantando com mais firmeza 
Para falar dos profetas 
Cada qual tem uma pureza 
Ele lê sem formatura 
Nos livros da natureza 
 
 [Os sinais] da natureza 
 Estuda com paciência 
 Faz as suas projeções 
 E vê coincidência 
 E sabe tudo da terra 
 Por conta da Providência 
 
Profeta com inteligência 
[Ele tem cultura da terra] 
Trazendo de seus avós 
When it is time for the rains to come 
And the weather becomes healthy 
Clouds embellish the space 
Even if it is the dry season 
Any clump of cloud 
Moves water in the river 
 
    To talk of winter and of cold 
    Moves me 
    I don’t want to talk about drought  
    Because I become miserable  
    I don’t want to cause pain 
    To the suffering sertanejo (…) 
 
But by talking about culture 
Singing with more conviction 
Talking about the prophets 
Each one with a purity 
He reads without formal training 
From the books of nature 
 
    [The signs] of nature 
    He studies with patience 
    Makes his forecasts 
    And sees coincidence 
    And knows everything about the land 
    Due to divine authority 
 
Intelligent prophet 
[He holds the culture of the land] 
Which was passed down from his grandparents 
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A descobrindo a sua até 
Às vezes ele enxerga coisas 
Que a FUNCEME não deu fé 
 
(...) 
And then discovers by himself 
At times he sees things 
That FUNCEME did not notice. 
 
(…) 
 
As we can see in the fragments “I support what he [Aldoar] said / Because he is wise / 
He was the son of farmers / And knows our place well” (Silva and Nascimento, above), and 
“Intelligent prophet / [He holds the culture of the land] / Which was passed down from his 
grandparents / And then discovers by himself” (Calixto and Lima, above), in local popular 
perception, if the individual is to read the signs of nature, he has to have the experience of 
many decades, something that is indicated by his age, and by having been born into a family 
of rural producers.  
One interesting aspect of these poems is the presentation of the elaboration of 
forecasts as reading the books of nature, something the prophets do without the need to have 
attended school and without holding academic titles. This is a recurrent image: we see it in 
Patativa do Asaré’s poem above (“Here God taught me everything / Without the need of 
books” – although here we presents books as indexes of urban life), in Calixto and Lima 
above (“He reads without formal training / From the books of nature”), and also explicitly 
manifested in other writings, such as in the following passage: 
 
O agropecuarista Joaca Rolim, que foi uma espécie de patriarca, conselheiro e poeta do distrito 
de Missão Nova, se notabilizou como um conceituado profeta de chuvas. ... Joaca dizia que 
aprendeu a fazer profecias no livro da natureza, observando o comportamento das árvores, dos 
animais, a direção dos ventos, a temperatura, ou o ronco do primeiro trovão de janeiro. ... 
São homens simples, semi-analfabetos, que fizeram do sofrimento causado pelas constantes 
estiagens um livro de estudos (Diário do Nordeste, September 18th, 2004a) 
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Producer Joaca Rolim, who was a kind of patriarch, counselor and poet of the 
district of Missão Nova, became known as a competent rain prophet. … Joaca 
used to say that he learned how to make prophecies using the book of nature, 
observing the behavior of trees, animals, wind direction, temperature, or the 
sound of the first thunder in January. … 
They are simple men, semi-literate, who transformed the suffering caused by 
recurrent droughts into a book of studies. 
 
 
The symbolic importance of the concept of books has to be understood against the 
literacy levels of the rural population in Ceará. Data from 1999 show that 51% of the rural 
population was illiterate, while 57% of the whole population of the state with sixty years of 
age or more was illiterate (IPLANCE, 2002b, p. 307). The average number of years of 
school attendance, for the rural population over sixty years of age, was in 1999 just one year 
(ibid., p. 159). Besides the aforementioned perceived link between formal education and 
urban life, as implied in Patativa’s poem, literacy and formal education were historically 
understood as a sign of social distinction, as I will discuss below. 
Traditional forecasts were, and still are, distributed by word of mouth, through 
interpersonal relations within social networks; also, some individuals, if not too shy, go to 
local bars and meeting places on market days (dia da feira) or during religious festivals, when 
the municipality is filled with outsiders and locals alike, to draw comments on his or her 
observations. In the Cariri region, as in the neighboring state of Pernambuco, both to the 
south of the Jaguaribe Valley, it is an old local tradition that some individuals transform their 
forecasts into poetry and print them on cordéis, which are little booklets that are distributed to 
the population. This comes from the colonial tradition of publishing lunários (popular 
almanacs), where one finds a mixture of astronomical, astrological, meteorological, medicinal 
and agricultural popular knowledge (Rios, 2003, p. 79). Even if not printed at all, local 
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forecast techniques and successful forecasters have been relayed in popular poetry for at 
least the whole of the 20th century.  
Extrovert individuals are also accustomed to announcing their forecasts on local radio 
stations, as they are frequently invited to do so due to the popularity of the issue in the 
hinterland. This was reflected in fieldwork when I found out that it is usually the local radio 
host who knows how to find the rain prophets of the region. It is interesting to note that 
most rain prophets fear being over-exposed outside the groups that usually receive their 
forecasts (something that, since the beginning of the rain prophets meeting, in 1997, 
occurred due to the participation of the regional and national media). In the beginning of 
2005, I interviewed ten prophets that presented their forecasts in the annual rain prophets 
meeting. Seven of them are (or were, due to retirement) agriculturalists, while one is a dentist, 
one is a retired officer of the merchant navy, and one was a farmer but is now a mechanic88. 
Nine of them said they avoid explicitly publicizing their forecasts, but do so only if requested. 
All of them affirmed they are usually requested to announce their forecasts by the local 
populations where they live, and five of them admitted having been visited by local 
politicians in the past. All of them said that they appeared in the regional and national media 
due to their participation in the meeting, and that it increased considerably their popularity in 
the places where they live. At the same time, eight of them affirmed having been victims of 
ridicule or some kind of verbal abuse in their own communities, and that was used as 
justification for not advertising too loudly their forecasts in recent years. Contemporaries in 
rural communities are clearly a more friendly audience than youngsters in the near urban 
                                                 
88 Paulo Costa is the dentist, Luiz Gonzaga is the official of the merchant navy, and Airton Caititi is the 
mechanic. As mentioned before, they are among the youngest of the prophets (Airton Caititi is 61). 
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centers. That explains why radio is a much preferred medium for announcing forecasts: due 
to the restricted reach of radio waves, guaranteeing that the audience is strictly local. 
Yet one does not have to leave the auditorium in which the rain prophets meeting 
takes place to witness ridicule of the prophets. Two fragments of my transcriptions illustrate 
how prophets who make forecasts perceived as mistaken are publicly ridiculed. The 2004 
meeting was held on a very sunny and hot January 10th. During the activities of the event, the 
following verbal interchange between two organizers, using the microphones, took place: 
 
Helder Cortez: Vamos ouvir agora Joaquim Moqueca, lá do Custódio. Só informando, o nosso 
profeta Antônio Lima, que é do mesmo distrito dele, está doente, não pode vir, pediu pra se 
desculpar aqui a todos… 
Miguel Peixoto: agora Helder, é importante registrar que eu encontrei o Antônio Lima e disse 
a ele: “Antônio, é dia 10 o encontro”, aí ele disse, “é, debaixo de chuva!” 
[Risos da platéia] 
 
Helder Cortez: Now let’s listen to Joaquim Moqueca, from the Custódio district. 
Just to inform you, our prophet Antônio Lima, who is from the same district, is 
sick and could not come. He asked me to send his apologies… 
Miguel Peixoto: Now Helder, it is important to say that I met Antônio Lima and 
told him: “Antônio, the meeting will take place on the 10th,” and he replied: “yes, 
under rain!” 
[Laughs from the audience] 
 
 
In January 2004, as mentioned in an earlier chapter, the rains started later and 
flooded the Brazilian Northeast. Then at the end of the 2005 rain prophets meeting, 
the mayor of Quixadá was called to the microphone to deliver the final words of the 
event. He attempted a summary of the very diverse set of opinions delivered during 
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the meeting, and in the middle stopped to ridicule a prophet who issued, in 2004, a 
forecast perceived to be wrong89: 
 
Prefeito de Quixadá: … então dos profetas populares, a anotação é que nós temos uma 
preponderência de previsão de que vai ter inverno, de chuvas.  
Helder Cortez: Isso! 
Prefeito de Quixadá: Tirando o Renato e o Chico [Airton] Caititi…ele, inclusive muito 
interessante, ele previu no ano passado que não ia chover. Nas chuvas de janeiro, nós entramos 
em estado de emergência porque houve inundação da cidade, e ele tava inundado na casa dele 
que eu fui lá… 
[Risos intensos da platéia] 
Prefeito de Quixadá: … na madrugada a gente tava atendendo um povo vindo das chuvas e 
tava ele lá… [e ele havia dito] que não ia chover… isso é um dado pitoresco da história.90 
 
Mayor of Quixadá: … so, from the popular prophets, the conclusion we can get 
is that of the preponderance of forecasts for a rainy winter. 
Helder Cortez: That’s right! 
Mayor of Quixadá: Except for Renato and Chico [Airton] Caititi… he, this is 
really interesting, last year he forecast that it would not rain. During the January 
rains, we declared a state of emergency due to the flooding of the town, and his 
house was flooded, I went there… 
[Intense laughter in the audience] 
Mayor of Quixadá: … during the night we were giving assistance to people 
affected by the rains and he was among them… [and he had said] it was not 
going to rain… so this is a picturesque aspect of the story. 
 
 
Due to the frequency of such events, authors like Lemos Júnior affirm that for many 
individuals knowledgeable in traditional forecast methods, it is difficult to summon up the 
courage to publicly announce the conclusions of their observations or experiences: 
                                                 
89 One important piece of data is that mutual ridiculization is also part of what foreigners perceive as part of 
the gayety and informality of Brazilian patterns of sociality. 
90 Prophet Caititi was victim, in this episode, of the same inadequacy between collective mind frames regarding 
the rainy season and the forecast that affects scientific meteorology. The 2004 January – pre-season rains, 
according to meteorologists - were too intense but too brief. They flooded large areas of the region, filled 
reservoirs, then stopped. The rains that fell between February and June were below the normal or historical 
average, causing crop loses and characterizing the season as a “green drought”.  
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[N]ão é qualquer pessoa que se arrisca a uma prática futurista, mas é alguém de grande 
sensibilidade para observar as mudanças da natureza e dos animais, além de sua convivência 
com a seca e com períodos chuvosos, pois sente isso na pele e encontra coragem para expressar 
essa percepção da realidade, algo difícil para muitas pessoas (2000, p. 21). 
 
Not all people take the risk of engaging in the practice of forecasting the future. 
It has to be someone with great sensitivity in order to be able to observe the 
changes in nature and in animals, besides personal experience with droughts and 
rainy seasons, feeling personally the effects of all that, and summoning courage 
to express this perception of things, something difficult for many people. 
 
 
Even Chico Mariano, the most extrovert and vocal of the prophets, suffers from 
collective ridicule when the forecast is wrong. In a newspaper article from January 1999, one 
year after the 1998 drought, we read: 
 
Quem ouviu atentamente os pronunciamentos [dos profetas na reunião de 1999], favoráveis ou 
não, notou que havia uma preocupação de alguns deles, talvez decepcionados com as falhas nas 
previsões do ano passado. 
Até mesmo o mais famoso profeta das chuvas, como é conhecido o agricultor quixadaense e 
sexagenário Chico Mariano, demonstrou cautela ao ser solicitado para falar de suas previsões 
sobre o inverno que se avizinha. Somente depois de muita insistência por parte da imprensa, 
Chico Mariano resolveu falar, mesmo assim, com timidez e restrições (In Lemos Júnior, 
2000, p. 45).  
 
Those who listened carefully to the speeches [of prophets in the 1999 meeting], 
favorable or not [to the occurrence of rains], noticed that some of them were 
somewhat worried, perhaps disappointed with the failures of last year’s forecasts. 
Even the most famous rain prophet, as Chico Mariano is known, a farmer from 
Quixadá in his sixties, demonstrated caution when asked to speak about his 
forecasts for the upcoming winter. Only after a lot of insistence from the press, 
did Chico Mariano decide to talk, but in a shy way and exercising restraint.  
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Of all ten prophets interviewed, only Luiz Gonzaga affirmed that there is no link 
between climate and religion. One other prophet stated being unsure, and the other eight 
said the two things are deeply interconnected. Seven affirmed that the denomination “rain 
prophet” is not correct, since they are not “real” prophets with divine powers, while two did 
not answer the question, and only one said the title seemed to be right. Four individuals said 
their forecast methods and their knowledge of nature have limitations, and that they may 
incur in errors due to that; four asserted to know everything about local nature and having 
guaranteed forecast methods; and two did not answer the question. With regard to their 
opinion about scientific meteorology, four individuals mentioned the fact that 
meteorologists have sophisticated equipment, which gives them better forecasting powers; 
two said that scientists cannot make good forecasts because they disregard religion and the 
powers of God; one said that scientists only want to make money; one said they make too 
many wrong forecasts; and two said that prophets and scientists do not belong to the same 
realm (“they stay there, I stay here, and we don’t mess with each other”). When asked about 
their opinions of FUNCEME, one individual said they have sophisticated equipment and 
that gives them better forecast powers; one said that FUNCEME and prophets don’t belong 
to the same realm; two said they issue wrong forecasts too often; two said they are like one 
other prophet; three said they are good but sometimes make mistakes; and one individual 
said that FUNCEME lies about the climate.  
Next I turn our attention to the relationship between such patterns of interpretive 
habits of the local population and the way in which the activity of government technicians, 
meteorologists included, is inserted and recontextualized in local social dynamics.  
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Politics of Climate: the use of science in public policies 
Climate information is used for important governmental activities in Ceará, such as for the 
Civil Defense in their attempt to predict and plan for any contingency activities to be carried 
out in cases of drought or flooding, and for the State Health Secretariat in their monitoring 
of dengue cases (dengue mosquito reproduction cycles are heavily dependant on rains, and 
therefore rain forecasts help the secretariat prepare and plan its activities). However, more 
importantly for the issue at hand, scientific climate forecasting is used for the distribution of 
drought resistant seeds by the State Agriculture Secretariat (SEAGRI) to rural populations 
who practice dryland agriculture. 
In the midst of these distribution activities, conflict exists between official and local 
criteria regarding the best time to distribute the seeds; these conflicts are profoundly linked 
to the different ways in which governmental officials and local rural producers conceptualize 
and relate to climate and to political structures. This difference leads to political disputes 
around which stakeholders possess the legitimate authority and the decision-making power 
over when to carry out the seed distribution.   
Climate forecasts occur in what could be called an environment of endemic political 
tension, although of low intensity, between official agents and some social sectors. This 
affects meteorologists in many ways. A meteorologist of the neighboring state of 
Pernambuco told me that the governor of her state authorized her participation in the 
Climate Outlook Forum in Fortaleza of 2002, but forbade her from making contacts or from 
answering any kind of requests from her state’s media regarding what was discussed at the 
forum. Meteorologists from other states of the Northeast confirmed what seems to be a 
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pattern: climate forecasts are perceived as being potential “political bombs,” and therefore 
need to be handled with extreme care.  
This issue has two sides. Firstly, there is local producer discontent, which is directed 
towards the government, and concerns the schedules for contingency activities. Drought 
resistant seeds are distributed, in the perception of rural producers, “too late,” i.e., after the 
rains have already begun. It is a common practice in the hinterlands for fields to be prepared 
when the dry season has just drawn to a close, so that seeds are planted when the very first 
rains arrive, when humidity reaches around a foot deep. These rains (called pre-season rains 
by local meteorologists, as mentioned before) result from cold fronts that bring rains to the 
west of the state of Bahia and to the south of Piauí, and don’t have the required minimal 
duration to sustain crops. The interval between these early rains and the more regular season 
(brought by the inter-tropical convergence zone in the Atlantic Ocean), that runs from 
around late February to early June, is called veranico (“little summer”, meaning dry spell), a 
term also used for any period of over ten consecutive days without rains, which is usually 
enough to destroy any appearing sprouts of maize or beans. If a dry spell ruins the fields, 
and the crops are lost, the fields are cleared and prepared again, new rains are awaited, and 
seeds are once again planted once the fields are perceived to be humid enough. This cycle is 
repeated until the season “really starts” and rains can sustain the crops until harvest. Planting 
the seeds right after the first rains is a risky activity, and producers know it. However, if the 
pre-season rains last long enough to fuse with the season’s rains, and if the latter is well 
distributed over time (with no dry spells), there is the possibility of obtaining two harvests 
during the rainy season (especially of green corn or beans, which are harvested after ninety 
days, instead of after one hundred and twenty). This is a risk perceived as worth taking 
because, for the rural population who practice dryland agriculture, a great amount of 
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production output is for family subsistence, and the possibility of getting two harvests during 
the rainy season represents an amazing increase in household well-being for the coming 
months of the dry season.  
However, from the government’s perspective, the repeated distribution of selected 
seeds at the beginning of the rainy season makes the practice unviable, because such seeds, 
produced by special agricultural extension companies, are expensive. Therefore, the 
government has a need to adopt strategies that promote the efficient use of such valuable 
seeds. One strategy used is to refer to information provided by FUNCEME concerning local 
levels of soil humidity, which are monitored by the institution daily and upcoming rains, in 
order to ascertain when humidity levels will indeed remain long enough to sustain 
production. Even if the humidity of soils is a criterion that both government and producers 
use,91 the fact that the forecast of upcoming rains is officially prioritized over soil humidity is 
the factor that causes great distress between producers and government. Since many local 
producers, due to their different take on climate mechanisms (as discussed above), tend to 
disregard scientific forecasts, they generally do not accept the decision to postpone seed 
distribution based on these forecasts as legitimate. Added to this issue are the complex 
mechanisms and the slow pace of local bureaucracy in seed distribution. Because of this, a 
certain degree of frustration is recurrently observed in local producers when seeds are not 
distributed at times when they believe they should receive them. It is therefore not 
uncommon for producers to plant the seeds they kept from last year’s harvest, or to plant 
seeds of lower quality they buy locally, and then consume the government seeds once they 
finally arrive. That decreases considerably the efficiency of the seed distribution program. 
                                                 
91 The high spatial variability of rains in the region (i.e. the fact that there are often marked differences between 
precipitation levels in different areas within the same municipality) makes it hard for all producers to accept 
these official measurements. 
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One other aspect linked to the politics of climate information is that the 
announcement of a possible future drought tends to generate a wave of emergency situation 
declarations in the hinterland, in which municipalities request contingency funds from the 
state government. Some of such requests are used to maintain local social structures and 
processes, which in times of drought are affected in proportion to economic suffering. 
However, it should also be remembered that many municipalities of Ceará’s hinterland live 
with constant drinking water scarcity, which is supplied by a non-reliable and inconsistent 
fleet of tanker trucks that usually sell bad quality water at high prices. For these 
municipalities, the possibility of drought makes worse what is already a difficult situation, 
and evokes haunting images of malnutrition, rising mortality rates in infants and elders, 
conflict, and migration. In this context, industrious local mayors, well aware of the usually 
slow pace of official bureaucracy, prepare for the worst by requesting money from the state 
government in advance. Sometimes, due to the constant misery that some communities face, 
the influx of drought contingency money raises the living standards of whole communities, 
even if only temporally, to levels even higher than those of good rain years. Even though it is 
understandable that at times local populations pressure local mayors to declare an emergency 
situation as soon as possible, in reality the number of communities that do this is not high, 
because the amount of relief funds available tends to be limited and these generally take a 
long time to reach their destination.   
For these reasons, there is always caution within the state government to recognize 
and make official any situation that technically could be considered a drought. This is one of 
the factors feeding into social disputes concerning the legitimate definition of what a 
drought is, and the variations in official recognition of drought situations. One strategy used 
by the state government to protect agencies such as FUNCEME and the State Rural 
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Extension Office (EMATERCE) from political pressures emanating from the interior of the 
state, and from Fortaleza politicians, is to insulate the institutions’ technicians 92  from 
politicians, and to some extent from the media, by using a scientific discourse that tends to 
neutralize the possible politicization of such agencies. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
the state’s Civil Defense, for instance, created a “technical” set of criteria to rank 
municipalities applying for contingency funds or services (such as the request of tanker 
trucks for water transportation) in terms of priority. The technicality of the adopted set of 
criteria prevents the government of being accused of favoring some municipalities at the 
expense of others (Lemos, 2003; Lemos et al., 1999).   
Concerning FUNCEME, the government has attempted to dissociate the agency 
from the public’s perception of their seed distribution scheme, even though in practice there 
is no other agency that monitors soil humidity and elaborates climate forecasts. In January 
2004, EMATERCE announced that seed distribution would also take into consideration 
input from its own field technicians and not only FUNCEME data. Yet public discontent 
due to the delay in seed distribution was no different from that of other years, as we can see 
in the newspaper article transcribed below:  
 
Agricultores iniciam plantação de milho, feijão e arroz 
Os agricultores estão animados com as chuvas que têm molhado bem a terra neste mês de 
janeiro. Até ontem foram registrados 200 mm em média no Município de Iguatu. Há áreas 
que já registram mais de 250 mm. A maioria dos pequenos produtores rurais não quis esperar 
pelas sementes do Governo do Estado e já está plantado as culturas tradicionais de milho, feijão 
e arroz. 
O pequeno agricultor, Raimundo José dos Santos, na localidade de Gadelha, cultivou dois 
hectares de milho e feijão. Usou grãos que tinha guardado da safra passada. “A gente nem sabe 
quando vai haver distribuição de sementes e se tem direito de receber”, disse. “Com a terra 
molhada, o negócio é não perder tempo e plantar logo”. 
                                                 
92 It is important to remember that these institutions also form part of the governmental bureaucratic apparatus. 
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Os pequenos produtores rurais, Antônio André de Oliveira e Francisco de Assis Horácio, 
também do distrito Gadelha, não quiseram aguardar a distribuição das sementes selecionadas. 
“Temos que ser mais esperto e aproveitar as primeiras chuvas”, disse André de Oliveira. “Por 
aqui já nasceu pés de milho e de feijão”. Aqueles que fazem a agricultura familiar, pais e filhos, 
em pequenas áreas, são os que estão cultivando o solo na expectativa de uma boa safra das 
culturas de subsistência. 
Neste ano, o inverno tem sido cedo. As chuvas fortes chegaram em janeiro, mas normalmente na 
região de Iguatu as precipitações só ocorrem com maior intensidade a partir de março. O 
presidente do Sindicato dos Trabalhadores Rurais de Iguatu, José Olavo Pinto, criticou o atraso 
na distribuição das sementes. “Todos os anos esse problema se repete”, disse. 
O presidente da Comissão Municipal de Agricultura, vereador Aderilo Alcântara, também 
defende a distribuição antecipada das sementes. “É comum nos meses de janeiro e fevereiro 
ocorrem as chamadas chuvas de pré-estação. Não importa o nome que se dá, mas o agricultor 
tem que aproveitar a terra molhada e fazer o plantio”. O Centro de Atendimento ao Cliente 
(CEAC), da Ematerce, informou que até o final desta semana começa fazer a entrega das 
sementes de milho e feijão que já estão armazenadas no depósito da Conab (Diário do 
Nordeste, January 21st, 2004). 
 
Farmers initiate production of maize, beans and rice 
Farmers are excited with the rains that have been intensely moisturizing the soil 
in this month of July. Until yesterday, 200 millimeters of precipitation have been 
recorded, on average, in the municipality of Iguatú. There are areas in which 
precipitation reached 250 mm. The majority of the small producers did not want 
to wait for the seeds distributed by the Government of the State, and is already 
cultivating the traditional crops of maize, beans and rice. 
The small farmer Raimundo José dos Santos, from the district of Gadelha, 
prepared two hectares of maize and beans. He used seeds that he kept from the 
past harvest. “We don’t even know if a seed distribution will take place, and if we 
are eligible for receiving them,” he said. “With the soil humid, it is important not 
to waste time and to quickly prepare the fields.” 
The two small producers Antônio André de Oliveira and Francisco de Assis 
Horácio, also from district of Gadelha, did not want to wait for the distribution 
of selected seeds. “We have to be smart and take advantage from the very first 
rains,” said André de Oliveira. “We have already some sprouts of maize and 
beans around.” Those who practice family-scale agriculture, fathers and sons, in 
small lots, are those who are cultivating the soil and expecting a good harvest of 
subsistence crops. 
This year the winter came early. Strong rains arrived in January, but usually, in 
the Iguatú region, intense rains fall as of March. The president of the Rural 
Workers Union of Iguatú, José Olavo Pinto, criticized the delay in the 
distribution of seeds. “Every year we have this same problem,” he said. 
The president of the Municipal Agriculture Commission, municipal 
representative Aderilo Alcântara, also defends that the distribution of seeds 
should take place earlier. “It is common to see pre-season rains in the months of 
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January and February. It does not matter what name you give to them, the 
farmer has to take advantage of the moist soil and to start the cultivation.” The 
Customer Service Center (CEAC) of Ematerce informed that until the end of 
this week the distribution of seeds that are stored in the CONAB storehouses 
will begin. 
 
 
Unfortunately, the already mentioned unprecedented intensity of the 2004 pre-season 
rains ended up flooding the municipality of Iguatú, and most areas of the Jaguaribe Valley, 
just a couple of days after the publication of that article. The flooding destroyed the majority 
of the agricultural fields of the region93. 
 
The Discourse of Indexical Authority as the weapon of the weak 
A key element in the problem at hand is the fact that some forecasts are legitimized, in the 
eyes of the poor rural population, while others are delegitimized. This delegitimation, as I 
suggested above, occurs not only due to intrinsic distinct ways in which the rural population 
and scientists understand climate. It goes beyond that, in the sense that the delegitimation 
itself is, in some circumstances, a political message. That can be seen in the forms in which 
the discourse of indexical authority is manifested in the hinterlands. The central element in 
this equation lies in the local representations of the social stratification of the rural world. 
As mentioned in the beginning of part 2 of this text, the state of Ceará is characterized 
by immense social inequalities. The state is the fifth most unequal in the country in terms of 
wealth concentration (Lemos and Nunes, 2004), with over 42% of its population living in 
                                                 
93 In 2005, once again the problem was repeated. Despite the reduced amount of rains in the month of January, 
many producers in the south of Ceará did not wait for the seed distribution and started the agricultural activity 
after the very first rains – and, as usual, without the guidance of any forecast. Farmer Luís de Souza, for 
instance, prepared one hectare of maize and beans. He declared to the local press that “Já está na hora de plantar. 
Todos os anos, a distribuição atrasa e não adianta esperar muito tempo [it’s time to start cultivation. The distribution of 
seeds gets delayed every year and it is not worth waiting too long].” Diário do Nordeste, February 1st, 2005. 
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miserable conditions; however, the state GDP has been growing steadily for at least a decade 
and a half, making richer an already wealthy elite. This extreme inequity is not new, as we 
saw in chapter four, and is also not invisible to poorer sectors of the population. Elements 
that mark these class distinctions are present everywhere; they permeate language use, media, 
symbols and social rituals.  
In the hinterland, the form of perceiving social stratification is a clear sign of how 
inequalities are understood. It is usual for rural individuals to make use of the categories of 
dotô (“doctor”) and cidadão (“citizen”), and also use of a third and interesting category linked 
to the first, that of dotozinho da cidade (“little doctor from the city”). Cidadão and dotô are two 
extremes within a polarized categorization system. Individuals who label themselves as 
cidadão are usually those who make use of the category set. By using cidadão he or she defines 
him or herself as ordinary, non-formally educated and destitute of power in the form of 
office or property, and in contrast by using the term dotô he or she refers to a malleable 
category that includes land owners as well as local, state and national level politicians. The 
dotozinho da cidade is the figure of the technician, usually very young, who goes to the city to 
study the rural world - something rural people see as a paradox. The dotô is recognized by his 
or her94 use of language (technical or formal, or making use of imperatives), by their clothes, 
by the car in which he or she arrives, through the forms s/he participates in the sociability of 
the hinterland - through their giving of orders (mando) -, and in the case of technicians, in 
their decontextualized opinions (i.e. not related to local traditions) concerning production 
and climate, and their complex arguments that reach the point of unintelligibility. Even if 
such social categories are only a caricaturization of the social order, they are important in the 
                                                 
94 But usually his; dotôra is the term for women who fill the same role. 
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sense that they represent the way in which rural populations usually approximate patrons and 
technicians in some of their perceived characteristics.  
In terms of climate forecasting, hinterland populations face a problem that can be 
understood in terms of the issue faced by the poet Patativa do Assaré, in the poem 
transcribed above. In Ceará, forecasts are issued in a formal, technical language, by a 
governmental agency located in Fortaleza, using temporal and spatial scales very different to 
those understood and used by local producers. The characteristics of these forecasts are 
signs of a socio-economic and political world – that is, the world of urban elites - that poor 
rural people can only integrate into their lives through the obeying of orders and through the 
historical feeling of being marginalized, exploited, and impotent. The forecast then becomes 
linked to a group of concepts where nature, society, politics and religion are fused into an 
integrated representation of the world in which everything, in one sense or another, is linked 
to hierarchical structures and to distinction mechanisms. Scientific forecast is then locally 
taken to be a governmental product, and, in its relation to the seed distribution scheme, it is 
seen as an attempt by the government to gain control over some productive aspects of 
human behavior in the hinterland. It is therefore understood more for its political qualities 
than as a politically neutral informative product used as a planning element in productive 
activities or in contingency schemes. 
There is one important factor in the way poor rural populations of the region relate to 
official forecasts and to other acts or products of the government, which is worthy of 
mention here. Even if scientific climate forecasts are issued by Fortaleza “doctors,” there is 
no direct mechanism through which these forecasts can be imposed and their use enforced. 
Although the imposition of regulations made into laws - especially in the form of decrees - 
affects the ways in which local populations relate to the natural environment, as is the case 
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with local regulations regarding the disposal of wild animals, water use, animal health, the 
commercialization of agricultural products and the production of pollution and garbage, just 
to mention a few examples, there is no way of applying the same imposed governability to the 
collective comprehension of climate issues and to the use of climate information. Naturally it 
is something that has never crossed the mind of local meteorologists. Nevertheless, official 
meteorology is perceived as being linked to the government, and it often becomes an object 
of ridicule. That happens in part because there is no risk of retribution, that is, differently 
from the relationship between the rural population and other governmental agencies, where 
there is some kind of exchange95, there is no palpable relationship between meteorologists 
and farmers. Meteorology becomes a scapegoat to express the frustration against the 
government felt by the rural population, which is often manifested through making fun of 
meteorological agents. A very popular joke in the Jaguaribe Valley during our fieldwork 
period is transcribed below: 
 
Técnicos da FUNCEME pedem hospedagem na casa de sertanejo para passar a noite. O 
dono da casa, senhor idoso, oferece um quarto aos técnicos, que dizem preferir o alpendre, onde 
instalariam suas redes. O senhor diz que choverá durante a noite; os técnicos olham para o céu 
estrelado e dizem que isso é impossível. O senhor então entra e tranca a porta. No meio da 
noite, é acordado pelos técnicos a golpear a porta durante o temporal. Na manhã seguinte os 
técnicos perguntam ao senhor como este sabia a respeito da chuva. Este aponta um jegue parado 
à frente da casa: “estão vendo esse jegue, que não tem uma das orelhas? Pois quando ele vai 
dormir embaixo daquela latada ali, é porque vem chuva. Ele não gosta que água entre em seu 
ouvido”. Moral da história: mais vale um burro meteorologista que um meteorologista burro. 
 
FUNCEME technicians stop at a house in the hinterland to spend the night. The 
owner of the house, an old man, offers the technicians a room inside the house. 
However, they say they would prefer to sleep on the porch, where they will hang 
their hammocks. The old man warns them that it is going to rain. But the 
technicians look at the clear sky and say it is impossible. So the old man enters 
the house and locks the door behind him. In the middle of the night he is 
                                                 
95 As the distribution of seeds by the State Agriculture Secretariat, which regardless of the disputes over the 
best time to carry it out, is locally much appreciated. 
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awakened by the technicians banging at the door hit by the predicted storm. In 
the morning, the technicians ask the old man how he knew about the storm. He 
points to a donkey at the front of the house. “See that ass missing an ear? When 
he goes to sleep under that shelter over there, it means that it is going to rain. He 
doesn’t like getting water in his ear.” The moral of the story is: a meteorologist 
ass is worth more than an ass of a meteorologist96. 
 
 
As we can see, meteorology exists within a highly politicized environment. This is not 
only due to the attempts of local politicians to make use of climate forecasts according to 
their agendas, but it also refers to the ways in which wider political factors such as 
relationship dynamics between social groups and classes, the social distribution of wealth, 
and the impacts of climate generate symbolic configurations that frame the way in which the 
meteorological product is understood and used. Such interpretive configurations induce 
people to relate to climate forecasts in ways other than those intended by the technical 
agents who issue them. 
On the other hand, we cannot ignore the fact that many social actors exercise a great 
deal of influence in these symbolic processes. Both the Annual Meetings of Rain Prophets in 
Quixadá, and the Climate Outlook Forums for technicians in Fortaleza, are attempts to 
regiment representations of climate in society. In the next two chapters, I will discuss how 
both events are organized around the need to control the ways in which messages are 
interpreted, through the regimentation of symbols. 
                                                 
96  In Brazil, donkeys are frequently seen as a symbol of stupidity. An interesting variation of this joke 
substitutes the earless donkey with a donkey that has sweaty testicles, because a donkey’s sweaty testicles are 
also taken as a sign of a good rainy season on the approach in many places of the hinterland. See Finan, 1998; 
also Lemos Júnior, 2000, p. 26. 
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6. Regimenting Thinking About Climate [I]: The annual meeting of rain 
prophets in Quixadá 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quixadá, the municipality where the Annual Rain Prophets Meetings take place, is 
surrounded by the most beautiful collection of rocky formations of the state of Ceará. Two 
blocks away from the main square, where the municipal church is located, we find the Shop 
Owners’ Association of Quixadá (CDL), a one storey building with a simple but comfortable 
auditorium.  
On the sunny morning of January 10th, 2004, before the meeting began, the so called 
prophets were incessantly and repeatedly interviewed by journalists (picture 14). The 
municipal government sponsors the meeting, providing a breakfast for all participants, 
before the meeting, and lunch after it, in a local restaurant.  
The meeting is organized, since its very first version, by a man called Helder Cortez. 
He is an employee of the state water distribution and sanitation company (CAGECE), and 
was transferred to Quixadá in 1992. He said that he became interested in the phenomenon 
of the rain prophets because some of them used to approach him, in late December and 
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early January, to say that they forecasted he would have trouble or easy times in his job, due 
to the forecasted upcoming rainy season (which impacts the water level in local reservoirs 
and therefore affects municipal water distribution). So in a Rotary Club meeting, in which 
the local mayor and the president of the municipal CDL were present, he suggested the 
realization of a rain prophets meeting, and was fully supported by the others. According to 
Helder, and to the current president of CDL, João Soares, the main goal of the meetings was, 
and still is, to provide information about the upcoming rainy season to farmers and business 
owners who need to prepare their stocks. Since a great deal of the municipal commerce 
exists around agriculture, the information about the quality of the upcoming rainy season 
enable, in theory, business owners to plan ahead their stocks. One other goal mentioned by 
Helder was the need to call the attention of the government for the fact that, as mentioned 
earlier, selected seeds were being systematically distributed too late. 
The 2004 meeting was officially opened with the presentation of local popular poetry 
(repente), by the poets Guilherme Calixto and Valdir de Lima (see the poem transcriptions in 
previous chapter), in which the practical environmental experiences of hinterland inhabitants 
is represented as being superior to that of technicians.  
The auditorium is divided in two groups of rows of seats, with a corridor in the center, 
going from the main door to the stage, over which there is a long table. Along the central 
corridor, TV crews installed their tripods and cameras. Photographers were closer to the 
stage and the table. The auditorium was full, filled by the rain prophets, some local 
politicians, representatives of the local government and those of surrounding municipalities, 
journalists from local and regional radios and newspapers, local university students, a group 
of social scientists from a Spanish university, and some interested individuals from the local 
population. A team of film makers, led by director Marcos Moura, was shooting a 
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documentary on the rain prophets. There was a total of five TV crews present, each with 
their lighting equipment, turning the strong lights on and off, alternately.  
After the presentation of the poets, Helder Cortez suggested that everyone stand up 
and recite the prayer Pai Nosso (Our Father) collectively and out loud. People held each 
other’s hands, as Catholics usually do during church masses, while reciting the prayer, all in 
the same rhythm. Helder then called to the table Professor Caio Lossio Botelho, a retired 
geographer from the Federal University of Ceará (UFC), who dedicates his time to the study 
of climate, often publishing articles in local newspapers and producing his own forecast. 
Prof. Botelho enjoys participating in the rain prophets meeting, and he has done so since the 
early versions of the meeting. Although the organizers like to say that he represents the 
university, the UFC does not recognize this fact, and Prof. Botelho himself on many 
occasions mentioned the fact that some of his colleagues in academia ridicule him for 
participating in the event.  
Besides Prof. Botelho, Helder called to the table the representative of FUNCEME, 
meteorologist Davi Ferran Moncunil, and then all the rain prophets present in the meeting. 
Soon the table was not big enough for the amount of people, and the prophets had to 
squeeze together in order to fit on the stage.  
Professor Botelho was the first to give a speech. In his talk he compared the rain 
prophets to Albert Einstein, in their capacity to use intuition in order to understand nature, 
something which, according to him, is a gift from God. He then announced his forecast: 
according to the more than twenty climate indicators he allegedly took into consideration 
(although he did not specify what they are): the 2004 rainy season would start in March and 
would be of average intensity.  
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The microphone was then passed to the representative of FUNCEME, and he was 
asked to announce the scientific forecast for the season. He frustrated the excited audience 
by saying that an official forecast had not yet been produced, because the Annual Climate 
Outlook Forum was yet to be held in Fortaleza.  
This was then followed by the rain prophets being called up one by one to announce 
their forecasts over the microphone (pictures 15 and 16). Most of the prophets were clearly 
intimidated by the media circus, which in 2004 was much bigger than in previous years. 
According to Helder Cortez, there were many other individuals knowledgeable on such 
issues, but most, being peasants accustomed to the tranquility of rural life, are “too shy” to 
accept the invitation to participate. In total, twenty prophets delivered their predictions, 
some stating the exact days in which rain would fall, others using the previous year of 2003 
as a basis for comparison. After each announcement, the CDL president (who in 2004 was 
Miguel Peixoto) asked each individual to publicly explain in detail the types and times of 
observations and experiences on which they based their judgment, explaining that the 
association would later prepare a publication with those descriptions. The request generated, 
in some prophets, puzzled expressions, not because they could not answer the question, but 
because, as we saw in the previous chapter, the answer was not as simple as implied in the 
question. Some of them started with very general answers like “well, I observe the animals 
and plants,” but were then asked to be more precise. With the exception of a few prophets, 
the majority have no fixed formula for these experiences, and usually their observations 
form part of their everyday activity in the fields. That makes it hard for some to 
decontextualize their observations and recontextualize them in such a contrasting 
environment as requested by the organizers.  
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In the meeting, many individuals stated that forecasting is becoming more difficult of 
late, and attributed this to the destruction of the natural environment all over the planet. 
Signs are not always coherent (different sources may provide conflicting readings); 
sometimes the signs are too weak; other times they are just plain wrong (for instance when 
ants themselves “miscalculate” and end up having their nests washed away by rising streams 
when the rainy season starts). 
One interesting thing was observed in 2005, in comparison to the 2004 meeting: in the 
2005 meeting, the composition of the group of individuals called to sit at the table was 
different. This included the mayor of Quixadá, the president of the CDL (João Soarez), once 
again Prof. Caio Lóssio Botelho, and the meteorologist Namir Giovani da Silva Mello, 
representative of FUNCEME. The prophets were called to announce their forecasts on the 
floor, in front of the stage. Helder Cortez remained on the floor too, managing the list of 
prophets and the microphone. When prophets came to the microphone, most of then 
immediately turned to the mayor, the highest authority present in the auditorium. In doing 
that, since the mayor was at the table, they turned their backs to the TV cameras, and were 
immediately asked, by journalists and by Helder Cortez, to turn their faces to the TV 
cameras. Some showed that to be difficult, having to divide their attention between the 
mayor and the cameras, which were in opposite spatial locations (see picture 17). Some 
tended to turn again towards the mayor, just to be asked to turn and face the cameras again. 
In the 2004 meeting, the authorities were not as high as the mayor (only the heads of 
municipal secretariats were present), and they were sitting in the auditorium, while the 
prophets were above the stage, at the table, so there was no spatial conflict – authorities 
were just next to the TV cameras in 2004. The 2005 meeting showed how organizers and 
some prophets valued differently local and external authorities – the mayor and the media  
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Some journalists took prophets out of the auditorium, in the middle of the meeting, to 
have them interviewed outside. The movement of cameramen, cable men, TV producers, 
and reporters dragging prophets outside was intense during the meeting. That had the 
potential to cause some degree of disturbance in the audience’s attention, which was 
compensated by the fact that the strong lighting kept focusing on the front area of the 
auditorium, where the stage is, giving the room the ambience of a theater.  
At the end of the meeting, while the last prophets were announcing their forecasts, a 
state politician, State Congressman Roberto Pessoa, arrived in the auditorium, and after the 
last prophets he was called to the table to deliver his speech. He said he had just arrived 
from the National Institute for Spatial Research (INPE), in São Paulo, where he was told 
about the forecast for the upcoming rainy season: rains around the usual tending to below 
normal. 
 
Uma coisa que eu fiquei muito satisfeito em saber, que eu não sabia, que o semi-árido … na 
questão metereológica ele tem uma possibilidade de acerto de 80%, pro acerto pra seca, como 
acerto pra dá chuva, então isso é uma vantagem muito grande, né, ao planejamento de governo, 
quer dizer, o semi-árido é a única região do nordeste que os institutos de pesquisas cientificas, 
no mundo todo, tem um índice de acerto de 80%. No leste e no sudeste nem tem previsão de 
chuva, no sudeste não tem previsão nenhuma, é 30%, 30% não é nada, 50% já não é nada, é 
nascer ou não nascer mulher, metade, metade. Então, o nordeste tem essa questão que eu não 
sabia, …e a informação que nós temos … é que vai ser uma quadra invernosa dentro de media 
das chuvas do semi-árido, dentro da média, fevereiro, março e abril, já está resolvido, mas nesse 
ano a seca é 30%, é, 20 aí pra errar … então, é uma informação privilegiada que nós tivemos 
e eu achei que eu divia participar com uma surpresa aqui aos agricultores … e começa a decisão 
que é plantar para justamente ter a boa safra. 
 
Something that caused me great satisfaction to know, and that I did not know, 
was that for the semi-arid, meteorological models have a probability of success 
of 80%, in forecasting droughts or rains. That gives official planning a great 
advantage, doesn’t it? That is, the semi-arid is the only region in the Northeast in 
which research institutes from all over the world have a chance of success of 
80%. In the East and in the Southwest, they do not even have rain forecasts, the 
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chances are 30%, and 30% is nothing, 50% is nothing, it is just like knowing the 
sex of a child, half and half of chance. Then, the Northeast has this thing that I 
did not know… and the information we have [that is, that he brought from 
INPE] is that the rainy season will be close to the average of the rains of the 
semi-arid, close to the average, for February, March and April. The chances of 
drought are 30%, and there is 20% that this forecast is wrong. So this is 
privileged information that we received and I thought I should participate here 
with this surprise for the producers… and therefore to trigger that decision, that 
is to start cultivation in order to guarantee a good harvest. 
 
 
The meeting was then declared to have reached its end, and attendees went to a local 
restaurant to have lunch together. Some prophets did not participate: they were taken by TV 
crews to their fields, in order to produce images of the prophets “in action.”  
 
Decontextualizing the local: the social context for the production of folklore 
For the purpose of analysis, let’s consider the following selected fragment from the 
transcription of the 2004 meeting: 
 
Chico Leiteiro: Meu cordial bom-dia para todos que estão aqui presentes. Minhas previsões de 
inverno, que eu sempre tenho feito meus prognósticos, sempre vem dando certo. O ano passado a 
previsão é boa, o ano retrasado deu certo, até agora não deu bobeira não. Pode dar agora em 
2004. Eu acho que o 4 é difícil ter bobeira nele. Pode ter muita água, mas bobeira não dá não. 
E a previsão do inverno é que nóis temo agora, a partir do dia 20 de Janeiro, nóis temos boas 
chuvas em nossas regiões, pode chover em todo o estado. Fevereiro nóis temos boas chuvas 
também, quem plantar não perde. E meio de março será… aumenta mais o volume da chuva. 
Abril, chuvoso… e temos chuva até junho. Pelas minhas expectativas. Que agora eu tenho 
abservado, muitas experiências que vem dando certo. Pode ter uma negativa, mas tendo uma 
negativa e quarto boa, não tem probrema, o importante é a gente vê. E eu peço às pessoas: 
prante, … que todo mundo pode colher os bons frutos, crendo em Deus, que Deus vai mandar, 
se Deus quiser.  
Miguel Peixoto: Chico? [Quais são suas experiências? fora do microfone] 
Chico Leiteiro: Minhas experiências são justamente a barra de outubro, setembro, e agora a de 
Sta. Luzia, tudo deram boa; e outra é as aves, os passarinho, tão muito animado, 
principalmente a corujinha, o rouxinol, gavião vermelho; e as até pedras também tão suando 
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pela manhã. Você tira uma pedrinha daquela, vira e ela está bem molhadinha, é expectativa de 
boas chuvas. A umidade esta encima da flor da terra. E muito obrigado. 
[Aplausos da platéia] 
Helder Cortes: Agora nós vamos ouvir nosso profeta Chico Mariano. Ontem nós conversamos, 
e ele faz um desafio ontem a alguns repórteres. Pela manhã nós tava filmando e ele disse: “hoje 
não chove aqui não, mas vai chover bem alí, e à noite vai relampejar”. E o César [reporter da 
TV Verdes Mares/Globo] viu à noite relampejando, ontem, em Quixadá. Ele preveu ontem 
de manhã. E choveu bem alí, o Dr. Caio Lóssio tá dizendo que choveu, aqui em Quixadá não. 
Ok? Então, Chico Mariano… 
Chico Mariano: Bom dia a todos que estão aqui presentes, muita paz, um ano bom, paz é o 
que nós precisa.. 
Miguel Peixoto:  Mais perto [do microfone]. 
Chico Mariano: ... um ano bom de paz. Que a gente seja humilde uns com os outros, que é 
muito bom [inaudível]. E quero parabenizar o Dr. Helder, o Dr. Hugo, pelo oitavo encontro, 
uma salva de palmas eu peço pra eles. Palmas para o Prof. Caio Lossio Botelho, João, que 
toda vida teve com nós aqui, seu Miguel, e todo pessoal que tá aqui, e que da valor… uns, e 
outros não. Profeta só teve um verdadeiro, foi Noé, o primeiro profeta do mundo que a 
anunciou a chuva, o dilúvio, passou 40 anos anunciando, ninguém acreditou, disse: ele é um 
doido, besta, que não sabe o que tá dizendo. Entonces, aqui tem uns parentes de Noé, né (risos 
e palmas), desafia a chuva! Diz até o dia que chove! Eu, nessa mentira, fazer isso?  
Mas esse mês nós temos chuva, temos um início, bom, que tá dizendo que há um bom inverno, 
eu não tô dizendo que é mês de inverno que o povo quer, que queria 1964, 64 não é, é uma era 
quatro, porque o 64 depois do dia 13 de dezembro, 13 de dezembro às duas horas da tarde, 
quando foi de noite deu uma chuva que o açude tava cheio, foi o grande inverno, 64; 74 pegou 
no dia 11 de Janeiro, foi um grande inverno! O povo queria ver outro inverno desse, mas 
tornou-se um inverno com uma seca verde.  
Eu tô vendo um inverno bom, criador, e abril, maio haverá enchente que enche os açudes, a 
Fortaleza se aperrear um pouco, aquele povo de casebre, vamos esperar um bom inverno. Mas 
ainda tamos no inicio desse mês. [inaudível] 
Miguel Peixoto: Chico? 
Chico Mariano: … então a FUNCEME vai dar uma previsão, pro dia 23, aí como o rapaz 
falou, e ele vai encontrar previsões boas, e vocês mesmos que estão aqui, vão todos ter visto… 
Miguel Peixoto: Chico, por gentileza, o que é que você observa pra chegar a essas conclusões? 
Chico Mariano: Rapaz, isso eu faço dia 1° de julho, o dia que o inverno termina e o mesmo 
dia o outro dia começa, já é propicial ter, se me aparecer nuvem, se aparecer chuva naquele dia 
1° de julho, se aparecer a chuva for às 10 horas do dia, pode marcar no dia 15 de janeiro que 
chove, se você vê no dia 1° de julho chuver às 10 horas do dia marre ou merno perto... pode 
escrever no papel: dia 15 de janeiro inicia-se inverno. 
Miguel Peixoto: 2003 choveu dia 15… dia 1° de julho? 
Chico Mariano: … chuveu. 
Miguel Peixoto: Choveu? 
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Chico Mariano: chuveu. Aí você pode marcar. Aí no outro dia, que é o dia 2 de julho, você faz 
fevereiro. Se chuver bem a noite, você começa às 12 horas da noite e marcou outras 12 horas, o 
que ocorrer dentro daquele período você apresenta. [inaudível] Eu sei por isso. Eu fazendo uma 
pesquisa... 
Miguel Peixoto: então você leva em conta só o mês de julho? 
Chico Mariano: Não. Aí no terceiro dia eu faço… 
Miguel Peixoto: Março. 
Chico Mariano: Março. No 4° dia que eu faço que é abril, no 5° que é maio, no 6° dia que 
eu faço que é junho. Aí eu pego aquilo ali, exploro, aqueles períodos que eu vejo durante a noite, 
eu faço uma matemática, que soma 180 dias, aquilo que eu tô vendo, aí eu faço os dia que 
chove. Aí eu pego o resto do mês, os 24 dias, e boto tudo num mês só. Julho fica pra Janeiro. O 
que houver em mês de agosto eu faço novamento, o que houver no mês de agosto eu boto pra 
fevereiro… 
Miguel Peixoto: Você só observa isso, não observa formação de planta... 
Chico Mariano: Não. 
Miguel Peixoto: aquela da pedra de sal, barra de natal, nada disso? 
Chico Mariano: Não! Pra que? Eu já fiz, eu já fiz tudo e aquilo mente! Pedra de sal, eu tô 
cansado de fazer, molha tudinho e não chove. Tô cansado de fazer, da seca e vem um inverno 
que não tem tamanho! Esse negócio de rato, tatu, formiga…. 
[Risos e aplausos da platéia] 
…pode acredita no que quiser, inverno nós tem, pode ficá certo, vai ter o início esse mês... 
Miguel Peixoto: começa a chover quando Chico? 
[Risos da platéia] 
Chico Mariano: Que dia? Perigoso! 
Miguel Peixoto: começa a chover quando? 
[Risos da platéia] 
Chico Mariano: eu sei o dia, mas vou deixar vocês sem resposta, só vou dizer que esse mês 
ainda tem, viu? Tem o início do inverno. 
[Risos da platéia] 
Miguel Peixoto: muito bem, Chico. 
[Aplausos da platéia] 
 […] 
Helder Cortez: Vamos ouvir agora Joaquim Moqueca, lá do Custódio. Só informando, o nosso 
profeta Antônio Lima, que é do mesmo distrito dele, está doente, não pode vir, pediu pra se 
desculpar aqui a todos… 
Miguel Peixoto: agora Helder, é importante registrar que eu encontrei o Antônio Lima e disse 
a ele: “Antônio, é dia 10 o encontro”, aí ele disse, “é, debaixo de chuva!” 
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[Risos da platéia] 
Helder Cortez: Joaquim, à vontade. 
Joaquim Santiago: Bom dia a todos, meu nome é Joaquim Ferreira Santiago, e eu moro no 
Custódio, na fazenda Salvação. Fui convidado pelo nosso companheiro João Soarez. Então… 
a gente não sabe de nada, porque de muitos… somos bastante pessoas que falam, então um diz 
uma coisa, outro diz outra, outro diz outra, e ninguém num sabe como é que vai ficar a coisa. 
Porque conversa… é muitas pessoas que fala e o inverno só é um. As quadra invernosa, só é 
uma. Então… eu acredito que no mês de janeiro pode dar algumas chuvas, que pode dar 
mesmo que tá na época. Mas não mostra que vai ser inverno também não, agora em Janeiro 
também não. Agora fevereiro, março, abril, maio, nesses meses chove muito. Agora pra frente 
eu não sei falar também não. Agora… 
Miguel Peixoto: Seu Joaquim, o sr. observa o que pra chegar a essa conclusão, de que chove em 
fevereiro, março, abril, e maio, não chove em janeiro tanto mas chove alguma coisa… o que é 
que o sr. observa, o que é que o sr. pesquisa? 
Joaquim Santiago: Rapaz, aí é que nem falou nosso patrão aqui (Chico Mariano), existe 
muita dúvida sobre o problema do inverno, porque a gente atribui uma coisa, outro outra, outro 
diz outra, é cada um uma pessoa, eu não xingo aquilo que o meu amigo fala… 
Miguel Peixoto: Não, eu quero saber o que o sr. observa… 
Joaquim Santiago: Ai então eu falo o que eu sei, o que eu observo, aí eu vou falar. Então aí o 
cabra diz assim: “não mas não sei o que tal, porque é que você confunde essas coisas?” Porque 
no sul não existe profeta, não existe pessoas falando em experiência, não existe nada… 
Miguel Peixoto: Não, seu Joaquim, mas o que é que o sr. observa, o sr. se baseia em que? 
Joaquim Santiago: E porque é que aqui o camarada aqui se baseia em experiência, eu digo 
assim, rapaz é o seguinte, é porque nós não mora no sul, a gente mora no Ceará. Aí então a 
gente faz um bocado de experiência, aí vamos ver que vai dar certo… 
Miguel Peixoto: Quais são as experiência, é isso que eu quero ver, pra deixar registrado. 
Joaquim Santiago: Eu faço a experiência no mês de dezembro, cedinho, eu procuro cavar a 
terra numa profundidade, vamos dizer um palmo ou dois, se a terra estiver bem mornazinha, 
nós temos inverno, e se a terra estiver friazinha, gelada, não. 
Miguel Peixoto: Começo de dezembro, ou primeiro de dezembro? 
Joaquim Santiago: Dezembro… não é no primeiro não, pode ser o mês todinho. Então… 
Miguel Peixoto: O sr. cava um buraco no chão… 
Joaquim Santiago: Certo… 
Miguel Peixoto: De que fundura? 
Joaquim Santiago: É… aí então tem uma experiência também, pra cehada dos inverno 
também. Uu faço uma baliza para a estrela Dalva. Ela tá pra cima. Quando ela está no 
nascente e muda pro poente. Então eu fiz uma baliza pra ela, se ela se mover do lugar de onde 
ela está para o norte, é uma experiência boa porque sabe que tem inverno, se ela ficar la naquele 
lugar não tem também não.  
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Miguel Peixoto: Com relação ao buraco, se a terra tiver morna é que tem chuva? Com relação 
ao buraco, se a terra tiver morna é que tem chuva? Se tiver fria não tem chuva. 
Joaquim Santiago: Não tem. Em 93 eu fiz essa experiência pra um moço. Aí eu falei pra ele, 
eu cavei um buraco, a terra fria mesmo que gelo, e falei “meu irmão, não tem inverno esse ano 
não.” E ele disse “porque seu Joaquim”, e eu falei “venha cá, veja essa terra como é que tá”, e 
ele disse “Seu Joaquim o que é que tem isso aqui?”, e eu disse, “isso tem muita coisa. Porque a 
terra tá sem força, e quem faz atrair as nuvens, as chuvas, são a atmosfera da terra…” 
Miguel Peixoto: Seu Joaquim, com relação a esse buraco, é a qualquer hora, independentemente 
se é ao meio dia, de manhã… 
Joaquim Santiago: Não senhor, eu faço pela manhã. Porque… mais tarde ela pode estar 
quente porque tem o sol, aí ela se potrege com a quentura do sol, aí pega a frieza da noite… 
[Aplausos da platéia] 
Miguel Peixoto: Tem mais experiência seu Joaquim? Tem mais experiência ou é só isso? 
Joaquim Santiago: A lua cheia de Janeiro, ela não foi muito agradável não, mas também ela 
não mostrou papel feio também não. Eu tava pastorando, e quando ela saiu, foi bem 
amarelinha, um sinal bom. Agora se ela tivesse nascido bem branca, e porque não tinha nada 
interrompendo o espelho dela. Aí então ela ficou muito vermelhinha… então fiquei animado 
porque esse ano não vai ser ruim também não. …só sei doutor, que esses quarto meses nóis tem 
inverno, com os poder de Jesus nóis tem. 
Helder Cortez: Se Deus quiser 
Joaquim Santiago: Se Deus quiser   
[Aplausos da platéia] 
 
Chico Leiteiro: My cordial good day for everyone that is here. My forecast for 
the winter… cause I have always made my forecasts, and they have been right. 
Last year the forecast was good, the year before too, till now my forecast did not 
get it wrong. Perhaps I can get it wrong in 2004. But I think it is difficult to fail 
in a year ending in 4. It can have too much water, but failure I think is difficult. 
And the forecast for the winter is that we will have, starting in the 20th, good 
rains in our area, it may rain in the whole state. In February we will have good 
rains too, those who plant will not lose their crops. And in the middle of 
March… the volume of rains will increase. April will be rainy… and we will have 
rain till June. That is according to my expectations. I have been observing many 
experiments that have been working well. There can be a negative experiment, 
but if we have one experiment showing negative signs and four giving positive 
signs, we will have no problems; the important thing is to be able to see. And I 
tell people: plant … because all can have good fruits, believing in God, because 
God will send them, according to God’s will. 
Miguel Peixoto: Chico? [What are the experiments you make? - out of the 
microphone] 
Chico Leiteiro: My experiments focus on the horizons of October, September, 
and more recently Saint Luzia Day, and they have all shown to be good. Another 
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sign is the birds, principally the little owl, the nightingale, the red falcon, and also 
stones are sweating in the mornings. You take a little stone, flip it over, and if it 
is nice and damp, it is a sign of good rains. Humidity is in the ground. Thank you 
very much. 
[Applauses from the audience] 
Helder Cortez: Now let’s listen to our prophet Chico Mariano. Yesterday we had 
a conversation, and he issued a challenge to some reporters. In the morning we 
were shooting [for a TV show], and he said: “today it will not rain here, but it will 
rain over there, and during the night we will see lightning.” And Cesar [a reporter 
from TV Verdes Mares/Globo] at night saw lightning, yesterday in Quixadá. 
And he [Chico Mariano] predicted it yesterday in the morning. And it rained over 
there, Dr. Caio Lóssio is here saying that it rained, but not here in Quixadá. OK? 
So, Chico Mariano… 
Chico Mariano: Good day to all that are here, peace, a good new year, peace is 
what we need… 
Miguel Peixoto: Closer [to the microphone] 
Chico Mariano: … a good year of peace. Be ourselves humble one with the 
others, because it is very good [inaudible]. I want to congratulate Dr. Helder, Dr. 
Hugo, for the eight meeting, I ask you for your applause. Let’s applaud Prof. 
Caio Lóssio Botelho, João, who has been with us for his whole life, Mr. Miguel, 
and everyone who is with use and who appreciates… some, and others do not. 
There was only one real prophet: Noah, the first prophet of the world, who 
announced the rain, the deluge, spent forty years announcing it, and no one 
believed him, they all said: “he is crazy, a madman, and does not know what he is 
saying.” So, it seems that we have some relatives of Noah here, right? [laughter 
and applause from audience] Challenging the rain! I will not take part on this lie. 
But in this month we will have rain, a beginning of rains, a sign that we will have 
a good winter. I am not saying that it will be the winter that people want, people 
wanted a winter like 1964’s, and it will not be like 64. It is a year ending in 4. In 
64, after December 13th, on December 13th at 2 p.m., when night arrived the rain 
was enough to fill the dam; it was a great winter, the 1964’s one. In 1974 the 
winter started on January 11th, and it was a great winter! People wanted to see a 
winter like that, but it was indeed a winter with green drought. 
I see a good winter, good for herds, and in April and May we will have flooding 
that will fill dams, Fortaleza will suffer a little [referring to populations living in 
areas along rivers, in the metropolitan area, with high risk of flooding], that 
people living in fragile shacks. Let’s wait for a good winter. But we are still in the 
beginning of the month. [inaudible] 
Miguel Peixoto: Chico? 
Chico Mariano: … and FUNCEME will issue their forecast on the 23rd, as he 
has told us [making reference to the Climate Outlook Forum to take place in 
Fortaleza], and he will uncover good forecasts (will forecast for good weather), 
and all of you here will have already been witness to it… 
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Miguel Peixoto: Chico, excuse me, what do you observe in order to get to these 
conclusions? 
Chico Mariano: Young man, I make it on July 1st, the day in which the winter 
ends, the same day in which the other [season] starts, and we can already have… 
if I see clouds, if it rain on that day of July 1st, if it rains on 10 a.m., you can take 
note that it will rain on January 15th… if you see that on July 1st it rains at 10 a.m., 
more or less… you can write down: the winter will start on January 15th. 
Miguel Peixoto: And did it rain on 15… July 1st? 
Chico Mariano:… it did. 
Miguel Peixoto: Did it? 
Chico Mariano: It did. And you can write down. And then in the other day, July 
2nd, you get February. If it rains in the evening, you start at midnight and mark 
twelve more hours, what happen in that period you mark down [inaudible]. 
That’s how I know. I make a research… 
Miguel Peixoto: So you take in consideration only the month of July? 
Chico Mariano: No. Then in the third day I make… 
Miguel Peixoto: March. 
Chico Mariano: March. On the 4th I make April, on the 5th is May, on the 6th it is 
June. Then I get that, explore those periods I see during the night, and I make 
my math, that adds 180 days, that I am seeing, and I discover the days in which it 
will rain. Then I get the rest of the month, the 24 days, and put all in just one 
month. July stands for January. What happens in August I do once again, what 
happens in August I apply for February… 
Miguel Peixoto: You look only at that, don’t you look at the formation of 
plants… 
Chico Mariano: No. 
Miguel Peixoto: the salt stones, the horizon on Christmas Day, none of it? 
Chico Mariano: No! What for? I have done it all, and they all lie! Salt stones, I am 
tired of doing that, it all melts down and it doesn’t rain! I am tired of doing that, 
it gives signs of drought and a huge winter comes! This business of rat, armadillo, 
ant… 
[Laughter and applause from the audience] 
Chico Mariano: … you can believe whatever you want, we will have winter, you 
can be sure, and it will begin this month… 
Miguel Peixoto: Chico, when will it start raining? 
[Laughter in the audience] 
Chico Mariano: What day? What a dangerous question! 
Miguel Peixoto: When will it start raining? 
[Laughter in the audience] 
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Chico Mariano: I know the day, but I will leave you with no answer, I will only 
say that this month we will still have rains, ok? We will have the beginning of the 
winter. 
[Laughter in the audience] 
Miguel Peixoto: Well done, Chico. 
[Applause from the audience] 
[…] 
Helder Cortez: Now let’s listen to Joaquim Moqueca, from the Custódio district. 
Just to inform you, our prophet Antônio Lima, who is from the same district, is 
sick and could not come. He asked me to send his apologies… 
Miguel Peixoto: Now Helder, it is important to say that I met Antônio Lima and 
told him: “Antônio, the meeting will take place on the 10th,” and he replied: “yes, 
under rain!” 
[Laughter from the audience] 
Helder Cortez: Joaquim, make yourself comfortable. 
Joaquim Santiago: Good day everyone, my name is Joaquim Ferreira Santiago, 
and I live at the Custódio, in the Salvação Farm. I was invited by our fellow João 
Soarez. So… we know nothing, because of many… we are many people talking, 
so one say one thing, other say another, and other still another, and no one 
knows what the result will be. Because talking… it too many people speaking but 
the winter is only one. The winter season is only one. Then… I believe that in 
January we can have some rains, because indeed it is time for rain to come. But I 
don’t see it as winter, not in January. But in February, March, April, May, we will 
have a lot of rains in those months. Beyond that I cannot say. Now… 
Miguel Peixoto: Mr. Joaquim, what do you observe in order to get to these 
conclusions, that we will have rains in February, March, April, and May, but not 
so much in January but we will get some rain… what do you observe, what kind 
of research do you do? 
Joaquim Santiago: Young man, it like our patron here said [pointing to Chico 
Mariano], there is a great deal of doubt on this issue of the winter, because we 
look at some things, others look at different things, and each person is distinct, 
and I do not insult what my fellow friend says… 
Miguel Peixoto: No, I want to know what you observe… 
Joaquim Santiago: I speak what I know, what I observe, that’s what I say. Then 
someone comes and asks: “this and that, what do you get confused with those 
things?” Because in the South there are no prophets, there are no people talking 
about experiments, there is nothing… 
Miguel Peixoto: No, Mr. Joaquim, but what do you observe, do you base your 
observations on what? 
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Joaquim Santiago: That’s because here people base their actions on experiments, 
that’s what I say, young man, we don’t live in the South, we live in Ceará. We 
make several experiments to see which work and which don’t… 
Miguel Peixoto: What are the experiments, that’s what I want to know, to have it 
recorded. 
Joaquim Santiago: I make my experiment in December, very early, I dig the soil 
and make a hole of, say, one to one and a half foot, and if I find warm soil we 
will have winter; if I find cold soil, we will not. 
Miguel Peixoto: Beginning of December, or December 1st?   
Joaquim Santiago: December… not in the 1st, it can be during the whole month, 
So… 
Miguel Peixoto: You dig a hole on the ground… 
Joaquim Santiago: Yes… 
Miguel Peixoto: How deep? 
Joaquim Santiago: Yes…and there is another experiment too, to know about the 
arrival of the winter. I make a ruler for the Morning Star (Estrela Dalva). It is up. 
When it goes from dawn to dusk, I mark its path. If it moves from the previous 
path towards the North it is a good sign because we know we will have good 
winter; if it does not move, there is no winter. 
Miguel Peixoto: Regarding the hole on the ground, if the soil is warm it means 
the approaching of rains? And if it is cold there is no rain. 
Joaquim Santiago: There is not. In 1993 I showed this experiment to a young 
man. I told him, I dug the hole, the soil was as cold as ice, and I said, “my 
brother, there is no winter this year.” And he said “why not Mr. Joaquim?,” and I 
said “come here and check this soil,” and he said “and so what,” and I said “this 
is very important. Because the earth has power, and what attracts clouds, and 
rain, is the atmosphere of the earth…” 
Miguel Peixoto: Mr. Joaquim, regarding the hole, can it be done anytime, midday, 
in the morning… 
Joaquim Santiago: No, sir. I make it in the morning. Because… later the soil can 
be warm because of the sun, it gets protected with the warmth of the sun. So we 
have to get the coldness from the night… 
[Applause from the audience] 
Miguel Peixoto: Are there more experiences, Mr. Joaquim? Are there more or 
that’s all. 
Joaquim Santiago: The full moon of January, it was not very pleasant, but it was 
not too negative either. I was herding, and when the moon appeared, it was 
yellow, a good sign. Now if it had appeared all white, that would be because 
there was nothing interrupting its mirror. So then it was a little red… and I felt 
happy because it means that this will not be a bad year… all I know, doctor, is 
that in those four months we will have winter, with the power of Jesus we will. 
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Helder Cortez: It’s God’s will. 
Joaquim Santiago: It’s God’s will. 
[Applause from the audience] 
 
 
In this fragment, we have the participation of Helder Cortez (organizer of the event), 
Miguel Peixoto (co-organizer and president of the CDL), and three prophets: Chico Leiteiro, 
Chico Mariano and Joaquim Santiago. In the discourse of each one, we find interesting 
elements that will help us identify some of the main elements that structure the event.  
If we compare the words of Chico Leiteiro in the meeting with what he had shown me 
when I visited him some weeks earlier, we see two things: first, there is no reading of how 
each month of the upcoming rainy season will be, in terms of intensity of rains, in the 
behavior of animals and plants, or in the humidity of the soil, the signs Chico Leiteiro most 
likes to work with. Secondly, the responses seen in the ecosystem inform about the 
approaching rain, even the amount of rain supposedly, but not its distribution in time. Yet 
there seems to be peer pressure towards being able to talk about each month in turn – 
forecasting the amount of rains for each month in particular means to be able to forecast dry 
spells in the middle of the rainy season, something that meteorology clearly cannot do. This 
is highly valuable information, because it is the only way in which a rain forecast can be 
turned into an agricultural production forecast. Scientific mathematical methods inform only 
the probably aggregate rainfall over a three month period (January to March, for instance, or 
April to June). For that reason, claiming to be able to predict rains and dry spells, that is, the 
months (and sometimes days and weeks) in which rain will and will not occur, gives the 
prophets the image of being more powerful than science. Thus, forecasting each month 
became a kind of requirement for being recognized as a powerful and legitimate prophet, 
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something like a genre that developed throughout the years, through mutual influence of one 
prophet over the others. Only the establishment of correlations between different periods, 
like the method described by Chico Mariano in his discourse, can supposedly provide 
information about specific months. For that reason, while the observation of animals 
informs about the general quality of the upcoming rainy season (that is, if it will be “good,” 
meaning normal to above normal, or not), Chico Leiteiro uses the very popular technique of 
the salt rocks on Saint Luzia’s day, which establishes the correlation between the rocks and 
the months of the rainy season. We can see that there is not a great amount of detail in his 
specification of the rains that will fall in each month. Secondly, due to the short time he had 
and to the straightforward style of question used by Miguel Peixoto, his descriptions of the 
behavior of animals and other ecosystem signs gained the appearance of being formulaic 
procedures. Thus, we see a marked decontextualization imposed by the way the verbal 
interchange in the meeting is structured. 
In Chico Mariano’s discourse, we can see that he is very provocative, and he likes to be 
controversial. He criticizes some of the other prophets, especially those who base their 
forecasting methods on the behavior of animals and on plants, saying he tried these methods 
and they don’t work. He says that FUNCEME will come up with positive forecasts after the 
meteorologists meeting in Fortaleza, and although he kept giving specific details of how he 
can forecast the exact days on which rain will occur, he suggested that those who say exactly 
when the rainy season will begin are liars (because supposedly no one can do it; only Noah 
could). His provocations were reflected in the discourse of Joaquim Santiago, who replies 
that he does not insult the others who have different methods, implying that what Chico 
Mariano had just said was impolite. He sarcastically refers to Chico Mariano as “nosso patrão 
aqui [our boss here],” but there is no hierarchical distinction between the prophets, and 
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Joaquim Santiago was in an indirect way implying that Chico Mariano was behaving as if he 
was a local boss, which was improper. Nevertheless, in order to avoid a head-on 
confrontation with Chico Mariano, who, besides being older, is known for being very vocal 
and popular, Joaquim Santiago changes his argument reframing the conflict as being 
between “southern” and “northeastern” views of the nature. Those – southerners, he 
implied - who criticize the activity of prophesizing rains in the northeast know nothing about 
the sertão and therefore should not talk about it; that’s a theme we already saw in Patativa’s 
work and in other cultural manifestations of the sertão.  
As we can see, the structure of the rain prophet meeting – the management of the 
verbal interchange and the constraints the organizers of the event impose on it, the nature of 
the audience, formed in great part by the regional media, as well as the nature of the venue in 
which the meeting takes place - is something radically different from the usual situation in 
which forecasting has traditionally taken place. As depicted in the poems by Antonio da Silva 
and Silvio do Nascimento, and also by Guilherme Calixto and Valdir de Lima, both 
transcribed above, forecasting activity finds its socio-cultural nexus in that it does not focus 
only on rain, but rather on how the ecosystem, the social world and the metaphysical realm 
are deeply interconnected. We find evidence of that in fragments of the transcription of an 
interview with João Ferreira de Lima, one of the most prominent experts on climate in 
Quixadá, presented below. We can see, through the interview, how my attempts to keep the 
focus of the conversation on issues of climate were not successful. This is because climate 
forecasting is just one particular way of relating to nature within a complex system of 
forecasting that also includes the forecasting of social relations, events, and so forth. 
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Renzo Taddei: algumas pessoas falaram [na reunião] que não são profetas. O quê que significa 
ser um profeta? 
João Ferreira de Lima: profeta é a pessoa que tem muita experiência na vida, viu, precisa de 
muita experiência, e se a natureza ajudar isso... se a natureza não ajudar ele e não for muita 
experiência, num tivé muita experiência ... o homem deve ter muita experiência pra poder entrar 
em qualquer pergunta, em qualquer coisa e saber responder isso, ter essa mentalidade boa. 
Renzo Taddei: entendi. Quais são as experiências que o senhor faz? 
João Ferreira de Lima: minhas experiências é você reparar as coisas direitinho. Passar, olhar 
todo dia, viver daquilo, né, parando, saber como é que vai as coisas... 
Renzo Taddei: e pra onde que o senhor... 
João Ferreira de Lima: ... e também entender tudo. 
Renzo Taddei: o senhor olha pros planetas? 
João Ferreira de Lima: olho pros planetas, saber como é que vai, se vai levar as barras, 
amanhecer sendo o dia, anoitecer... viu, [olho a barra às] cinco horas da tarde, cinco horas da de 
manhã, quer dizer, é preciso o caba tê muita experiência. Entendeu? 
Renzo Taddei: entendi. Algumas pessoas falaram “eu não sou profeta”. Existe alguma 
discriminação aos profetas? 
João Ferreira de Lima: existe. Sim existe. Porque o profeta é o profeta Isaías, aqueles profetas 
que tinham aquelas leis de Deus, né. Nós samos, como se diz um reparador, num sabe? Nós 
chamamo de profeta, mas é forma de dizer, mas num pode nem ser profeta, profeta é aquele que 
nasce com um dote, que Deus mandou que ele profetiza tudo e tudo dá certo. ... Dei essa 
orientação pra você, pra você ficar sabendo. Profeta, a palavra profeta é aquelas, daqueles 
profetas que o Nosso Senhor deixou, pessoa que tem aqueles dote dado por Deus... pra nóis a 
palavra não é essa viu, é “reparador”. 
(...) 
Renzo Taddei: o pai do senhor sabia fazer, sabia reparar também, não? Foi ele que ensinou o 
senhor ou o senhor aprendeu só. 
João Ferreira de Lima: não, eu aprendi sozinho, a pessoa quando ele nasce com um dote ele 
aprende por coisa dele e sabe responder tudo que você perguntar, como em qualquer matéria pode 
perguntar que eu lhe respondo bem direitin. ... indico, sou quase um professor, dou indicação 
como é que a pessoa vive, dou indicação, toda indicação, qual é o dia próprio da gente sair sem 
medo. 
Renzo Taddei: sair pra onde? 
João Ferreira de Lima: andar no mundo sem medo. 
Renzo Taddei: ah, eu não entendi. Explica pra mim isso, como assim? 
João Ferreira de Lima: a pessoa sair tem o dia, da pessoa sair sem haver abscesso, pra ver se 
tem algum aviso. Tudo no mundo a pessoa tem, tem aviso tem aquela viagem não dá certo, se eu 
vou voltar de canoa, se não dá… 
Renzo Taddei: e como o senhor sabe isso, quais são, onde o senhor repara qual é, quais são os 
sinais? 
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João Ferreira de Lima: sinais sabe o que é, devido as instruções do coração palpita. 
Renzo Taddei: palpita o coração. 
João Ferreira de Lima: o coração palpita. No caso de eu já havia de sair ali no alto, bem 
pertim, e a mulher disse, “João, cê num foi, não?” [e eu disse] hoje o dia não é próprio pra mim 
ir ... pra canoa, mas eu não digo a ela nem o motivo como é. Se você num tivé cuidado, uma 
coisa e outra, aí se você precisar de uma oraçãozinha, faço uma oraçãozinha pra você ... você 
chega o caba diz eu vou… como é teu nome? 
Renzo Taddei: Renzo. 
João Ferreira de Lima: eu vou matar já o Renzo, infiá a faca e tudo mais, mas quando [te] vê, 
[te diz] ah Renzo, coisa e tal, passa e vai simbora. 
Renzo Taddei: e qual a oração? 
João Ferreira de Lima: é uma oraçãozinha que tem um palpitezin, tem o dente de São 
Cipriano, tem o livro de São Cipriano, de capa preta... 
(…) 
Renzo Taddei: me diz uma coisa, as pessoas procuram o senhor pra perguntar [sobre chuva]? 
João Ferreira de Lima: pergunta, as vez faço uma garrafada, uma coisa... 
Renzo Taddei: o que é uma garrafada? 
João Ferreira de Lima: garrafada é raiz de pau, fazer uma garrafada de raiz de pau, por que 
a pessoa, por exemplo, tá com uma gastrite, tá com uma úlcera, tem mulher que tá inflamada, 
barriga inflamada,... eu sou quase um cientista natural (risos). 
Renzo Taddei: é um remédio? 
João Ferreira de Lima: é remédio do mato, eu só trabalho com remédio do mato. 
 
Renzo Taddei: Some people [in the meeting] say they are not prophets. What 
does it mean to be a prophet? 
João Ferreira de Lima: A prophet is a person who has a lot of experience in life, 
you see, you need a lot of experience, and if nature helps with this… if nature 
doesn’t help him and he does not have a lot of experience, one must have a lot 
of experience… a man must have a lot of experience to be able to approach any 
question and to be able to answer it, to have a good mentality. 
Renzo Taddei: I see. What are the observations that you make? 
João Ferreira de Lima: My observations consist in looking at things correctly. 
Pass through a place; observe it every day, to live from that, right? Pausing to see 
how things are… 
Renzo Taddei: And where do you… 
João Ferreira de Lima: … and to understand everything. 
Renzo Taddei: Do you look at the planets? 
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João Ferreira de Lima: I look at the planets, to see what is happening, what the 
horizon is like, when it is dawn and when it is dusk… you see, [I look at the 
horizon at] five in the afternoon, five in the morning, what I want to say, is that 
it is necessary for one to have a lot of experience. Do you understand? 
Renzo Taddei: I understand. Some people were saying “I am not a prophet.” Is 
there any discrimination towards prophets? 
João Ferreira de Lima: Yes, there is. Because a prophet is [like] the prophet Isaia, 
like those prophets who received their laws from God, right? We are, what you 
would call an observer, you know? We call ourselves prophets, but it is just a way 
of speech, but we can’t be prophets, a prophet is a person who is born with a gift, 
who God sent to prophesize everything so that everything comes true. … I tell 
you this so that now you know. Prophet, the word prophet, is ment for those 
prophets who Our Lord sent down to earth, a person who has a gift from 
God…  For us it is not the right word you see, it should be “observer.” 
(…) 
Renzo Taddei: Your father also knew how to observe? Did he teach you or did 
you learn by yourself? 
João Ferreira de Lima: No, I learned by myself, a person when born with a gift 
he learns about it himself and knows how to answer anything you ask; for any 
subject that you can ask me about I’ll give you the right answer… I give 
indications, I am almost like a professor, I suggest how a person should live, I 
give indications, all types of indications, of which day it is ok to leave without 
fear. 
Renzo Taddei: To leave to where? 
João Ferreira de Lima: To walk in the world without fear. 
Renzo Taddei: Oh, I don’t understand. Can you explain to me, what you mean? 
João Ferreira de Lima: There is a certain day when a person can leave [home], 
leave it without danger, to look for warning signs. In all the things of a person’s 
world, there exists warnings that a trip will not work out, like if I must return by 
canoe, if that will not work out… 
Renzo Taddei: And how do you know that, what are, where do you observe this, 
what are the signs? 
João Ferreira de Lima: Signs you know what they are, they are taken from the 
instruction of the heart beat. 
Renzo Taddei: The heart beat. 
João Ferreira de Lima: The heart beat. There was a time when I had to go to the 
hills, very close to here, and my woman said, “João, you didn’t go, did you?” [and 
I said] today is not the right day to go… by canoe, but I didn’t tell her the reason. 
If you don’t take care, of one thing or another, I know what you need, you need 
a little prayer, I’ll make a little prayer for you… you arrived and a guy said I am 
going to… what’s your name? 
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Renzo Taddei: Renzo. 
João Ferreira de Lima: I am going to kill Renzo, cut him with a knife and cut up 
everything else, but when he sees you, [he says] oh Renzo, this and that, then he 
leaves and goes away. 
Renzo Taddei: And what is the prayer? 
João Ferreira de Lima: It is a little payer that has a little beat, has the tooth of 
Saint Cipriano, there’s the book of Saint Cipriano, with the black cover… 
(…) 
Renzo Taddei: Tell me something, do people search for you to ask [about rain]? 
João Ferreira de Lima: They ask, and sometimes I make them a garrafada or 
something… 
Renzo Taddei: What is a garrafada? 
João Ferreira de Lima: A garrafada is from the root of a plant, you make a 
garrafada from the root of a plant, because a person, for example, has gastritis, 
ulcers, there are many women who have inflammation, inflamed stomachs … I 
am almost a natural scientists (laughs). 
Renzo Taddei: Is it a remedy? 
João Ferreira de Lima: It is a bush remedy; I only work with bush medicine. 
 
 
As we can see, the ways in which forecasts are presented in the rain prophet’s meeting 
is a marked decontextualization from such an intricate net of relations linking together 
different spheres of life, especially concerning method description, because it reduces 
forecasting from a manifestation within complex narratives to a simple mechanical formulaic 
technique. In an attempt to render all forecasts comparable, and to frame them in a way that 
supposedly enables business and agricultural decisions, the dynamics of the meeting reduce 
the complexity of the forecasts in their connections to other dimensions of agricultural life, 
due to the decontextualization the meeting itself causes. On the other hand, presenting the 
forecasts in all their complexity at the meetings was not possible, since the multiplicity and 
heterogeneity of forecasting methods and localities they refer to would transform the event 
into a semiotic Babel.  
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Even when transmitted through word of mouth, through cordéis or through local radio, 
a degree of decontextualization is always involved. The prophet has to reduce the complexity 
of his or her metasemiotic thinking about nature to the degree of formulating a small piece 
of text that can be effectively communicated. But since these traditional forecasts make such 
extensive use of the experience of ordinary everyday life in the rural world, there is no real 
trouble for other people from the hinterland to recontextualize and make sense of the 
information. This can also be seen to some degree in Fortaleza, where around 61% of its 
population was born in the interior of the state97, and many more maintain contact with 
family members there, and thus share their anxieties over the rainy season, and also often 
share income with these relatives during times of drought.  
The presence of journalists at the meeting from the southern city of São Paulo (Folha 
de S.Paulo), and the screening of a report on the event by a local affiliate of TV Globo for the 
national news program (Jornal Nacional), holds some distinct connotations. In mainly urban 
southern parts of the country, such practices, experienced through decontextualized mediatic 
textual chunks, are seen as exotic and as Quixotesque. The romanticization of rural life and 
of popular culture of the Northeast has become, in the last two decades, one of the main 
themes for the tourism industry in states such as Ceará. One finds in Fortaleza, for instance, 
fancy expensive restaurants98 in which local “traditional” gastronomy is served, waiters are 
dressed as “country folk” (caipiras), and walls are made out of adobe, imitating poor rural 
dwellings of the hinterland. Through such simulacrum of rurality, the tourist gains a 
folklorized feeling for the world of the sertão without leaving the comfort of the city.  
                                                 
97 See Diário do Nordeste, February 21st, 2003. Evidence of such strong influence of the rural imaginary on the 
life of the metropolitan area can be seen almost everywhere, as for instance in the fact that street kids usually 
offer to take care of cars parked on the streets, in exchange for coins, using the verb pastorear [to herd]: “posso 
partorear seu carro? [Can I herd your car?].” 
98 For example: restaurants Boi do Sertão, Lá na roça, and Kukukaia. 
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The development of the Tourism Industry has been advertised by the state 
government as one of the preferential alternatives, in terms of economic activity, for 
agriculture. Quixadá has been attempting to become one of the centers for tourism in the 
hinterlands, offering options in historical, rural and ecological tourism. Besides the famous 
and stunning surrounding rocky formations and the historical Cedro Reservoir for which the 
municipality is known, the local business owners recently became involved in discussions 
about the exploitation of the tourism potential of the meeting, partly through an attempt to 
make the rain prophets meeting a circus for the spectacle of rural poverty. That was given 
the most explicit form by representatives of the State University of Ceará (UECE) who 
attended the 2005 meeting, and at the very end presented their ideas: 
 
Pesquisador: Hoje além dos pesquisadores que normalmente se encontram nesse evento, nós 
temos um grupo da universidade chamado Observatória da Cultura, (…) e o nosso interesse 
nesse evento é ver que outras repercussões a gente pode tirar deste encontro. E eu tive vendo entre 
outras coisas o seguinte: nós temos um evento que atrai muita atenção, e que nós podíamos 
transformá-lo num evento de turismo, porque Quixadá tem cada vez mais as características de 
destino turístico de cultura popular, de cultura propriamente brasileira, e que vocês representam, 
e que é isso que a gente está estudando aqui. Parabéns pelo evento.   
Helder Cortez: O nosso intuito mesmo é valorizar essa cultura, resgatar, nós temos aqui o 
Chico Leite, descendente do pai dele, tá perpetuando essa cultura, nós queremos que os filhos de 
profetas, ou subrinhos ou amigos, deem continuidade a esse trabalho. 
 
Researcher: Today, besides the usual researchers that attend this event, we have a 
group from the university called the Observatory of Culture, (…) and our 
interest in this event is to see what other repercussions the event generates. And 
I have been observing, among other things, the following: here we have an event 
that attracts a lot of attention, and that we could transform into a tourist event. 
Quixadá has been increasingly gaining characteristics of a tourist destination 
linked to popular culture, of Brazilian culture per se, and you are representatives 
of that, and that is what we have been studying here. Congratulations for the 
event. 
Helder Cortez: Our very intention is indeed to promote this culture, save it, we 
have here Chico Leite, inheritor from his father, he is perpetuating this culture, 
and we want the children of prophets, or nephews or friends, to give continuity 
to this work. 
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For the journalist in attendance from São Paulo, the 2004 meeting seemed so 
Quixotesque as to be “quase inverossímil [almost unreal]”99. As commented by Portis-Winner, 
mass tourism creates “fakelore,” which in this case is based upon an idealized view of rural 
poverty, and can only be sustained through refraining from direct contact with it, through 
moving the places and circumstances in which social action takes place. It also changes the 
environment in which local rituals and performances occur, and sometimes adds to the 
performative aspects of local rituals and events, changing the real to make it look more 
“authentic” (2002, p. 39). 
The production of forecasts is also understood as the production of folklore by some 
local intellectuals. Two cases are worth mentioning. The first is the dentist and rain prophet 
Paulo Costa, of whom we have talked already. During the 2004 meeting, Paulo Costa said, 
during the announcement of his forecast: 
 
Paulo Costa: É uma observação muito longa, o trabalho é muito cansativo, mas a gente tem 
que fazer isso em função, pra que eu possa conservar exatamente uma tradição e um costume, 
para que isso torne-se uma cultura. A minha missão aqui não é a nem tanto de profeta, com a 
preocupação de acertar ou de adivinhar, a minha missão aqui é de continuar um trabalho que 
sirva de cultura, para que a juventude que vem atrás de mim a leve até a frente. Porque eu estou 
sentido porque esse ano eu não vi através de cultura, nenhum canto de reizado. Eu espero que 
isso sirva de exemplo, não só para os mais jovens, mas que também conservem os nossos usos e 
os nossos constumes. Então eu abracei essa missão para fazer cultura e não adivinhamento e 
acertamento de inverno. Eu acho que estou sendo bem claro nas minhas colocações. Então eu me 
fico enviadecido, na minha alma, eu fico agradecido com varias pessoas que chegam e compõe 
uma mesa, pra fazer um ato desse porque exatamente isso é cultura. Isto é que leva a crer que a 
sensibilidade nossa também  toque a nossos governantes, a nossos gestores, para que nos vejam 
com outro olhar bem diferente, porque nos nos preocupamos uns com os outros. Essa é a minha 
missão, no que diz respeito ao que eu faço sobre o inverno. (…) Agora se eu vou acertar que vai 
chover, aí não é comigo, é com a Providência e só os poderes de Deus, e Deus nos abençõe. 
                                                 
99 See Folha de S.Paulo, January 18th, 2004. 
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Paulo Costa: The observation is very long, the work is tiresome, but we have to 
do it, in order to keep a tradition and a custom, to turn it into culture. My 
mission here is not so much to be a prophet, with the intention of making 
accurate forecasts; my mission here is to give continuity to something that works 
as culture, for the new generations that come after me take forward. Because I 
am sad for not having seen, this year, through cultural manifestation, 
presentations of the reizado100. I hope my work serves as an example, not only for 
the young, in the conservation of our uses and customs. So I embraced this 
mission in order to make culture and not to guess and forecast the winter. I 
believe I am being very clear in my words. So I feel full of complacence, in my 
soul, I am thankful for so many people who come and participate in this table, in 
order to participate in an event like this, exactly because this is culture. This leads 
me to believe that our sensitivity will touch our governors, our policy makers, so 
they can start looking at us with other eyes, because we care about each other. 
This is my mission, in regard to what I do about the winter. (… ) Now, whether 
or not I am going to get it right in forecasting the rainy season, that does not 
concern me, but Providence and the powers of God bless us all. 
 
 
The second case is the young historian Manoel Lucindo Lemos Junior. He is the 
grandson of the late Chico Leite, and son of the prophet that participated in the attended 
rain prophet meetings and who attends by the same name. In his thesis for completion of 
the bachelor’s degree in History, entitled The Popular Prophets of Quixadá, Lemos Júnior frames 
the activities of rain prophets as the resistance of illiterate and semi-literate rural elders from 
the increasing exclusion from social life they feel, as societal dynamics become increasingly 
fast paced and technologically sophisticated (Lemos Júnior, 2000, p. 22). In his final 
considerations, the author states that 
 
A valorização do sertanejo e de suas crendices poderá ficar no vazio, caso não tenhamos a 
atenção devida para com suas histórias. (…) Foi dado aqui apenas um passo para que as 
manifestações populares de Quixadá sejam preservadas e guardadas como tesouro que nem o 
tempo, e nem os problemas consumem ou nos fazem esquecer. Buscamos acabar com o 
preconceito de que a História local é menos importante do que os acontecimentos estruturantes 
de uma sociedade. 
                                                 
100 Reizado is an ancient popular cultural manifestation of the Brazilian Northeast. 
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Enfim, para mim, esta pesquisa dá uma pequena parcela de contribuição para que a prática da 
história oral seja ampliada nesta Faculdade, assim como a preocupação para conservarmos o 
patrimônio cultural de Quixadá. Destes sujeitos sociais que devem ser sempre apresentados 
como originadores da história local, pois eles são também o acontecer histórico (Lemos Júnior, 
2000, p. 36-37). 
 
The appreciation of the hinterlander and their beliefs can lose its meaningfulness, 
if we don’t give the proper attention to their stories. (…) In this text we have just 
one step further in the direction of the preservation of the manifestations of the 
popular prophets of Quixadá, cared-for as a treasure that neither time nor 
problems will consume and make us forget. We intend to end the preconception 
that local History is less important than the structuring factors of a society. 
Finally, to me this research makes a small contribution to the amplification of the 
practice of oral history in this college, as well as for the preoccupation in 
contributing to the conservation of the cultural heritage of Quixadá. These social 
subjects must be referred to as originators of local history, as they are also 
history in the making.   
 
 
We can therefore detect different forms in which the activity of rain prophets are taken 
and made meaningful in the local social dynamics. For the population of rural areas, older, 
and with very little formal education, the forecasts are contextualized pretty much according 
to the elements described in previous sections of this text – intrinsically associated with a 
religious framework that offers moral explanations for collective suffering linked to climate, 
and also to agricultural results, and to other narratives, some of them making explicit 
reference to the most relevant social distinctions for the local rural population, which 
currently involve the rural-urban dichotomy. For this section of the population, the real 
value of the forecast seems not to be its direct functional and economic aspects: we have 
already seen that the majority of farmers start the planting cycles after the first rains, 
regardless of any forecast. Other studies (Finan and Nelson, 2001; Lemos et al. 1999, 2002; 
Roncoli et al., 2001; Höeynck, 2003) show that the majority of the rural population does not 
have flexibility in infrastructural aspects or even in capital to change their productive 
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activities according to rain forecasts. Through diversification of activities, as mentioned in 
chapter three, the population attempts the reduction of their overall vulnerability, but their 
options are not many, beyond raising animals, looking for daily jobs that also tend to be 
linked to agriculture, making gardens close to rivers and doing dry land agriculture in larger 
areas. So the value of the forecast, for the local rural population, seems to be linked to its 
teleological aspects: in average, the forecasts tend to be for good rainy seasons, which is 
what everyone expects to hear. Collective anxiety tends to induce prophets who believe in a 
bad rainy season to silence or to make ambiguous announcements, and forecasts for a good 
rainy season are commemorated as good news. In 1997, most prophets forecasted good 
rains, and the state went through a drought period. In 1998 it happened again, and it was the 
worst drought of the 1990s. In 2004, most prophets issued forecasts for a good rainy season, 
and despite the heavy rains in January, at the end of the rainy season the situation was 
configured as a green drought, with over 60% of the agricultural fields of the state ruined 
due to dry spells. In 2005, FUNCEME, Prof. Caio Lóssio Botelho, Luiz Gonzaga from 
Camocim, and two other prophets announced below average rains, one of them – Airton 
Caititi - only to be ridiculed by the mayor of Quixadá himself. The other seventeen prophets 
issued forecasts of a good rainy season, while the meteorological indicators signal a below 
average rainy season due to the unfavorable state of the Equatorial Atlantic Ocean. The fact 
that among the rural population the prophets do not lose their authority, despite the 
frequent failure of their forecasts, is strong evidence that the forecasts have, more than 
anything else, an important ritualistic value in the teleological discourse on the religious 
organization of the universe. For psychoanalyst Karla Martins, the forecasts are part of a 
psychological strategy to deal with the imagery of hunger and death associated with droughts, 
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bringing with it a message of hope 101 . Lemos Júnior makes specific reference to this 
dimension – that is, of the group of people who voice collective wishful thinking - of the 
social role of rain prophets when he says that: 
 
Aproximar-se dos profetas foi mais do que transformar seus sentimentos em conceitos 
acadêmicos, e sim reconhecer as raízes dessa gente dos sertões quixadaenses que sempre traz a 
esperança de dias melhores (2000, p. 36). 
 
Getting close to the prophets was more than to transform their feelings into 
academic concepts, but rather to acknowledge the roots of these people from the 
hinterlands of Quixadá, who always bring with them the hope of better days to 
come. 
 
 
The younger population, on the other hand, has been marked by two trends in the 
rapid social changes that mark current rural Ceará: the intense migration of the young 
population from rural to urban centers, and the dramatic increase in the number of children 
and teenagers who attend schools regularly, even in rural areas. With regard to the first factor, 
as mentioned earlier, the state of Ceará has been living an accelerated process of 
urbanization. In 1950, 25% of the population of the state lived in cities, towns, or villages. In 
2000, this number reached 71.5% (IPLANCE, 2002b, p. 64)102. An important part of the 
migration is focused on the city of Fortaleza, which in 1991 had 36% of the population of 
the state, and in 2000 had 40% (Ibid.) In terms of formal education, according to official 
data, between 1981 and 1999 the average number of years of schooling for the rural 
population between 15 and 24 years of age grew from 2.1 to 4.8. For the metropolitan area 
of Fortaleza, the increase was from 5.7 to 6.8 (Ibid., p. 156). In the same period, illiteracy 
                                                 
101 Diário do Nordeste, February 18th, 2005. 
102 This numbers include the city of Fortaleza. Data for the Jaguaribe Valley solely show that the urbanization 
rates grew in the following pace: 38.1% in 1980, 48.4% in 1991, and 53.6% in 1996 (Garjulli et al., 2002, p. 4).  
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rate in rural Ceará, for the population between 15 and 24 years of age, fell from around 40% 
to 18%, while the illiteracy rate of the same sector of the population in the metropolitan area 
of Fortaleza fell from 13% to around 6% (Ibid, p. 149). For the population between 25 and 
59 years of age, illiteracy rate among rural populations fell from 45% to 35%, while in the 
metropolitan area the reduction was from 23% to 17% (Ibid., p. 151). As we can see, the 
exposure of the young population of rural and urban Ceará to formal schooling reached 
unprecedented levels, if compared to the educational records of their parents and 
grandparents. Together with schooling comes the academic tendency to value science and 
technique, seen as “modern,” and, due to the gradual reduction in the overall capacity of this 
sector of the population to replicate the complex webs of meaning involved in the way rural 
elders understand the relation between climate, religion, and society, there is the tendency to 
see local traditions as folklore. The words of Paulo Costa (the only prophet with an 
academic degree), Lemos Júnior and the academics from UECE are evidence of how the 
academic world tends to reinforce the museification of what is seen as not finding its proper 
place in the symbolic organization of urban life, except as indexes of the past. 
In any case, the meeting - as an institutionalization of the relationship between 
prophets and local, state and national media - led to many transformations in the way 
forecasts exist and are presented, at least in this particular context. Firstly because, as already 
mentioned, the dynamics of the meeting constitute a whole different genre compared to the 
circumstances in which forecasting occurs outside of the event. The meeting imposes a 
regimentation of space, time, rhythm, and form of presentation, and therefore breaks the 
indexical ties to which such forecasts are originally bound. In other words, the meeting is 
metapragmatically organized according to an ideological configuration that, through strongly 
regimenting the way the prophets’ performances take place as well as the environment where 
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they happen, also produces a semiotic regimentation of the conjunction of meanings and 
actions: it iconizes the old rural individual to a folklorized representation of the Brazilian 
culture in which the rural is understood as more “authentic” than the urban, while erasing 
the complexities of the thinking of such individuals – reducing their time of exposure and 
guiding their presentations through the use of questions, as we could see in the 
transcriptions – in order for them to fit better the model of the “wise and simple rural 
folk.”103 
Furthermore, the forum audience is radically different: TV crews, international 
researchers, film makers. These breaks in indexical links results in other forms of legitimacy 
construction: the prophets (and their communities) see their pictures in the newspaper and 
their images on TV which translate into an ultimate recognition of authority. Repetitive 
contact with the media teaches them a different style of performance, changes the scope of 
their forecasting, and extends horizons for these individuals.  
Some indeed learn very fast how to navigate in this new environment. Chico Mariano 
is perhaps the most successful in calling the media’s attention (see picture 18). He loves 
controversy, and so do journalists. That can be seen, in the transcription that opened this 
section of this chapter, in his action of pointing to the FUNCEME meteorologist and saying 
“[ele] vai dar uma previsão, pro dia 23, aí como o rapaz falou, e ele vai encontrar previsões boas, e vocês 
mesmos que estão aqui, vão todos ter visto [He will issue their forecast on the 23rd, as he has told 
us (making reference to the Climate Outlook Forum to take place in Fortaleza), and he will 
                                                 
103 There are other events in the Brazilian calendar of popular festivals that provide evidence on what is been 
suggested here. For the urban population of the Brazilian southeast, the June Festivals - dedicated to Saint 
Anthony (June 13th), Saint John (June 24th), and Saint Peter (June 29th) – are less religious festivals and more a 
kind of a series of carnivalesque events in which individuals dress like “country bumpkins,” imitate the rural 
way of speaking in an exaggeration of what is perceived as the rural accent, and drink and eat traditional 
aliments from the interior. 
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uncover good forecasts (will forecast for good weather), and all of you here will have already 
been witness to it].” In saying this, Chico Mariano was forecasting a future meteorologists’ 
forecast: he was producing, in other words, a metaforecast. For reasons such as these, the 
southern media called him a “pop prophet”104. In his rhetoric, his powers extend not only to 
forecasting what science would say, but to other countries’ climate as well. On a separate 
occasion he declared: 
 
Se aquela americana que esteve me entrevistando me levasse pra Califórnia, eu poderia dar uma 
olhada no tempo deles. ... Esse pessoal da meteorologia só consegue prever o futuro do tempo uns 
2, 3 dias. Eu não. Eu faço as minhas pesquisas e experiências durante o ano todo, e quando 
chega uma altura, eu já posso dizer com certeza, se o inverno vai ser bom ou não, com bastante 
antecedência (Diário do Nordeste, September 18th, 2004c). 
 
If that American lady who interviewed me took me with her to California, I 
could take a shot at predicting their weather. … The meteorology personnel 
there can only predict the weather two, three days in advance. Not me. I do my 
research and observe things during the whole year, until I reach the point when I 
can say with certainty if the rainy season will be good or not, a considerable time 
in advance. 
 
 
                                                 
104 See Folha de S.Paulo, January 18th, 2004. 
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7. Regimenting Thinking About Climate [II]: Meteorologists Reunited in 
Fortaleza 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The annual Climate Outlook Forum, which during 2004 had its sixth meeting, is usually 
attended by researchers and technicians from meteorological agencies of the Brazilian 
Northeast (such as FUNCEME and meteorological offices from surrounding states), by 
researchers from other Brazilian climate institutions (such as INMET – the National 
Institute of Meteorology and CPTEC/INPE – the Center for Weather Forecast and Climate 
Studies - part of the National Institute for Spatial Research), and by international research 
institutions interested in the climate of the Northeast (most frequently the IRI - 
International Research Institute for Climate Prediction, Columbia University, and the United 
Kingdom Meteorology Office). The meeting takes place in rented conference rooms, in 
hotels located along the charming Beira Mar Avenue in Fortaleza, right in front of the ocean. 
Journalists are not invited to attend the main activities of the event. 
The meeting can be divided into three moments. The first two take place behind 
closed doors, and the third is when the forecast (as it is constructed during the previous two 
moments) is presented to the media. 
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The first moment consists basically of a presentation, by researchers and technicians 
from different institutions, of the forecasts obtained through the use of climate models and 
simulations developed by each institution for the approaching rainy season (picture 19). 
During these presentations, models are critiqued and hypotheses and technologies are tested 
by means of comparison, as is typically the case for applied science meetings. Many of the 
meteorologists present are professors at local universities and work for local meteorological 
agencies. This is because the meteorological field in Brazil is relatively small, generating 
overlap between university and governmental agencies. 
One important difference between this meeting and other scholarly reunions is the 
fact that the outcomes of the latter rarely have the same degree of visibility, or are 
accompanied by the same degree of anxiety, that marks the Climate Outlook Forums. 
Outside the walls of the auditorium in which the meeting takes place, the anxiety directed 
toward the awaited rainy season grows daily. The possibility of drought is a recurrent 
phantom, and the appearance and multiplication of forecasts of all types is a kind of social 
strategy to deal with such a historically justified collective anxiety crisis. Furthermore, as I 
mentioned in the previous chapters, forecasting proliferates as the dry season nears its end. 
This panorama, marked by excitement and anxiety, leads to an interesting 
transformation in the internal dynamics of the meeting. When the presentation of each 
institution’s results comes to an end, academic confrontations become cooperative, and all 
of the institutions unite in an effort to prepare a final report for the event, which contains 
only one final forecast, of consent among participants (picture 20). There is some 
coincidence between the forecasts of different institutions, especially when their models tend 
to be based upon similar principles. When the final report is issued, consensus is taken as 
one of its essential elements. Usually the final report does not contain the same degree of 
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detail as contained in the presentations of the first moment: it is through the simplification 
of more technical details that the construction of consensus takes place. The forecast is 
presented based on probabilities associated with three categories of possible rain fall: below 
historical average, historical average, and above historical average, and is divided by state sub-regions 
within which precipitation characteristics are more or less homogeneous. Historical average 
means the result of a calculation in which the total recorded precipitation during the rainy 
season, for each municipality, and for the whole historical records available, are added up, 
and then divided by the number of years for which data is available. For the coastal areas of 
Fortaleza, for instance, the historical average of precipitation between the months of 
February and May is 924.1 millimeters of rain105. If we add the month of January into the 
statistics, the average goes to 1,002.3 mm. For the Sertão Central area, where Quixadá is 
located, the historical average between February and May is 562.9 mm (reaching 623.8 when 
January is added). For the Jaguaribe Valley, these numbers are respectively 651.2 and 720.1 
mm106. Currently downscaling techniques are being developed, with the goal of increasing 
the spatial refinement of the forecast, from large regions to areas of around sixty square 
kilometers. 
The anxiety of meteorologists regarding the potential power of words is manifested in 
the construction of the final report of the event: long debates are directed towards the 
selection of the right words to represent intended ideas. Different linguistic possibilities are 
tested, and debated, in an attempt to minimize potential interpretation errors. Behind this 
lies the fear that small communication failures or misinterpretations can cause embarrassing 
                                                 
105 One millimeter of rain means one millimeter of precipitation per square meter, what is equivalent of number 
of liters per square meter. Therefore 924.1 millimeters in Fortaleza means that in the considered period it 
rained 924.1 liters per square meter. 
106 Source: FUNCEME, 2005. 
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political situations, not only for the state government, but also for meteorologists, who have 
to spend a great amount of energy in the constant re-legitimization of their professional 
activities in places like Ceará. In the 2004 meeting a meteorologist presented his results, and 
shared, with some degree of nervousness, an issue concerning what they were about to 
forecast:  
 
tá diferente mas não mudou … tá favorável a não atrapalhar… 
 
It is different (from previous meteorological conditions) but has not shifted… it 
will tend not to make things worse…. 
 
 
To which another meteorologists replies:  
 
‘Favorável a não atrapalhar’ é um abuso de linguagem só pra não dizer seca, o que é 
compreensível ... Como escrever isso aí vai ser uma coisa importante no exercício de hoje à tarde  
 
‘Tending not to make things worse’ is an abuse of language in order not to make 
explicit a reference to drought, which is understandable ... How to communicate 
this (in a written format) will be an important issue for this afternoon’s exercises. 
 
 
In a different presentation, another meteorologist presented his results and stated:  
 
Dá um frio na barriga ver isso, né? … é pra seco mesmo 
 
To see this gives us butterflies in the stomach, doesn’t it?… it seems that it 
indeed points toward dryness. 
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When discussing which terms should be used in order to communicate the forecast 
(that the first half of the rainy season would most likely be close to historical average, while 
the second half presented a tendency to be drier than the first half, which could have 
negative impacts on dryland agriculture), someone mentioned:  
 
Quando se fala ‘normal’, o agricultor já tem na cabeça que ele vai ter problema. 
 
When we say normal, a farmer already has in his mind that he is going to have 
problems. 
 
 
In one of the last presentations of 2004, the director of the National Institute of 
Meteorology stated: 
 
A previsão está ligada ao uso, à interpretação que se vai fazer dela, ou seja, à agricultura de 
sequeiro, aos recursos hídricos, à defesa civil. A linguagem da previsão vai muito do uso que se 
faz dela em si. A linguagem tem que ser modulada pelos casos mais sensíveis, e não para setores 
menos vulneráveis. ... Além disso, o ‘timing’ da previsão é importante, e em janeiro a chance de 
que se faça uso produtivo dela é maior. A qualidade da previsão depende de como trabalha o 
seu usuário. Se o sujeito plantou, não adianta a gente vir com uma nova previsão daqui a duas 
semanas! 
 
The forecast is linked to its usage, to the interpretation that will be made of it, 
that is, usage by dryland agriculture, by the water resources realm, or by civil 
defense activities. The language of the forecast will be defined by the usage made 
of it. The language used has to be modulated for the most sensitive cases, and 
not for the less vulnerable cases… Besides this, the ‘timing’ of the forecast is 
important, and in January the chance that real usage will be made of it is higher. 
The quality of the forecast depends on how its user uses it. If an individual has 
already planted, it does not really matter if we come up with a new forecast two 
weeks later! 
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During the 2005 meeting, after the consensus forecast was already constructed, a lively 
debate started around how to name the categories of rain, or the range of probabilities of 
intensity of rain. Some suggested the categories be called estação mais seca que o normal (drier 
than usual season), estação normal (normal season), and estação mais chuvosa que o normal (rainier 
than usual season) – for short, seca, normal e chuvosa. That immediately generated contrary 
reactions from individuals fearing that the word seca (which in Portuguese means both dry 
and drought, depending of how the phrase is constructed) could be either used maliciously by 
the media generating exaggerated and sensationalist manipulations, or just wrongly 
interpreted by journalists causing a drought to be announced. Others suggested the terms 
abaixo da media histórica (below historical average) instead of drier than usual, which would 
avoid the word seca all together, what they saw as positive, besides being more technically 
correct. Then it was pointed-out that the term “below historical average” is too technical and 
hard to understand, even by formally educated people. After a long discussion, it was 
decided that the forecasts would be announced in the following way: 
 
A previsão é de que o total de chuva esperado para ocorrer durante o período de fevereiro a maio 
de 2005, no estado do Ceará, fique com valores em torno da normal climatológica (media 
histórica) a abaixo desta.  
 
The forecast is that the total amount of rains expected to take place between 
February and May of 2005, in the state of Ceará, will stay around the 
climatological107 norm (historical average) or below it. 
 
 
Together with the forecast, the journalists would receive a table stating what the ranges 
that define these categories for each sub-area of the state are. The labels of the categories in 
                                                 
107 In the meteorological jargon, climatology means the statistical use of historical databases with data about 
precipitation. 
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the table were muito seco (very dry), seco (dry), normal (normal), chuvoso (rainy) and muito chuvoso 
(very rainy). Notice that the word seco, in its masculine variation, means dry but does not 
mean drought, as drought is referred to only by the feminine noun, seca. 
The head of the Ceará State Science and Technology Secretariat, Mr. Hélio Barros, in a 
speech that opened the 2004 Climate Outlook Forum, called participants’ attention to the 
delicate nature of what they were dealing with: 
 
Temos que ser cuidadosos na preparação do prognóstico, e precisão é necessária porque o 
trabalhador rural é exigente. Nós vivemos uma situação peculiar, na qual, quando distribuímos 
o prognóstico pelo estado, nós geramos um aumento na expectativa das populações locais, o que 
depois pode ser entendido como erro no prognóstico... O sucesso econômico do estado não virá da 
agricultura, o semi-árido não é muito produtivo. A equação fica difícil para os governantes. O 
PIB agrícola é caótico, apresentando variações imensas no tempo. Nós temos que criar 
alternativas fora da agricultura para a população do sertão. 
 
We need to be careful in the preparation of forecasts, and precision is necessary 
because the rural worker is demanding. We face a peculiar situation, in which, 
when we distribute the forecast throughout the state, at the same time we induce 
an increase in the local populations’ expectations, which can later be transformed 
into a perception of error in the forecast. … The state’s economic success will 
not come from agriculture; the semi-arid region is not very productive. The 
equation becomes a difficult one for policy makers. The agricultural GDP is 
chaotic, presenting huge variations over time. We have to create non-agricultural 
alternatives for the populations of the hinterland. 
 
 
The second part of this fragment shows how climate uncertainty affects high level 
policy makers. The impact of climate variation on the local economy and society generates a 
chain of vulnerabilities that affect distinct social groups differently, but that affect, one way 
or another, practically the whole population of the state. If some groups perceive their 
vulnerability as being based on issues of food security, others perceive it through the amount 
of expectation the rest of society directs towards them. It is therefore hard for high level 
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policy makers to match the responsibility level that society demands of them, in order to 
create effective strategies for coping with the economic impacts of climatic variations. 
As we can see, metapragmatic awareness, and the use of metapragmatic strategies is an 
integral part of how forecasts are produced and communicated. Once the report has been 
completed, the second moment of the forum reaches its end. 
The third moment of the meeting consists of a press conference in which the forecast 
is publicly announced. In Ceará this activity is coordinated by FUNCEME. Before the press 
conference begins, the forecasts is usually presented to the governor and to the heads of 
state secretariats related to areas usually affected by climate variations. Then the president of 
FUNCEME presents the forecast to a group of invited journalists from local newspapers 
and TV and radio stations. The form in which the press conference is organized is 
semiotically very interesting. During fieldwork I attended the press conferences of three 
sequential years – 2003 to 2005 -, and all presented similar features. I will analyze two events: 
the ones that took place at the end of 2002, and in early 2004. 
The first press conference attended took place on December 19th, 2002 (picture 21). 
The forecast pointed towards a tendency for rainfall below historical average. Besides journalists, 
also present at the press conference were the head of the Ceará State Rural Development 
Secretariat (SDR), the dean of the State University of Ceará (UECE), a director of the 
National Water Agency (ANA) and former president of FUNCEME, the general director of 
the International Research Institute for Climate Prediction (IRI), a researcher from the 
National Institute for Spatial Research (CPTEC/INPE), and the meteorology manager of 
FUNCEME. 
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Initially, the president of FUNCEME presented a sequence of slides with two clear 
objectives: besides communicating the forecast, the intention was also to seize the moment 
and educate the journalists present about the ways in which forecasts are produced and their 
basic characteristics, especially in relation to their probabilistic nature. 
After the presentation, the authorities present in the auditorium were called to the 
table and invited to make speeches. The first speech was delivered by the head of the Ceará 
State Rural Development Secretariat, who announced that selected seeds would be 
distributed at the proper moment, and that the government, with support from science, 
would do whatever it could to reduce the possible negative impacts resulting from scarce 
rainfall. He then announced the creation of a harvest insurance for dryland producers, in 
which farmers would pay the amount of R$ 6 (around US$ 2), and in the event that over 
60% of their fields be lost, they would receive six monthly instalments of R$ 100 (US$ 33), 
corresponding at the time to around 40% of the national monthly minimum wage. 
After the government official finished his speech, journalists began to leave the 
auditorium without displaying any trace of ceremony, despite the presence of local and 
national authorities, and started setting up their television apparatus in the gardens of the 
institution. FUNCEME’s president followed them, and for the next hour he was interviewed 
by the TV crews present, and by radio and newspaper journalists. Besides announcing the 
forecast, he advised that since the conditions of the Pacific Ocean could change in the near 
future, the population should keep monitoring for periodic updates in the forecast. That 
evening he was on every news program on television, and the next day printed media 
repeated his words verbatim, conserving his formal style of technical language. This was 
considered a sign of success for the local meteorological group, since there was no 
sensationalistic use of the forecast.  
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Indeed the presence of El Niño in the tropical Pacific Ocean dissipated at the end of 
2002, and on February 25th, 2003, FUNCEME was required to issue a new forecast, 
announcing that the rainy season would most likely fall inside the category of historical average 
rainfalls. And so it happened, causing local producers to consider the rainy season a good 
one; it even generated a record production of grains in Ceará’s agricultural history. A few 
producers from the south of the state manifested their discontent concerning the first 
forecast, arguing that it caused them to lose the chance of getting two harvests. It seems 
clear that the record agricultural production for Ceará occurred largely because the majority 
of producers did not apply the first forecast to their activities. 
In order to avoid these situations in which changes in the indicators used in the 
elaboration of predictions invalidate early forecasts, the following Annual Climate Outlook 
Forum was postponed until late-January. Besides the usual activities, a session of debates 
with potential users of climate information was also included, in which some dryland 
producers, irrigators, the president of EMATERCE, the president of the Federation of 
Agriculture of the State of Ceará and some water committee members from the Jaguaribe 
and Curu Valleys participated. 
The press release followed the users’ debate with a table composed of the president of 
COGERH, the general coordinator of CPTEC/INPE, the head of the Water Resources 
Secretariat of Ceará, the president of FUNCEME, and the director general of INMET, who 
is a former director of IRI (picture 22). Even though this forum, as I mentioned previously, 
was conducted while torrential rains were falling outside, the forecast pointed towards the 
likelihood of a rainy season that would become dryer towards its end (figure 7 in appendix 1). 
Both the head of the Water Resources Secretariat and the president of COGERH repeated 
the same idea in their speeches: that due to the current and extremely abundant rains in 
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January, most reservoirs of the state were full, and the state was therefore in a comfortable 
situation with regard to demand from the most important water consumption centers of the 
state (of which the metropolitan area of Fortaleza is the most important). These forecast 
declarations were made only one day after the first dam overflowed in Ceará, while others 
were being rapidly filled by the high flow caused by the intense rains of the previous ten 
days108. Ceará was, at the time, prepared for up to two years without rains, due to the amount 
of stored water, as was repeated by the president of COGERH in the following days. During 
the same rainy season, the number of reservoirs that bled reached ninety-five of the one 
hundred and twenty-three reservoirs managed by COGERH109.  
 
Metapragmatic strategies in press conferences: dancing in the semiotic ball 
The composition of the group of people sitting on the main table during the press 
conferences of both forums is worthy of analysis. Although organizers deny the event is 
planned in order to induce specific interpretations of the message communicated110, some 
elements seem to be relatively clear in terms of the ways in which symbols are combined. 
The first thing that calls the observer’s attention is that the heads of the secretariat 
under which FUNCEME sits in the bureaucratic structure of the state are not present, but 
rather the heads of other secretariats are; specifically those more affected or politically 
related to the implications of the forecasting. For instance in the forum of December 2002, 
although FUNCEME at the time sat under the Water Resources Secretariat, the official 
present at the forum was instead the head of the Rural Development Secretariat – who was 
                                                 
108 See O Povo, January 22nd, 2004. 
109 See O Povo, June 16th, 2004. 
110 Some even calling me Machiavellian just for having implied this in my questioning. 
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ready to announce their harvest insurance plan at the same time as the forecast for a drier 
than usual season was announced. In January 2004, when FUNCEME sat under the State 
Science and Technology Secretariat (a shift that occurred in 2003), it was instead the head of 
the Water Resources Secretariat who was present at the press conference and who, together 
with the president of COGERH, announced a record level of water storage for the state, at 
the same time that the announced forecast indicated a tendency towards a drier end of 
season. In both cases, a clear message to be sent to the population was that the top levels of 
state government are concerned with climate issues and are present at climate discussions. 
The presence of a different secretariat representative, other than the one who oversees 
FUNCEME, may also indicate an integration of distinct government sectors. In both cases, 
the metonymic association between the forecast and the secondary announcements (harvest 
insurance or record levels of water storage) seemed to have the goal of diluting the 
potentially negative character of the forecast. 
The dean of the state university was not among the authorities sitting on the directive 
table, but his presence in the auditorium has some degree of importance in the sense that 
FUNCEME officials have an explicit goal of presenting the institution as being research 
focused rather than being a policy making or political apparatus. Many signs of contact 
between the university and FUNCEME (many FUNCEME technicians are professors at 
local universities) reinforce the above idea that the institution uses scientific insulation as 
protection from external attempts to manipulate forecasts for political ends. 
The presence of the director general of IRI, as well as of one of the main researchers 
in the area of climate at the National Institute for Spatial Research (which is located in the 
southern state of São Paulo and is seen as a national center for the production of cutting 
edge technology) confers a degree of authority to the forecast; an authority that is grounded 
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in elements that extrapolate the limits of the state of Ceará and are connected to the main 
centers of technological production, not only in the nation but also worldwide, such as 
INPE in São Paulo and IRI in New York (in 2004, the presence of INMET, from the 
national capital city of Brasília, had the same effect). This is an important element in the local 
social battles for authority. Besides making use of local stereotypes concerning modernity 
and technological sophistication linked to southern Brazil or to the “developed world” 
(represented by the international institutions), it also provides a great deal of protection 
against attempts to manipulate the forecast by local politicians, something that appears 
frequently in the literature on the use of climate information in Ceará111. According to Lemos 
et al: 
 
Ceará provided an example of policy makers attempting to use climate forecast 
products to legitimate their power positions, that is, to suggest in public 
discourse that Science could be made the handmaiden of policy making. In this 
politically charged environment, technocrats rely on scientific information about 
climate to insulate policymaking from both political 'meddling' and public 
accountability. Policymakers, in other words, look for a technocratic 
policymaking model - defined as the pursuit of a policymaking process grounded 
on technical and scientific knowledge, rationality, efficiency, and autonomy - that 
isolate Decision-making from outside interference (1999, p. 9). 
 
 
Orlove and Tosteson make reference to a different, and much more direct, kind of 
manipulation: 
 
In 1992, [FUNCEME] offered a false negative forecast of drought for 1993, 
predicting normal rains that did not materialize. Individuals close to FUNCEME 
in that year state that the agency’s climate forecast division had argued that 
                                                 
111 França Júnior, 2003, and Carvalho, 1987, denounce the already mentioned fact that a forecast pointing 
towards a multi-year drought issued by CTA, issued in 1979 (the first year of a drought that extended to 1983) 
was “filed” by the national authorities, who considered it “artificially alarming” and a menace for the “good 
image of the region.” 
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precipitation would be well below normal, but that top officials were concerned 
that a second drought forecast would create a political situation unfavorable to 
the current state governor, up for reelection in that year. Though other factors, 
such as the inherent uncertainty in all forecasts, may also have operated, this 
account seems plausible (1999, p. 14)112. 
 
 
In any case, the way the forecast is presented as being authored by not only local but 
also national and international institutions makes it, in a sense, “bigger than Ceará,” and 
poses difficulties for local attempts to make indiscriminate use of it, from state governors to 
local politicians. During the 2005 press conference, for instance, the first slide of the 
presentation had only the logo of FUNCEME in the top right corner, the words “Climate 
Forecast for 2005” centralized on the screen, and right below the list of institutions 
“backing” the forecast: FUNCEME/INMET/INPE/IRI/UK Met Office (see picture 23). 
Also, in the 2004 forum, the press conference had a special explicit message: for the 
first time in recent history, INMET and CPTEC/INPE, two institutions considered to be 
rivals, were participating in the same meeting and issuing the forecast as part of a team. What 
seems to be clear here is an attempt to maximize the authority of their forecast through the 
regimentation of the number of forecasts available to the public. Even if meteorological 
agencies can not do this for all forecasting types, they successfully managed to do it for 
scientific forecasts. In this way, there can be no public disagreement among official 
meteorological institutions, once the general public (not having been trained to comprehend 
the details of meteorological models) press for better and more trustworthy forecasts and 
                                                 
112 I followed up this case in order to understand what happened in detail. Indeed, the conditions of the Pacific 
and Atlantic Oceans at the end of 1992 pointed to a normal rainy season, when the forecast was issued. A 
couple of months later, already in 1993, the waters of the Pacific started to get warmer, and that created the 
need for a new forecast, this time pointing towards the high probability of drought. Individuals who 
participated in the whole process in 1993 told me that officials linked to the then governor ordered 
FUNCEME meteorologists not to issue a new forecast, due to the reasons pointed out by Orlove and 
Tosteson. Later FUNCEME had to stand accusations of failure and incompetence. 
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punish agencies by discrediting them; this is something that occurs disproportionately to the 
success rates of scientific forecasts, once success is invisible and failure is usually over-
emphasized. An occurrence in 2004 provided explicit evidence of this strategy: one 
meteorologist who could not attend the first day of the meeting, and therefore who did not 
participate in the collective construction of the official forecast, arrived in the middle of the 
press conference and decided to manifest her personal opinions regarding the up and 
coming rainy season, something that prompted an immediate and energetic contrary reaction 
both from the head of the Water Resources Secretariat and from the general coordinator of 
CPTEC/INPE. She was, by so doing, offending an underlying agreed strategy of not 
displaying public discordance - let alone during a press conference.  
This symbolic organization of the climate forecast announcement, even if more often 
than not carried out in an intuitive and not an explicitly debated manner, forms part of a 
strategy for legitimacy construction for scientific climate forecasting in Ceará’s social 
universe. Meteorological agencies do not only need to produce forecasts that are perceived 
as “right,” they need to educate journalists and the population in general about the technical 
specificities of forecasting (such as the non-consideration of pre-season rains for the start of 
a season, something that the population either don’t know or systematically does not take 
into account when judging the quality of forecasts), and also to create a symbolic context in 
which the potentially disastrous power of forecasts is controlled. 
The local newspaper O Povo, nevertheless, complained about what was seen as an 
ambiguous and “elastic” forecast for 2004, noticing also that FUNCEME had issued three 
different forecasts in the previous year, none of them providing a precise prediction:  
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O Povo, 24 de janeiro de 2004 
ABAIXO OU NA MÉDIA 
Prognóstico de chuvas para 2004 é impreciso 
O período invernoso do Estado pode ter chuvas na média ou abaixo disso. Mas em uma 
previsão elástica, a Funceme afirma poder ocorrer períodos sem precipitação e não descarta 
extremos de chuva localizada. Técnicos dizem que as últimas chuvas são resultado de uma 
frente fria. Um açude já sangra e o nível dos reservatórios do Estado está próximo do verificado 
em 2003, ano para o qual a Funceme fez três prognósticos para a quadra chuvosa. 
''Como a previsão é de chuvas em torno da média histórica a abaixo dessa média, poderão 
ocorrer veranicos acentuados, não se descartando também a possibilidade de ocorrência de eventos 
extremos de chuva localizada''. É o que apresentam as considerações finais da tendência 
climática para o período invernoso, de fevereiro a maio, divulgado ontem em entrevista coletiva 
no encerramento de um encontro de avaliação climática para o semi-árido nordestino.  
A previsão bastante elástica é resultado da dificuldade de se fazer um prognóstico, de acordo 
com técnicos da Fundação Cearense de Meteorologia e Recursos Hídricos (Funceme), do Centro 
de Previsão de Tempo e Estudos Climáticos do Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais 
(Cptec/Inpe) e do Instituto Nacional de Meteorologia (Inmet).  
(...) 
Prognósticos em 2003 
Os prognósticos de quadra chuvosa, como quaisquer previsões, podem não se realizar. Para o 
ano passado, a Funceme fez três prognósticos para o período, em dezembro de 2002, em janeiro 
e fevereiro de 2003. Em cada apresentação, uma previsão diferente:  
20 de dezembro de 2002 - A Funceme diz que o inverno ficará abaixo da média. O fenômeno 
El Niño é apontado como a principal causa do provável inverno de chuvas poucas e irregulares 
previstas entre as regiões do Estado.  
24 de janeiro de 2003 - Segundo o órgão de meteorologia, o El Niño enfraquecido pode 
garantir boas chuvas no Ceará, mas a tendência a chuvas abaixo da média é mantido.  
27 de fevereiro de 2003 - Muda o quadro apresentado pela Funceme, que prevê inverno normal 
no Ceará. A tendência agora é que o Estado tenha chuvas dentro da categoria considerada 
''normal''.  
28 de março de 2003 - Em reportagem de O POVO, o presidente da Funceme, Francisco de 
Assis de Souza Filho, avalia a quadra chuvosa de 2003 como uma das melhores das últimas 
décadas. 
 
O Povo, January 24th, 2004 
BELOW OR AVERAGE 
The 2004 Rain Forecast Is Imprecise 
The winter season in the state may have average or below rain falls. But in their 
elastic forecast, Funceme affirms that periods of no precipitation may occur, and 
does not disregard the chance of localized and extreme rain falls. Technicians say 
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that the last rains that fell were due to a cold front. One dam is now overflowing, 
and the water levels in the state reservoirs is close to what they were in 2003, a 
year for which Funceme issued three forecasts for the rainy season. 
“With a rain forecast indicating falls around historical average or below that 
average, there may be accentuated dry-spells, also localized events of extreme 
precipitation are not being disregarded.” These are the final announcements 
concerning the tendencies for the winter period, from February to May, divulged 
yesterday at a press conference at the end of a meeting for climate evaluation in 
the northeastern semi-arid region. 
This very elastic forecast is the result of the difficulty in elaborating a prognostic 
according to technicians from the Ceará Foundation for Meteorology and Water 
Resources (Funceme), from the Center for Weather Forecast and Climate Studies 
of the National Institute for Spatial Research (Cptec/Inpe), and from the 
National Meteorology Institute (Inmet). 
(…) 
Prognostics for 2003 
The prognostic for the rainy season, as with any forecast, may not take place as 
such. Last year Funceme issued three forecasts for the same period, in December 
2002, in January and in February 2003. In each announcement, a different 
forecast was given: 
December 20th, 2002: Funceme announces that the winter months will receive 
below average rains. The El Niño has been singled out as the main cause of a 
probable winter with few and irregular rains forecasted to fall in the state region. 
January 24th, 2003: According to the meteorology institution, the weakened El 
Niño could promise good rains for Ceará, but a tendency for below average rain 
falls is still being maintained. 
February 27th, 2003: The forecasts presented by Funceme have changed, and a 
normal winter is forecasted for Ceará. The tendency for state rains now sits 
inside the category of “normal”. 
March 28th, 2004: In a report give by O Povo, Funceme president, Francisco de 
Assis de Souza Filho, evaluates that the 2003 rainy season has been one of the 
best in the last few decades. 
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8. Scapegoating the oracle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recreating indexical links, slipping in polysemic territory 
Over the years, the leading meteorologists at FUNCEME grew discontent with the cycle of 
anxiety, repeated year after year, related to the media coverage of the forecast. In the last 
three years, a new strategy was adopted: to participate with more intensity in events 
organized by potential users of climate forecasts throughout the state. That includes 
participating in meetings dedicated to the rain prophets, or organized by water committees, 
rural unions and associations, municipal governmental institutions, and even schools. 
Namir Giovani da Silva Mello is one of the meteorologists of the institution who 
participates more intensely in the communication of the forecasts. As we saw earlier, he was 
FUNCEME’s representative in the 2005 rain prophets meeting, and he has been attending 
such meetings since they started being held in 1997. He is also someone who appears 
repeatedly on television and in newspapers and, as a result, people recognize him on the 
streets. Namir told me that on several occasions, in the last ten years, he avoided public 
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spaces in order not to be victim of verbal abuse and ridicule, especially when shortlived 
weather events cause in the population the feeling that the climate forecast was wrong113.  
After having participated in several meetings, of a different nature and in different 
places, Namir developed some strategies for increasing the efficiency of his presentations. 
He picks his clothes according to the audience he believes will be present, trying not to look 
too formal or “too urban.” He tries to reduce the intensity of the use of technical jargon in 
such events (with varying degrees of success, as we will see in a moment). He realized that 
mentioning the fact that he was born into a family of farmers and grew up in a rural area, in 
southern Brazil, often changes the attitude of the audience, especially when the presentation 
is made to the local rural population. And he developed a way of framing his discourse so as 
not to counterpose religion and science: only God is able to know with total certainty the 
facts of climate. Science can only give probabilities. But science is also a gift from God. All 
this shows a remarkable sensitivity towards the metapragmatic aspects of communication, 
especially regarding the way things not strictly linked to the content of the forecast, but to its 
form – in this case, the appearance, behavior and perceived family profile of the person who 
communicates it – affect the way meaning is constructed and message is understood, as 
some things that appear to be only details (language, clothes, styles of behavior) are in fact 
indicators that position the individual in the social world, in the perception of the audience, 
in the background of the ensemble of texts and genres we discussed in previous chapters.  
                                                 
113 The climate forecast refers to the accumulated rains for the whole season. That means that it can rain many 
times even when a drought was forecasted, since the forecast talks about the general accumulated rains after the 
end of the season. Nevertheless, when droughts are forecasted and it rains in the state, the population usually 
interprets that as a mistake in the forecast. Meteorologists differentiate weather – that is, short term events, like 
the weather reports that inform if it will rain or not in the following five days -, from climate – long term events, 
like a drought or a rainy season as a whole. 
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On February 5th, 2004, Namir delivered a presentation at a meeting for the Water 
Committee of the Metropolitan Basins, in which the forecast was announced and basic 
climatic principles that regulate rain in the Northeast were presented. The verbal interchange 
between individuals in the auditorium and the meteorologist contains several revealing 
features of how the general public relates to how forecasts are issued. Below, we present 
some fragments of the transcription of that meeting (a larger fragment can be found in 
appendix B): 
 
Presidente do comitê: eu tenho visto muito na região, aquele negócio, “a FUNCEME não 
disse nem sim, nem não, nem muito pelo contrário”, que é esse negócio do inverno normal, né? 
Então, seria muito importante, não só para essa audiência que está aqui, que é uma audiência 
bastante eclética e que reúne basicamente todos os 30 municípios da região aqui metropolitana 
(refere-se à região denominada Bacias Metropolitanas, que é mais extensa que a região 
metropolitana de Fortaleza), que fosse bastante explicado pela FUNCEME o que é 
“normal”, porque às vezes a pessoa pensa que não vai ser um ano nem muito seco nem vai seu 
um ano muito chuvoso, um ano normal, mas o que é isso, isso tem que ser traduzido para a 
população, a população não está entendendo, porque diz assim, “rapaz, mais uma vez a 
FUNCEME errou”, eu to ouvindo comentário por aí, tá certo? (...) Mas eu gostaria que você 
colocasse esta posição mais didaticamente, ok? 
Namir: O que significa normal? Cada posto pluviométrico, cada município, tem a sua série 
histórica. ... Cada posto vai ter o seu muito seco, o seu seco, normal, chuvoso e muito chuvoso. E 
aí a gente faz uma média por região. Então tem um posto em Tauá que (a média) é 400 
milímetros, e um posto em Ibiapina que é mais de 1200 milímetros. Então o normal para 
Tauá é 400 milímetros, e o normal para Ibiapina é 1200 milímetros, então nós fizemos um 
mapa com a distribuição destas chuvas, o que significa ser o normal, que é uma categoria, que 
tem um limite inferior e um limite superior, o normal pra Tauá é de 400 a 500, o normal pra 
Ibiapina é de 1100 a 1300, então esse mapa é divulgado junto com a previsão para que as 
pessoas saibam... ou uma tabelinha também... para que as pessoas saibam o que é o normal 
para a sua região. 
(...) 
Voz feminina: Todo ano chove o normal? O que é o “normal”? Isso não ficou bem... 
Namir: O normal é uma média histórica. Numa média histórica, você soma todos os janeiros, 
por exemplo, e faz a média. Você soma 30 janeiros, divide, e então você tem um valor 
normalizado. De ano a ano, você vai ter ou acima do normal ou abaixo do normal, abaixo do 
normal é um ano seco, e acima do normal é um ano chuvoso. 
Voz feminina: então 400 milímetros em Tauá é “normal”, todos os janeiros...  
Namir: esse é um valor de referência... é uma média histórica... 
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 (...) 
Voz masculina: ... Os municípios não tem um prognóstico; o pessoal da cidade tem, mas para 
os municípios o prognóstico não funciona. Precisa de estudo mais apurado, de uma certeza 
maior do tempo. Uma pergunta: houve alguma alteração com relação à estrutura, nós queremos 
saber... o que entrou com relação a equipamentos de última geração, dentro da FUNCEME, 
pra dar à FUNCEME a possibilidade de uma precisão maior, e um monitoramento maior. 
E o que não entrou, o que é que a FUNCEME precisa, e o que é que vai custar isso ao 
governo do estado.  
(...) 
 
Committee president: In this region I have been witnessing [people saying] 
“FUNCEME did not say yes or no, nor the opposed” [using a Brazilian joke 
about peoples’ evasiveness] about this idea of a normal winter, right? So, it is very 
important, not only for this auditory, which is a very diverse audience that unites 
basically all 30 municipalities of the metropolitan basins region (he is referring to 
the area called Metropolitan Basins, which is larger than the Fortaleza 
metropolitan area), that FUNCEME explain what is normal, because sometimes a 
person thinks that it is not going to be too dry nor too rainy, a normal year, but 
what exactly is that? This should be translated to the general public, who are not 
understanding it, and then we hear comments such as “man, FUNCEME got it 
wrong again,” I am hearing this kind of thing around, ok? (…) But I wanted you 
to explain this idea in a more didactic way, ok? 
Namir: What does normal mean? Each pluviometric station, each municipality, 
has a historical series… Each station has a category of very dry, dry, normal, rainy 
and very rainy. We then calculate the average per region. For instance there is a 
station in the municipality of Tauá that has an average of 400 millimeters (per 
year), and a station in the municipality of Ibiapina that has an average of over 
1200 millimeters. Then the normal for Tauá is 400 millimeters, and the normal for 
Ibiapina is 1200 millimeters, and with this we made a map with the distribution 
of these rains. Normal is a category that has a range with inferior and superior 
limits, the normal for Tauá is between 400 and 500, the normal for Ibiapina is 
between 1100 and 1300, so this map is released together with the forecast to the 
public … or maybe a little table as well… so that people will know what the 
normal is for their region.  
(…) 
Feminine voice: Do we have normal rain falls every year? What does normal mean? 
That part is not clear… 
Namir: The normal is the historical average. For a historical average, you add up 
all precipitation records for January, divide, and then you have the normalized 
value. So every year, you will have above or below normal, below meaning a dry year, 
and above meaning a rainy year. 
Feminine voice: Then 400 millimeters in Tauá is normal, for every January… 
Namir: That is the reference value… it is the historical average… 
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 (…) 
Masculine voice: … The municipalities don’t have forecasts. The city people 
have forecasts, but the forecasts don’t function for the (hinterland) municipalities. 
There is a need for more accurate studies, certainly over a more extended time-
frame. A question for you: has there been any change in relation to infrastructure, 
we are curious… what has been upgraded at FUNCEME in terms of latest 
technology, in order to give FUNCEME the capacity for improved precision, or 
for improved monitoring? And what is still needed, and how much will it cost 
the state? 
(…) 
 
 
At a specific point in the dialogue, after being repeatedly questioned about the degree 
of forecast precision, Namir stated that “only God is infallible.” 
As perceived by FUNCEME meteorologists, the direct verbal interchange with 
potential users of climate information enables the communication to be incomparably richer 
than the communication through the media. This is true specifically in the case we just saw 
above because we have an audience composed in its majority by municipal technicians and 
representatives of institutions of the local civil society with a profile that is different than 
that of the average poor rural farmer. As became evident through the questions people direct 
to Namir, the focus of attention was indeed the technicality of concepts and the difficult 
understanding of the meteorological jargon. 
As we can see, forecasting is structured around a concept – historical average 
precipitation – that is a statistical construct. Although there are tables of historical 
precipitation records per municipality on FUNCEME’s webpage, and often – as in the 2005 
forecast - such tables accompany forecasts sent to the press, during more than three years in 
which I have followed press coverage of climate issues in Ceará, I have never seen these 
tables published in newspapers alongside the forecast. Even if they were to be published, 
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few producers would make sense of number abstractions such as 400 mm of accumulated 
precipitation. Also, for large municipalities that have high spatial climatic variability within 
the region, the use of data collected from just one meteorological station can be troublesome. 
This means that precipitation levels in areas immediately surrounding the meteorological 
stations are quite often different from those in its more distant rural districts. For instance, 
according to Maurício de Oliveira, a technician from the municipality of Iracema, the 
proximity of that area to the Apodi Hills creates a multiplicity of different precipitation 
patterns inside the borders of the main municipality, which means that some rural areas 
present precipitation patterns that are very different to those close to the meteorological 
station.  
However, more importantly, using the idea of (statistical) “average” as the guiding 
principle to inform the public about rainfall could only work if the public’s perception of 
precipitation was not affected in any way by wishful thinking114, or by other aspects of what 
economists and psychologists call bounded rationality (Kahneman, 2002). But as we saw in the 
case of the rain prophets, in general, the population tends to have subjective appreciations of 
the upcoming season strongly marked by hope and positive expectation. The meaning of 
“average” tends to be strongly affected by such patterns of perception, distancing itself from 
what is obtained through statistical calculations.  
Additionaly, since most of the population, who depend on rains for subsistence, 
measure the quality of a season by production output rather than by precipitation levels (a 
phenomenon that has also been observed by researchers in other parts of the world – see 
Roncoli et al., 2001), they may intuitively take “average” to mean something different than 
                                                 
114 And as I have been arguing throughout this text, wishful thinking is a central theme in local genres related to 
climate. 
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what it really is. Between the statistical indications of a wet season (such as the amount of 
accumulated precipitation used in forecasting) and production output, there are many 
complex requirements and bottlenecks linked to the agricultural field. The situation is made 
complex because rains have to be more or less homogeneously distributed over time, 
without dry spells, and for periods long enough to sustain crops. The pre-season rains of 
2004, for example, were over 300% above the historical average for that month and 
devastated agricultural fields throughout the whole state. This was followed by seasonal rains 
below historical average. Together, these variables caused a green drought, because even 
though the volume of accumulated rains was high, the agricultural conditions were not good 
and therefore agricultural yields were very low115.  
Meteorologists of the region know their forecasts cannot reach that degree of detail. 
However, within the set of current possibilities the problem lies in the more or less loose use 
of the words normal and average, which have different meanings in different situations, and 
which induce distinct readings by different actors. When accused of incompetence or 
imprecision, meteorology becomes a victim of the use of polysemic terminology within a 
socio-political situation that requires semantic precision, but that instead exists in an 
environment with little communicational efficiency.  
 
Entrapped by the myth of certainty 
Science and tradition have different ways of understanding semiotic links between different 
elements, and this is implicated in their use of distinct categorization schemes. Rural peoples 
tend to think about the climate through the categories of sky and earth: with earth being 
                                                 
115 See Diário do Nordeste, June 7th, 2004. 
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related to the well-being of animals, plants and people and sky being related to atmosphere 
and space (rain, stars, sun) and to metaphysical elements. In Portuguese, although there is a 
distinct word for heaven (paraíso), sky (céu) is also frequently used to refer to the place of 
God. Through the careful reading of natural cycles, knowledgeable individuals mathematize 
divine will and attempt to model the metrics of climate. In this we can see some similarity to 
meteorological work. Often, such mathematization can also be seen in forecasting that is 
transformed into popular poetry.  
Naturally, the scientific community tends to work in a considerably different way. 
While rain prophets usually look up, meteorologists usually look down, analyzing satellite 
images and diagrams of sea surface temperatures that represent continents as if they were 
seen from space (as in figures 2 to 4). However, the use of scientific concepts does not 
prevent wishful thinking also on the part of scientists. The level of expectation in the 
scientific community in relation to the potential gains from the development of better 
climate models of the El Niño proved to be very unrealistic, as pointed out by many authors 
(Glantz, 1979; Lemos et al., 1999; Broad, Pfaff and Glantz, 2002). Since a great deal of 
poverty and hunger around the globe is, in one way or another, linked to climate events, the 
advances in capability to predict some of these events led sectors of the scientific community 
to believe that, in a short period, great contingents of people would have their living 
standards dramatically increased. Several factors that impose difficulties in the local 
application of climate information prevented such a thing from happening, and this caused 
climate related institutions like NOAA to dedicate funding and research efforts in order to 
understand the problems related to the use of climate information. For scientists and non-
scientists alike, it is indeed very difficult to deal with the idea of uncertainty. As we can see 
from the examples mentioned in the text transcribed above, as the people see it, if certainty 
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is not in God’s will then it should be provided by the potency of computers and 
mathematical models. 
Even though it is important to mention that religion is not the only narrative linked to 
climate for the poor rural population of Ceará, it is clear that the link between rain, 
agricultural production, subsistence and vulnerability and help from “above” – as is implied 
many times in governmental rhetoric concerning the use of climate information in 
contingency activities – undoubtedly trigger the continued association between climate, 
clientalism, and religion. Such anchoring of concepts is much older and more solidly 
established in local genres and mind frames; they are more deeply index-linked to the socio-
political reality of rural populations, than are new technical and bureaucratic forms of 
relationships with the environment that seem to be abstracted and detached from the rural 
world. 
Local genres and mind frames concerning climate may be old, but their visibility 
remains high, due to everlasting, unresolved and tense relations between sociopolitical 
structures, resources, production, and climate, in a way that climate is not incorporated into 
the realm of the invisible, or taken for granted (doxa). At the same time, there is no possible 
regimentation strategy for local narratives concerning climate that can be applied to the 
whole gamet of rural individuals, and because of this, climate remains an open field in 
defiance of regimenting efforts by the central government. As we will see in an upcoming 
chapter, the situation is different for narratives concerning water allocation because the 
number of irrigators is incomparably smaller than the number of dryland producers; in fact, 
small enough to enable the government to create institutionalized processes and networks 
that extend to practically every water user in the Jaguaribe Valley.  
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The external observer is impressed with the degree of social pressure heaped upon the 
shoulders of meteorology, not only from rural producers, but also from the media, the urban 
population and the government. This high level of pressure stems from another form of 
semiotic regimentation that takes place: the already mentioned discourse of the naturalization 
of misery, that is, a situation in which the extreme poverty of Ceará’s rural population is solely 
related to climate events. This is an old narrative, already hyper-criticized in the academic 
realm, but that still exists as a distinctive trace in the collective imagination and in official 
discourse concerning drought. The contiguity of drought or flooding, and their accompanied 
peaks of social suffering, lead people to see the first as the immediate cause of the second. 
However, something to which little attention is given is that climate is not the only 
determining factor of rural hunger and misery, but that other elements also play a crucial role 
in these extreme conditions, such as specific socio-political arrangements – mainly the 
extreme concentration of fertile land and water - that prevent poor sectors from increasing 
their means of survival and reducing their vulnerability towards climate variations. When the 
lack of rain is presented as the sole cause for poverty – something we also find manifest in 
many forms of popular culture, such as in some of the poems transcribed above – the role 
of excluding social structures, which have developed throughout history, goes unchecked 
and therefore remains invisible. Climate is made the villain, and meteorology, acting as the 
oracle responsible for forecasting abundance or misery, then receives a great deal of the 
collective anxiety that revolves around climate phenomena. (Almost like the already 
mentioned case of Pedro Nogueira de Lima, accused of being responsible for drought in his 
community.)  
At the same time, as I mentioned already, researchers like Finan and Nelson (2001), 
Lemos et al. (1999, 2002), and Roncoli et al. (2001), among others, have shown how the very 
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poorest strata of the rural population are usually those who cannot make effective use of the 
forecasts, because of, among other things, their lack of minimum infrastructure and 
resources. Höeynck, for example, states that “economically, the subsistence-oriented 
production system is stagnant – or even recessive considering ecological constraints – since 
there is no range of decisions to optimize on-farm resource allocation and to invest in 
technical progress” (2003, p. 387). This means that, even if forecasting managed to 
incorporate all characteristics desired by rural farmers, and within the current socio-political 
context a drought was forecasted “perfectly,” the most vulnerable sectors of the local 
population would still not be able to effectively adapt to the situation, and would remain 
dependent, as usual, on local clientalistic support and governmental contingency efforts.  
An important aspect of the issue at hand refers to the fact that the results of 
meteorological work sit inside a field of representations in which certainty verses uncertainty is 
represented as either possession, or not, of knowledge and power, without nuances and 
gradations. In the religious version of this discourse, climate is seen as forming part of a 
morally ordered and predictable universe, in which there is a metaphysical reason for 
suffering caused by collective crises, and therefore what is uncertain on a first level (in this 
case climate) reflects, even if of difficult interpretation, a (divine) absolute and just will. 
Religious narratives function as semiotic operators that give certainty to the uncertain and 
give the appearance of being definite to the probable. Politics is also a field in which the 
uncertain is presented as certain, and in which ambiguity is constructed and deconstructed 
according to the moment’s needs. Politics and religion are fields in which protection is the 
currency in a highly emotionally charged symbolic market. Within this environment there is 
no way in which meteorology can act effectively. And because of this, once again, 
meteorology becomes the perfect victim for symbolic sacrifice – that is, to have its public 
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image recurrently severely damaged - now due to the symbolic outcome of this hybrid genre 
of thought and action created by the interplay between local politics and religious discourses. 
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9. Water Allocation in the Jaguaribe Valley 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Historical and political background  
In 1986, as already mentioned, an important political transformation occurred in Ceará. For 
the first time, political groups that were historically linked to rural oligarchies lost the state 
elections to a new group of young industrialists, congregated around the CIC, or the 
Industrial Center of Ceará. Economic development by means of rational and efficient public 
management became the central theme for the new group in power, and incentives were 
created to attract economic progress to the state. In 1987, the State Water Resources 
Secretariat (SRH) was created, with departments including the already existing FUNCEME, 
and COGERH (Company for the Management of Water Resources); this newly-created state 
water agency was formed in part to help compensate for the financially weakened DNOCS. 
When the young industrialists took office in 1987, headed by Tasso Jereissati, they 
reformed the structures of government agencies, creating for the first time the State 
Secretariat for Water Resources. This was also accompanied by the establishment of a group 
of engineers and university professors, organized around the Hydraulic Engineering 
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Department of the Federal University of Ceará, and the Brazilian Association for Water 
Resources (ABRH), within the top levels of state government. This group was in contact 
with the main centers of research for water management in Brazil116, and abroad117. In the 
mid 1980’s, this group also attended international conferences that promoted basic 
guidelines for decentralized participatory water management. 
This group of engineers had previously been working in water resources 
management for the state of Ceará as consultants hired by the government through the 
Infrastructure Secretariat. When the Water Resources Secretariat was created, during the first 
term of Tasso Jereissati’s government, the leaders of this group became leaders in the formal 
institutional configuration of the government, in governmental agencies 118  dedicated to 
technical tasks related to water management, and created space for the application of water 
management models brought from other places into Ceará.  
Water management in Brazil also includes national stakeholders. Besides DNOCS, 
another federal agency is the National Water Agency (ANA), created in 2000119 in order to 
implement an integrated national policy by means of working with state governments to 
modernize water management and to manage transboundary watersheds120.  
                                                 
116 Such as the Polytechnic School at the University of São Paulo. 
117 Some group members had graduate degrees in hydraulic engineering from the University of Colorado, one 
of the main American centers for research in water management. 
118  Besides the already mentioned SRH and COGERH, SOHIDRA was another governmental agency 
dedicated to construction of water accumulation and transportation infrastructure. In the late 1990s, 
FUNCEME also created a Water Resources Department and gathered some of the best technicians and 
researchers in Ceará, establishing itself as one of the main research centers of the region, along with the 
Hydraulic Engineering Department at UFC. One of the main scientific awards in Brazil, the Prêmio Jovem 
Cientista of 2003, was given to a researcher at FUNCEME for his work in water management. FUNCEME’s 
activities compensate the fact that none of the other governmental agencies – SRH, COGERH, SOHIDRA, 
and DNOCS - develop any kind of systematic research activity in water management. 
119 This organization was created by Federal Law 9984/2000. 
120 According to Brazilian law (decree 24643/1934), rivers basins that are located entirely inside the borders of 
one state are jurisdiction of that particular state, while rivers basins that cross state borders lay under federal 
jurisdiction. 
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Due to the strategic importance of water, and the diversity of actors and interests, 
water allocation is usually a conflictive activity. In Ceará, the Water Resources Secretariat 
(SRH) reviews within-state activities while the state water agency, COGERH121, oversees the 
debate concerning specific reservoir decisions within the water-allocation committees. The 
main marked historical patterns of conflict include those between the Fortaleza metropolitan 
area vs. the hinterland, industry vs. agriculture, public small irrigation (including subsistence) 
vs. private large irrigation and communities around reservoirs vs. communities downstream 
along the river.  
 
The Fiscal Wars and the Internal Disputes in the Government on Water Management 
These institutional organizations have to be understood against larger sociopolitical 
processes that to some extent frame the ways in which local political narratives on water and 
climate are created and used. On the one hand, economic liberalism and economic 
development discourse is adopted as a guiding paradigm for the creation and management of 
public policies for the regulation of economic activity and the welfare of the population. 
However, internal disputes continue to occur inside the governmental apparatus concerning 
how to manage the state’s resources, in terms of the degree of centralization of decision-
making power. 
The political decision to promote economic development through the attraction of 
businesses and industries took place at the same time in many Brazilian Northeastern states, 
and generated what was called the Fiscal Wars: a competition among states in terms of 
advantages and commercial benefits offered to enterprises. Economic development was to 
                                                 
121 COGERH was created by state law 12.217/1993; it is a mixed-capital company. 
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be achieved through exploiting the productive potential of the state, and through investing 
in high tax revenue generating activities in order to finance state growth. The Fiscal Wars 
ended up favoring companies but resulted in reduced effective results in state revenue 
collection. Because of this, it is not uncommon to find financially ruined governments in 
states with growing GDPs, as it is the case for Ceará. The most important target sectors 
included tourism, shrimp production and the cultivation of tropical fruits and flowers for 
export. There have also been numerous industrial districts created around the Fortaleza 
metropolitan area. 
One of the most important requirements for external investment is the existence of 
adequate infrastructure for productive activity. Of key importance for many industrial and 
commercial activities is the guarantee of a continuous and reliable water supply. Ceará has a 
relatively good infrastructure for water accumulation; dams are distributed around the 
hinterland, particularly in the Jaguaribe Valley, and canals have been constructed to bring 
part of the accumulated water from the Jaguaribe Valley to the metropolitan area. 
Inside the structure of the government, so I was told, there are two groups that 
dispute the control of water management at the highest institutional levels122. The first, and 
older group, is composed primarily of politicians and engineers linked to construction 
companies. In Brazil this group has become known as the Construction Contractors Lobby 
(lobby das empreiteiras). Their main focus of activity lies in infrastructure construction. The 
second group is composed principally of academics, consultants, technicians and members 
                                                 
122 Describing what goes on inside the government’s meeting rooms, in an environment of harsh political 
competition, is not an easy task. Yet I found a great degree of overlap in the stories received from three 
different government institutions that form part of the “water world” in Ceará (DNOCS, COGERH and 
FUNCEME), from information that was given by mid- to upper-tier officials. If the following is not the 
definitive picture of what occurs inside these meeting rooms, it is at least how many technicians make sense of 
the institutional disputes over water management that occur in this context. 
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of civil society. For this group, water management is seen as a special kind of conflict 
management activity. Their focus lies in participatory approaches, in which local conflicts on 
water allocation are highlighted. This second group is of a more recent formation. I will refer 
to the two groups as the infrastructure group and the conflict management group. 
Regarding the infrastructure group, the Construction Contractors Lobby is believed 
to be the main source of funds for electoral activities and political campaigns (verbas de 
campanha) of the group in power. Construction companies see the government as one of 
their main clients, as is usually the case in poorly developed states like Ceará, in which a great 
deal of the financial resources of the state are in the hands of the government, and where 
economic development is usually understood as infrastructure construction. On the other 
hand, through acting as funders of political campaigns, construction companies not 
unusually become patrons of local politicians, guaranteeing for themselves, through 
clientalistic ties with the institutional power holders, a share of the money arriving from 
federal development funds or from international donors like the World Bank. In these 
political circumstances, centralized decision making is convenient for this group because few 
elements are at stake, power is clearly distributed among individuals as part of a small group 
that makes decisions, control of activities is easier, and reproduction of power is facilitated.  
This play of power can be seen in the following analysis of institutional change that 
took place at the beginning of 2003, after the 2002 elections, when the power balance inside 
the government experienced a shift. This change was centered partly on the current vice-
governor of the state of Ceará, Maia Júnior, himself the owner of a construction company, 
and who is considered the principal leader of the infrastructure group. He is also the head of 
the State Planning Secretariat (SEPLAN), and was, at one time, linked to the State 
Infrastructure Secretariat (SEINFRA). Maia Júnior was the main coordinator for the political 
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campaign of his party in the last state elections (PSDB), and during this process gained 
greater political power than he had held in previous terms.  
The conflict management group members became government officials through the 
creation of agencies such as SRH and COGERH; mainly through the work of technicians 
who were not linked to the inner political structure of the government, but were outsiders 
(mainly consultants working in the water resources domain). For this reason, there is a 
natural concentration of the members of the infrastructure group in the highest levels of the 
government (the core of the PSDB in the state), while members of the conflict resolution 
group tend to be located at lower ranks, have no links with the core of the group in power, 
but are rather technicians. Many of the latter are politically aligned with the opposition 
parties in the state (PT, PSB, and PCdoB).  
The aims of the conflict resolution group are seen as somewhat different from those 
of the infrastructure group. Although in part the conflict resolution group also focuses on 
financial issues and the reproduction of power, their goals contain a strong ideological 
element linked to environmental discourse, such as the global campaign for water 
conservation, and sociopolitical efforts to democratize decision making regarding water 
allocation, mainly in the hinterland. The conflict resolution group naturally has more leaders 
due to its less centralized power. The engineer Hypérides Macedo is seen as one of the 
principal leaders of the conflict resolution group. He was head of the Water Resources 
Secretariat (SRH) for more than one term in the past, also owner of consulting companies 
for water management, and is currently a member of the National Water Resources Council 
in Brasília.  
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This type of two-party structure can also be seen inside institutions like DNOCS, in 
which older technicians favor an approach linked to infrastructure construction, and the 
newer technicians tend to act within conflict resolution paradigms, like participatory water 
allocation schemes. 
Another important background factor is that the paternalistic public management 
model (in which the state is the main inducer and funding source for economic 
development) could no longer be sustained in the 1990s. In financial crisis, the state was not 
able to fund economic development through its usual means, and discovered that new 
activities, such as water management, could be a source of revenue (in part due to the 
introduction of tariffs, but most of all due to the influx of World Bank money into the state). 
However, to the detriment of the infrastructure group, the conflict resolution group holds a 
considerable amount of power in the water management sector, because of the introduction 
of participatory approaches since 1994 (in which the number of decision-making 
stakeholders is now greater and spread over many local committees), in a decentralization 
process that they coordinated, making centralized political control over decisions more 
difficult.  
Construction companies tried to adapt themselves to the idea of participatory 
management, acting alongside local infrastructure demands. With the state financially ruined, 
the money coming from the World Bank for the construction of the Castanhão Reservoir 
(and later for the Integration Canal) became a disputed governmental issue. In past terms, 
top state officials wanted to have access to funds allocated directly to the Water Resources 
Secretariat, then headed by Hypérides Macedo, by the World Bank, and Hypérides’ 
resistance to that was the source of internal conflict in the government. After the 2002 
elections, Hypérides left the structure of the state government for the National Water 
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Council in Brasília. Maia Júnior, now holding more power, wanted to transfer all water 
infrastructure construction activity (with the funds allocated to it) from SRH to SEINFRA, 
and to integrate CAGECE (the state municipal water agency and the main client of 
government construction companies, besides SRH) with COGERH; however it seemed that 
the World Bank did not approve the plan. Maia Júnior then installed people from his 
immediate party to manage the state’s water system. Edinardo Ximenez Rodrigues, from 
CAGECE, was made head of the SRH, and Izelda Rocha, from SEINFRA, was made 
president of COGERH. Both came with strong orientations towards centralized control and 
revenue generation activities, and that immediately caused friction with groups that privilege 
the creation of a participatory and socially legitimate water management system, even if it 
had to be subsidized. Naturally, among these groups were the water committees of the 
hinterland.  
Within this scheme, a major issue was that the relationship between supply and 
demand in the Jaguaribe Valley was already very tight; highlighted in the frequent local 
conflicts over water allocation. In 1995 the state began constructing the Castanhão Reservoir, 
and some years later the Integration Canal to bring water to the metropolitan area, with 
capacity for up to twenty-two cubic meters per second of stream flow123. At the same time, 
the government adopted an approach that seems to be widely accepted among water 
researchers and technicians in Brazil and abroad, in which the creation of storage capacity is 
combined with efficient water management schemes. In practice, efficient water 
management means the creation of mechanisms for inducing water users to reduce their 
consumption through increasing the productivity of the used water volume. Strategies used 
                                                 
123 That is more than twice of the average stream flow for the Jaguaribe River during the past ten years, during 
dry seasons. 
  
270
by government officials include the creation of incentives for the updating of irrigation 
technologies to more efficient methods in terms of water usage, and through the creation of 
a tariff for bulk, non-treated water taken directly from a river or dam. This was done because, 
from an economic perspective, water is understood as a scarce asset with economic value; in 
terms of economic development, the maximizing option is to allocate water to activities with 
high added value, so that maximum profit is extracted from each unit of water volume.  
Nevertheless, not only water accumulation takes place inside the physical space of 
the hinterland, as local political structures have also developed around these water allocation 
processes in accordance with the local political genre of clientalistic relations. Against this 
background, the new techno-economic paradigm has been understood in a very different 
manner than it has been in the metropolitan areas. If locally the shared idea existed that 
water is scarce even for local agricultural production, the idea of taking water to the 
metropolitan industrial areas was radically opposed.  
Opposition was manifested in different ways and included the sabotaging of 
infrastructure. In 1993, due to an acute water shortage in the Fortaleza metropolitan area, the 
then governor Ciro Gomes ordered the emergency construction of the already mentioned 
Canal do Trabalhador (Workers’ Canal), linking the Jaguaribe Valley to the metropolitan region. 
He also ordered any barriers located along the river to be destroyed - some constructed in 
order to raise the water levels and enable farmers to irrigate their lands - with the goal of 
making the water run faster along the riverbed. He also sent the military to the valley to 
guarantee that the water reached the new canal. There was no consultation of the population 
of the valley. The irrigation project of Jaguaribe-Apodi (DIJA), which depends on a large 
pumping apparatus to have water sent from the river to the irrigation lots, had its pumping 
paralyzed for over a week, generating loses that, according to the manager of the irrigation 
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project, made irrigators indebted with banks for many years afterwards. The climate of 
discontent rose to the point that irrigators from the southern areas of the Jaguaribe Valley 
broke into the operation cabin of the Orós Reservoir, and shut off the water valve, therefore 
preventing the dam’s water from being released (Garjulli et al., 2002). Similar cases, some 
including the destruction of the valves, have occurred in various dams with some regularity 
over the past ten years. This reflects that, in the eyes of local populations, the government 
does not have uncontested authority nor legitimacy to make decisions concerning water 
allocation in the Jaguaribe Valley. It was in such circumstances that COGERH decided to 
put into practice a particular item in the 1992 state water law (law 11.996/92) that instituted 
local participation in water allocation decisions. In 1994, a water allocation commission, with 
representatives from unions, associations of producers and politicians from the entire valley, 
was created to make water allocation decisions124. As we will see in detail in the following 
chapters, this approach has serendipitously proved, to the government, to have some degree 
of efficacy through the construction of a new context in which water could be moved 
throughout the state with less political conflict. 
 
Development and Water in Ceará: Institutional Configuration 
In 1992, the Ceará Water Resources Secretariat submitted to the State Legislative Assembly 
(Assembléia Legislativa) a proposal that instituted a new paradigm for state water management. 
The text of the law had been practically copied from a law created in the state of São Paulo, 
in 1991, with only a few changes. At that time, one of the main debates inside the technical 
community was related to what was known as basin agency. The new model suggested that 
                                                 
124 For a more detailed description of this whole process, see Garjulli et al., 2002, p. 15-16.  
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water management actions, in case of a watershed, should be carried out by a private 
company, supervised by local government, based on guidelines established in legislation, and 
in accordance with decisions made by participatory water management organs. These 
companies were the basin agencies, and were proposed in order to circumvent the inefficient 
bureaucracies of local governments, and their characteristic political centralisms. Critics of 
the basin agencies argued that water management, as a vital element for the public’s 
wellbeing, should remain in the hands of policy makers and public officials. At the same time, 
others saw the possible adoption of basin agencies as the first step towards the privatization 
of water.  
In any case, it is interesting to note that Ceará’s law proposal did not mention the 
basin agencies, although São Paulo’s law did (Barth, 1999). This omission was seen as a sign 
of the state’s political centralization tendencies. The law (11.996) was passed on July 24th, 
1992. Even though there was no mention of basin agencies in the law, the World Bank 
imposed (as a condition for a series of loans related to state water infrastructure 
constructions125) the creation of a private company that would not be directly linked to 
government structures, although the government would retain control of a minimum of 51% 
of its stocks126. COGERH was created in 1993 to act according to the model of a basin 
agency, but to manage the waters for the whole state of Ceará (which was divided into 11 
basins and sub-basins). 
                                                 
125 The idea of participatory water committees was also imposed by World Bank, in the early 1990s, upon the 
state, as a condition for a series of loans (Garjulli et al., 2002, p. 14). That materialized in the introduction of 
the water committees in the law 11.996/1992. It is clear though that the World Bank was not the only factor 
influencing the adoption of the water committee system: other states in Brazil were creating committees, and 
local intellectuals linked to the water management had been discussing participatory water management before 
in Ceará. The importance of the role of the World Bank seems to be not in the introduction of the idea, but 
rather in pressing local politicians, not directly related to water management and naturally resistant to any idea 
of decentralized decision making, for its adoption. 
126 In reality, the government currently holds 98% of the shares.  
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State law 11.996 outlined the management structure for state water resources. The 
law introduced guidelines for the creation of a specific institutional configuration to be 
responsible for water planning and management in Ceará. The law also outlined the basic 
principles of political action for the system, with the most important being the decentralization 
of political decisions for water management. Besides this, for reasons of manangement, the 
law instituted licensing and charging for water use, and the requirement of permits for 
infrastructure construction. In this law, decentralization was understood as the integration 
and participation of society’s different water-user sectors in political decisions for the 
management of water resources (Garjulli, 2001a, p. 108). Participation was then framed into 
an institutional structure. The State Council for Water Resources (CONERH) was created at 
the most authoritative political level, and has the power to arbitrate water conflict at the 
highest level before the state judiciary becomes involved. The law also established the 
creation of a water committee for each of the eleven river basins, each with power to 
deliberate over water allocation inside their basins, but ultimately with the responsibility to 
submit to the power of state council. 
The passing of the law did not lead to the immediate creation of the committees. In 
fact, no participatory effort occurred until 1994. In that year, reservoir levels in the Jaguaribe 
Valley were very low, and there were clear signs of a major shortage crisis in the near future. 
Technicians from the Organization of Users Department, of the newly created COGERH, 
were inspired by the 1992 law allowing participative organs to become involved in state 
water allocation, and decided to transfer decision making processes concerning water 
allocation to the valley’s community for the two largest reservoirs of the region: the Orós 
and the Banabuiú Reservoirs (both of which are responsible for the regularization of stream 
flow in the Jaguaribe River, which has the Banabuiú River as its most important branch). 
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These technicians, who were sociologists and geographers with previous experience in civil 
society organizations in Fortaleza, traveled around the Jaguaribe Valley and visited as many 
local associations, unions, cooperatives and local municipal governments (town halls and 
municipal councils) as they could, and invited them to participate in a meeting to decide 
upon water allocation for the two already mentioned reservoirs. The commission thus 
formed was named the Commission for Allocation of the Waters of the Jaguaribe-Banabuiú 
Valleys (but is usually referred to as the Jaguaribe Commission). Even though this 
commission was not exactly what the law referred to by a water committee (with each 
committee originally to be responsible for one single basin), the Jaguaribe Commission was 
created for the allocation of water from the main reservoirs of the whole valley which 
contains four (sub-)basins 127 . The idea was that the commission was a provisional, 
emergency and informal organ that would be made extinct when the formal basin 
committees were formed in the future128.  
The number of institutions that participated in the commission increased throughout the 
years, reaching the current level of one hundred and seven voting members, made up of 
representatives from federal, state and municipal governments, from civil society, and water 
users. COGERH technicians tried to form the commission with a balance of representatives 
                                                 
127 The Salgado basin, which is also a subsection of the Jaguaribe Valley, was not included because it is not 
linked to the network of dams that make perennial the Jaguaribe River. 
128  In 1997, the first basin level water committee was created in the Curu Basin. Later on other basin 
committees were also created in the Jaguaribe Valley (the Baixo and the Médio Jaguaribe Committees were 
created in 1998 in the low and middle sections of the valley, respectively; the Banabuiú Committee in 2000, and 
the Alto Jaguaribe Committee in 2002, in the higher sections of the valley). The basin committees were 
structured as to have 30% of its membership from civil society, 30% from the water users sector, 20% from 
municipal government, and 20% from state and federal government institutions. The local population of the 
valley resisted the loss of the Jaguaribe Commission, and it has from then on remained in operation, despite the 
constant messages sent from the SRH that the commission should be put out of practice, and that water 
allocation should be undertaken instead by the basin water committees. When this roll over occurs, there will 
be a change of some voting members, but no change in the water allocation practices, since the committees 
were modeled on the Jaguaribe Commission. 
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from civil society (understood here as non-productive and non-governmental institutions, 
such as NGOs, religious organizations, community associations of neighbors affected by 
water issues, and rural workers unions etc.), from different water user sectors (associations 
of producers, and of fishermen etc.), and from federal, state and municipal government 
levels. This commission currently comprises: 
- twenty-seven municipal government representatives from the local area (constituting 
25% of its membership) -from prefeituras (town halls – the executive branch of municipal 
government) and their secretariats, and from câmaras municipais (municipal councils – the 
legislative branch of municipal government) -;  
- eighteen representatives from the state and federal governments (constituting 17% of 
its membership) – including representatives of DNOCS, COGERH, EMATERCE, state 
government secretariats, and the Federal Hydroelectric Company of the Northeast 
(CHESF) -;  
- thirty-two representatives from civil society (constituting 30% of its membership) – 
including representatives from diverse rural workers unions, as well as from municipal 
associations, church groups, and from community associations of diverse interests (the 
associations with the most representation are the rural workers unions, holding 41% of 
the seats reserved for civil society participation) -; and  
- thirty representatives from water user sectors (constituting 28% of its membership) – 
with representation from municipal companies that provide water for human 
consumption, associations for producers involved in public irrigation projects, 
associations for producers who farm on privately irrigated areas, and fishery associations. 
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Participation in the commission is a voluntary, non-remunerated activity. Institutions 
were invited to participate, and were asked to nominate their representatives.  
For the state government, the conduciveness of the structure to participation was 
therefore guaranteed: with the most important stakeholder groups of each community 
appropriately represented in the committee (although important institutions refused to 
participate, as we will see in a moment), all SRH would have to do – through the action of 
COGERH technicians - was to assume the role of coordinators and mediators. Besides the 
Jaguaribe Commission, COGERH used the same model for smaller reservoirs, creating 
commissions with members from local communities, and organizing water allocation 
meetings at the end of each rainy season.  
In the eyes of COGERH and of the rest of the technical world linked to water resources 
in Ceará, the management of reservoirs is considered to be a technical issue. Therefore the 
proper language register and set of criteria to be used for water allocation decision making 
should also be technical. Discussions should include technical factors such as the reservoirs’ 
storage capacity, its current water level, the amount of water lost due to evaporation, and its 
açoriamento (decrease in depth, and therefore in storage capacity, due to accumulation of 
organic material brought in by the river). Decisions were to be based on the prescribed logic 
that reservoir management has to balance the demand for water from productive activities 
with the need for storing a safe amount of water to attend to human consumption needs for 
a certain period of time (in case of a future drought). From the perspective of the 
government, it is preferable to have water flowing in a river, and therefore being used for 
productive economic activities, such as irrigation, than having water sitting in reservoirs 
being lost to evaporation. Yet the memory of past droughts drives individuals, and most 
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government technicians, to favor a more conservative approach, in which less water is 
released.  
COGERH elaborates calculations and creates simulations for the release of water from 
the reservoir into the river, by showing the changing monthly conditions of the reservoir, 
based on different release flows129. All measurements are calculated using the metric system: 
water level is measured in meters, volume in cubic meters 130 , and release rates of the 
reservoir valves, and the stream flow in rivers, in cubic meters per second. COGERH 
generates around six of these simulations annually and submits them to the decision-making 
apparatus of the commissions.  
The problem is that not everyone takes COGERH’s set of technical criteria as being the 
most relevant; and furthermore, not everyone perceives COGERH as a neutral organ with 
authority to arbitrate the process. It is especially in smaller reservoir committee’s that this 
problem intensely arises. 
 
Local Water Ownership Felling 
In order to make sense of the impacts of the new institutional configuration created by law, 
and practiced by COGERH technicians, we have to understand how these relate to the 
political circumstances of that particular moment. When Tasso Jereissati assumed leadership 
of the government in 1987, he purported that he would end clientalistic practices within the 
government, and carried this out through very unpopular measures, such as the firing of 
                                                 
129 Figure 8 in appendix 1 outlines two simulations for the Orós Reservoir, illustrating what would happen to 
the reservoir in terms of the decrease in total accumulated volume, the decrease in water level, and the total 
volume evaporated, if five or six cubic meters per second was to be released into the river. These simulations 
were for the dry season of 2002. 
130 One cubic meter equals one thousand liters (roughly two hundred and sixty gallons). 
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thousands of employees that had been hired in the previous year, as political favors during 
the then election time. He also tried to put an end to the usual pattern of political relations 
(based on the exchange of political favors) between the government and hinterland 
politicians, by creating a special secretariat dedicated to hinterland issues, and posting as the 
secretary an industrialist who adopted a distant and dry communication style towards local 
politicians. The centralization of powers in the hands of the government was so intense that 
during the first years of Jereissati’s government, many of his allies in the state Legislative 
Assembly shifted to the opposition’s party, and over time, even some of his close allies from 
the CIC, many of them having been heads of state secretariats in Jereissati’s first term, ended 
up splitting from the party and becoming oppositional leaders (Bonfim, 2002; Abu-El-Haj, 
2002).  
In breaking the traditional links between state government and local mayors, 
Jereissati also ended up also losing a great deal of control that was previously held by the 
government over local issues, because this control was exercised through channels of local 
political allies. On the other hand, the central importance of the state government in local 
economy, as the main investor and creator of employment opportunities, gave the governor 
the power to overcome the limitations of such a difficult political situation in the hinterland 
in a different fashion: several local individuals were hired to act as state government agents, 
and local commissions were created, funded and coordinated by the state government, 
where local individuals and government technicians would act upon local needs. But the 
local individuals chosen were usually not part of the local municipal government, and the 
commissions were designed to limit the role held by local mayors in these activities. In this 
sense, local decentralization was used as a tool by the highly centralized state government. At 
the same time, the government began intense official propaganda in a push for support from 
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the local population, and to make the locals hired as government agents in municipalities, 
and the commission members, feel like their status had improved locally. Two projects in the 
state that have adopted this strategy – one aimed at health agents, and other introduced 
during the 1987 drought relief actions - showed good results, and because of this, became 
internationally known (see Tendler, 1997). However, over the long term, the government 
could not cope with the situation of being disconnected from local politics; also, during this 
time, many local mayors strategically started to align themselves to the political party of the 
new governor (PSDB).  
The creation of the Jaguaribe Commission has to be understood as part of this 
political panorama. Through this participatory commission, created, as already mentioned, as 
an emergency remedy to a forecasted crisis, the government later realized that it could gain 
effective control of the water accumulated in the hinterland, a necessary resource for the 
developmental plans of the group in power, which included, for the future to come, the 
transference of greater amounts of water from the hinterland to the industrial zones of the 
metropolitan area. The difference between the Jaguaribe Commission and other 
commissions was that during the creation of the former, the government was in a process of 
organizing its water management apparatus (through the recent passing of the water law and 
the creation of COGERH), and many of the COGERH technicians responsible for the 
commission arrived on the scene with a strong technocratic mind frame concerning how 
water should be managed131. 
                                                 
131 While most COGERH technicians are engineers, the department responsible for the initial organization of 
the Jaguaribe Commission’s activities was formed, as already mentioned, by sociologists and geographers. All 
had a more political approach to the issues at hand, and saw the commission as a real opportunity for 
promoting a level of democratization in the power relations of the hinterlands. They were soon being 
discriminated against from inside the company, with other employees making jokes that they were “leftist 
fundamentalists” or “reds.” There was also a degree of internal conflict inside COGERH regarding the amount 
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Together, the participatory approach and COGERH’s imposition of the conditions 
within which water allocation could take place created a new set of conflicts. Communities 
could not decide upon the criteria with which they would work when making decisions 
about water use. Furthermore, neither were they well versed on the terms imposed by 
COGERH. Very few local individuals had a systematic or integrated understanding of water 
use in the valley, principally because the water demand in other communities was usually not 
known. For this reason, besides their role to coordinate water allocation meetings, 
COGERH technicians had the goal of communicating to local communities the water 
demand levels of other areas. In real terms, this meant trying to convince local people to 
release water for others to use, and this in turn was frequently framed inside local political 
contexts as COGERH taking sides in local political disputes and participating in the 
allegiance to certain powerful local groups.  
In regards to the understanding of, and the ability to use, technical terms and 
concepts, if illiteracy and lack of formal education is high in Ceará, it is even higher in rural 
districts, which are located far away from important regional centers in which there are more 
economic and educational opportunities.   
Santa Maria, in the Médio Jaguaribe Sub-basin, and Buraco Fundo132, in the Banabuiú 
Sub-basin, are two important sites that have experienced conflict of this nature. In these two 
places, the local communities tend very strongly not to accept the technical authority of 
COGERH, and therefore numeric evaluations and simulations provided by this agency are 
usually not taken as authoritative accounts concerning local situations. The introduction of 
participatory management practices in these places, that is, the creation of the reservoir 
                                                                                                                                                 
of decision centralization the company and SRH were imposing upon the commission, and upon other 
participatory groups related to water in Ceará.  
132 Names of localities and people linked to cases of local conflicts were changed. 
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commissions, reinforced the increased feeling of ownership that communities have for water 
stored in local reservoirs. Inhabitants of Santa Maria and Buraco Fundo resist the liberation 
of water from their local reservoirs (both being communities located at their margins) when 
their local leaders believe that the level of the water is low and the release of water will bring 
about future suffering; this resistance is sometimes so great that it challenges legal decisions 
and the authority of the federal police. Due to these problems, the reservoir of Santa Maria 
had remained with its valve closed for more than three years. In 2001, the conflict between 
local land owners, demanding water release for irrigation, and the community of mostly 
small landless farmers living around the reservoir, opposing release, escaped the COGERH 
technicians’ control. COGERH technicians assured the local population that, despite the 
reservoir’s very low level of water (to the point that many of the rulers used to measure 
water volume were completely outside of the water. See picture 26), there was enough water 
for at least two years of human consumption, and therefore some water could be released to 
attend to irrigators located a couple of miles down the river. Professor Marisol, a 
schoolteacher and member of the local church group, and one of the most influential local 
leaders, defied the authority of COGERH technicians, by saying that the local population 
didn’t believe that there was enough water for two years, and that COGERH was taking 
sides with the powerful irrigators of the area, and was therefore manipulating the technical 
data in their favor. Professor Marisol felt that COGERH could not guarantee the well-being 
of the population in regards to water supply: “só Deus pode, mandando chuva [only God can, by 
sending rains]”. She also argued that the lower the reservoir’s water level, the muddier it 
becomes, leading to a lower quality of drinking water, and less fish at the dam. In that year, 
members of the community cut off access to the valve of the reservoir, by closing it and 
breaking it, so that it could not be opened anymore. The case went to the judiciary, and 
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when a judge was sent to the community escorted by two hundred federal police officers, 
they were met by two thousand members of the community armed with knives and 
machetes133. The valve was not re-opened. 
João César is a land owner and private irrigator who lives a few miles downstream 
from the reservoir; he therefore supported the water release. He is also a member of the 
Jaguaribe Commission. When I visited him in August, 2002, he told me that he was no 
longer receiving mail from COGERH, as all mail passes through the postal service office of 
the community, and his letters were being systematically retained.  
The reservoir valve remained closed, and COGERH technicians avoided visiting the 
community until the end of the 2004 rainy season, due to the fear of physical violence. Later 
on, due to the intense rains of January 2004, the reservoir filled to the point of overflowing, 
and the community finally authorized water release. 
Santa Maria, although a district of the municipality of Jaguaribe, is located relatively 
far away from the regional center. According to local statistics, the district had a population 
of two thousand seven hundred and fifty-two in 1996. There are few ties between the two 
communities, beyond the fact that officially the inhabitants of Santa Maria are considered 
residents of Jaguaribe. Very few local leaders of Jaguaribe have social ties with the 
population of Santa Maria. The case is different for the land owners: the father and brother 
of João César had previously been mayors of the municipality of Jaguaribe, and he himself is 
well known in the town. The conflict that originated in the community was between local 
community leaders organized around a church group, and large private producers, located 
some miles down the river. COGERH’s social role was framed inside this conflictive 
                                                 
133 These numbers are estimates provided by local leaders during interviews. 
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panorama, and the company technicians’ stance, that water should be released from the 
reservoir, was immediately understood as the company politically aligning itself with large 
producers’ interests. 
A major factor differentiating Santa Maria from Buraco Fundo is the different local 
leadership’s profile and action. Because of this difference, even if the nature of two conflicts 
is identical, the outcomes are different. Buraco Fundo is such a small community that there 
are no official demographic numbers recorded. I estimate that around fifty families live in 
the community. The most respected local leader in the Buraco Fundo district is Seu Joselito, 
who is capable of influencing the decisions of the local population due to his status as a 
knowledgeable person concerning the local reservoir, gained through the many decades he 
has worked as the DNOCS reservoir manager. The years in which Seu Joselito has worked 
for DNOCS have given him the opportunity to become familiar with all of the producers in 
the region. Also, it was he who controlled the reservoir valve, giving him a further degree of 
local prestige. At the same time, his position as DNOCS employee created a social and 
economic distinction between him and the very poor population that live on the dam’s 
margins. DNOCS’ managers usually live in houses constructed by the same institution 
(which in a community like Buraco Fundo means the largest and most comfortable house), 
have access to cars or motorcycles, and when living in such remote places like Buraco Fundo, 
usually carried guns. Even though Seu Joselito is no longer an employee of DNOCS, he still 
acts as the main local authority on the reservoir. He is also connected with the political life 
of the area, in which patron-client relationships develop between local political leaders in 
higher municipal ranks. When I visited him, he went through all the names of the local 
producers located downstream from the dam, and told me about their properties, political 
affiliations, and past office positions. Furthermore, his position as the wealthiest person in 
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the community means that he is the only one who owns a car, and who can drive sick 
community members to the nearest hospital, giving him the role of a small local patron. Seu 
Joselito often acts on behalf of the local community, which although very poor, suddenly 
gained power over water allocation when COGERH instituted the local reservoir 
commission. He acts as the region’s political broker to keep local conflicts from escalating 
and reaching the point reached in Santa Maria. He often influences the local community 
members to side with the requests of irrigators who depend on the reservoir’s water, so 
usually local reservoir commission meetings are brokered in advance134. But this is not always 
so. In 2002, the water level was extremely low, the fish were disappearing, and the 
community was very worried about the future situation in terms of available drinking water. 
Seu Joselito, along with the rest of the community, took up a position against water release. 
In these circumstances, the valve was left open enough only to allow a minimum amount of 
water release, in order to prevent major crises for large producers, but much less than what 
was requested. One day before my visit to the dam, a COGERH technician visiting the 
district to verify the level of the reservoir had been attacked with a knife135, by a community 
member, when he got too close to the reservoir’s valve. 
Some interlocutors believe that creating local reservoir commissions before the 
creation of a statewide (or at least basin-wide) community consciousness of the systemic 
quality of water management generated the problem experienced. Since all reservoirs are part 
of a water system, in which the water released from one reservoir feeds another one further 
down stream, decisions that are hyper-localized are not recommended. However, in these 
                                                 
134 In Brazil, this activity of negotiating and trying to establish pacts and alliances to define, in advance, the 
outcomes of an institutional meeting like the one mentioned here, is called articular, “to articulate,” and it is 
seen as a normal aspect of political life. 
135 The attack happened August 9, 2002. Luckily that attacker was not successful in his attempt, and the 
COGERH employee was unharmed. 
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circumstances, when conflicts, such as those which occurred in Santa Maria and Buraco 
Fundo arise, reservoir management depends on the input of local leaders like Seu Joselito136, 
and their ability to make use of their clientalistic social relations. 
 
Fractured Governmentality 
At the present time, most of COGERH’s activities in the hinterland, besides the monitoring 
and maintenance of infrastructure and the measurement of stream flow along the river, are 
concentrated along three fronts: 1) activity coordination for the Jaguaribe Commission, for 
small reservoir commissions, and for basin committees, i.e., coordinating participativeness in 
decision-making regarding water allocation systems; 2) creation of a control system for water 
demand through the introduction of licenses for water usage (locally called outorgas); and 3) 
the introduction of mechanisms to charge for the use of water.  
 Since the members of the Jaguaribe Commission are the main opinion-makers in 
their local worlds, COGERH makes intense use of these meetings to promote its current 
agenda. 
 Licenses and charging for water use are aspects not open to public negotiation, and 
were imposed by the law 11.996/1992, even before COGERH and the commissions were 
created. The rationale behind the idea is that, since water is a limited resource in (and of137) 
                                                 
136 For a description of other cases of conflict of similar type in Ceará, see Garjulli et al. (2002, p. 12-14). The 
cases here selected do not reflect the main features of COGERH’s activities in the state: these examples are 
rather exceptions to the rule. Of one hundred and twenty-three reservoirs, less than 10% present the level of 
conflict we see in Santa Maria. What we don’t know, however, is if other local leaders act in a similar fashion as 
Seu Joselito, or if the local commissions work as desired by COGERH, by democratically making decisions 
about the water release and solving internal conflicts during its meetings. 
137 Brazilian national water law 9433/1997 defines water as a public good to be controlled by each state, or if 
rivers cross state borders, by the federal government. Water cannot be treated as a private possession by 
individuals, and municipalities have no rights over waters that cross their geographic space. 
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the state, and a vital one for economic production, it has economic value, and therefore 
should be strictly controlled, waste should be avoided; and, as an asset, it is best invested in 
activities that give the highest economic returns for the state. One of the legal amendments 
that the current government made in the law regarding water resources was to reprioritize 
agriculture and industry in the water users list. Number one on this list is human 
consumption and, in practice, urban centers (and therefore the whole service sector) are 
served with priority. The second priority is given to animal consumption, which is not too 
much of an issue because water demand is remarkably lower than that required for industry 
and agriculture. Agriculture was originally given third priority; however, the new legal ruling 
switched it to fourth and industry was brought up from fourth to third. Furthermore, 
because of the fear of a massive water crisis in the metropolitan area, in the last ten years 
canals have been constructed to link reservoirs of the hinterland with the state’s capital. 
These constructions have also assured the provision of water for industrial purposes in the 
recent past. 
 Under this economic rationality, any agricultural activity with intense use of water 
and low economic return should be avoided138. This is the case for rice production, which is 
the principal crop for the smallest half of producers in the Jaguaribe Valley. The rice grown 
was originally selected by state agronomists who created land reform projects in the state in 
the seventies, during the last military regime, based on specific soil quality, and due to the 
fact that rice was already produced in some lakes and ponds of the region during the rainy 
season. The irrigation technique used by rice producers is the least sophisticated one, and it 
is known as flooding, in which water flows from irrigation canals into the rice fields until all 
rice plants or seeds are submerged. Due to the high evaporation rates of the area, water 
                                                 
138 These are locally called atividades perdulárias, that is, spendthrift activities. 
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usage is very intense, and very poorly controlled. In this manner, the distribution of licenses 
is, in theory, an attempt to control the volume of water used (users should not use more 
water than that stipulated in their license), and the payment for water was created in order to 
promote efficiency (inducing irrigators to adopt more efficient irrigation technologies), and 
to avoid wastage.  
 The population reacted negatively towards these introductions, and COGERH 
infrastructural limitations prevented such efforts from being fully implemented in practice. 
There is a massive resistance to the idea of paying for water, especially untreated water 
coming directly from the river, pumped by farmers into their fields, or from irrigation 
channels. Despite the fact that this state water law was created in 1992, almost no one in the 
hinterland was informed about it. The government lacked the resources to implement the 
law, reflecting the general pattern of Ceará’s water legislation in which laws and decrees are 
not created to be immediately put into practice. The main goal in the creation of laws not 
corresponding to local practice, according to top level bureaucrats of SRH, is to create 
mechanisms to induce certain kinds of behavior that favor economic development, such as 
the efficient use of water. We can see that explicitly stated in the following fragment of an 
interview with the president of COGERH: 
 
Renzo Taddei: A lei estadual de recursos hídricos (11.996) foi aprovada em 1992, e nós já 
estamos em 2004, e aínda existe um esforço grande pra conseguir aplicar alguns elementos da 
lei, principalmente porque a sociedade resiste a isso. A lei foi aprovada muito antes de que 
condições sociais existissem pra poder fazer com que a lei pudesse ser aplicada. A tarifa de 
água, por exemplo, foi aprovada no CONERH, e virou decreto, e existe, obviamente, um 
setor grande da população que discorda com a idéia da tarifa ou diz que a água é de Deus, 
etc. 
Izeuda Rocha: É. é verdade. É um esforço grande isso aí. 
Renzo Taddei: Mas virou lei…  
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Izeuda Rocha: E tem que ter a lei, porque senão você também não tem uma base pra você 
poder começar a materializar o processo. Porque eu não tenho legalidade. Porque se você fosse 
esperar que a lei seja consuetudinária, que ela vá legitimar um consenso, fica muito difícil. 
Talvez até a constituição dos Estados Unidos é que seja consuetudinária porque tem cem 
anos e só são cem artigos também, né? Mas, do ponto de vista da lei, a lei no Brasil é muito 
mais indutora, disciplinadora, do que consuetudinária. Mas por outro lado, como é que você 
estrutura um processo, como é que você estrutura um sistema, se você não tem amparo legal 
até pra viabilizar essa estruturação. O caso da COGERH foi clássico: se não se cria, 
legalmente, a COGERH, não se tinha determinação. Se criou porque se tinha determinação 
e se fez, mas se não existisse a lei ela não tinha sido criada. 
 
Renzo Taddei: The state law on water resources (law 11.996) was passed in 
1992. We are now in 2004, and there is still a big effort to make possible the 
application of some instruments created by the law, mainly because of 
resistance by society. The law was passed much before the social confitions 
existed for the law to be put in practice. The water tariff, for example, was 
approved by the State Water Council, and was transformed into a decree, and 
there still exists a large societal sector that disagrees with the idea of water tariff, 
or who say that water belongs to God, etc. 
Izelda Rocha: That’s true, this requires a big effort. 
Renzo Taddei: And it became a law… 
Izelda Rocha: And the law is necessary, otherwise you don’t have the required 
base for starting to materialize the process (of creating a rational water 
management system). [Without the law] I would not have the required legality 
to act. If you wait for the law to be consuetudinary, that it will legitimate a 
consensus, the situation becomes very difficult. The American Constitution is 
perhaps consuetudinary because it has a hundred years and a hundred articles, 
right? But from our perspective, the law in Brazil works much more as 
inductory, as disciplinary instrument, than a consuetudinary thing. On the 
other hand, how would you structure the process, how would you structure a 
system, if you don’t have legal support in order to viabilize this structuration? 
The COGERH case is typical: if you didn’t have a law saying that COGERH 
should be created, the company would not exist. 
 
 
 The legislation is then more of a public declaration of the direction the development 
of the institutional water management system is to take. Nevertheless, they function, in 
practice, to create “institutional space,” as local SRH agents put it, for future actions of the 
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government. That is, they define a space of legality against which it becomes illegal to act, 
therefore limiting space for political dissidence139.  
 It is then COGERH’s responsibility to visit hinterland communities and 
communicate that practices have to change because a new law has been passed. For example, 
state decree number 27.271, previously mentioned, was passed on November 28th, 2003, 
without taking into account the counter-requests of two basin committees, and without 
receiving official feedback from two of the most important water committees of the state 
(the Lower and Mid Jaguaribe Basin Committees). A water tariff system was created, and 
was made official through the decree, but there was no practical way to implement it 
successfully, without facing massive dissidence from local users, something that would cause 
the state government to lose face. Besides the fact that SRH lacks even a minimum 
enforcement infrastructure, there is no precise data on the amount of water each user 
consumes (i.e. there is no measurement of water use for agriculture), and water licenses are 
issued based on an estimated average amount of water a certain type of crop requires, the 
declared size of a plot, irrigation method, and on the geographic location of a property 
(which has implications for evaporation rates).  
 So if, on one hand, the license system would give SRH a more precise idea of the 
total basin water demand, enabling the government to better plan its efforts to balance 
supply and demand, on the other, the licenses are not contracts, and while they may still 
restrict the freedom of farmers to increase the size of their cultivated lands (because it 
implicates an increase in total water volume consumed), farmers know that the government 
cannot guarantee water supply. Licensing is something that binds farmers without binding 
the government. Government technicians explain that the gain for producers would be the 
                                                 
139 On this issue see also R. Taddei, 2004. 
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overall improvement in the capability that COGERH has to effectively manage reservoirs 
once total demand is known (and controlled), and therefore decreasing the chances of 
reservoir depletion due to the use of bad quality information in technical management 
schemes. This is very different from the direct mutuality style found in the politics of the 
hinterland, as seen in clientalistic relations, in which individuals are clearly aware of what 
they lose and what they gain from a particular relationship. For individuals to be able to 
understand an abstract idea like the potential aggregate future gains resulting from 
centralized bureaucratic control of water demand, it seems that they need to be familiarized 
with bureaucracy, or to possess a certain amount of formal schooling. For many, this is not 
the case; for others, there is the idea that the government acts expressly against rice growers. 
In any case, water laws are mainly not known outside the circles most directly involved with 
official water related institutions.  
 There are many reasons for such popular resistance against paying for water, the 
most prominent being the idea that water is a natural resource provided by God, and 
therefore it is not a commodity. This idea exists more strongly among rural workers and in 
small communities. There is also the idea that payments are another tax, another way in 
which the government can extract money from small farmers 140 . This idea is spread 
throughout the hinterland, and is strongest in areas marginalized from the main axes of 
economic life, i.e. rural districts far from municipal centers. These communities believe that 
tax money paid does not return in the form of infrastructure development, as has been the 
case throughout the history of these marginalized areas. Rural electrification, now 
widespread, is a rather new phenomenon, and transportation infrastructure is still very poor, 
                                                 
140 Conflicts over taxes go far back in Brazilian history, and many rebellions which occurred throughout the 
colonial period, and even after the transition to the republican era, were grounded in popular resistance towards 
government taxes. See Cunha, 2002 for an example, and also Prado Júnior, 1963. 
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despite accounts that it was even worse beforehand (Finan, 2001). It is important to note 
that the relationship between government and marginalized populations of the hinterland 
historically has been polarized into two extremes: on one hand, the absence of the state 
government’s support for local issues – such as past cases of family feuds, which to an 
extent still occur today, and also the notable lack of police presence in the hinterland141 -; and 
on the other hand, this absence of general support is contrasted with the intense paternalistic 
activity of the government, in times of social crisis (Montenegro, 2001; Neves, 2000b). The 
social memory of many communities has led to the idea that when the government is not 
absent, it acts without taking into account local opinion, nor asking for retribution142, except 
for votes. 
 
Water tariff: the first experience 
In 2001, the Jaguaribe Valley was on the brink of another water shortage crisis. The 
Banabuiú Reservoir, by then the second largest and most important in the valley, held only 
7.8% of its capacity at the end of the rainy season. The flow to be released from the 
Banabuiú Reservoir was set at the Jaguaribe Commission meeting at 1.3 cubic meters per 
second (having been 13.5 in 1998, 9.5 in 1999, and 6.2 in 2000). In the previous year, the 
commission meeting set the ration level at 50% of the average historical water use (users 
were to use no more than half of the amount of water used in previous years), for all sectors 
with exception of human and animal consumption. The Orós Reservoir, the largest of the 
valley, held 26.2% of its maximum capacity, and the flow to be released was fixed at ten 
                                                 
141 Municipalities in the Jaguaribe Valley present an average of one police officer per one thousand and five 
hundred inhabitants.  
142 Government pensions are one exception in this panorama (Finan, 2001), but even they are a part of national 
and not state policy. Other participatory efforts, such as Project São José, in which the state funds local 
infrastructure projects, are very recent and they have yet to have much influence over this public opinion. 
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cubic meters per second (having been 19.6 in 1998, 17.7 in 1999, and fourteen in 2000). 
ANA, the Brazilian National Water Agency, a strong promoter of transformations in local 
practices towards economic efficiency regarding water use, in association with SEAGRI, 
created a crossed-subsidization project called Águas do Vale (Valley Waters). Rice producers 
would be induced not to produce, and in return would be compensated R$400 to R$600 per 
hectare not cultivated, which was around half of what producers would make if they received 
the necessary water supply; fruit producers would have access to the water, but in return they 
would have to pay for it, making this the first required payment for non-treated water for 
agricultural use in local history143. Shrimp production, a highly profitable activity, was also 
added to the group to receive water. The economic justification for such different treatment 
of production types is that fruit growers would lose their investments if they did not receive 
water (i.e. fruit trees would die); fresh water shrimp production, although not very different 
from rice in terms of water consumption, is undertaken by a relatively small group of 
individuals and therefore the total required amount of water was not as great. But most 
importantly, due to the high profitability of this activity, it was believed that shrimp 
producers would have no problem in paying water bills. The income generated by these 
payments would then be used to compensate the rice producers, but as it would not be 
enough, ANA contributed R$ 8 million, and the state of Ceará R$ 2 million to the scheme. 
According to COGERH technicians’ estimations, during years without water restrictions, 
rice cultivation is responsible for 45% of agricultural water use in the Jaguaribe Valley, with 
51% of all agricultural production of the valley undertaken using the flooding irrigation 
method (COGERH, 2001, p. 7).  
                                                 
143 A small group of irrigators located along the Canal do Trabalhador (Workers Canal) were already paying for 
water, ever since the construction of the canal. 
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 COGERH presented the program during a Jaguaribe Commission meeting. The plan 
was presented as an unavoidable necessity; there was little room for choice, since the water 
available would be insufficient anyway. It was entered in the minutes as being “approved by 
the commission.” A large communication and sensitization campaign was then prepared to 
target producers of the valley, which was reported by local newspapers and radio stations. 
 The rice producers in the main water consumption centers of the valley have an 
average plot size of four to five hectares, organizing their labor around family ties, and using 
very simple irrigation methods; on the other hand, fruit growers have variable plot sizes. In 
the public irrigation district of Apodi Hills (known locally as DIJA), farmers initially received 
lot sizes of between five and seven hectares, but now a great percentage of the fruit 
production region contains lot sizes of more than twenty hectares, due to previous land 
concentration processes in which indebted producers sell144 their lands to larger producers 
during times of crisis (mostly during droughts. See Villa, 2000). Their irrigation system is 
more efficient, as is their technical control of production (through the use of plague 
treatments, fertilizers, etc), and fruit lots usually have employees working on them. In 
summary, many fruit lots have the same characteristics of agribusiness.  
 The Águas do Vale program was implemented for the region. In the areas in which 
rice was normally grown, most producers migrated temporarily to neighboring villages for 
temporary employment in the markets, in the services sector, as motorcycle-taxi drivers, and 
so on. Some irrigators affirmed having their living standards reduced to the point of 
depending on the pensions of the elders145 in their households. The fruit producers were 
                                                 
144 In public irrigation projects such as Icó-Lima Campos, Morada Nova or DIJA, producers are not entitled to 
sell their lands, since they do not have official land titles. Nevertheless, there is an informal land market with 
non restrictive negotiations, without any kind of official control. DNOCS is the official holder of these plots. 
145 Totaling a minimum wage, i.e. around monthly US$ 80. 
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charged R$ 0,01 per cubic meter of water received, resulting in a bill of R$ 70 to R$ 100146 
per hectare farmed, according to the program plans.  
 The huge majority of fruit and shrimp producers did not pay their water bills; only 
21% of those who got water did. According to COGERH technicians, the result should take 
into consideration two different aspects: the positive and the negative outcomes. The 
positive outcome was that the Jaguaribe Valley was about to experience a huge crisis in its 
water system, pointing towards loss of investment, increased farmer debts, increased 
migration to Fortaleza, and other urban centers, and the selling of lands for very low 
amounts of money in order to pay debts and to enable migration, leading to the 
concentration of lands in the hands of large producers, etc. Retrospectively, the relief 
provided to rice farmers avoided this crisis. However, the negative outcome of the program 
was the high number of farmers who did not pay their water bill. There is no official 
explanation for this lack of payment; even COGERH technicians look puzzled when 
discussing the topic147.  
 A few large private rice producers around the municipality of Morada Nova, in the 
Banabuiú Basin, reacted strongly against the proposal. One producer, who was also the 
                                                 
146 Between US$ 23 to 33 per hectare. 
147 Besides the compensation received for not producing, the rice producers received incentives to switch from 
rice to fruit production, by being offered a subsidized irrigation kit for the production of one hectare of fruit 
orchards (micro-aspersion), plus training, and credit. One thousand kits were made available as part of the 
program. Some interlocutors told us that there were flaws in the plan: 1) The soil used for rice production is 
not as suitable for fruit production; 2) Fruit production involves higher risks, due to plagues and to the fact that 
fruit trees take a longer period to start producing gains (from many months to some years), a period in which 
the small producer would have no income; 3) The astonishing majority the state’s producers are already in debt 
to the BNB, preventing them access to credit for the acquisition of the new irrigation kits; 4) Rice cultivation is 
much simpler than any fruit growing and cultivation methods, and limited educational levels and literacy may 
prevent individuals from shifting from one production method to the other. Also, multinational giants like Del 
Monte and Nolen, and local large cooperatives like Frutacor, dominate the fruit business, and the small farmers 
fear their competition. As a result, there were almost no producers interested in the program. In 2004, an 
internal document from the Morada Nova Irrigation Project showed that rice was still being cultivated in two 
thousand five hundred and eleven of the two thousand eight hundred and eighty-five hectares (87%) of the 
project. 
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owner of the local radio station and of some local businesses, started to publicly campaign 
against the program, and the group he represented continued to pump water from the river. 
COGERH then induced the local water committee, during a committee meeting, to take 
legal action against these producers. The committee supported this, and the local judge in 
charge of the process requested a technical report from COGERH itself. In the end, the 
judge ordered the pumps to be apprehended, and set a huge fine for anyone found pumping 
water from the river. This was the first time that a water committee had participated in a 
legal dispute, and it was framed as a historical victory in the new participatory approach. 
 Producers who were consulted about their non payment of water bills stated that the 
main reasons were: 1) There was not enough time to adjust their cost structures to take into 
account the new tariff. Most, if not all of them, had no idea about how much they would 
have to pay until they received the first bill. Since there are no individual water usage 
measurements, only macro-measurements that are based on stream flow in some sections of 
the river, the bills were calculated according to estimates associated with the kinds of crop 
being produced. This meant that many users were not sure of how much water they were 
using. Alternatively, each water license specifies an approximate amount of water allowed, 
and that could give them an idea of the bill, but most didn’t do the calculations ahead of 
time (many even saying that they had never received the approved license even after having 
completed and submitted the application); 2) There is a high rate of informal negotiations 
and flexibility in the farmers’ use of land: sometimes different producers use the same piece 
of land in different seasons; 3) As sometimes a producer “acquires” a piece of land, but there 
is no legal possession of irrigation lots in public irrigation areas, and they, knowing about 
COGERH’s lack of enforcement capabilities, decided not to pay to see what would happen; 
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and 4) For some, water is not a commodity, but is imbued with symbolic (religious) value, 
and therefore these individuals perceived charging for water as  immoral. 
 Overemphasis on negative results and billing mistakes in public discussions also 
worsened the public image of the water payment program. During the following Jaguaribe 
Commission meeting, a farmer complained that he received a bill of over one thousand reais, 
which is more than half of most small farmers’ annual income; this generated some panic 
among the members present from the poorer sector of the rural population. 
 The licensing question has ended up being associated with these payment issues, and 
many farmers won’t request licenses for fear of receiving water bills. COGERH made 
arrangements with other official institutions like BNB and SEMACE, so that farmers could 
not be issued SEMACE environmental licenses or BNB loans if they don’t have a 
COGERH license. On the other hand, there are some groups that have already accepted the 
idea of paying for water. These sectors are located closer to larger municipalities and are 
composed of mainly technicians, agronomists, municipal government employees, or 
members of the basin committees. 
 The approval of the Águas do Vale program in the Jaguaribe Commission meeting 
occurred in a context in which farmers had no option but to accept it, due to the serious 
water shortage at the time. This served as an effective semiotic strategy to legitimize the 
introduction of the program, and to test how the water payment program would be received 
by the community, leaving the commission, and not the government, held accountable for 
the results. When critics argue that a low level of water payments were made because of the 
program’s public image, and failure to gain legitimacy among the valley’s producers, the SRH 
rebuttal has been that the program was democratically approved in the water allocation 
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meeting. Two years later, during the 2003 Jaguaribe Commission meeting, top SRH officials 
announced that outstanding cases of non-payments would be sent to the judiciary if they 
were not shortly rectified. Also, licenses (which until 2004 had to be renewed annually) 
would not be issued to indebted producers, also meaning that they were not eligible for BNB 
loans, or for environmental licenses. 
What has been presented so far gives us an idea of the external environment in 
which water allocation occurs, specifically in terms of local cultural and political habits 
associated with water, and government agendas to establish participatory arenas that 
circumvent the political control of local leaders, even if, such as in the case of Buraco Fundo, 
local leaders are necessary for the management of local dams. The government also realized 
that it could legitimize its agenda if it could be framed as approved in participatory 
commissions. Nevertheless, this was not a simple task, and in order to understand the 
dynamics of this process, we will now analyze the internal dynamics of the water allocation 
meetings.
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10. The Water Allocation Ritual 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Typically, after the end of the rainy season (late June, early July), COGERH sends invitations 
by mail to each of the one hundred and seven voting members of the Jaguaribe 
Commission148. The chosen site for a commission meeting is usually an institution that offers 
the minimum infrastructure necessary. The municipality of Limoeiro do Norte has been 
frequently chosen, where an institution called NIT (Technological Information Center) has 
available a comfortable air-conditioned auditorium. For the meeting, sound infrastructure 
(microphones) and visual equipment (projectors) are prepared. All individuals attending the 
seminar receive a small booklet which outlines the technical information to be debated 
during the seminar. This booklet usually contains tables and graphs about reservoir levels, 
evaporation rates, proposed water release rates to be voted upon, and so on. Voting 
members receive color printed copies; other participants receive black and white 
photocopies. 
                                                 
148 During our fieldwork period, we attended a total of five commission meetings, three being in the Jaguaribe 
Valley and two in the Curu Valley. The structure of all the meetings attended was identical. 
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 In all meetings I attended, activities, scheduled to begin at 9 a.m., were always 
delayed at least forty minutes. In all cases, organizers were waiting for the State Water 
Resources Secretariat (SRH) head to arrive. The meetings are coordinated by a COGERH 
technician, who controls the events’ timing. This individual is usually the local manager for a 
basin, or someone with a higher rank, from Fortaleza. The first activity consists of the 
composition of the directive table: the head of SRH is called to the table, followed by the 
president of COGERH, representatives of DNOCS and EMATERCE, a representative of 
the municipality hosting the seminar (usually the municipal secretary of agriculture), and the 
presidents of the Jaguaribe Sub-Basin Committees.  
 Each member of the directive table gives a speech, starting with the head of SRH, 
then the president of COGERH, followed by the other members of the directive table. 
These speeches usually promote the importance of the seminar as a democratic event for 
water allocation, and speak of the necessity for greater organization and consolidation, so 
that the democratic process can be stabilized. The presentations also promote COGERH’s 
agenda, concerning such things as the necessity for every farmer in the valley to hold a water 
license, or the advantages of introducing the payment system as a management mechanism. 
 The directive table is then adjourned, and its members return to the auditorium. The 
COGERH technician leading the seminar then calls the invitees of the day to present 
specific topics of importance, such as payment for the use of water and its advantages, or the 
necessity to maintain riverbeds in good condition without barriers, or the urgency of 
discussing issues related to pollution control, and so on. Usually, after these presentations 
take place, discussions and debates arise from their content. The COGERH technician 
adjudicates, sometimes calling on other COGERH specialists for specific technical 
information. An interval is then held for lunch. 
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 The last presentation (which may be before or after lunch) is when the current 
situation of the reservoirs is discussed, and when the reservoir operation simulations are 
presented to the auditorium. This session is highly technical, and I observed that many 
individuals have difficulties with the technical language used, some momentarily losing 
interest and at times leaving the auditorium to have a coffee or to smoke a cigarette.  
 After the last presentation takes place, the auditorium is divided into three groups: 
the first group consists of all individuals living, producing or working in the Orós Basin up 
to the Castanhão149 Reservoir, who meet and deliberate over water release rates from the 
Orós valve. The same takes place for the Banabuiú Reservoir, involving users and 
communities from populations located around the reservoir up to the point where the 
Banabuiú River meets the Jaguaribe River, and a third group forms consisting of the 
participants from the river section in between Castanhão and Itaiçaba, where a barrier 
separates fresh and sea waters. 
 Each one of these groups then debate the simulations previously provided by 
COGERH. There are about six simulations provided for each reservoir, with different 
release rates, their associated rates of evaporation, and rates of volume decrease in available 
water. All simulations are mapped from the current reservoir situation (see figure 8 for a 
sample of the data discussed). The proposed values of water liberation pre-define the 
context in which the decision-making process takes place. 
 Sometimes the range of volumes suggested by COGERH is contested, i.e. the 
maximum or minimum suggested water release values. If they are questioned, COGERH 
technicians provide explanations based on technical details of the reservoir. Usually on these 
                                                 
149 Until 2001, the Orós and Banabuiú were the only reservoirs for which water allocation was negotiated 
during commission meetings. From 2002 onwards, discussions grew to include the Castanhão Reservoir. 
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occasions, we see irrigators located downstream from reservoirs – which in the Jaguaribe 
Valley are the majority - pressing for higher release rates, and COGERH technicians, along 
with farmers who produce around the reservoir and fisherpersons, argue for lower release 
rates. COGERH technicians join the lively debates during the meetings, and they usually act 
in a conservative manner in relation to water releases. The amount of water made available 
for public management, nevertheless, is politically pre-defined by the state government 
(SRH), and is based on the eventual need for water transfer from the Jaguaribe to the 
metropolitan area through the Canal do Trabalhador (Workers Canal). The values suggested by 
COGERH already take into consideration water volumes that are not open to democratic 
allocation – guaranteed human consumption level is one of these, and water destined for the 
Fortaleza metropolitan area is another150. 
 Debates concerning the volumes to be liberated seem to be based on pragmatic 
criteria. Users tend to play with their memories and perceptions to make correlations 
between the abstract numbers being discussed (flows in cubic meters per second, for 
instance), and the real situations of the river in question and their economic activity needs in 
past years. They make mental comparisons between how much water is being proposed to 
be liberated now and how much was liberated during the previous year. Then, based on an 
individuals’ evaluation of how much water was running in the sections of the river close to 
where they work, or in the irrigation channels they use, and through these memories, they 
decide if the proposed volume will be sufficient – i.e. they try to match numbers with past 
images of the river or of irrigation channels. The same applies to fishermen and members of 
communities close to reservoirs: past experiences are used as guides, and the numeric 
                                                 
150 When water storage levels in the metropolitan area reservoirs are high (as there were in 2004), there is no 
need to transfer waters from the Jaguaribe River, and in these circumstances the Workers Canal is not used 
except for local demand along the canal.  
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information offered by COGERH is rendered meaningful through a mental interpolation 
between a previous year’s number (volume released), the perception of the previous year’s 
real water availability, and this year’s proposed volume, which results in an evaluation of 
whether the proposed volume is good, not enough, or too much. That is the process 
through which farmers learn, through repeated participation in such meetings, how to make 
sense of the abstract numbers used in the technical discussions. 
 The actors will then defend their interests (generally according to the gross taxonomy 
of stakeholders presented in appendix 2). One important pattern of action is that groups 
classified as water users tend to fight for water availablity close to them, meaning that, as 
mentioned, groups located around the reservoirs (upstream) tend to fight against water 
release, while groups located downstream tend to fight for water release. Many interesting 
outcomes can result from these discussions: stakeholders may negotiate a specific release rate 
associated with the promise by one sector or group to clean the riverbed in order to improve 
the stream flow, and increase the water levels in an irrigation project area downstream; 
variable rates of liberation may be approved, in which the released volume will increase or 
decrease during the dry season, for specific reasons. The COGERH technicians leading the 
discussion write down all deliberations on a large sheet of white paper taped to a wall. They 
also enforce the preference for a consensual decision. Arguments and debates continue for 
hours in an attempt to reach consensus. If consensus is impossible, the decision is made 
through the taking of a vote.  
 When the three sub-groups reach their decisions, the COGERH technician leading 
the activities asks the attendants to return to the auditorium, the results of each deliberation 
are read out aloud, and recorded in the seminar’s report. The technician then congratulates 
all who participated in the seminar, reinforces the importance of the meeting as a democratic 
  
303
mechanism, and declares the seminar closed. The voting members present then sign the 
attendance sheet. 
 Shortly after the seminar, COGERH prepares a summary of the activities and 
deliberations of the commission, and the State Water Council for Water Resources 
(CONERH) meets and (usually) approves them. 
 
A closer look at the decision making process 
One recurrent rhetorical debating strategy is the use of sophisticated language and the 
phrasing of specific political interests in technical terms, and in doing so, enacting local 
ideological configurations that link social status to formal schooling, literacy, and ability to 
perform verbally in public events. This strategy makes use of the pronounced socio-
economic and educational differences among participants, in which the capacity for technical 
language use transforms speech into authoritative discourse.  
 The Commission meeting is structured and conducted in such a way that technical 
language and approaches are hyper-valued, to the detriment of other register types. This is 
reflected in the way in which the first half of the meeting is important in defining how the 
second half will take place.  
 There are clear ritualistic features in the meeting. During the morning, for two to 
three hours, different technicians lecture about important issues related to water 
management that affect the everyday lives of most producers - like the maintenance of 
irrigation canals, pollution, licenses, and reservoir management. They stand on a stage that is 
above floor level and, using a microphone, comment on slides being projected on to a wall. 
These individuals are specialists and are treated as authorities in what they will lecture about. 
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They are also, naturally, presented as specialists, which is a clear aspect of the metapragmatics 
of making specific and verbal reference to people’s social ranks, which in this case is indexed 
by schooling or training, or by posts held in local institutions. This is an aspect of the 
organization of the activities that affect everyone, since individuals asked to identify 
themselves do so by saying their names, municipality where they come from, and 
institutional affiliation before they speak. I realized that people mention their ranks if this 
information will increase their perceived status in the meeting. Farmers usually introduce 
themselves as “producer at the irrigation project X” or solely as “water user in the 
municipality of Y,” while individuals holding managerial roles in associations or 
governmental agencies make explicit reference to their positions – as presidents, directors, 
managers, supervisors, heads of municipal secretariats, and in this list we see, in equal 
situation, the categories of engineers (from DNOCS, for instance) and technicians (e.g. from 
COGERH or EMATERCE). 
 The extensive use of the technical register is perceived as a problem by some of the 
event organizers, as we can see in the fragment of an interview below, with a COGERH 
technician that participated in the creation of the Jaguaribe Commission in 1994:  
 
Um aspecto importante é essa questão da linguagem técnica. Nós estamos tentando estabelecer 
algumas formas de comunicação, como cartilhas que agente utiliza aqui. É uma tentativa de 
aproximar essa linguagem técnica da linguagem mais popular. Apesar de que, nessas bacias 
(do Jaguaribe e Banabuiú), você vai encontrar um quadro técnico bastante desenvolvido. No 
vale do Banabuiú, a gente vai, junto com a comissão a cada localidade, discutir como é que se 
deu o processo de operação para os produtores. Mas essa questão da comunicação, como chega 
até a população, às vezes não é aferida. 
 
One important aspect of this issue is the technical language. We are trying to 
create some communication channels, like the use of pedagogical booklets. 
That is na attempt to approximate the technical language and the popular 
language. Even though in the Jaguaribe and Banabuiú basins you will find a 
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well developed group of local technicians. In the Banabuiú Valey, (after the 
water allocation meeting) we visit the districts, together with the water 
allocation commission, and we discuss with local producers how the water 
allocation process took place. But this communication issue, how this 
information reaches the population. That is something not measured. 
 
 
 COGERH faced problems with the technical language also when the company 
decided to create a database with managerial data from water users in the Jaguaribe 
Valley. Interviewees did not understand basic questions that were considered 
fundamental in order to create a database with useful information – such as the 
concept of stream flow (vazão), for instance. The technician responsible for the water 
users database explained: 
 
Renzo Taddei: Eles não entendiam o conceito de vazão? 
Técnico: Não. 
Renzo Taddei: Que tipo de usuário nos estamos falando?  
Técnico: Interessante, uma coisa terrível é que, de uma primeira mão, a gente acreditava ser 
só aquele irrigante (pequeno), que são a maioria dos usuários de água bruta, parecia que só 
ele não entendia o que era vazão. Mas mesmo em alguns meios mais avançados, onde o grau 
de instrução não era tão baixo, também não sabiam o que tava sendo perguntado. Então o 
que é que a gente fez? Não adiante você forçar muito nessas perguntas. Você usa variáveis 
indiretas, e a gente fez um modelinho que a partir de medias climatológicas locais, a gente já 
tinha a evapotranspiração calculada aqui, agora quando eu peço pra ele qual a área em que 
ele esta situado, que cultura ele faz, método de irrigação, coisas que ele sabe responder. A 
partir daí eu posso estimar qual seria as necessidades de água dele.  
Renzo Taddei: Quer dizer que eles não controlavam a quantidade de água? Se um sujeito 
estava fazendo a cultura do arroz, por exemplo, como ele sabia a quantidade de água a usar? 
Técnico: Por que que o arroz de forma muito, como eu diria, inadequada, foi ocupando todo o 
estado? Uma das teses que eu acho que é bastante valida é a seguinte: os métodos de irrigação. 
Quanto mais eu avanço em termos tecnológicos, quanto mais eu saio de irrigação de superfície, 
aspersão, e localizada, eu preciso saber, eu vou precisando mais de ter conhecimento de 
quando e quanto irrigar. Já na irrigação de superfície, eu não preciso responder essas duas 
perguntas, eu coloco uma quantidade de água, e a planta vai ter água na sua potencialidade, 
e consequentemente vai produzir de forma potencial. A medida que eu vou pra sulco, eu 
ainda tenha a chance de aplicar a lamina adequada. Mas quando eu vou para aspersão, isso 
já modifica um pouco; quando eu for para a localizada, isso modifica muito, e assim 
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sucessivamente. Consequentemente, as respostas positivas de métodos induziam os agricultores 
naquela direção. Por isso que cerca de 50% da nossa água esta toda neste tipo de irrigação. 
Chega a ser 50% inundação, e em torno de 20% sulco, dando uma faixa de 70% de 
irrigação de baixa eficiência. Pra mim uma forma de mudar isso talvez fosse dar condição do 
produtor saber, ter uma noção clara, mudar de geração de irrigação. Ele entender que eu 
preciso de aplicar quantidades exatas em tempo determinados. 
Renzo Taddei: O conceito de vazão não é um termo central em reuniões de usuário? Que 
capacidade tem esse pequeno irrigante de entender o que é que esta sendo discutido? 
Técnico: Essa é uma magia de criar uma linguagem, e aos poucos eles vão entendendo e 
fazendo uma analogia com algumas outras variáveis mais tranqüilas. Por exemplo, se você 
trabalhar com uma vazão x e ela tem uma outra variável, que e a depressão do açude, e ele 
entende bem isso, a medida que varia o volume do açude, que é o ponto de referencia dele, ele 
entende com facilidade aquilo. Então, para os valores ele até pode não ter tanta clareza assim, 
o que que é efetivamente, mas ele tem noção. Ate as vezes eu comparo com a questão de 
lamina precipitada, um conceito bem abstrato, difícil, ele então fala assim, “choveu tantos 
milímetros”, as pessoas já tem uma clareza por associação. Alguém explicou num 
determinado momento, então eu associo com uma chuva, como uma quantidade de água. E 
depois, com o exercício disso, ele começa a ter noção. Então tem um valor que ele entende com 
muita clareza, que é o nível do açude, o açude vai descendo, descendo, e ele já conhecia isso, ele 
já trabalhava a base, o açude tem pouca água, o açude tem muita água, e a gente vem 
trabalhando isso desde 94. Então tem toda uma construção de um linguajar ao longo do 
tempo, não e tão simples assim.  
 
Renzo Taddei: So they couldn’t understand [make use of] the concept of 
stream flow? 
Technician: They couldn’t. 
Renzo Taddei: What is the profile of the water user we are talking about here? 
Technician: Interestingly, a terrible thing was that, at first glance, we imagined 
that only those (small) irrigators, which are the numeric majority of consumers 
of bulk water, would not understand the idea [make use of the concept] of 
stream flow. But even in some more advanced groups, where the formal 
education rates were not so low, they also did not know what we were asking. 
So what did we do? You should not push them too much with these questions. 
So we decided to use indirect variables, and we created a mathematical model 
using local climatologic information, we already had the evapotranspiration 
rates calculated, and then when I asked the producer where he was located, 
what crop he grew, and what irrigation method he used, he could answer that. 
From that information I can calculate their water necessities. 
Renzo Taddei: That means that they did not control the amount of water they 
were using? If someone was cultivating rice, for instance, how did he know the 
right amount of water to use? 
Technician: Why did rice, very inappropriately, I would say, occupy the whole 
state? One hypothesis that I believe is valid explains that through the irrigation 
method. The more I advance in terms of technology, the more I distance 
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myself from flooding, (towards) sprinklers and dripping, the more I need to 
know when and how much water to use. In the method of flooding, I don’t 
need to know these two things, I use a given amount of water, and the crop 
will have more water than needed and the efficiency in terms of harvest will be 
high. When I use the method of furrows, I can also use the proper amount of 
water (without having to know precisely the amount of water being used). But 
when I go to sprinklers, that changes a bit, and if I use dripping, that changes a 
lot, and so on. 
Consequently, the good results (of the flooding methods) induced producers to 
adopt it. That is why around 50% of our water is used through this type of 
irrigation method. We have up to 50% in flooding, and around 20% furrows, 
totaling 70% of low efficiency irrigation. I believe that one way of changing 
that would be to enable the producer to know, to have a clear notion, and 
change the irrigation technology. He has to know I need to use exact amounts 
at the right times. 
Renzo Taddei: Isn’t the concept of stream flow a central element in the water 
allocation meetings? How can the small farmer understand what is being 
discussed in those meetings? 
Technician: That’s the magic of creating a language, and slowly they start to 
understand and to make analogies with other variables they are more used to. 
For instance, when you work with a rate x of stream flow, there is another 
variable, which is the level of the water in the dam, and the producer 
understands that well. He knows that the level decreases when the volume of 
water accumulated in the dam decreases, and he easily understands that. So he 
may not be so clear about the numbers (of stream flow rates), but he has a 
notion. Sometimes, I compare this with the issue of the precipitation film, 
which is a very abstract concept, a dificult one. So when someone says, “it 
rained x millimeters,” people already understand that by association (with water 
volume). Through time, with repetition, the individual starts to understand. So 
there is a variable that the producer understands very clearly, which is the water 
level in the dam, the water levels goes down, down, down and he knows about 
that, the dam is empty, then the dam is full, and we have been working with 
that since 1994. So there is a whole language constructed over time, and it’s not 
that simple. 
 
 
 Even if the farmer and the technician disagree on the referential content of 
utterances, specialists and technicians, in their condition of authorities, send out constant 
metapragmatic messages concerning the correct register and conceptual framework to be 
used for the context. In doing this, a genre is defined as authoritative. And it is constantly 
evoked in individuals’ attempts to gain control over the activities of the afternoon. 
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 Thus, during the afternoon debates, it has been observed that having command of 
the proper technical language is a crucial factor for the construction of interactional 
dominance. This strategy is used as an attempt to index commission members as either 
knowledgeable or unknowledgeable individuals, and to symbolically organize interactions in 
a way that the first are seen as having the authority to lead the latter category, and the latter 
are seen as having to follow this authority due to their “ignorance.” These rhetorical moves 
are counterbalanced by the actions of technicians associated with church groups, with 
universities, and with community associations; sometimes EMATERCE employees end up 
taking-on the role of informal representatives for small farmers and fishermen in the arena 
of sophisticated phraseology.  
 In any case, these configurations are combined with the debate’s tendencies as 
commented upon above (in which groups located around reservoirs will tend to fight against 
groups downstream, many times regardless of their activities or social status). During the 
verbal interchange, the authority to define the proper allocation choice is continuously 
disputed, and during the early stages of the meeting, blocks are formed according to their 
geographic location in relation to the reservoir. An internal dispute among groups within 
these blocks then takes place, in order to define who has the authority (which in this case 
also means the technical ability) to speak on behalf of the block. As a result, conflict between 
the upstream and downstream blocks takes place through verbal debate between the most 
technically capable representatives of each block. For instance, technicians from municipal 
water agencies located upstream and fishermen from communities located on the reservoir 
margins tend to have coinciding goals (opposing high rates of water release). However, the 
first tends to be part of the educated technical middle classes of the small urban centers of 
the hinterland, and the latter are usually the poorest and less formally educated individuals in 
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attendance. So it is not unusual for the first, naturally and without explicit agreement, to 
assume the role of representing the latter in the debates. Furthermore, by declaring a larger 
representation, a representative is in a better position. Therefore, the poorer groups are 
frequently used as resources during argumentation. Another common rhetorical move is to 
defend ecological positions in order to hide economic interests of a group in favor of a 
particular argument (such as for the maintenance of a higher release rate so that the stream 
flow will revive distant river sectors, keeping the river’s ecosystem alive).   
 Nevertheless, the debates are normally open to all individuals present at the meeting. 
Usually, and especially in years of water scarcity, the number of attendants is much higher 
than the number of voting members151. This means that while the commission group is 
attempting to reach consensus, everyone present can influence the debate. But if the ability 
to command a particular technical register is the filter for verbal participation, and even 
though many groups exert pressure through mass attendance, most of these people will not 
participate verbally besides taking part in the (politically effective) collective mumbling that 
occurs after arguments are presented, as signs of approval or disapproval. Popular civil 
society organizations, like community associations and unions, are usually the groups 
responsible for bringing these types of crowds to the meetings. If a consensus is not reached, 
and voting must be exercised, then only those one hundred and seven voting members can 
participate, as part of one of the three subgroups (Orós, Banabuiú, or Castanhão). This is a 
moment in which underprivileged groups and actors suffer due to their lack of infrastructure 
(mainly in terms of transportation), since it does not matter how many union members are 
                                                 
151 An example given to us, illustrating how important these meetings are, was that the date chosen for the 2002 
seminar coincided with the date of a Brazilian national soccer team match in the World Cup. COGERH 
technicians expected the meeting to have fewer attendants due to this; however it turned out that the match did 
not affect attendance, and on the day there were not enough seats in the auditorium to accommodate the 
number of attendees. 
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present, if the official representatives – i.e. voting members - are not present, their votes are 
lost. Voters are then called to manifest themselves verbally and publicly. The COGERH 
technician counts the votes and writes them on the piece of paper taped to a wall. 
 The discussions, and the voting process, may deliberate over other elements besides 
the reservoir volume to be released. For instance, in cases of acute water shortages, they may 
debate the appropriate criteria for water rationing. 
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11. The Multiple Meanings of Participation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Question of Representativeness 
When COGERH decided to intercede in the management of conflicts over water, and 
created the Jaguaribe Water Allocation Commission, there was no local and direct 
representative political resistance against it. Most people did not know exactly what it was; 
while others were suspicious about the government’s attempts to transform local political 
processes, and decided not to participate. Of this group, the most important case is that of 
left-wing social movements or organizations like the MST or the Catholic Church Land 
Pastoral Committee (CPT). It is understood, by some of the local leaders of these 
movements, that the government is increasingly using local participatory commissions for 
the purpose of legitimizing their own agendas. This can be seen in the words of a member of 
a local NGO who, despite his distrust in the government, decided to participate in the water 
commission: 
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Havia um certo temor que essa proposta de gerenciamento participativo das agues nada mais 
fosse, senão outro programa do “governo das mudanças”, que visava cooptar lideranças e 
movimentos sociais. E haviam exemplos de sobra desses programas que falavam de 
‘participação’, mas que tinham como objetivo principal desmobilizar a sociedade, deixando-a 
dividida em quantidade enorme de associações comunitárias que tinha o único objetivo de 
conseguir um benefício do Estado e que eram controladas pelas velhas lideranças políticas 
locais, - que inclusive escolhiam nome das associações e seus dirigentes – que sempre estiveram 
próximos ao poder. Assim surgiram os CMDS’s (Conselho Municipal de Desenvolvimento 
Sustentável), o Projeto São José e vários conselhos municipais. Então você pode imaginar, o 
que pensávamos quando ouvimos falar em Comitê de Bacia, logicamente, que todo mundo 
ficou ‘com o pé atrás’. Inclusive tivemos uma certa dúvida com relação a nossa participação, 
mas resolvemos aderir ao processo de discussão sobre a formação dos comitês e de deliberação 
das agues dos vales do Jaguaribe e Banabuiú, devido a percepção que os grandes produtores de 
Limoeiro do Norte e do Baixo Jaguaribe estavam participando das discusses. Então 
começamos a participar para evitar que os grandes produtores prejudicassem os pequenos 
agricultures, mas com bastante receio e prontos para nos afastar a qualquer momento (In 
Garjulli et al., 2002, p. 23). 
 
There was a certain fear that this participative water management proposal was 
no more than another program of the “Government of Changes,” with the 
intention to coopt leaders and social movements. And we had many previous 
examples of such programs, which talked about ‘participation,’ but whose main  
objective was demobilization of society, leaving it divided in an enormous 
amount of community associations. Their only goal was getting benefits from 
the State, and were controlled by old local political leaders, who even picked 
the name of the associations and their leaders. These political leaders were 
always close to institutionalized power. That’s how programs like the CMDS 
(Municipal Council for Sustainable Development), the Saint Joseph Project, 
and many municipal councils were created. So you can imagine what came to 
our minds when we heard about water committees for the first time. We 
naturally adopted a distrustful position. We were not even sure if we should 
take part in that, but we decided to participate in the discussions for the 
creation of the water committees and the water allocation process, because we 
knew that the large producers of Limoeiro do Norte and the Low Jaguaribe 
Valley were participating. We joined the discussions to protect the small 
farmers from being harmed by the large producers, but we still had a great 
degree of mistrust, and we were ready to leave at any moment. 
 
 
 Another important aspect in the commission’s creation is that COGERH technicians 
discursively framed it as an effort to democratize water-related decisions in the hinterland. 
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Democratization, since the 1980s, has been a major Brazilian meta-narrative, and few would 
utter a word against it.  
 However, most importantly of all, some local political elite groups quickly realized 
that they would come out better off in the water allocation game than small farmers – due to 
their intuition about what later became reality, that is, their greater ability to command the 
technical language and to perform as required in the commission meetings, as exposed in the 
previous section - and for this reason they soon became fierce supporters of the commission.  
 Each voting member, who officially acts in the commission as a representative of a 
group or social sector, is supposed to communicate the contents to the other members of 
the institution/community. Our interviews revealed that very few do this, with the exception 
of some Rural Workers Unions, church organizations (especially those linked to Caritas), or 
groups that send a large number of participants to attend the seminar  annually (usually 
groups that have experienced water shortages in previous years), in order to exert crowd 
pressure during voting. If the invitation is shared, local communication networks are used, 
such as local radio programs, messages during church services, church loudspeakers, and 
cars with loudspeakers attached to their roofs (picture 32). Usually, opinion makers in the 
group induce discussions previous to the meeting about the position the local representative 
and the group attending the seminar should take.  
 COGERH technicians are aware of the fact that there is a problem of representativeness 
of the representatives, that is, most of the voting members do not act in favor of their group 
as the democratic model imagined by the institution prescribes. Often, voting members act 
without previously consulting with the individuals he or she supposedly represents. Very 
often the voting individual is a local political leader, and his/her leadership is not based on 
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democratic consultation but on his or her authority over a local population. In this regard, it 
is important to note that the most established local political rituals do not aim to collectively 
solve local problems, but rather aim to define who has the authority to deal with problems at 
hand. This occurs in elections, for instance, in which it is decided who will be the local 
patron in control of the municipal government apparatus for the following four years. 
Understanding this is important in order to grasp how local rural populations perceive the 
role of leadership and authority, which in turn is reflected in the form that leadership takes 
inside local associations and cooperatives. It is natural for those who viewed the new 
participatory water allocation commission as a radical political novelty, to continue 
perceiving participation in these political rituals, although novel, as something to either 
define authority or to report and deal with problems in the terrain of those with authority 
(for this case, to report and liaise with COGERH). As we will see, the way in which the 
water allocation ritual has been structured reinforces such understanding rather than 
opposing it. 
 It is important to add that none of the associations that constitute the commission 
were created with the original intention of participating in water management; some 
associations are very general in their scope, such as the rural workers unions. These unions 
tend to provide legal support to landless workers and small farmers; water management 
issues aren’t usually on union leaders’ agendas. Rural worker union leaders are very often 
victims of political violence, and therefore many tend to adopt a discrete participation style. 
Others, such as associations for public irrigation project producers, are usually created with 
specific goals, such as to protect their membership from any middlemen charging high prices 
for tractor time or pesticides. Most associations of this nature don’t represent all producers 
of an irrigation area.  
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 There is also the situation in which non-participation in associative activities is 
strategic. When I asked the president of a shrimp producers association in the Baixo 
Jaguaribe basin if the decisions taken in commission meetings were communicated to the 
associates of the institution, he said that, because of the water tariff discussion, most avoided 
even knowing what was going on: 
 
Renzo Taddei: Quando as decisões são tomadas nas reuniões da commissão de alocação de 
água, as informações chegam aos associados?  
Presidente da associação: Normalmente não. Por exemplo, aqui a gente tem dificuldade de 
traze-los. Na época que tinha o dinheiro para financiamento aqui, qualquer reunião era 
lotado o nosso auditório. Hoje em dia uma assembléia geral ou uma ordinária, a gente 
consegue reunir 20% somente. Nós somos em 330. Então, ainda mais para falar sobre isso, 
eles não querem nem ouvir. Eles não querem ouvir, eles evitam de saber. É, aquela história, 
quem não conhece a Bíblia acha que não está pecando. A partir do momento que você começa 
a conhecer a Bíblia , você vai ver que está pecando. Então, as vezes tem gente evita conhecer, 
para não saber qual é o pecado que está cometendo. E assim são eles. Eles preferem não 
saber como é que está esse negócio. “Não, eu não quero nem saber. Tem água na minha 
porta eu, vou puxar”. 
 
Renzo Taddei: When the decisions are made in the water allocation 
commission meetings, does this information reach the associates? 
President of the association: Usually not. For instance, we have a hard time 
bringing people to meetings. When we had credit for our activity, every 
meeting filled the auditorium. Today in general or ordinary assembly meetings, 
we can only get 20% of members. There are three hundred and thirty members. 
So especially if we will deal with water tariffs, they don’t want to know, don’t 
want to hear about it. It’s the same old story, those who don’t know the Bible 
think they are not living in sin. So sometimes there are people who avoid 
knowing it, in order not to know which sins they are committing. That’s how 
they are. Thay prefer not to know how the thing is going. (They say:) “I don’t 
want to know. If there is water in my place I’ll pump it.” 
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Infrastructure Issues and Institutional Instability 
Lack of minimal infrastructure is a common complaint received from commission members. 
The primary issue is the lack of transportation to attend meetings. The groups will try to 
allocate resources to transport participants to commission meeting, and the scraping 
together of resources can be a major problem for some groups, in which case local leaders 
and politicians are often asked to contribute, which in turn creates future political obligation 
(picture 33). Besides the problems of transportation, there is another issue that may prevent 
people from attending the seminars: one day spent at the seminar is one lost production day. 
These problems affect underprivileged groups more than wealthier ones, or representatives 
of official institutions and municipal governments. This is one of the factors that can sway 
the results of allocation seminars towards the interests of better structured and resourced 
groups. Interestingly, the three presidents of the older water committees in the Jaguaribe 
Valley – that is, the Baixo Jaguaribe (Low Jaguaribe), Médio Jaguaribe (Middle Jaguaribe), and 
Banabuiú committees - are linked to municipal governments, representing local political 
elites. 
The reticence of the government regarding these complaints could be attributed to 
internal disputes inside the top levels of the state government regarding how much power 
the commissions should have. There are clear signs of internal resistance towards the 
delegation of political power from the central agencies in Fortaleza (SRH and COGERH) to 
local committees. Perhaps the clearest example of this occurred in 2001, when a member of 
the state council for water resources, Professor Antonio Nunes de Miranda, an engineer and 
professor at the Federal University of Ceará, criticized the governmental effort to transfer 
some decision-making power to the local water allocation commissions, saying that the state 
could lose control over its reservoirs. This led to the state council passing a resolution to re-
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position the committees as being consultative rather than deliberative 152 . This change 
provoked negative reactions from members of the Jaguaribe Commission. 
 The commission holds no guarantee that its deliberations on any issue will be 
adopted, since deliberative power regarding water issues is primarily in the hands of the state 
council, with the head of the state’s Water Resources Secretariat (SRH) as its president. 
According to the understanding of some commission members and COGERH employees, 
there is an informal agreement that the state council will approve the commission’s 
“deliberations” over reservoir management. Commission members, who are also members 
of the basin water committees, have been fighting for the inclusion of seats in the state 
council for their representatives. SRH has signaled that one seat may be reserved for the 
committees in the future. In the water management circles of the state, the state council is 
seen as an institution composed of members who are under the political control of the top 
spheres of government, and who have little connection with the water resources world153. 
Even SRH employees admitted this fact, but all also mentioned that the composition of the 
state council would probably change in the near future. 
 
 
                                                 
152 This created some confusion regarding the legal attributes of committees, since the national water law gives 
them the power to decide on issues of water allocation. 
153 The composition of the State Council for Water Resources, according to the law 11.996/1992 is as follows: 
head of the Water Resources Secretariat (SRH) - president; representatives of other state secretariats - 
Administration and Planning (SEPLAN); Transportation, Energy, Communications and Constructions 
(SETECO); Agriculture (SEAGRI); Industry and Commerce (SIC); Social Action (SAS); Development and 
Environment (SDU) – providing a total of six members; one DNOCS representative; one UFC (Federal 
University of Ceará) representative; one representative from the Association of Mayors from the state of Ceará; 
one representative from the Brazilian Association of Water Resources (ABRH); one representative from the 
Brazilian Association of Sanitation Engineering; one representative from the state judicial department; and one 
representative from the Agricultural and Water Resources office of the state’s Legislative Assembly (Assembléia 
Legislativa). 
  
318
Still, the Legitimacy Problem: Sabotage 
The annual Jaguaribe Commission Water Allocation Meetings have not eradicated sabotage 
cases, and this in turn may signal the limits of the commission in terms of its legitimacy both 
to allocate water, and to solve local conflicts. In June 2003, group discussion concerning the 
allocation of the Banabuiú waters at the Jaguaribe Commission meeting decided that some 
limited flow should be directed to a small community called Riacho Seco, which is 
geographically located behind the Morada Nova Irrigation Project. For the water to reach 
this community, it has to travel through the irrigation canals of the irrigation project, from 
one end to the other, to then be released into the community’s river bed. The whole group 
approved the Riacho Seco community request, including representatives of the Morada 
Nova Irrigation Project. But in practice, when the water entered the irrigation project canals, 
it was not allowed to flow any further due to the refusal of local irrigators. Because of this, 
one night in August, the last gate of the Morada Nova Irrigation Project was broken, forcing 
the release of some water into the river bed. Irrigators from the project were very angry, and 
COGERH technicians quickly set up a meeting to arbitrate the conflict, which could have 
escalated to the point of physical violence between the communities. During the meeting, 
the argument that water release had been approved during the previous Jaguaribe 
Commission meeting was not convincing enough for local irrigators. In the end, the 
irrigators were convinced by a combination of two different arguments, presented by the 
COGERH technician leading the meeting, as we can see below:  
 
Como eu falei aqui inicialmente, (essa situação) me preocupa muito, porque já tive 
oportunidade de participar de outras discussões, de outras debates como estes aqui, isso é 
importante, isso cresce as pessoas. Mas nós temos que trabalhar com os pros e contra, quem 
tá na chuva é pra se molhar, não tem essa a história. Então, eu vou dar um exemplo bem 
prático: a água do açude Cipoada, esse ano, só tinha como chegar água lá pra atender o 
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abastecimento humano, e o pessoal ali pra baixo não tinha água, certo, não tinha água, por 
que não tinha. Nós fizemos o maior sacrifício pra água chegar lá, e quando a barragem tava 
enchendo, apareceu alguém por lá e arrombou, quebrou e a água foi embora, certo? Então eu 
tô trazendo um dado concreto para os senhores aqui, pra que a gente tenha a preocupação de 
que quando você barra totalmente (a negociação), poderá acontecer algum transtorno pra vocês 
e causar prejuízos muito maiores que você deixar um centímetro ou dois ali no conta-gotas, 
né? Não estou dizendo que isso vai acontecer, e Deus permita que isso não aconteça, mas que 
existe o risco, vocês sabem que existe porque já aconteceu de quebrarem o cadeado. 
(…) 
Mas uma coisa é certa: a gente a gente se surpreende quando se depara com uma reunião 
dessa, onde não há (predisposição para) negociação, porque a COGERH só trabalha com 
negociação. Na reunião (de alocação de água deste ano), pra chegar a 9 (metros por Segundo 
de vazão) que foi um grande ganho para o perímetro, e foi a COGERH que coordenou, 
junto com o DNOCS, uma negociação. Se a COGERH fosse para não negociar, era muito 
complicado, né? A COGERH mesmo achava que era melhor trabalhar com 7,5, 
tecnicamente achava, mas não pode chegar e amarrar isso, então chegou a 9, que era um 
interesse dos usuários, do perímetro, chegou a nove, ou seja, aumentou um bocado do que era. 
Ou seja, o principio da coisa é negociar. E tem mais um fator, quando não é possível 
negociar, a coisa não termina por aí, existem outras instancias que precisam negociar um 
momento, eu não sei se isso vai ocorrer, mas quando não se negocia em uma instancia, surge 
outras, surge a justiça… eu to dizendo a realidade, existe muitas situações que não foi 
possível negociar e se acabou em outra instancia, por isso que o ideal é sempre negociar, antes 
de chegar nas outras. 
 
As I said in the beginning, (this situation) seriously worries me, because I have 
participated in other discussions and debates like this, and this is important, 
this makes people grow. But we have to work with the pros and cons, if you go 
out in the rain you know you will get wet, so there’s no way back. I will give 
you a very practical example: there was water available in the Cipoada dam, this 
year, for nothing other than human consumption. There was no water for 
those people downstream; there was no water at all. We made all sorts of 
sacrifices to make that water reach the dam, and when the dam was being 
filled, someone went there and destroyed, broke (the valve) and the water went 
away, ok? So I am bringing you a real factor to be taken in consideration, so we 
can be advised that when you obstruct completely (the negotiation), you may 
have future headaches, and financial losses that will greatly surpass what these 
one or two controlled centimeters of water [the object of the negotiation] 
represent, right? I am not saying that it will happen, God may not allow it to 
happen, but there is the risk, and you know because it someone broke the lock 
once before.  
(…) 
Yet one thing is right: we are very surprised when we arrive at a meeting like 
this, where there is no (predisposition to) negotiate, because COGERH only 
works with negotiation. (In this year’s water allocation meeting), the approved 
release rate of nine cubic meters per second was a big victory for the irrigation 
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project, and it was COGERH, with DNOCS, who coordinated the negotiation. 
If COGERH did not want to negotiate, it would get really complicated, right? 
We at COGERH believed that the best thing was to work with seven and a 
half cubic meters per second, technically speaking. But you cannot go there 
and obstruct the negotiation. So the rate reached nine cubic meters per second, 
that is, it was increased considerably. Therefore, the main principle to be used 
is negotiation. And there is one more factor: when there is no way to negotiate, 
things do not stop there, but there are other negotiation levels. I don’t know if 
this will happen in this case, but when there is no negotiation at one level, 
other levels are used, there is the legal system… I am telling the truth, there 
were many situations in which negotiation was not possible and that ended up 
at other levels. That is why it’s ideal to be open to negotiation, before the 
decision reaches higher levels.  
 
 
In his speech, the technician argues that whenever neighboring communities (such as 
Riacho Seco) felt they were being disadvantaged, the irrigators were running the risk of 
becoming victims of sabotage once again. He complements his argument saying that 
whenever negotiation at one level was not possible, a higher decision authority would have 
to be involved, making explicit reference to the judicial system – which, in Brazil, is generally 
seen as a slow, inefficient, and many times class-biased bureaucratic apparatus; in other 
words, something to be avoided. This was a compelling argument, and finally the project 
irrigators reconsidered their position. 
In 2004, the spectacularly intense rains of January filled most of the reservoirs 
managed by COGERH. The president of the company declared that water storage was 
sufficient for the next two years, even if it did not rain at all. The general feeling among 
irrigators of the Jaguaribe Valley was that the abundance of water would mean the 
inexistence of conflicts. Because of this, the Annual Jaguaribe Commission for Water 
Allocation Meeting had a very small attendance – only 40% of the voting members attended 
the meeting. However, even though most factions were satisfied, there was one group that 
would be negatively affected by the full reservoirs: the vazanteiros, the irrigators who cultivate 
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within reservoir limits. For this group, it is favorable when water is released from a reservoir 
valve, and the water level goes down, uncovering some land. These lands are very moist and 
usually extremely fertile, and therefore DNOCS distributed permits for their cultivation. On 
the other hand, when the reservoir is full, these farmers have no land to cultivate, so they 
favor a certain release rate, just enough for a small amount of land to be uncovered by the 
water. They were the only sector who expected conflict surrounding the abundance of water 
supply, and they were also the main group to attend the commission meeting. From the 
group of over thirty voting members (besides the non-voting annual attendees) responsible 
for allocating waters from the Orós Reservoir, only ten attended the 2004 meeting, most of 
them being vazanteiros. Because of their unprecedented numeric majority, they had no trouble 
in approving the decision for the application of a higher release rate from the Lima Campos 
Reservoir, a small dam connected to the Orós by a canal, so that their lands would be 
uncovered, and so that they could re-commence cultivation. However, when this took place 
in practice, it caused a big stir in the Icó-Lima Campos Irrigation Project, located just 
downstream from the Lima Campos Reservoir. This project had remained almost paralyzed 
for over four years due to the lack of water in the Lima Campos Reservoir, during a period 
in which many irrigators experienced financial losses and many hardships. Although the 
recent high water levels in the same dam brought new hopes to these irrigators, when they 
witnessed the high volume of water being released, they immediately reacted against it. A 
group of individuals from the irrigation project broke the chains that guarded access to the 
reservoir’s valve, entered the valve station and closed off the flow of water (see picture 39). 
Once again COGERH and DNOCS interceded, and the commission’s previous decision 
was overturned. The case ended up in the judiciary, where an agreement between irrigators 
and vazanteiros was finally made. 
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Semiotically transforming the space for decision making 
Through the creation of the basin committees and reservoir commissions, the government 
instituted a novel political space in which core water conflicts would be exposed, framed in 
time and space, structured by the characteristics of the particular technical discourse in use, 
the interactional dynamics could be metapragmatically organized, and conflicts would 
therefore become more manageable due to the imposition of these regimentations. The 
government set the pace of the process of instituting participatory commissions, which, as 
we saw earlier, alienated the most well developed institutions of civil society linked to social 
movements in the hinterland (something that was detected in many other studies of the 
creation of participatory water commissions in Brazil. See Cardoso, 2003; Dino, n.d.). At the 
same time, another important conceptual novelty proved to be politically convenient for the 
government: framing the committee meetings as “democratic events” meant a transference 
of accountability for water allocation from the state water agencies to the commissions 
themselves. This shift caused some politico-semiotic vertigo because it disarticulated the 
widespread political discourse structured around the presumption that the state government 
– as a patron in a clientalistic relationship - should be responsible for the well being of its 
population.  
At the same time, the Jaguaribe Commission created a mid-ground political level 
between the state government and the local level political realm 154 . After successful 
experiences with participatory commissions in other areas, government technicians realized 
that through such commissions the chain of political clientalistic ties that characterized the 
                                                 
154 This is also discussed by Gutiérrez (2003), focusing in a different case of participatory water allocation 
experience in Brazil. 
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relationship between different political scales in the state could perhaps be substituted by a 
chain of institutions, going from the local realm to the state level, all under the central 
control of state technocrats  - that is, from local reservoir commissions to basin 
commissions, like the Jaguaribe Commission, and basin committees, to the supreme powers 
of the State Council, which is controlled by the head of SRH.  
This mid-ground space was quickly dominated by technicians and members of the 
hinterland’s urban middle classes155. For this reason, all watershed committee presidents have 
been, since the institution of such committees, members of the local educated middle 
classes; most have been technicians of some sort (such as heads of municipal agriculture 
secretariats), some have been local politicians, and others have been school teachers. No 
committee president in the Jaguaribe Valley has ever come from the water users or civil 
society sectors. All have been technicians occupying office in municipal governments. The 
new political arena formed by the Water Allocation Commission has become a disputed 
prize for these local technical elites, who naturally have links to powerful local groups 
(through their occupying of technical positions in municipal government structures, and in 
most cases also by being members of local powerful families), because it offers them the 
opportunity to participate directly in state government activities, without the mediation of 
local patrons, and therefore is seen as an opportunity to gain local respect and authority156.  
                                                 
155 The COGERH technicians who started the whole process of organizing the water allocation meetings 
recognized it, although timidly, in Garjulli et al. (2002, p. 20). 
156 Gutiérrez (2003) argues that the activity of government technicians, in the creation of the participatory water 
committees in the Sinos Basin, in Southern Brazil, was what created the possibility of effective participation of 
local civil society. That is an argument that runs in a direction somewhat contrary to mine – although the 
differences in political and social processes between Southern and Northeastern Brazil do make room for 
different experiences in terms of the creation of participatory water allocation. He does not clarity who exactly 
he refers to by the expression civil society, although he mentions the category of “environmentalists,” what 
denotes, I imagine, individuals with profiles (although not agendas) approximated to what I here call “local 
technicians.” If that is right, then our arguments are in some degree similar. 
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After ten years of annual water allocation meetings, the COGERH technicians 
responsible for the event had a clear awareness of this differential receptivity towards the 
activities of the event. In 2003, the then manager of the department responsible for 
preparing all the technical information, graphs and tables used in the water allocation 
meetings made that clear, during an interview: 
 
Renzo Taddei: Você acha que a repetida participação dos pequenos produtores nas reuniões 
de alocação de água está mudando lentamente essa visão dessas pessoas, ou seja, elas estão 
sendo apresentadas pra essa nova maneira de ver as coisas, e estão absorvendo isso 
lentamente, ou você acha que ainda existe uma resistência? 
Técnico: Eu acho que o público que a gente atinge é mais propício a essa idéia da 
racionalidade de uso, do controle do uso. Mas eu acredito que esse público que tá lá no sertão 
mesmo, eu acredito que ainda tá muito longe da gente se aproximar desses grupos aí. 
Renzo Taddei: Ou seja, você tá querendo dizer que os integrantes da comissão de usuários 
não são necessariamente uma representação da população do sertão. 
Técnico: Desta mais tradicionalista, não. 
Renzo Taddei: Do público mais tradicionalista... 
Técnico: Mais mitológica né? 
Renzo Taddei: Ou seja, nas reuniões de alocação é um público que já está semi preparado. 
Técnico: Tem uma percepção, tem uma percepção e uma própria formação técnica, eu acredito 
que ele já esteja mais predisposto pra essa visão, de você falar de modernidade, de 
racionalidade de uso, né? Eu tenho pra mim que nós ainda não temos essa capilaridade (no 
acesso à população), sabe? De chegar a esse núcleo de uma visão mais tradicional, eu acredito 
que tá longe e a nossa linguagem é totalmente diferenciada da linguagem desse núcleo. 
Renzo Taddei: Você acha que existem problemas de comunicação, de compreensão? 
Técnico: De comunicação, de linguagem, de visão de mundo. Eu acredito que você vai ter que 
ter uma outra abordagem pra trabalhar essa gente. 
 
Renzo Taddei: Do you think the repeated participation of small producers in 
the water allocation meetings is slowly changing their views, that is, are they 
being presented to new ways of seeing things, and are absorbing that slowly, or 
do you believe there is resistance towards that? 
Technician: I believe the population that we reach is more open to this idea of 
rational use of water, of control in water use. But I believe that with the 
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population in the deep hinterland, we are still very far from getting closer to 
these groups. 
Renzo Taddei: That is, are you saying that the composition of the water 
allocation commission is not necessarily a good sample of the population of 
the hinterland? 
Technician: not for the population that is more linked to traditional ways of 
living. 
Renzo Taddei: Traditional people… 
Technician: These people more linked to mythologies. 
Renzo Taddei: So in the water allocation meetings we find people who are 
already in a sense prepared for that. 
Technician: They have a better perception, they have a technical background, 
and I believe thay are more predisposed to this vision, to this discourse about 
modernity, rationality in water use, right? I myself believe we don’t have this 
capacity of reaching the general population, you know? We don’t get to those 
nuclei in which the approach is more traditional, we are far from that, and our 
language is completely different from the language of these nuclei. 
Renzo Taddei: Do you think there are communication and comprehension 
problems, then? 
Technician: We have problems of communication, of language, in views of the 
world. And I think we will need a different approach to work with those 
people. 
 
 
The lower strata of small producers, as we have mentioned, tend to attribute less 
importance to the commission in general, and at times continue to rely upon sabotage and 
upon direct attacks to water infrastructure.  
In this sense, the Water Allocation Commission established a novel (but regimented) 
arena in which state and local technical elites can interact, and therefore the state can 
reestablish political links with the local political agents who are most directly linked to water 
management in the hinterland: the local technicians. All of this has occurred in an 
environment fully controlled by the government (that is, the Jaguaribe Commission and the 
Basin Committees), which, once again, leaves local mayors outside of the main arena. 
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The Water Allocation Commission has also become a valuable device to advance the 
government’s agenda regarding development, especially in regards to management, and to 
the use of water. As we have seen, the rationale behind Ceará’s governmental development 
efforts in the hinterland, in regards to water management, that is, its understanding of water 
as a commodity157, its economic rationale and management, and its allocation following 
patterns resembling financial asset investment, in being directed to the most productive and 
profitable activities, seem to go directly against the cultural and economic habits of a large 
majority of the hinterland’s population, who tend to conceive of water as a divine gift, or at 
least as a public good for which the government, seen as another political contender, and not 
as a neutral arbitration element, cannot impose legislation; and against the rice culture so 
deeply rooted in local economic habits. It is therefore relevant to ask: Why adopt a 
participatory approach in such circumstances? 
The political convenience of a participatory approach, in such a conflictive 
environment, besides meeting a requirement imposed by the World Bank, is that it allows for 
the possibility to exercise a great deal of semiotic manipulation of how things are framed. At 
implicit and explicit metapragmatic domains, water allocation meetings are framed differently - 
almost in an opposite manner. In official rhetoric, the situation is framed as a parliament-like 
instance in which distinct groups have equal power over water allocation, regardless of their 
origins or nature. But, in practice, the meetings are structured in a way in which some 
established local practices and beliefs are depicted as inappropriately old and reminiscent of 
another historic and economic moment; and the populations that hold such practices and 
                                                 
157 Parts of the development community working in the state, support the creation of a water market, in which 
the possession of water would be transferred from state to private ownership, and water titles would be 
negotiable. To a point this would reflect water markets already set up in Colorado, California and other parts of 
the world. 
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beliefs are seen as victims of their own backwardness. The general tone used by state 
technocrats echoes the words of Euclides da Cunha, in his 1902 book about a rebellion 
against the government in the Northeast hinterland: “We are condemned to civilization. We 
either progress or disappear” (Cunha, 2002, p. 79). 
So, as we can see, the semiotic organization of discourse is an integral element in 
how new power relations are constructed. Firstly, the technical-scientific terminology of the 
language game in which water management is decided upon constitutes symbolic violence 
towards those with less formal education, since it alienates them from the process, and 
guarantees that those who can play the language game well – primarily technicians from state 
and municipal governments, and from the agribusiness sector – maintain control over water 
negotiations. This generates a feeling of “não importa o que aconteça, a gente sempre perde [no 
matter what happens, we always lose]” among small farmers, which was an actual phrase 
used by the president of a rural workers union from the Banabuiú Valley. Yet we can 
observe, on the other hand, that after a decade of participation in the allocation meetings, 
some small farmers have now learnt how to manage the new environment, including the use 
of technical concepts.  
Secondly, the authoritative discourses of technicians attach economic rationality and 
capitalistic values to the technicalities of water management. In this environment, the 
committee meetings are ritual performances in which these discourses are legitimized and 
become a structuring element that shape the practice of water allocation.  
Naturally, there is a great deal of resistance towards these processes. I already 
mentioned the still pervasive presence of sabotage, and the refusal of important social 
movements to participate in the water allocation ritual. A few technicians linked to municipal 
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governments also understand the water allocation ritual as an effort of decision making 
centralization in the hands of the government158. Yet resistance is slowly mitigated by the 
metapragmatic power of the allocation ritual. The democratic status given to the whole water 
allocation effort, ritualistically reinforced in every speech given by state officials, at the 
beginning and at the end of each committee meeting, disorganizes the discourses that accuse 
the government of promoting centralization, once at least in the pragmatic level, the 
government is promoting participation. It is usually those who refuse to participate – 
intellectuals linked to the Catholic Church and to social movements like MST and CPT - 
who can most successfully turn their metapragmatic awareness of the form in which the 
water allocation ritual takes place into coherent political discourse. 
The façade of democratization serves also to disorganize established popular 
discourses about suffering, and about the state’s responsibility for the welfare of the rural 
population, which is a reflection of clientalistic habits in which the state is considered the 
patron. As the committees are held accountable for the meetings’ results, typical popular 
forms of resistance, developed throughout history as coping mechanisms during drought 
and water crisis, are short-circuited.  
 
 
                                                 
158 These are located mainly in the Baixo Jaguaribe region. The main leaders of the Baixo Jaguaribe Water 
Committee present a remarkable degree of clarity in their view of the governmental actions, and this committee 
is the most vocal one in defense of attributions and power the national water law gives the water committees. 
The other six water committees of the state do not have the same degree of political organization. 
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Conclusion  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The aim of this work was to show how the approach presented in the first part of this text 
could be used profitably in analyses that transcend the topic of language ideologies to other 
political domains in which meanings are also semiotically manipulated. This approach is 
grounded in the link between meaning-making activities and institutional settings, both 
mutually related in an unresolved dialectic way159 . One of the main advantages of this 
approach is the link between the micro scale analysis of local political and symbolic life and 
broader socio-economic transformations. It also provides examples of the political 
importance of thinking about how configurations of the visibility/invisibility of ideas or 
social groups are manipulated through institutionalized rituals, a key aspect in the approach 
of issues like the social inclusion of marginalized populations. On the other hand, in 
focusing on the ways in which contextual factors participate in meaning-making activities, 
this approach complements some discourse analysis methods that limit themselves to verbal 
interactions.  
                                                 
159 The topic itself is hardly a novelty - manipulative strategies as a theoretical approach gained prominence in 
political anthropology in the 1970s (Vincent, 1978) -; what this approach intends to offer is a more refined and 
structured account of the microphysics of such meaning transformations. 
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The main argument could be recapitulated in the following way: first, we need the 
concept of language ideologies, which Irvine defined as “the cultural system of ideas about 
social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interests” 
(1989, p. 255). The importance of the idea of language ideologies lies in the fact that, in a 
great deal of what happens in everyday socio-political life, we see metapragmatic discourses 
encapsulating, and enacting in multiple (and usually covert) ways, ideologies of language use, 
therefore playing an important role in the institutionalization of discursive mechanisms in 
society (Mertz, 1998). In other words, the metapragmatic dimension of communication is 
where ideologies are put to work organizing interaction and, in so doing, affect the 
reproduction of social reality, but in a way that does not usually call attention to those same 
ideological configurations. 
At the same time, stakeholders create institutions for addressing circumstantial needs. 
Institutions are deeply related to political agendas and as we could see throughout the text, 
agendas in transformation, due to larger processes of socio-economic change, generate 
institutional transformations. Yet the efficacy of institutional configurations is based on what 
they are able to achieve, by design or serendipitous bricolage, in terms of the goals of the 
agents involved. On the other hand, since there is no social action that is not informed, 
guided and controlled by symbolic configurations and exchanges, institutional action is 
socially and politically effective through the enacting of rituals, which were called, 
throughout this text, institutionalized rituals. Rituals are intrinsically organized around the 
activity of sorting out symbols and putting them to work in specific semiotic ways. This is a 
process that affects not only the collective understanding of things, but also social and 
cultural identities. A fundamental dimension of that is, once again, the metapragmatic level - 
as a realm in which specific ideological configurations will gain prominence in organizing 
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interactional dynamics -, which sets the interpretive stage upon which symbols will circulate 
and gain meaning. But of course, since there is always a multiplicity of different stakeholders 
in any given field, there is always some degree of contestation involved. Sabotage is, in most 
cases, nothing more than the recognition, by a given agent or group of agents, that both the 
current outcomes of hegemonic institutionalized rituals go against their agendas and that the 
metapragmatic organization of the institutionalized rituals taken as normative is too tight and 
structured to be attacked in the arena of the ritual itself. 
Metapragmatics and semiotic regimentation are processes that are at the same time 
linked to the naturalization of the arbitrary, or to the production of doxa, and to the internal 
constitutive dynamics of fields. Fields are, in particular ways, organized around certain inner 
semiotic regimentations, which set the tone (genre, rhythm, and material arrangements) for 
social action, and are at the same time the object of dispute therein. So the situation of a 
field in a given moment, as a specific configuration of forces and social actions, is the result 
of semiotic regimentation efforts sustained by some participant groups to oppose competing 
framings. In practice, such regimentations take place through the imposing of specific genres, 
with their associated restrictions of time, space, and perceptibility (of which visibility is one 
dimension), in which social action occurs. Teleological qualities of genres reduce the 
cognitive and semiotic complexity of a given environment. A higher degree of successful 
regimentation by groups in control of semiotic and material resources takes place in the 
existence of an overwhelmingly dominant ideology which is accepted, explicitly or implicitly, 
by most participants, and enacted in rituals. In the absence of such a highly pervasive 
dominant ideology, social activity resembles less a stage and more an arena, in which 
conflicts over representation arise and where the internal semiotic organization of a field 
itself becomes an element of dispute, even if this generally occurs unconsciously. Thus it is 
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in this metasemiotic arena that symbolic domination is constituted throughout the history of 
encounters.  
An interesting aspect in this line of theory is that, through the manipulation of the 
metasemiotic dimensions of political arenas, one possible outcome is the achievement of 
symbolic domination, not through the imposition of a symbolic pattern, but rather through 
more or less successful control of game dynamics. This leads to the configuration of a very 
special form of hegemony: one that is not marked by the resulting sets of beliefs found in 
the minds of subordinate classes, but rather one that achieves its goals through relative 
control of how the game unfolds. In order for powerful groups to maintain their dominant 
status-quo in the political field, it is often necessary for weaker groups to believe they are 
winning, or at least that they have a real chance to win. This is frequently done by the 
diversion, through metapragmatic strategies, of the energies of weaker groups to arenas 
where outcomes are marginal or irrelevant in the main political field. Bartra (1987), for 
example, discusses the way in which local narratives on Mexican popular culture, with its 
many and repeated emotionally charged symbolic references to the country’s pre-Hispanic 
heritage, and the country’s sociopolitical structures (which are marked by profound racial 
and class divisions), are linked in order to legitimize the former as a proper construction 
through which Mexicans express their feelings, without challenging the latter. Concerning 
the same issue, Canclini suggests that: 
 
Los mitos nacionales no son un reflejo de las condiciones en que vive la masa del pueblo, si no el 
producto de operaciones de selección y “transposición” de hechos y rasgos elegidos según los 
proyectos de legitimación política (1990, p. 177) 
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National myths do not reflect the living conditions of the masses, but rather are 
products of operations of selection and “transposition” of traces and facts 
elected according to political legitimation projects. 
 
 
Such patterns of semiotic regimentation are so deeply grounded in institutional 
practices that it is usually a difficult task for defiant groups to meet the conditions necessary 
in order to put together any politically effective metapragmatic attack. In Brazil, racial 
relations in most places are organized through a set of narratives based on mestiçagem (race 
mixing), which are used as strategies that hinder the political recognition of different racial 
backgrounds as being important elements within the sociopolitical structures of the country, 
especially in terms of wealth and power distribution. This is reflected in the fact that the 
most important nation-wide social movements of Brazil are not grounded in ethnic identities, 
or in racial identities. Scheper-Hughes (1992) reports having generated embarrassment by 
bringing up racial issues during conversations in Pernambuco, Northeast Brazil, which 
represented a break in local etiquette codes. As we can see, etiquette codes may also be part 
of the doxa self-defense apparatus. 
When an attempt to impose a specific metapragmatic frame upon a field is successful, 
it creates semiotic inertia that operates against those pushing for the establishment of 
opposing frames. This explains why, for instance, it is more difficult to declare opposition 
against set game rules, than to subscribe to them, either overtly or covertly. Firstly, a great 
deal of explanation is necessary, and often occurs through the use of a particular language or 
register which itself forms part of the semiotic regimentation of the same political field. This 
causes the explanation to lose much of its power160. Along these same lines, in situations of 
                                                 
160 For instance, this is why, during the 2004 presidential elections campaign in the United States, anti-war 
activists have used the common strategy of trying to change the whole genre of discussion - from the paranoia 
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ideological domination, dissent tends to require more time and effort (in order to enlist 
evidence), while supporting a dominant ideology requires much less effort, and most often 
can be achieved through the use of stereotypes. As affirmed by Goldsmith, “when marginal 
people turn to the conventional language in an effort to interpret their suffering and devise 
valid means for altering their lives, at best they confront confusion and, at worst, they meet 
their own failure” (in Parmentier, 1994, p. 187). When subordinate groups are forced to use, 
or have as their only available resource, a dominant groups’ symbolic language, the latter 
need only make minimal use of external forms of coercion in order to keep the status quo 
(Ibid.).  
Agency is not enough, as we said in the introduction, but there are other 
requirements for successful action in a field. The circumstances for successful exercise of 
agency in social transformations may appear in major historical processes of social change 
(Sahlins, 1981), or be created through creative explorations of fissures and fractures that 
never cease to exist in social realm (Williams, 1977). Yet, as Ortner (1997) reminds us, 
stakeholders are differentially situated with respect to power. Effective actions would 
necessarily involve summoning means and energy for metapragmatic action, something that 
may not be available; hence the importance of the location of the agent in the arena, and in 
the social field more generally.  
I will now return to the Ceará cases, summarizing and providing some further 
analyses about the ways in which the theoretical approach selected helps us understand an 
important part of the local processes linked to the political uses of climate information and 
the local water allocation rituals.  
                                                                                                                                                 
of fear that framed discussions on external politics and national security, to a focus on more pragmatic issues, 
like the national economy - because it is difficult to justify peace inside the logics of militarism and of artifitially 
inflated self-defense impulses. 
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Rain prophets meetings  
In the social life of climate forecasting in Ceará, we can see regimentation attempts in action 
in three interesting cases of more or less conscious attempts to manipulate understandings of 
climate information. The first is the attempt of local urban business people in Quixadá to 
exploit the activity of rural knowledgeable individuals for their benefit, through the 
realization of the Rain Prophets Meetings. As we saw in this text, the circumstances in which 
the meeting occurs and the media through which it is broadcasted to outside the walls in 
which it takes place, radically decontextualize the ways in which such traditional forecasts 
exist in society and puts those local narratives, as performed by rain prophets, in the chains 
of reified recontextualization that characterize the ways the media deal with the 
phenomenon. By generating the erasure of most of the contextual complexities that 
characterize the forecasting actions of those individuals, the meeting becomes itself a major 
semiotic operator that transforms the actions of rain prophets into decontextualized chunks 
of folklore. 
Folklore as discourse is inserted in the ways the urban-rural differences are 
conceptualized in the urban world, while at the same time reproducing the rituals in which 
the semiotic spaces for each are marked in a society that becomes more urban with time. 
This happens through the impoverishment of the symbolic content of rural cultural 
manifestations, through semiotic operators that locate the rural manifestations in its 
museographic space. But folklorization as semiotic manipulation is hardly a surprise in this 
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context, due to the fact that the differences between the urban and the rural161 are not only 
intellectual but most importantly phenomenological, as they are related to the concepts of 
time and rhythm; to the forms through which individuals recognize (or misrecognize, in the 
case of urbanites in general) their dependence and vulnerabilities towards the natural 
environment. Unable to make sense of such phenomenological differences, which are often 
not explicitly represented in the cultural manifestations of the rural world, the urban 
imaginary has no other option than to folklorize the rural.  
In the rain prophets meetings, the semiotic transformation from rural to folklore 
takes place due to the way the metapragmatic organization of the event makes use of a set of 
ideological configurations related to the role of the rural world in the urban imaginary. The 
relationship between the rural and the urban is understood against the existence of many 
narratives on the links between the nation and cultural heritage and between cultural heritage 
and the rural world - such as the role of cattle ranching in the occupation of the terriroty of 
Ceará, or the sugar-producing areas of the Northeast as the first important economic center 
of the nation, or the importance of coffee in the development of southeastern areas of Brazil. 
Against these discourses, the rural gains the mark of icon of the past. A romanticized 
representation of the rural, based on a romanticized representation of the past, inspired by a 
romanticized representation of the nation.  
This chain of idealizations is maintained by a complex set of factors, among which 
the most important is the way in which images of the rural world are socially distributed. A 
great deal of the phenomenological ungraspability of the representations of the rural world 
in the urban imaginary is due to the decontextualization processes involved in the mediatic 
                                                 
161 And naturally here I am using an idealized representations of each and ignoring the border spaces in which 
the distinction among them is difficult. 
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construction and vehiculation of such representations. Communication technologies are 
semiotic operators of great importance in the manipulation of meanings. Digital media 
imposes specific structural configurations on timing, space and content organization, all of 
which affect the way in which content is framed and reported. The media is an external 
social synchronizer, responsible for inserting people inside specific sociocultural time frames, 
and conversely responsible for inserting time scales inside people’s minds (Néri, 2003, p. 
211). In the chunks of media reproductions of the imagetic discourse on the sertão, as 
constantly seen on Brazilian television shows and magazines, any possibility of grasping 
fundamental contextual cues is lost due to the internal features of media discourse: the 
imposition of a language genre (the marked “journalistic” language of reporters) that 
unavoidably indexes the language forms of the local subjects, according to existing language 
ideologies; of a time frame, characterized by the strict organization of time in television, and 
by the editing of material in all media types. Media coverage breaks indexical ties between a 
depicted event and its contextual circumstance. Furthermore, different media types have 
developed different characteristic genres, with their specific teleological characteristics. News 
reports make use of many rhetorical devices to construct authority (with reported speech 
being perhaps the most widely employed), and the continuous decontextualization that 
media coverage imposes upon an event creates an aura of authoritative discourse.  
Also, the intense and cacophonic reproduction of signs in the process creates what 
can be called the semiotics of the distant, which refers to decontextualized, aseptic and 
neutralized depictions of situations, that in other circumstances would be seen as highly 
emotionally charged162, but that are instead emptied of such emotional content due to the 
                                                 
162 One particularly famous example of this is the widely aired images of American pilots using missiles to 
destroy Iraqi buildings during the Gulf War, and of the infrared cameras attached to the airplanes, which 
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absence of indexical contextual grounding and due to normalization through repetition. The 
semiotics of the distant, enacted through the multiple chains of decontextualization in the 
socio-semiotic life of individuals and groups, is an important tool in providing political 
efficacy to actions and narratives of specific groups, in many circumstances163.  
Looking back to the rain prophets, we see that at the end of the process, identified 
with the past, imagined by the urban population as guardians of a folklorized understanding 
of the cultural heritage of the nation, seen sometimes as cultural heroes, sometimes as 
victims of their own backwardness, rural individuals are represented in the developmentist 
political cosmologies as devoid of authority for making decisions that affect their everyday 
                                                                                                                                                 
generated images that resembled videogame screens, reinforcing a trend in the semiotics of the distant that 
generates a perception of war that approximates it to Baudrillard’s concept of simulacrum (Baudrillard, 1983). 
163 This topic was discussed in the works of many scholars, among which Zygmut Bauman. In his analysis of 
the Holocaust (1989), he argues that there seems to be a tendency in sociological theory to belittle the 
significance of the Holocaust by means of two regimentation strategies: 1) presenting it as being exclusive to 
Jewish history; or 2) presenting it as an extreme manifestation of human aggressive instinct. The Holocaust is, 
therefore, presented as being a distant phenomenon in space and time for the majority of the world’s 
population. In this manner, the Holocaust says more about the state of sociology, he argues, than the reverse. 
The author defends the opinion that there is a need to understand how sociopolitical patterns characterizing 
this era of human history, which is marked by technological militarism and bureaucratic logics, may produce 
the conditions required for events like the Holocaust (Giddens, 1987, makes a similar argument)163.  
Spitulnik (1998) also provides an interesting example concerning radio programming in Zambia. Air 
time in Zambia is dedicated to different ethnic group languages, and is organized according to official 
ideologies of equality, ethnicity and nationhood, which is reflected in the use of some of the linguistic groups of 
the country, in detriment of others. This organization of radio programming resulted in the iconic mapping of 
social divisions, while at the same time created new sets of perceived structural contrasts and relational values 
among languages, which has become a focal point for the construction and contestation of language value 
(Ibid., p. 170). Through this analysis we can see that media-enacted semiotic regimentation affects space, time, 
perception, and material circumstance. It indexes power configurations, and also creates iconic maps that not 
only typify social categories, but also define their associated degree of legitimacy to enable participation in a 
given political game163. 
Nationalistic narratives also deeply depend upon decontextualization and specific semiotic 
regimentations. The project of nation heavily depends on narratives of homogeneity, and of the nation as a 
unitary moral community. This organizational principle is easily found in judicial discourse (Philips, 2000). 
Homogeneity narratives are constituted around semiotic operations, in which the nature of a group of people is 
essentialized, and such essentializations are aided by the creation of oppositions, in which attention is only 
focused on specific elements of the group, and by doing so, it becomes easier to erase the background elements 
that confer distinctiveness within groups163. There is the need for semiotic erasure in the making of the nation 
as a project. In the words of Philips, “what makes people part of a nation is that they are citizens of it, and 
nothing else” (1998, p. 220). 
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lives, inserted, as they are, in an environment undergoing fast-paced modernization – 
something similar to what we could see, for example, in the discussions on water allocation. 
 
Annual Meteorological Meeting in Fortaleza 
The second case of attempted semiotic manipulation of climate information is the way 
meteorologists decided to issue their scientific forecast. The forecast is presented as a 
collective construction that involved not only local meteorologists but also institutions from 
other southern states and also from overseas, preventing local politicians who exert political 
control over the activities of FUNCEME to make political interferences, such as those 
documented in the past. At the same time, the leaders of the main meteorological agencies 
attempt to reduce the number of scientific forecasts available to society to just one. In order 
to understand why these strategies were adopted, we need to remember that in Brazil, as in 
many other parts of the world, most meteorological institutions integrate the local political 
structures: in Ceará, FUNCEME is part of the State Science and Technology Secretariat 
(having been part of the State Water Resources Secretariat in the past), while the National 
Institute of Meteorology (INMET) is linked to the National Agriculture Ministry and the 
Center for Weather Forecast and Climate Studies at the National Institute for Spatial 
Research (CPTEC/INPE) is part of the National Science and Technology Ministry. 
Meteorologists have politicians as their bosses, while at the same time they fear the political 
manipulation of forecasts, as they saw happening so many times in the past, with negative 
repercussions for meteorological agencies. Through the anxieties that afflict meteorologists 
when they find indicators of probable droughts, we see that they have some degree of 
awareness that they are symbolic scapegoats in a complex situation in which society is filled 
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with frustration and no effective way out of the problem is foreseen. Perhaps 
“consciousness” is not the right word, if this, as a feature of the mind, is usually represented 
as seated in the brain, while most meteorologists experience the problem in their stomachs, 
as one meteorologist put it during a meeting. What a neurotic situation! Meteorology fears its 
provider, suffering due to political misuses of the products of its work by those who have 
power to decide its destiny. Taking this into consideration, we can see how the solution 
found by the leaders of the main meteorological agencies in Brazil was ingenious: on the one 
hand, regarding a direct control strategy, since there is no possible political action against the 
political class that is above meteorology in the political structure, they decided to act inside 
of the group, creating an alliance between agencies and issuing only one forecast. On the 
other, this same alliance, due to the fact that it involved national and international 
meteorological agencies, gave the forecast a symbolic dimension of being, as mentioned, 
“larger than Ceará,” which therefore functioned as a strategy against local political 
manipulations. But for this metapragmatic move to work, a set of ideological configurations, 
enacted through local narratives, was set in motion: first, the representation of the forecast 
as a scientific product, associated with the representation of science as politically neutral; that 
was reinforced by the participation of national and international agencies, seen as 
disconnected from local political processes and institutions and therefore politically 
disinterested; and third, there is a link of metonimic associations: the stereotypical image of 
the “Developed World” as being marked by technological sophistication is projected 
towards the American and British meteorological institutions that participate in the meetings; 
a similar process happens with national agencies from São Paulo (INPE) and Brasília 
(INMET), two of the most economically developed centers of the country; and these 
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associations are used in the construction of the legitimacy of the forecast produced by the 
joint work of institutions. 
This strategy is accompanied by the elaboration of press releases as performances in 
which semiotic elements are designed – even if without explicit intention, as my informants 
insist on saying – in order to generate transformations in the general perception regarding 
the seriousness of the forecast. In the first attended press release session, a below average 
rain forecast was announced concomitantly with a harvest insurance; in the following year, 
another below average rain forecast was announced together with the information that, due 
to extreme pre-season rains, reservoirs around the state had unprecedented high volumes of 
accumulated water, what would guarantee that the main centers of consumption (mainly 
Fortaleza) had guaranteed supply for two years, even with no rains at all in that period. The 
metonomic association between the “bad” and the “good” news was intended to prevent 
media sensationalistic manipulations, through diluting the dramatic power that all drought 
forecasts carry with them. 
 
Ridiculing meteorology 
The third case, although to some degree a less focused activity, is the existence of an 
enormous number of jokes ridiculing meteorologists in the interior. It is of interest to note 
the way in which rural popular culture tends to depict technicians in general, among which 
we find meteorologists. There seems to be what we called the discourse of indexical authority, 
which sustained that “you need to be rural to understand rural things.” It also acts as a 
metapragmatic move towards defining the grounds upon which authority is constructed 
around the semiotic politics of climate, and its implications for local economy and society. It 
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is almost the exact opposite process from what happens in the Rain Prophets Meetings: if 
there the performances of rural knowledgeable individuals are transformed into folklore, 
here we see the rural world semiotically transforming the perceived social identity of 
technicians, representing them as fools. Rural hinterlanders seem to make strategic use of 
this discourse in a field in which the government is dependent upon their collaboration, such 
as in the case of seed distribution programs. Although, in other governmental sectors, 
agencies are usually not compelled to explain and justify their actions to the general public, 
the same cannot occur when implementing seed distribution schemes. SEAGRI’s agenda 
clearly works towards changing local production behaviors, in both the irrigation and 
dryland sectors and this type of change requires some degree of effective communication 
between the government and rural populations. However, the general rural population 
replies to this message, not in a manner desired by the government, but instead by not 
adopting the agricultural calendar suggested by the government (that is, using their own seed 
and occasionally eating the seeds sent by the government), and by ridiculing meteorology. I 
intended to show, in chapter five, that this message is directed specifically towards the 
government and urban elites, because scientific meteorology is perceived as forming part of 
their terrain.  
But why meteorology? First, the adoption of scientific forecasts as guiding devices 
for official decision making, in such a politicized environment, put meteorology “on the 
spot.” And second, rain, not only as a material natural event, but also as a symbolic construct 
– in all the anxiety it brings attached to it, suffered by rural hinterlanders and by urban 
politicians - is the only overlapping element between the complex scientific discourses and 
the rural way of life. The existence of the overlapping element creates a symbolic arena in 
which science and tradition dispute for legitimacy and authority. It does not happen with 
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water management, though, for two reasons: there is no equivalent, in rural discourses, of 
the technical water management methods nor of the role of the water specialist, as are the 
local traditional forecast technologies and the figure of the rain prophets in the field of 
climate; and water is, as in the case of local land tenure patterns, submitted to a process of 
concentration in the hands of local elites that alienated, throughout local history, the poorer 
strata of the population from water management in general. As a rule, having access to water 
sources in Ceará is an index of wealth.  
As I mentioned in my analysis of the social life of forecasts, scientific forecasting 
carries marks of its origin – the places where they are produced, and the language and 
concepts they use – that are then indexed in the local sociopolitical dynamics, not by the 
informative content they carry, but by the social groups with which they are seen to be 
associated; that is, the urban technicians that work for the government. While the 
relationship between rural producers and SEAGRI involves the exchange of seeds, and 
different kinds of subsidies and insurances, the relationship that these producers have with 
FUNCEME is based upon nothing more than the exchange of information. Since scientific 
forecasting is, due to the complex concepts it uses, difficult to re-contextualize in local 
environments, FUNCEME then becomes the perfect scapegoat in such a panorama: it can 
be held as a symbol of the government and of the urban elites and can then be “sacrificed” 
(that is, ridiculed) with no risk of retribution.  
These jokes are strategic devices in the reproduction, among certain groups, of the 
attitude generally observed towards meteorologists and meteorology in general: an attitude 
of open joking defiance and distrust. So for those groups – who tend to be the poorest, 
oldest and illiterate segment of the rural population and therefore exactly those targeted by 
the public policies that intend to make effective use of scientific climate knowledge in order 
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to decrease the vulnerability of such individuals in relation to extreme climate variations – 
that attitude is a key element of the background interpretive context in which the scientific 
rain forecasts will gain social meaning.  
It is remarkable here how the different groups – policy makers, farmers, local 
politicians, technicians - represent each other is ways that seem, for the external observation, 
to be what Taussig called fictionalizations (1987). The political efficacy of the categorical 
orderings through semiotic regimentations that take place in socio-political life is based on 
its capacity to operate some degree of semiotic synchronization among different social 
groups. These synchronizations are always partial and sustained by ongoing efforts, but there 
are social situations in which they seem to be particularly weak. For instance, it is a fact that 
inside complex and multi-layered modern social organizations, different stakeholders and 
groups of interest find niches in which they can develop their actions and continue with their 
agendas, in which unethetical actions and interests may coexist inside the borders of the 
same community, with a managed level of conflict. In conflicts and disputes, parts of a 
political field are in full contact, although synchronization may be strategically kept low. On 
one hand, the use of surprise and deceit as resources in an arena also seem to be an integral 
part of any field, and therefore groups tend to want to disguise their available resources and 
strategies. On the other hand, these situations usually imply semiotic regimentations that 
have profound effects on the perceptions of a group that enacts them. In such situations 
identities are reified and notions of culture, race, social class and other essentializations are 
produced by the political strategies of the contenders. The intercommunication between the 
parts is lowered, allowing space for the work of fictionalization. The intense production and 
reproduction of representations of the other, and of the self, along ideological lines, implies a 
certain degree of disconnectedness with semiotic processes that update semiotic habits by 
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incorporating the novel. So these fabulations, fed by fear, anxiety, and calculation, provide 
content to both the logical and to the unconscious actions and strategies used by contenders. 
According to Taussig, a crucial feature of fabulation work “lies in the way it creates an 
uncertain reality out of fiction, giving shape and voice to the formless form of the reality in 
which an unstable interplay of truth and illusion becomes a phantasmic social force. All 
societies live by fictions taken as real” (1987, p. 121). 
Even politically underprivileged groups, when devoid of a means by which to challenge 
the general status quo, employ the work of fictionalization in order to safeguard their sense 
of dignity and in so doing they create covert, symbolic, transferred, (and eventually politically 
efficient) resistance narratives (Scott, 1985, 1990)164. Retaliation may assume the form of 
                                                 
164 One of the most remarkable features of fictionalization, which is also where it receives most of its semiotic 
power, is the way it creates, through both reifications and emotionally charged projections, a space in which the 
“other” functions as the medium through which unspeakable anxieties and fears gain an identity, and also an 
identified location in time and space. In his study of the relationship between colonial agents in Southern 
Colombia and indigenous populations, Taussig argues that the extreme violence whites used against locals were 
a result of the formers’ fictionalization efforts that iconized fears and anxieties, associated with wildness, into 
the bodies of the latter: 
 
Wildness … raises the specter of the death of the symbolic function itself. It is the spirit of the 
unknown and the disorderly, loose in the forest encircling the city and the sown land, disrupting 
the conventions upon which meaning and the shaping function of images rest. Wildness 
challenges the unity of the symbol, the transcendent totalization binding the image to that which 
it represents. Wildness pries open this unity and in its place slippage and a grinding articulation 
between signifier and signified. Wildness makes of these connections spaces of darkness and light 
in which objects stare out in their mottled nakedness while signifiers float by. Wildness is the 
death space of signification (ibid., p. 219). 
 
The other, simply put, inherits the demons one fears. Representations are produced through the already 
mentioned semiotic functions that manipulate semiotic qualities, relationallities and perceptibility. The existence 
of conflict, and of the contenders themselves, becomes structured by the use of the typifications: order and 
disorder, crime and law, right and wrong etc. In reference again to the Southern Colombian colonial rubber 
trade, Taussig argues that “the colonial propounded and still effervescent image of the Indian depends precisely 
on this combination of opposites in which wildness and Christianity sustain and subvert one another” (Ibid., p. 
193). Through essentialized moralities, the conflict is socially organized according to cultural opposites and 
fictional realities; once again, we can see the action of the semiotic operators: iconization, recursiveness, and 
erasure.  
The work of fictionalization suggest that very often the groups engaged in a conflict are not fighting the 
same conflict, i.e., are not playing by the same rules, and sometimes situate the conflict in different provinces of 
meanings (Schutz, 1967a, 1967b). According to Mahmood, this is one of the real and most important problems 
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fantasy and find its perfect medium in myths and in art (Besteman, 1999, p. 135). New 
narratives of resistance are produced and they domesticate the experience of the victimized 
group, who find a way to retain their sense of dignity and honor (Nordstrom, 1997, p. 22). 
In some cases, agonistic playfulness, associated with humor or with the grotesque, elements 
that are abundant in popular cultural events such as Carnival, are transferred narratives of 
resistance with a certain degree of communicative power. In Kiefer’s words, “to feign 
agonistic conduct playfully presupposes that others recognize the ‘real thing’ as a capacity in 
themselves” (in Knauft, 1991, p. 413). Playing war is also part of the politics of power and 
meanings. 
In view of the above, we can see that, in Ceará, if on the one hand the discourse of 
indexical authorithy empties the scientific discourse from authority, on the other most of the 
rural population naturally understands that those same technicians who make use of such 
discourse – like the urban groups they seem to represent in the rural imaginary - have a great 
deal of control over local political processes. In these circumstances, the activity of ridiculing 
technicians channels the feeling of frustration and alienation suffered by hinterlanders in face 
of the imposition of ways of understanding and doing things that is alien to them, and that is 
indexed by a technical language of difficult comprehension. All of the above is immersed in 
a social field profoundly marked by each stakeholder’s fictionalization of the others. 
 
Water allocation 
In the discussion of water allocation rituals, in section three of part two, we saw that the 
government has been faced with the challenge of gaining effective control of water 
                                                                                                                                                 
of conflicts, “as obvious as it is frequently overlooked – the parties to it are playing different games” (1996, p. 
203).  
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accumulation in the hinterland, in order to carry out its developmental agendas involving the 
expansion of industrial activity in the Fortaleza metropolitan area. In so doing, the 
government has had to work alongside the outcomes of political strategies introduced by 
Tasso Jereissati’s government, including the adoption of an extreme centralizing political 
style, and the breaking of traditional ties that linked local scale politics to state level politics, 
leading to lowered government control over local political processes. Local participatory 
commissions, created to act alongside municipal governments and perceived as being 
previously successful in the areas of health and drought contingency, provided the model to 
be applied to water management, but with the difference that technicians who were linked to 
state water management institutions (SRH and COGERH), imposed a technical framework 
upon the allocation commissions concerning how water should be understood and dealt 
with. This culminated in the granting of authority to commission members according to 
their ability to handle such concepts and in a short time technicians linked to municipal 
governments assumed leadership during water management negotiations and decisions. 
Some less privileged water user groups remained relatively alienated from the commission 
processes.  
In summary, one effective result the water commission generated for the 
government was the re-establishment of communicational links between state and local 
political levels with a specific focus on water management. This established a new political 
arena positioned in-between the municipal and the state levels, in which local technicians 
could compete for status, and have direct access to governmental activities without the 
mediation of local patrons. However, the design of the water allocation meetings affects not 
only the position of technicians inside the commission. Although the official rhetoric 
presents the meetings as democratic egalitarian spaces for negotiation, we saw that these 
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negotiations are preceded by lectures and presentations by technical authorities, in which the 
technical framework and the government’s agenda are presented as the proper avenues 
through which decisions should take place. We observed that the ideological content of 
these lectures seems to directly influence the water allocation negotiations, which seems to 
be by design, as these lectures are often presented as educational activities. 
Here is where we see the metapragmatic organization of the water allocation meeting 
providing political efficacy to the process. This metapragmatic organization is based on a set 
of discourses with clear ideological implications. Among these discourses we find the 
argument in favor of the necessity of the use of disciplinary technologies in the control of 
water use, in order to rationalize it, due to ecological and economic reasons; the liberal 
approach to agriculture that asserts that previous irrigation projects created as social 
programs to attend poor landless families have to achieve economic self-sustainability, 
through the initiative and organization of the producers themselves, or should be 
discontinued; and that water, in having an intrinsic economic value, should be used as an 
economic asset, which means, in the government’s agenda, prioritizing high added value 
activities like industries and fruit and shrimp production for export, which increase the 
government tax revenue. One of the outcomes of such an ideological activity is a resulting 
conceptualization that traditional local agricultural activities, such as flooded rice 
agriculture 165 , is backward and economically irresponsible, and holds a great deal of 
responsibility for periodic water crises of the region, due to the sector’s high consumption of 
water. It also increases the perceived authority of representatives of the large agribusiness 
                                                 
165 With the important detail that rice was chosen by government technicians in the 1970s, and now the bulk of 
rice production takes place in government managed irrigation projects. 
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corporations in the water allocation meetings, due to the fact that their more sophisticated 
infrastructure enables a more controlled use of water. 
At the same time, in many situations the participatory nature of the commission has 
been used by the government to legitimize its agenda, such as in cases when schemes have 
been forced upon members (such as the Águas do Vale program), and then are later 
presented as having been “discussed and approved” by the commission, therefore leaving 
the commission and not the government accountable for the results of some of the 
initiatives of the latter. This aspect of the process deserves special attention. Many local 
social activists are conscious about this feature of the way the water allocation meetings are 
organized, but find it hard to coordinate coherent arguments to denounce it, exactly because 
the meeting is structured in a way to dilute such attacks. The core of the question lies in the 
way implicit and explicit metapragmatic features of the process interact. The implicit 
metapragmatic organization of the event is what we described above, that is, the forms 
through which the technical paradigm, imposed as the legitimate form for understanding and 
acting in water management, functioned as distinction mechanisms in which parts of the 
commission - those with less formal education – were alienated from power, while local 
technicians took control of activities. The explicit metapragmatic organization of the event, 
on the other hand, is seen in the constant verbal references, in the beginning and end of each 
water allocation meeting, to the democratic quality of the process, represented as an arena in 
which all participants had equal decision power. Here the ideas of democratic participation and 
equity are taken as key symbols. It is their vagueness and indeterminacy in meaning that make 
them so problematic, but at the same time so powerful, in the political arena. In the absence 
of secure grounds on which to set their definition, local agents create ways to turn this 
indeterminacy of referential meaning into practical solutions. It is usual to see, in 
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commissions such as the Jaguaribe Commission, an element or a dimension of a social 
process – in this case the organization of time, and the distribution of equal rights to speak 
among representatives of distinct groups – functioning as a guide in the achievement of 
social results - equity in conflict resolution. So the equality of power between groups in 
decision making processes is usually tackled through the setting of the equal right to speak 
for different groups to manifest their opinions. These two aspects are, initially, indexed to 
each other and later become iconized: one looks at the distribution of speaking rights and 
takes that for the democratic quality of the process. Attention is then focused on this 
element, which is used as an indexical anchor in practice and as an iconic symbol in rhetoric. 
The link becomes an explicit metapragmatic device for organizing the ritual practice of the 
game, such as when a mediator states “democracy means everyone respecting the right of 
others to speak.” This ends up reifying a representation of the political game and takes for 
granted an assumption that is not valid – the iconization between amount of available time 
and amount of available power, which is one of the main normative features found in Western 
political arenas -, as it ignores differences in linguistic competence and in control taken over 
metapragmatic strategies by specific participants. In a word, the implicit and explicit 
metapragmatic qualities of the process act in opposite ways, although these are not 
inconsistent, but rather one masquerades the other. That is why, when someone attempts an 
attack on the system, accusing the government of using the commission for legitimating its 
agenda, the system naturally absorbs such defiances: the discontent is given the right to voice 
his or her concerns, through his or her allotted amount of time, entering the process of 
being regimented in time, genre, style, etc. The distinctive power of disruption loses its effect. 
In the long run, as happened to so many local leaders associated with social movements, the 
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discontents leave the commission. Furthermore, as we discussed already, sabotage continues 
to be taken as a natural aspect of the political life of the hinterlands. 
 
 
As the case study here presented exemplifies, the reorganization of the local material order, 
brought about by economic development efforts in the so-called developing world, is 
dependent on how efficient these efforts are in reorganizing the symbolic order. In this 
transformational process, the creation of new institutions and with them new 
institutionalized rituals, is a widely employed resource. Nevertheless, the microphysics of the 
meaning transformations that take place during institutionalized rituals do not require the 
artificial construction of a collective synchrony of minds. I thus return to the argument that 
hegemony can be depicted as the state of a game rather than as a stable configuration of 
power. If one stakeholder temporarily wins the metapragmatic game, conflicts will not 
necessarily disappear, but performances in arenas will be established in a more or less stable 
manner. Hegemony does not signify the disappearance of conflict, but the regimentation of 
conflict into specific forms and directions. In the words of Besteman: “Hegemony emerges 
here as a process of contradictions; not as ideological glue, as false consciousness, as docile 
compliance. Hegemony takes form in the process of coming to agreement about what to 
contest, what to struggle over” (1999, p. 232). 
This is all very relevant when thinking about political action of underprivileged groups 
and minorities. When innovative forms of social action achieve the status of institutionalized 
rituals, they provide new frames to problems at hand, and new schemata of interpretations 
that enable individuals to differently locate, perceive and identify occurrences, to render 
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events meaningful and to affect and transform, in specific ways, the reproduction processes 
of reality. This, in my understanding, embodies the essence of everything that has been 
presented throughout this text: for any political action to be effective, be it in a situation of 
conflict or cooperation, of creating or resisting domination, it has to consider and make 
effective use of metapragmatic strategies. 
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Appendix A: Images and figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Level of indigence by sub-region for the state of Ceará. Indigence is defined as a monthly 
income per capita that is ¼ of the national minimum wage. Source: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2001. 
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Picture 1: Reservoir water being collected for 
human consumption. Photograph by the author. 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 2: A man points to his stock of grains 
kept from a previous harvest, to be used during 
the following rainy season. Photograph by 
Fernando Briones.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 3: A hinterland rural family. Photograph 
by the author. 
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Pictures 4 and 5: Tanker trucks used for water transportation in the hinterland. Photographs 
by the author. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: ITCZ, from 01/29/2004 to 02/02/2004. Source: FUNCEME. 
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Figure 3: Variation in vegetation cover in the state of Ceará, between August (left) and September 
(right) of 2003. Source: FUNCEME 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Water and vegetation cover in a satellite image. The dark areas in the center of the image 
are the irrigated lands of the Icó-Lima Campos Irrigation Project during the dry season. In the upper-
left side of this image we can see a part of the Orós reservoir and further down, the Lima Campos 
reservoir is visible. Source: EMBRAPA. 
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Figure 5: Orós dam – This graph depicts the dam’s accumulated volume of water between January 
1981 and May 2003. The fluctuating line represents the dam’s water level. When the water level 
reaches the gray line located at the top of the graph, the dam overflows. When it reaches the black 
line located at the bottom of the graph, it signifies that the reservoir is drawing close to depletion. 
Source: COGERH. 
 
 
 
 
Picture 6: The “bleeding” of the Orós reservoir 
after the strong rains of January 2004. 
Photograph by the author. 
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Picture 7: The Orós bleeding spectacle evoked 
religious sentiment. In this photo, a man prays in 
the dam’s observatory. Source: O Povo, February 
6th, 2004. 
 
 
 
 
Picture 8: The Orós bleeding transformed into a 
souvenir. Photograph by the author.
 
 
 
 
Picture 9: A glass receptacle filled with water 
from the first overflow from the Cedro reservoir, 
which took place at 2 a.m. on April 24th, 1924; 
and the ribbon used during the inauguration of 
the Feiticeiro reservoir in 1933. These items are 
currently on display in the Museu do Ceará. 
Photograph by Ana Laura Taddei. 
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Diário do Nordeste, 21 de Janeiro de 2004 (January 21st, 2004) 
CONFIRA (Check this out) 
Chuvas de ontem (Yesterday’s rains) 
 
Litoral Norte 
Santana do Acaraú/sede 69.6 
Granja/sede 10.0 
Amontada/sede 8.2 
Chaval/sede 3.3 
Miraíma/sede 3.0 
Camocim/sede 1.0 
Sinha Sabóia/Sobral 0.1 
 
Litoral de Pecém 
Santa Cruz/Itapajé 28.6 
Arapari/Itapipoca 20.2 
Uruburetama/sede 12.0 
Sebastião de Abreu/Pentecoste 10.8 
Casa de Pedra/Pentecoste 8.0 
Itapajé/sede 7.0 
Itapipoca/sede 6.4 
General Sampaio/sede 5.4 
Pentecoste/sede 3.4  
 
Litoral de Fortaleza 
Horizonte/sede 26.0 
Itaipaba/Pacajus 12.0 
Aquiraz/sede 11.0 
Itapebussu/Maranguape 10.0 
Lagoa do Juvenal/Maranguape 9.0 
Funceme/Fortaleza 8.0 
Pacajus/sede 7.0 
Caucaia/sede 6.2 
Eusébio/sede 4.0 
Lagoa da Serra/Caucaia 2.8 
 
Maciço de Baturité 
Redenção/sede 43.2 
Palmácia/sede 9.8 
Guaiúba/sede 9.2 
 
Ibiapaba 
Nova Betania/Nova Russas 21.0 
Mucambo/sede 7.0 
Graça/sede 6.0 
América/Ipueiras 5.1 
Canindezinho/Nova Russas 4.0 
Ipu/sede 3.0 
Reriutaba/sede 3.0 
Jaguaribana 
Nova Floresta/Jaguaribe 45.0 
Russas/sede 29.2 
Jaguaruana/sede 28.0 
Iracema/sede 23.2 
Pereiro/sede 23.0 
Giqui/Jaguaruana 18.8 
Quixeré/sede 18.8 
Aeroporto/Aracati 17.2 
São Vicente/Icó 13.6 
Itaiçaba/sede 13.6 
Icó/sede 13.0 
Palestina/Orós 13.0 
Jaguaribe/sede 12.2 
Bastiões/Iracema 11.0 
Aracati/sede 10.4 
Alto Santo/sede 9.0 
Ema/Iracema 8.2 
São João/Ererê 7.2 
Palhano/sede 6.2 
Orós/sede 5.2 
Aruaru/Morada Nova 4.8 
São José de Fama/Iracema 4.0 
Banabuiú/sede2.3 
Bixopa/Limoeiro do Norte 2.0 
 
Cariri 
Jucás/sede 80.0 
Santana do Cariri/Sede 50.0 
Palestina do Cariri/Mauriti 47.0 
Mararupa/Mauriti 46.3 
Lameiro/Crato 45.0 
Farias Brito/sede 41.8 
Altaneira/sede 40.0 
Jardim/sede 39.0 
Gam. de S. Sebastião/Missão Velha 39.0 
Abaiara/sede 36.0 
Crato/sede 33.9 
Lavras da Mangabeira/sede 31.2 
Granjeiro/sede 30.2 
Mauriti/sede 28.2 
Cedro/sede 26.2 
Amaniutuba/Lavras da Mangabeira 20.3 
Várzea da Conceição/Cedro 20.0 
Barbalha/sede 15.2 
Aurora/sede 11.6 
Jati/sede 10.0 
Ipaumirim/sede 8.5 
Barro/sede 6.8 
Penaforte/sede 5.0 
Sertão-Central e Inhamuns 
Arneiroz/sede 131.4 
Baú/Iguatu 88.0 
Estação Ecológica/Aiuaba 76.0 
Quixoa/Iguatu 68.0 
Flamengo/Saboeiro 65.0 
Catarina/sede 63.5 
Iguatu/sede 56.0 
Caiçara/Tauá 51.2 
Aiuaba/sede 50.0 
Altamira/Tauá 47.0 
Cabaceira/Campos Sales 41.0 
Parambu/sede 41.0 
Carrapateiras/Tauá 40.0 
Pajeú/Araripe 38.0 
Vera Cruz/Tauá 37.0 
Fazenda Nova/Aiuaba 32.2 
Araripe/sede 31.1 
Solonópole/sede 28.0 
Aratama/Assaré 26.0 
São João do Trissi/Tauá 24.0 
Campos Sales/sede 22.2 
Santa Tereza/Tauá 22.0 
Bom Nome/Aiuaba 21.0 
Potengi/sede 21.0 
Marrecas/Tauá 21.0 
Assaré/sede 18.8 
Guaribas/Acopiara 18.0 
Tauá/sede 15.6 
Monteiro/Quiterianópolis 15.0 
Mombaça/sede 13.0 
Várzea Nova/Antonina do Norte 
10.6 
Brejinho/Araripe 10.2 
Dep. Irapuan Pinheiro/sede 9.0 
Quiterianópolis/sede 9.0 
Pedra Branca/sede 8.0 
Ibicua/Piquet Carneiro 8.0 
Quixeramobim/sede 7.8 
Tapuiara/Quixadá 7.5 
Bom Jesus/Tauá 7.5 
Milhã/sede 5.0 
Mineirolândia/Pedra Branca 5.0 
Aeroporto/Crateús 2.8 
Independência/sede 2.0 
Senador Pompeu/sede 1.6 
Lagoa do Mato/Itatira 1.0 
 
Figure 6: Precipitation is closely scrutinized by local newspapers. The names in bold refer to sub-
regions of the state. Underneath each sub-region, towns or districts are listed along with the amount 
of rain they received in millimeters. 
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Picture 10: A water fountain in an open air mall 
in Aldeota, a wealthy neighborhood of Fortaleza. 
Photograph by the author. 
 
 
 
Picture 11: Grass being watered in the state 
government building complex (Cambeba), 
Fortaleza. Photograph by the author. 
 
 
 
Picture 12: Man saves a statue of Padre Cícero 
from flooding. Source: Diário do Nordeste, 
January 30th, 2004. 
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Picture 13: Water and climate are omnipresent 
themes in local religious rituals. Photograph by 
the author. 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 14: A rain prophet being interviewed by 
local journalists before the annual meeting of 
rain prophets in Quixadá, January 10th, 2004. 
Photograph by the author. 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 15: The 8th Annual Rain Prophets’ 
Meeting of Quixadá (2004). A glimpse of the 
packed auditorium. Photograph by the author. 
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Picture 16: Expedito Epifânio da Silva 
announces his forecast to the cameras, 2004. 
Photograph by the author.
 
 
 
 
Picture 17: Rain prophet (with black hat) 
announces his forecast during the 2005 
meeting, trying to divide his attention 
between the mayor (in yellow shirt, at the 
table) and the TV cameras. Helder Cortez in 
standing in front of the prophet and beside 
the mayor we see Prof. Caio Lossio Botelho 
(light blue shirt) and Namir Giovani da Silva 
Mello, from FUNCEME. Photograph by the 
author. 
 
 
 
 
Picture 18: Chico Mariano. 
Photograph by the author. 
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Picture 19: Meteorologists at the 2005 Fortaleza 
Climate Outlook Forum. Photograph by the 
author. 
 
 
 
 
Picture 20: After all individual presentations, 
meteorologists gather to construct the official 
forecast consensus. Photograph by the author.
 
 
 
 
Picture 21: Press conference, December 19th, 
2002. From right to left: Francisco Lopes Viana 
(ANA), Pedro Sisnando Leite (SDR/CE), 
Francisco de Assis de Souza Filho (FUNCEME), 
Antonio Divino Moura (IRI), José Antonio 
Marengo (CPTEC/INPE) and Antonio Geraldo 
Ferreira (FUNCEME). The dean of UECE, 
Manassés Fonteles, although not in this 
photograph, was also present at the meeting. 
Photograph by the author. 
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Figure 7: A forecast 
for the 2004 rainy 
season which was 
elaborated during 
the Climate 
Outlook Forum 
and released to the 
press by 
FUNCEME, 
Fortaleza. The 
numbers located in 
the blue boxes 
represent the 
numeric likelihood 
(by percentage) of 
rains above 
historical averages; 
while the numbers 
in the white boxes 
refer to the 
probability of rain 
falling close to 
historical averages; 
and those in the 
orange boxes refer 
to the probability 
of rain falling 
below historical 
averages. Source: 
FUNCEME. 
 
 
 
 
Picture 22: Press conference, January 23rd, 2004. 
From right to left: Izelda Rocha (COGERH), 
Maria Assunção Faus da Silva Dias 
(CPTEC/INPE), Edinardo Ximenez Rodrigues 
(SRH/CE), Francisco de Assis de Souza Filho 
(FUNCEME) and Antonio Divino Moura 
(INMET). Photograph by the author. 
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Picture 23: The forecast as a collective creation: 
larger than Ceará. Press conference, January 21st, 
2005. Photograph by the author.
 
 
 
 
Picture 24: Producer Martim Ribeiro dos Santos 
points to a diagram of temperature anomalies 
caused by the 1998 El Niño, which is framed and 
hanging in his living room, in Icó, Ceará’s 
hinterland. On the wall behind him we can see 
the lower part of a poster of Jesus’ Sacred Heart. 
Photograph by the author. 
 
 
 
 
Picture 25: The Castanhão reservoir, 2004. 
Photograph by the author. 
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Picture 26: A nearly dried up reservoir, with level 
indicators now beyond the water’s reach, in Santa 
Maria, Médio Jaguaribe. Photograph by the 
author. 
 
 
 
Picture 27: Bringing home water from 
a reservoir, Mid-Jaguaribe. 
Photograph by the author.
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 28: A field of flooded rice, Higher 
Jaguaribe. Photograph by the author. 
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Picture 29: Fruit production, Lower Jaguaribe. 
Photograph by the author.
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 30: An example of the furrow irrigation 
method used on a bean crop, Banabuiú. 
Photograph by the author. 
 
 
 
 
Picture 31: An example of center 
pivot irrigation system, Lower Jaguaribe. 
Photograph by the author.
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Picture 32: A car with loudspeakers attached to 
its roof, a common communication tool in the 
Jaguaribe Valley. Photograph by the author. 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 33: Some commission members depend 
on favors from local politicians, like the 
provision of transportation, resulting in the 
creation of political obligation. In this picture, a 
bus from the municipal government of Orós 
brought commission members to a meeting in 
Limoeiro do Norte. Photograph by the author. 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 34: The registration of voting members at 
a meeting of the Jaguaribe water allocation 
commission. Photograph by the author. 
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Picture 35: Jaguaribe water allocation 
commission. This image shows the head of 
SRH delivering the first speech from the 
directive table. Photograph by the author. 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 36: Jaguaribe water allocation 
commission. Commission members in the 
auditory during the morning presentations. 
Photograph by the author. 
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Pictures 37 and 38: Curu water allocation 
commission. Participants are divided into smaller 
groups, corresponding to river sections, in which 
water allocation negotiations take place. 
Photograph by the author.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 39: Irrigators breaking the 
chains that guard access to the Lima 
Campos reservoir valve. Source: 
Diário do Nordeste, July 24th, 2004. 
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OPERATION SIMULATION FOR THE ORÓS RESERVOIR 
FROM JULY 1st, 2002 TO JANUARY 1st, 2003 
 
MAXIMUM LEVEL: 199.50 m   VALVE LEVEL: 169.00 m
CAPACITY: 1,940.00 hm3   DEAD VOLUME: 16.87 hm³
 
SIMULATION AT 5.0 m³/s 
 
Date 
Level 
(m) 
Volume 
(hm³) 
Volume (%) Evaporation area (m) 
Released 
flow (m³/s)
Released 
volume 
(hm³) 
Evaporated 
volume (hm³) 
 Level 
variation (m)
Volume 
variation 
(hm³) 
07/01/02 186.36 420.091 21.7% 0.19 5.000 13.39 10.30 -0.44 -23.70 
08/01/02 185.92 396.447 20.4% 0.22 5.000 13.39 10.68 -0.49 -24.07 
09/01/02 185.43 372.417 19.2% 0.22 5.000 12.96 10.73 -0.48 -23.69 
10/01/02 184.95 349.137 18.0% 0.24 5.000 13.39 10.38 -0.54 -23.77 
11/01/02 184.41 325.459 16.8% 0.21 5.000 12.96 9.42 -0.52 -22.38 
12/01/02 183.89 303.167 15.6% 0.21 5.000 13.39 8.34 -0.55 -21.74 
01/01/03 183.34 281.601 14.5% 1.29  79.48 59.85 -3.02 -139.35 
 
SIMULATION AT 6.0 m³/s 
 
Date 
Level 
(m) 
Volume 
(hm³) 
Volume (%) Evaporation area (m) 
Released 
flow (m³/s)
Released 
volume (hm³)
Evaporated 
volume (hm³) 
Level 
Variation (m)
Volume 
Variation 
(hm³) 
07/01/02 186.36 420.091 21.7% 0.19 6.000 16.07 10.30 -0.49 -26.37 
08/01/02 185.87 393.995 20.3% 0.22 6.000 16.07 10.68 -0.54 -26.75 
09/01/02 185.33 367.513 18.9% 0.22 6.000 15.55 10.73 -0.56 -26.29 
10/01/02 184.77 341.245 17.6% 0.24 6.000 16.07 10.38 -0.60 -26.45 
11/01/02 184.17 314.934 16.2% 0.21 6.000 15.55 9.22 -0.61 -24.77 
12/01/02 183.56 290.228 15.0% 0.21 6.000 16.07 8.34 -0.63 -24.41 
01/01/03 182.93 265.816 13.7% 1.29  95.38 59.65 -3.43 -155.04 
 
Figure 8: A sample of a slide used during water allocation meetings, in which a simulation of the 
conditions of the Orós reservoir is presented under two different water release situations (under 5 
and under 6 cubic meters per second). 
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Figure 9: The perennialized sections of the Jaguaribe Valley, including the Banabuiú River, the most 
important infrastructural features of this water system (dams and canals), main government managed 
irrigation districts and the main municipalities. 
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Appendix B: Complementary Texts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 – Poem: Cante lá, que eu canto cá [Sing there, while I sing here] – by Patativa do Assaré (2003 
[1956], p. 275-280) 
 
Poeta, cantô de rua, 
Que na cidade nasceu, 
Cante a cidade que é sua, 
Que eu canto o sertão que é meu. 
Se aí você teve estudo, 
Aqui Deus me ensinou tudo, 
Sem de livro precisá. 
Por favo, não mexa aqui, 
Que eu também não mexo aí, 
Cante lá, que eu canto cá. 
 
Você teve inducação, 
Aprendeu munta ciença, 
Mas das coisas do meu sertão 
Não tem boa esperiença. 
Nunca fez uma paioça, 
Nunca trabaiou na roça, 
Não pode conhecê bem, 
Pois nesta penosa vida, 
Só o que provou da comida 
Sabe o gosto que tem.  
 
Pra gente cantá o sertão, 
Precisa nele mora, 
Poet, street singer, 
Born in the city, 
Sing of the city that is yours, 
And I’ll sing of the sertão that is mine. 
There you received formal education, 
Here God taught me everything, 
Without the need of books. 
Please, don’t come and meddle here, 
And I will not meddle there either, 
Sing there, while I sing here. 
 
You received education, 
You’ve learned a lot about science, 
But of the things concerning my sertão 
You don’t have the experience. 
You’ve never made a paioça166, 
You never worked in the fields, 
You cannot know it well, 
Because in this life, 
Only those who have tried the food 
Know its taste. 
 
In order for us to sing of the sertão, 
In it we need to have lived, 
                                                 
166 A Paioça is a house made from grasses of the region. 
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Tê armoço de feijão 
E a janta de mucunzá, 
Vivê pobre sem dinhêro, 
Trabaiando o dia intero, 
Socado dentro do mato, 
De apragata currulepe, 
Pisando inriba do estrepe, 
Brocando a unha-de-gato. 
 
Você é muito ditoso, 
Sabe lê, sabe escrevê, 
Pois vá cantando o seu gôso, 
Que eu canto o meu padecê. 
Inquanto a felicidade 
Você canta na cidade, 
A fome, a dô e a misera. 
Pra sê poeta divera, 
Precisa tê sofrimento. 
 
Sua rima, inda que seja 
Bordada de prata e oro, 
Para a gente sertaneja 
É perdido este tesôro. 
Com o seu verso bem feito, 
Não canta o sertão dereito, 
Porque você não conhece 
Nossa vida aperreada. 
E a dô só é bem cantada, 
Cantada por quem padece. 
 
Só canta o sertão dereito, 
Com tudo quanto ele tem, 
Quem sempre correu estreito, 
Sem potreção de ninguém, 
Coberto de precisão 
Com paciença de Jó, 
Puxando o cabo da inxada, 
Na quebrada e na chapada, 
Moiadinho de suó. 
 
Amigo, não tenha quêxa, 
Veja que eu tenho razão 
To have had its beans for lunch, 
And have had its mucunzá167 for dinner, 
To have known poverty, without money, 
Working the entire day, 
Stuck inside the brush, 
Wearing simple, cheap sandals, 
Stepping on thorns, 
Cutting through the unha-de-gato168. 
 
You are very proud, 
You know how to read, how to write, 
So keep singing of your contentment, 
And I’ll sing of my suffering. 
While of happiness 
You sing in the city, 
I sing of hunger, pain and misery 
To be a real poet, 
One must suffer. 
 
Your rhyme, even if  
Embroidered with silver and gold, 
For the people of the sertão, 
Its treasure is lost. 
With your well constructed verses, 
You can’t properly sing of the sertão  
Because you don’t know 
Our life of hardship. 
And its pain is only well sung, 
When it is sung by those afflicted. 
 
Only sing of the sertão properly, 
Include everything that it has, 
Those who always ran on the narrow, 
Protected by no-one, 
Covered in need, 
With the patience of Job, 
Working the handle of the hoe, 
In the quebrada 169and in the plateau, 
Dripping with sweat. 
 
Friend, do not complain, 
Understand that I am right, 
                                                                                                                                                 
167 Mucunzá is a corn based dish. 
168 Unha-de-gato is a type of local bush. 
169 Quebrada is a break in a path or a road. 
170 Sarapatéu is a Brazilian dish consisting of a large mix of ingredients, which the poet uses as a comparison. 
171 Abrolhos are peaks of rocky formations. 
172 Jatobá, gameleira and trapiá are local trees. 
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Em lhe dizê que não mexa 
Nas coisas do meu sertão. 
Pois, se não sabe o colega, 
De quá manera se pega 
Num ferro pra trabaiá. 
Por favo, não mexa aqui, 
Que eu também não mexo aí, 
Cante lá, que eu canto cá. 
 
Repare que a minha vida 
É deferente da sua. 
A sua rima pulida 
Nasceu no salão da rua. 
Já eu sou bem deferente, 
Meu verso é como a simente 
Que nasce inriba do chão, 
Não tenho estudo nem arte, 
A minha rima faz parte 
Das obras da criação. 
 
Mas porém, eu não invejo 
O grande tesôro seu, 
Os livros do seu colejo, 
Onde você aprendeu. 
 
Pra gente aqui sê poeta 
E fazê rima compreta, 
Não precisa professo. 
Basta vê, no mês de maio, 
Um poema em cada gaio 
E um verso em cada fulo. 
 
Seu verso é uma mistura, 
É um tá sarapaté, 
Que, quem tem poca leitura, 
Lê, mas não sabe o que é. 
Tem tanta coisa incantada, 
Tanta deusa, tanta fada, 
Tanto mistero e condão 
E ôtros negoço impossive, 
E eu canto as coisa visive 
Do meu querido sertão. 
 
Canto as fulô e os abroio 
Com todas coisa daqui: 
Pra toda parte que eu óio 
Vejo um verso se buli. 
Se às vêz andando nos vale 
Atraz de curá meus male 
Quando repará pra serra, 
In telling you not to meddle, 
In the things of my sertão. 
Well, my friend if you don’t know, 
How to handle 
A work tool. 
Please, do not meddle here, 
And I will not meddle there either, 
Sing there, and I’ll sing here. 
 
Take note that my life 
Is different from yours. 
Your rhyme is polished, 
It was born in a street salon, 
But I am so very different, 
My verse is like a seed, 
That sprouts from the ground, 
I don’t have education nor art, 
But my rhyme forms part, 
Of the works of creation. 
 
But nevertheless I don’t envy 
The grand treasure that you have 
The books from your school 
From where you learned. 
 
For us here to become poets, 
And to make a complete rhyme, 
We don’t need a professor. 
It is enough to see, in the month of May, 
A poem in each branch, 
And a verse in each flower. 
 
Your verse is a mixture, 
It is a sarapateu170, 
That, for those not well read, 
They will read, but will not understand. 
[Your verse] has so many enchanting things, 
So many goddesses, so many fairies, 
So much mystery and fantasy 
And other unreal things, 
And I sing of the visible, 
Of my beloved sertão. 
 
I sing of the flowers and of the abroios171, 
With all the things that are here: 
Everywhere I look 
I see a verse in the making. 
If sometimes I walk through the valleys 
To cure my ailments 
I notice the hills, 
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Assim que óio pra cima, 
Vejo um diluve de rima 
Caindo inriba da terra. 
 
Mas, tudo é rima rastêra 
De fruita de jatobá, 
De foia de gamalêra 
E fulo de trapiá, 
De canto de passarinho 
E da poêra do caminho, 
Quando a ventania vem, 
Pois você já tá ciente: 
Nossa vida é diferente 
E o nosso verso também. 
 
Repare que deferença 
Isiste na vida nossa: 
Inquanto eu tô na sentença, 
Trabaiando em minha roça, 
Você, lá no seu descanso, 
Fuma o seu cigarro manso, 
Bem prefumado e sadio, 
Já eu, aqui, tive a sorte 
De fumá cigarro forte 
Feito de paia de mio. 
 
Você, vaidoso e facêro, 
Tôda vez que qué fumá, 
Tira do bôrso um isquêro 
Do mais bonito metá. 
E eu, que não posso com isso, 
Puxo por meu artifiço 
Arranjado por aqui, 
Feito de chifre de gado, 
Cheio de argodão queimado, 
Boa pedra e bom fuzí. 
 
Sua vida é divirtida 
E a minha é grande pená. 
Só numa parte da vida 
Nóis dois samo bem iguá: 
É no dereito sagrado, 
Por Jesus abençoado 
Pra consolá o nosso pranto, 
Conheço e não me confundo, 
Da coisa mió do mundo 
Nóis goza do mesmo tanto. 
 
Eu não posso lhe invejá 
Nem você invejá eu. 
And in that moment I look above, 
I see a deluge of rhyme, 
Falling on the earth. 
 
But it is all shallow rhyme, 
Of jatobá fruit, 
Of gamaleira leaf, 
Of trapiá172 flower, 
Of birdsong  
And of the dust on the path, 
When the wind comes, 
So you have been made aware: 
Our lives are different, 
As is our verse. 
 
Take note of such difference 
That exists between our lives: 
While I am sentenced, 
To working in my fields, 
You are at rest, 
Smoking your calm cigarette,  
Well perfumed and healthy, 
While I, here, had the luck, 
To smoke a strong cigar 
Made from maize leaves. 
 
You, vain and elegant, 
Each time you want to smoke, 
You get from your pocket a lighter 
Made of the finest metal. 
I, who cannot afford that, 
Make my own artifact, 
Gathered from around here, 
Made with a bull’s horn, 
Filled with burnt cotton, 
A good stone and a good igniter.  
 
Your life is enjoyable 
And mine is pain. 
Only in one aspect of life, 
Are we both surely equal: 
It is in the sacred right, 
By Jesus we are blessed, 
In order to console our crying, 
Now I know not to get confused, 
That the best things in the world, 
We enjoy to the same extent. 
 
I cannot envy you, 
Nor you can envy me. 
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O que Deus lhe deu por lá, 
Aqui também Deus me deu. 
Pois minha boa muié, 
Me estima com munta fé, 
Me abraça, beja e qué bem 
E ninguém pode negá  
Que das coisas naturá 
Tem ela o que a sua tem. 
 
Aqui findo esta verdade 
Toda cheia de razão: 
Fique na sua cidade, 
Que eu fico no meu sertão. 
Já lhe mostrei um espêio, 
Já lhe dei grande consêio 
Que você deve tomá: 
Por favo, não mexa aqui, 
Que eu também não mexo aí. 
Cante lá, que eu canto cá. 
What God gave you there, 
Here God also gave to me. 
Well my good woman, 
Loves me with lots of faith, 
She holds me, kisses me and wishes me well 
And no one can deny 
That of natural things, 
She also has the same as yours. 
 
Now to close this truth, 
Filled completely with reason: 
Remain in your city, 
So that I can stay in my sertão. 
Now that I have shown you a mirror, 
Now that I have given you advice, 
Of which you should accept: 
Please, do not meddle here, 
And I will not meddle there either, 
Sing there, so that I can sing here. 
 
 
 
2 – Fragments of transcription: verbal interchange between members of the Metropolitan 
Water Committee and meteorologist Namir Giovani da Silva Mello. Fortaleza, COGERH 
auditorium, February 5th, 2004: 
 
Presidente do comitê: eu tenho visto muito na região, aquele negócio, “a FUNCEME não 
disse nem sim, nem não, nem muito pelo contrário”, que é esse negócio do inverno normal, né? 
Então, seria muito importante, não só para essa audiência que está aqui, que é uma audiência 
bastante eclética e que reúne basicamente todos os 30 municípios da região aqui metropolitana 
(refere-se à região denominada Bacias Metropolitanas, que é mais extensa que a região 
metropolitana de Fortaleza), que fosse bastante explicado pela FUNCEME o que é 
“normal”, porque às vezes a pessoa pensa que não vai ser um ano nem muito seco nem vai seu 
um ano muito chuvoso, um ano normal, mas o que é isso, isso tem que ser traduzido para a 
população, a população não está entendendo, porque diz assim, “rapaz, mais uma vez a 
FUNCEME errou”, eu to ouvindo comentário por aí, tá certo? Quer dizer, e a gente sabe que 
não erra,... tem expertos que trabalham na área, estão bastante satisfeitos com a previsão, eu 
pessoalmente estou, tenho acompanhado desde o final do ano todas as previsões da 
FUNCEME, to bastante satisfeito com o nível de... de... de responsabilidade da 
FUNCEME neste ano, certo? Mas eu gostaria que você colocasse esta posição mais 
didaticamente, ok? 
Namir: O que significa normal? Cada posto pluviométrico, cada município, tem a sua série 
histórica. ... Cada posto vai ter o seu muito seco, o seu seco, normal, chuvoso e muito chuvoso. E 
aí a gente faz uma média por região. Então tem um posto em Tauá que (a média) é 400 
milímetros, e um posto em Ibiapina que é mais de 1200 milímetros. Então o normal para 
Tauá é 400 milímetros, e o normal para Ibiapina é 1200 milímetros, então nós fizemos um 
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mapa com a distribuição destas chuvas, o que significa ser o normal, que é uma categoria, que 
tem um limite inferior e um limite superior, o normal pra Tauá é de 400 a 500, o normal pra 
Ibiapina é de 1100 a 1300, então esse mapa é divulgado junto com a previsão para que as 
pessoas saibam... ou uma tabelinha também... para que as pessoas saibam o que é o normal 
para a sua região. Agora as pessoas, a sociedade de um modo geral, sabe que quando a previsão 
é de um ano normal, ou regular, é um ano difícil para aquelas regiões onde o normal é chover 
pouco, é ser seco, há ocorrência geralmente de veranicos, há uma má distribuição da chuva, ou 
seja que chove muito num canto e não chove em outro bem próximo. Isso é o normal. Um ano 
chuvoso é mais ou menos o que aconteceu agora em janeiro, chuva generalizada em todo o estado, 
foi o que aconteceu em 85, aconteceu em 74, 75; e um ano seco é chuva pouca e uma 
irregularidade muito grande na distribuição desta chuva, tanto espacial, que é chover num ponto 
e não chover no outro, quanto temporal, que é chover agora e passar dez, quinze dias pra chover 
de novo, que é muito ruim pra agricultura. O ano de 2003 foi um ano normal, choveu próximo 
da média histórica para cada município, mas para a agricultura foi bom porque foi bem 
distribuído temporalmente, ou seja não ocorreram os veranicos, não ocorreram períodos de 
estiagem muito longos, principalmente no sertão, que não resiste por muito tempo. E mesmo 
num ano seco, é importante ressaltar que num ano seco podem ocorrer eventos extremos de chuva, 
principalmente em Fortaleza e em algumas áreas do estado, como em 93 teve chuva de 150 
milímetros que inundou Fortaleza e nós tivemos um ano seco. 97 nós tivemos chuvas de 280 
milímetros que inundou a cidade toda e foi um ano seco. Quer dizer, para a previsão de tempo é 
alguma coisa bastante extrema, para a previsão de clima uma coisa mais uniforme. 
Normalmente as pessoas gostam também de avaliar uma previsão que é para um período no 
meio, durante. No ano de 97 choveu do dia 22 de março ao dia 29 de abril. Nesse período, a 
crítica em cima da FUNCEME era muito grande, “disseram que ia ser seco e esta chovendo”. 
Aí quando chegou no final da estação, no final de maio, a gente foi fazer uma avaliação, e 
realmente os totais de chuva ficaram abaixo da média, e na agricultura do estado houve uma 
quebra de mais de 60% se não me engano nos valores. Então a previsão é para a quadra 
chuvosa, uma previsão probabilística, para fevereiro, março, abril e maio, e avaliação deve ser 
feita sempre no final. Não sei se eu fui claro com relação à sua pergunta. 
(...) 
Voz feminina: Todo ano chove o normal? O que é o “normal”? Isso não ficou bem... 
Namir: O normal é uma média histórica. Numa média histórica, você soma todos os janeiros, 
por exemplo, e faz a média. Você soma 30 janeiros, divide, e então você tem um valor 
normalizado. De ano a ano, você vai ter ou acima do normal ou abaixo do normal, abaixo do 
normal é um ano seco, e acima do normal é um ano chuvoso. 
Voz feminina: então 400 milímetros em Tauá é “normal”, todos os janeiros...  
Namir: esse é um valor de referência... é uma média histórica... 
Voz feminina: ... eu posso ter esse valor aí... modificado pra cada mês... 
Namir: ... exato. É a média histórica. E aí o que significa um milímetro de chuva? É um 
milímetro de água por metro quadrado. 400 milímetros, 400 litros de água. 
(...) 
Voz masculina: ... Os municípios não tem um prognóstico; o pessoal da cidade tem, mas para 
os municípios o prognóstico não funciona. Precisa de estudo mais apurado, de uma certeza 
maior do tempo. Uma pergunta: houve alguma alteração com relação à estrutura, nós queremos 
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saber... o que entrou com relação a equipamentos de última geração, dentro da FUNCEME, 
pra dar à FUNCEME a possibilidade de uma precisão maior, e um monitoramento maior. 
E o que não entrou, o que é que a FUNCEME precisa, e o que é que vai custar isso ao 
governo do estado.  
Namir: bom, nós tínhamos 11 estações meteorológicas desde a década de 60, que pertenciam, 
que pertencem ao Instituto Nacional de Meteorologia. Era só o que nós tínhamos no Ceará, e 
uma rede pluviométrica que era da SUDENE, e a partir de 74 a FUNCEME também 
começou a montar sua própria rede. Era só o que tinha. Hoje estão sendo instaladas 79, se não 
me engano, estações meteorológicas automáticas, em todo o estado, 20 já foram instaladas, até o 
final do ano todas serão instaladas, a um custo aí de quase 6 milhões de reais, que é financiado 
pelo Banco Mundial. E [temos] computadores, radar, imagens de satélite de meia em meia hora, 
nós recebemos imagens de um satélite europeu de meia em meia hora, somos o único lugar do 
Brasil que recebe de meia em meia hora, uma estação de recepção de satélite NOAA, 
americano, que é de uma órbita baixa e passa por nós aqui 4, 5 vezes ao dia e a gente consegue 
ter uma radiografia do que está acontecendo no Ceará, uns modelos matemáticos que são 
rodados nos supercomputadores do INPE em São Paulo, dos Estados Unidos e da Europa, e 
um convênio que a gente está tendo com instituições, não só do Brasil como do exterior. Então 
isso tudo nos ajudou a termos mais ferramentas para melhor prever... só que a meteorologia 
também não é só isso, a gente precisa agora com essas estações, com a nova série histórica de 
dados, e a ciência continuar evoluindo... eu costumo sempre comentar o que acontece nos Estados 
Unidos: eles prevêm, principalmente o tempo com uma precisão bastante grande, não é porque 
eles são melhores do que nós, [mas] porque os Estados Unidos tem uma perda de 1 bilhão de 
dólares por semana, ou seja, 55 bilhões de dólares por ano, devido aos efeitos climáticos: 
tornados, furacões, secas, vendavais, neve, deserto, então eles investem pesado em meteorologia, e 
eles estão estudando o clima deles há mais de cem anos, e nós estamos aqui no Ceará estudando 
há dez anos, com os dados que eram gerados pelas estações do INMET de 60 pra cá, então, 
era muito pobre, e as estações pluviométricas que medem a chuva também tem um total mensal 
muito bom, mas diariamente é muito complicado, porque a pessoa vai lá medir a chuva todo dia 
e ligar pra nós, nós observamos já que segunda-feira sempre chove mais do que sábado e 
domingo, ou seja, o indivíduo deixa acumular a chuva no sábado e domingo, não lê, e aí manda 
na segunda como se fosse um total, então os dados diários da chuva, é complicado você fazer. 
Então, em termos de equipamento tá bom, melhorou muito, há um investimento do estado em 
convênio com o governo federal, e em termos de dados e a evolução da ciência, a gente depende 
muito de um certo tempo ainda. 
 
Committee president: In this region I have been witnessing [people saying] 
“FUNCEME did not say yes or no, nor the opposed” [using a Brazilian joke 
about peoples’ evasiveness] about this idea of a normal winter, right? So, it is very 
important, not only for this auditory, which is a very diverse audience that unites 
basically all 30 municipalities of the metropolitan basins region (he is referring to 
the area called Metropolitan Basins, which is larger than the Fortaleza 
metropolitan area), that FUNCEME explain what is normal, because sometimes a 
person thinks that it is not going to be too dry nor too rainy, a normal year, but 
what exactly is that? This should be translated to the general public, who are not 
understanding it, and then we hear comments such as “man, FUNCEME got it 
wrong again,” I am hearing this kind of thing around, ok? I mean, we know 
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FUNCEME does not make mistakes… there are experts who work in this region, 
who are very satisfied with the forecast, I personally am, I have been following 
all of FUNCEME’s forecasts since the end of the year, and I am very satisfied 
with the level of… of… how responsible FUNCEME have been this year, right? 
But I wanted you to explain this idea in a more didactic way, ok? 
Namir: What does normal mean? Each pluviometric station, each municipality, 
has a historical series… Each station has a category of very dry, dry, normal, rainy 
and very rainy. We then calculate the average per region. For instance there is a 
station in the municipality of Tauá that has an average of 400 millimeters (per 
year), and a station in the municipality of Ibiapina that has an average of over 
1200 millimeters. Then the normal for Tauá is 400 millimeters, and the normal for 
Ibiapina is 1200 millimeters, and with this we made a map with the distribution 
of these rains. Normal is a category that has a range with inferior and superior 
limits, the normal for Tauá is between 400 and 500, the normal for Ibiapina is 
between 1100 and 1300, so this map is released together with the forecast to the 
public … or maybe a little table as well… so that people will know what the 
normal is for their region. Now people, society in general, know that when the 
forecast points to a normal, or regular year, it means that it will be a difficult year 
for those regions in which normal means little rain fall, dryness, with the 
occurrence of dry-spells, with bad rain distribution, that is, that it rains a lot in 
one place and it does not rain in another place of close proximity. This is normal. 
A rainy year is more or less characterized by what happened this last January, 
with generalized rains throughout the whole state as was also the case for 1985, 
and also in 1974, 1975. And a dry year is characterized by little rain and marked 
irregularities in its distribution, in space, in that it rains in one place and does not 
in another, and in time, meaning that it rains and then ten, fifteen days pass 
without rains, which is very bad for agriculture. 2003 was a normal year, it rained 
close to the historical average for each municipality, and for agriculture it was 
good because the rains were well distributed temporally, that is, we did not have 
dry-spells, long periods without rain, mainly in the hinterland, which cannot 
comfortably stand it for too long. And even in a dry year, it is important to note 
that in a dry year there can be extreme rain events, mainly in Fortaleza and other 
areas of the state, such as in 1993, when we had 150 millimeters of rains that 
flooded Fortaleza but overall the year was considered to be dry. In 1997 we had 
280 millimeters of rains that flooded the city and the year was also dry. This 
means, in terms of weather forecasting (i.e. in the short term) that it was 
something extreme, but for climate forecasting (i.e. in the long term) it was 
something more uniform (normal). Usually people also like to make evaluations of 
the forecast in the middle of the rainy season. In 1997 it rained between March 
22nd and April 29th. In that period, there was heavy criticism directed towards 
FUNCEME, saying “they said that there would be drought conditions and it is 
raining.” However when we reached the end of the season, at the end of May, we 
made an evaluation and in fact the rain totals were below average, and for 
agriculture there were loses of over 60% of harvests, if I am not mistaken. So the 
forecast is for the whole season, it is a probabilistic forecast, for February, March, 
April and May and an evaluation should always be carried out at the end. I am 
not sure if I was clear in relation to your question. 
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(…) 
Feminine voice: Do we have normal rain falls every year? What does normal mean? 
That part is not clear… 
Namir: The normal is the historical average. For a historical average, you add up 
all precipitation records for January, divide, and then you have the normalized 
value. So every year, you will have above or below normal, below meaning a dry year, 
and above meaning a rainy year. 
Feminine voice: Then 400 millimeters in Tauá is normal, for every January… 
Namir: That is the reference value… it is the historical average… 
Feminine voice: … that value can be… modified every month… 
Namir: … Exactly. It is the historical average. And what does a millimeter of rain 
mean? It is a millimeter of water in a square meter. 400 millimeters means 400 
liters of water. 
(…) 
Masculine voice: … The municipalities don’t have forecasts. The city people 
have forecasts, but the forecasts don’t function for the (hinterland) municipalities. 
There is a need for more accurate studies, certainly over a more extended time-
frame. A question for you: has there been any change in relation to infrastructure, 
we are curious… what has been upgraded at FUNCEME in terms of latest 
technology, in order to give FUNCEME the capacity for improved precision, or 
for improved monitoring? And what is still needed, and how much will it cost 
the state? 
Namir: Well, we have eleven meteorological stations from the 1960s, which 
belonged and still belong to the National Institute of Meteorology. That was all 
we had in Ceará, and we have a network of pluviometers owned by SUDENE, 
and beginning in 1974 FUNCEME begun to set up its own network. This was all 
we had. Today seventy-nine, if I am not mistaken, automatic meteorological 
stations are being installed throughout the whole state, twenty have already been 
installed and the rest will be installed by the end of the year. The cost has been 
almost six million reais, funded by the World Bank. And [we also have] 
computers, radars, satellite images generated every thirty minutes, we receive 
images from an European satellite every half hour, we are the only place in Brazil 
that gets an update every half hour; we have a station to receive satellite images 
from NOAA, an American one, which has a low orbit and passes over us four, 
five times a day and so we can get a radiograph of what is occurring in Ceará.. 
Mathematical models are run through INPE supercomputers in São Paulo, and 
in the United States and Europe, and we have agreements with institutions in 
Brazil and internationally. So all this has equipped us with the tools for better 
forecasting… but meteorology is more than that, now we require, with these 
stations, with the new historical series of data, and with continuous scientific 
developments… I used to always comment on what happens in the United 
States: they make forecasts, especially weather forecasts, with great precision, not 
because they are better than we are, but because of loses of one billion dollars 
per week, that is, fifty-five billion dollars per year, due to climate effects, due to 
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tornados, hurricanes, droughts, storms, snow, deserts, so they make heavy 
investments into meteorology. And they have been studying their climate for 
over one hundred years, while we in Ceará have been doing it for ten years, using 
data generated by the INMET stations from the 1960s on, therefore with poor 
data. Even though the pluviometric stations measure the total monthly 
precipitation with precision, the daily measurement is complicated, usually an 
individual makes a visit once a day to check the situation and to call us, we have 
observed that it usually rains more on Mondays than on Saturdays and Sundays, 
so it seems that the individual usually lets the water accumulate throughout the 
weekend and then sends the data on Monday as a total, and that affects the 
quality of daily measurements. So, in terms of equipment we are fine, the 
situation has improved a lot, there are now investments by the state in 
partnership with the federal government, but in terms of data and the evolution 
of science we will have to wait a little longer. 
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Appendix C: Stakeholders in the Jaguaribe Valley water allocation meetings 
 
Stakeholders Usual location in 
the basins 
Main pattern of seminar 
participation 
Usual rivals in the allocation 
process 
Usual allies in 
the allocation 
process 
Relative power in the allocation 
process 
Water distribution 
companies, either 
municipal (SAAEs) or 
state owned 
(CAGECEs) 
All sites. Every 
municipality has 
either a SAAE or 
CAGECE. Most 
are located 
downstream from 
the reservoirs, 
alongside the river. 
Tend to favor higher rates 
of water release, but with 
limits, so that future years’ 
water supply remains 
guaranteed. 
All stakeholders that oppose water 
release (vazanteiros – see below, and 
fishery associations). These 
stakeholders usually complain about 
unregulated water usage (between the 
reservoir and the municipality limits 
of which they are part) when it causes 
water shortage for the municipality. 
Barriers in the river also cause 
problems for these stakeholders, so 
they tend to press for good riverbed 
maintenance. 
Users located 
downstream 
along the river, 
but with limits in 
their support. 
They tend to 
worry about 
future years’ 
water supply for 
the 
municipalities. 
Greatest power is held by users, since 
their priority is guaranteed by law. 
Representatives of their institutions have 
their own infrastructure for participation 
(transportation, communication 
facilities, etc.), which improves the 
effectiveness of their political 
participation in the process. Many 
SAAE sponsor public campaigns against 
the privatization of water distribution 
services. Since most of these individuals 
are technicians, technical language is not 
a problem for them. 
Associations related to 
public irrigated 
perimeters 
DIJA and Morada 
Nova located 
downstream; Icó-
Lima Campos 
Irrigation Project 
located upstream. 
If downstream, tend to 
fight for the release of 
water; if upstream (i.e. 
around reservoirs), tend to 
fight for lower release rates. 
Downstream projects: vazanteiros 
(small farmers who farm the 
reservoir’s lands) and fishery 
associations. Occasionally private and 
public irrigators may clash.  This 
depends on who is located closer to 
the reservoir and gets the water from 
the river first. 
COGERH and 
EMATERCE 
technicians and 
private irrigators. 
Downstream 
projects: other 
actors who favor 
higher rates of 
water release. 
Medium to high power, due to support 
from COGERH and EMATERCE 
technicians. Many of these associations 
don’t have any infrastructure 
(transportation, communication), and 
depend on the support provided by 
other stakeholders. Most of the time, 
public irrigators have difficulties with 
the technical language used in the 
seminars, which may represent a 
political disadvantage. 
Associations related to 
privately irrigated 
properties 
Downstream from 
the reservoirs, 
(except for those 
located in Orós and 
Iguatú, Alto 
Jaguaribe).  
If downstream, tend to 
fight for the release of 
water; if upstream, tend to 
fight for lower release rates.
Downstream irrigators: vazanteiros 
(small farmers who farm the 
reservoir’s lands) and fishery 
associations. Occasionally private and 
public irrigators may clash. This 
depends on who is located closer to 
the reservoir and gets the water from 
the river first. 
Downstream 
irrigators; other 
actors who favor 
higher rates of 
water release. 
Medium to high power, since they have 
interests that are aligned with public 
irrigators (in terms of water release), and 
have good infrastructure to participate 
in the political process. Technical 
language is less a problem for them than 
that for public irrigators. 
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Stakeholders Usual location in 
the basins 
Main pattern of seminar 
participation 
Usual rivals in the allocation 
process 
Usual allies in 
the allocation 
process 
Relative power in the allocation 
process 
Vazanteiros – small 
farmers that work on 
the reservoir lands 
Reservoirs lands 
that are uncovered 
by lowering water 
levels. 
When the reservoir is full, 
they press for water release, 
so that reservoir land can 
be made available to them. 
When the level of the 
reservoir is low, they tend 
to strongly oppose the 
release of water, as water 
access tends to become too 
far from their fields and the 
cost of water transportation 
(through pumps) increases. 
All users who press for water 
liberation. 
Fishery 
associations, 
church groups, 
and community 
associations from 
the reservoir 
area.  
Little power. Along with the fishermen, 
these are the poorest members of the 
commission, lacking any resources in 
terms of infrastructure. Many 
vazanteiros do not attend the seminar 
for lack of transportation. Technical 
language is a strong barrier. The support 
of church groups and community 
associations tends to significantly 
enhance this group’s power. 
Representatives of 
rural workers unions  
There is no 
geographical 
pattern of location 
for these associates. 
These unions 
represent all kinds 
of small producers 
– those who work 
in rain-fed fields, 
on reservoir lands, 
or on small 
irrigated areas. 
Don’t have a clear pattern 
of participation. 
Geographical location is 
key factor. They are open 
to influence by other actors 
connected to the unions – 
public irrigators, 
vazanteiros or fishermen – 
depending on who attends 
the seminar. 
If downstream, those who oppose the 
release of water; if upstream, the 
opposite. 
If downstream, 
those who favor 
the liberation of 
water; if 
upstream, the 
opposite. 
Medium power due to the fact that 
several commission members are 
representatives of these unions. 
Nevertheless, it is not rare for them to 
act against each other in the seminar. 
Fishing associations On the reservoirs. Tend to oppose any water 
release: the lower the 
reservoir level, the poorer 
the water quality. This 
decreases the amount of 
fish. 
All users who press for water release. Vazanteiros, 
church groups, 
and community 
associations from 
the reservoir 
areas. 
Little power. Fishermen are poorer than 
vazanteiros and are harshly exploited by 
middlemen. They lack resources in 
terms of infrastructure. Many fishermen 
do not attend the seminar because of 
lack of transportation. Technical 
language is also a strong barrier. The 
support received from church groups 
and community associations tends to 
significantly enhance the power of this 
group. 
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Stakeholders Usual location in 
the basins 
Main pattern of seminar 
participation 
Usual rivals in the allocation 
process 
Usual allies in 
the allocation 
process 
Relative power in the allocation 
process 
Industries Mainly around 
Fortaleza, and to a 
much lesser degree, 
in the Lower 
Jaguaribe sub-basin. 
Tend to be absent 
in the Jaguaribe-
Banabuiú seminar. 
Tend to fight for the 
release of water from 
reservoirs. 
Vazanteiros, fishery associations, 
church groups and community 
associations from reservoir areas. 
All users who 
press for water 
release. 
High power, due to the privilege given 
to them by state law (industry ranks 
higher than agriculture for water use 
priorities), due to the government’s 
political decision to privilege Fortaleza 
in terms of water availability, and due to 
the high level of political articulation by 
its members (with developed 
infrastructure, communication 
apparatus, etc.).  
Representatives of 
COGERH 
- COGERH’s technicians 
(who are members of the 
seminar) tend to support 
public irrigation and also to 
support other actors 
considered underprivileged 
in the political process. 
Officially neutral Officially neutral Most powerful stakeholder. COGERH 
controls all activities of the seminar, 
including the range of possibilities for 
water allocation. They also set the tone 
for the technicality (language) of the 
seminar. See seminar activity description 
below. 
Representatives of 
EMATERCE 
More or less equally 
distributed around 
the valley.  
EMATERCE’s technicians 
tend to support public 
irrigation and to also 
support other actors 
considered underprivileged 
in the political process. 
Officially neutral Officially neutral Medium to high power. EMATERCE’s 
technicians tend to pay more attention 
to technical details. Due to their 
proximity to small farmers and 
vazanteiros, they sometimes act in 
support of these stakeholders. 
Representatives of 
municipal 
governments 
More or less equally 
distributed around 
the valley. 
Participation is based on 
geographic location and 
position in the municipal 
government. Usually, 
representatives of the 
executive power will fight 
for water supply for the 
municipality; while 
representatives of the 
legislative power will most 
likely fight according to 
local political interests. 
Executive power: Conflicts with 
private irrigators abound. They 
usually complain about unregulated 
water usage between the reservoir and 
the municipality, of which it forms 
part, when it causes water shortage. 
River barriers are also a problem for 
them, so they tend to press for good 
riverbed maintenance. Legislative 
power: will defend either party 
interests or political groups with 
which they are associated.  
Executive: 
SAAEs and 
CAGECEs. 
Legislative: 
Varies from 
private irrigators 
and companies 
to small farmers 
and vazanteiros. 
High power, as they have priority 
according to the law (human 
consumption is of first priority), they 
have access to infrastructure that 
facilitates their participation 
(transportation and communication – 
they usually offer representatives of 
disadvantaged groups help with 
transportation if it is of their political 
interest), and they have a good 
command of technical language. 
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Stakeholders Usual location in 
the basins 
Main pattern of seminar 
participation 
Usual rivals in the allocation 
process 
Usual allies in 
the allocation 
process 
Relative power in the allocation 
process 
Group representatives 
related to the church 
More or less equally 
distributed around 
the valley – 
stronger groups are 
found in Lower and 
Mid Jaguaribe. 
Tend to act in favor of 
disadvantaged groups. 
No defined rival, but they are usually 
opposed to the privileges given to 
large landowners (private irrigators) 
and industries. 
Community 
associations 
Little power, since they only have two 
seats. However, they are able to 
mobilize people and exert crowd 
pressure upon voting members. 
Community 
associations 
More or less equally 
distributed around 
the valley. 
Tend to represent and act 
in favor of disadvantaged 
groups. Representatives of 
communities located 
around reservoirs will fight 
for lower rates of release, 
and representatives of 
communities far from the 
reservoir will press for 
higher rates of release. 
No defined rival, but they are usually 
opposed to the privileges given to 
large landowners (private irrigators) 
and industries. 
Church groups Little de juris power, since they have few 
seats. As with the church groups, the 
weight of the associations lies in their 
ability to mobilize people and exert 
crowd pressure upon voting members. 
 
 
 
 
 
